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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1 Introduction 
The majority of instruments employed to evaluate business tax policies leave open the 
issue of micro-level heterogeneity. At the same time, heterogeneous effects of tax poli-
cies on individual firms and their aggregate revenue implications turn out to be im-
portant. The viability of reform proposals is highly dependent on expected revenue con-
sequences because governments face budget constraints. Revenue effects must also be 
considered if different reform proposals are to be compared. Moreover, the predicted 
effects on certain types of firms and industries also play a role.  
It thus makes much sense to extend the range of analytical instruments available for 
corporate tax policy analysis with a simulation model designed to account for the full 
distribution of firms and the associated micro-level heterogeneity. Based on such broad 
assessment, tax policy effects for aggregate tax revenue and firm-specific tax burdens 
can be derived.  
This concept is generally referred to as microsimulation. It has already been tried 
numerous times and is well-proven for tax-benefit analyses relating to the household 
sector. However, it is rather new to corporate tax policy analysis. One of the first corpo-
rate tax microsimulation models publicly documented and made available for applied 
tax policy analysis was developed by Reister (2009) and Reister et al. (2008) at the Cen-
tre for European Economic Research (ZEW Mannheim).  
In this dissertation, the microsimulation model developed at ZEW Mannheim, the 
ZEW TaxCoMM, will be enhanced by incorporating the behavioral responses of firms 
to corporate taxes. A wealth of theory and empirical evidence shows that taxable corpo-
rate income is elastic with respect to tax rates. Any appraisal of tax reform effects ignor-
ing the implications of firm behavior is therefore incomplete. Only with behavioral re-
sponses included will the model be able to evaluate tax reform effects beyond mere first 
round implications. The contribution of this dissertation is thus to significantly extend 
4 Introduction Chapter 1 
 
the scope of analysis of the microsimulation. It adds to create a simulation approach 
which can provide valuable insight and a better understanding of the consequences of 
business tax reforms.  
In this dissertation, the behavioral algorithms of ZEW TaxCoMM are developed and 
finally applied. Model parameterization is thus a key issue. A broad literature investi-
gates the effects of taxes on business behavior. As a consequence, empirical evidence 
on the size of the tax distortions abounds. There is often more than one plausible elastic-
ity estimate in the large number of disparate studies, depending on countries, time, and 
methodological approach. The selective use of model parameters can thus be a weak-
ness of empirical models (Steiner, 2008). For this reason, comprehensive meta-analyses 
are conducted for the purpose of model parameterization. 
The meta-analyses presented in this dissertation synthesize the evidence obtained 
from 2,167 primary estimates of the various tax effects on business behavior. They, re-
spectively, refer to the tax impact on foreign direct investment, capital structure choice, 
and profit shifting behavior. Conceptually, meta-analysis is a form of quantitative litera-
ture survey. It relies on econometric methods to systematically identify the quantitative 
impact of explicit or implicit choices of study design on the obtained empirical evi-
dence. Consequently, each meta-study presented in this dissertation stands on its own 
and contributes to the surveyed strand of literature. It offers “specific reasons, based on 
the studies themselves, why the evidence on a certain question may appear contradicto-
ry or overly varied” (Stanley, 2001: 132). With the insights gained from the meta-
analyses, the plausible response intensities for the modeled behavioral margins are pre-
dicted and employed to parameterize the behavioral algorithms of the microsimulation 
model.  
Finally, the functioning of the enhanced model is tested and illustrated by applying it to 
one of the most prevalent topics in corporate tax policy analysis: tax harmonization in 
the European Union. In March 2011, the European Commission renewed its ambitions 
to harmonize company taxation within the European Union by publishing a draft Coun-
cil Directive for a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB). Among other 
things, this draft directive governs a harmonized definition of the corporate income tax 
base. We will evaluate the impact of the European Commission’s proposal on German 
firms and aggregate German tax revenue. The role of behavioral adjustments to this 
hypothetical reform will be particularly highlighted.  
Chapter 1 Introduction 5 
 
 
The dissertation is structured according to the key issues raised above. Part II of the 
dissertation is focused on the incorporation of firm behavior into the model. Chapter 2 
will briefly explain the overall concept of ZEW TaxCoMM. The model compares a 
benchmark scenario with one or more counter-factual reform scenarios. Scenarios are 
defined with respect to the tax law in effect. Under the benchmark scenario, the simula-
tion computes firm-specific tax burdens according to the tax law of a pre-defined status 
quo. The reform scenario considers a modified tax law. Modifications might refer to 
statutory tax rates or the tax base definition of the major taxes levied on corporations in 
Germany: the corporate income tax including solidarity surcharge, and the local trade 
tax. 
Chapter 3 develops the behavioral algorithms for ZEW TaxCoMM. We take into ac-
count behavioral responses to tax reform at five margins of decision which are known to 
be the central components of the aggregate tax base elasticity. The model simulates be-
havioral responses of corporate debt policy, marginal investment decisions, and profit 
shifting activity. The long-term effects of the tax impact on the discrete choices of loca-
tion and legal form are implemented at the aggregate level. The behavioral algorithms 
are designed in a way that corresponds to standard microeconomic conceptions of opti-
mal firm behavior.    
In Part III of this dissertation, the focus will be on the quantitative meta-analyis of 
primary empirical evicence on the size of the essential tax distortions.  
Chapter 4 explains the econometric framework of classical meta-analysis and meta-
regression. Classical meta-analysis computes precision-weighted means of the reported 
tax effects, uniformly scaled according to a common effect size index, and tests for the 
significance of the genuine effect. In a meta-regression analysis, the reported effect size 
index, often a regression parameter, is regressed on a set of (mostly) dummy variable 
predictors which represent differences in method, design and data used by the primary 
estimation.  
Chapter 5 presents a meta-analysis on the relationship between foreign direct invest-
ment and company taxation. The scientific interest in international tax competition has 
considerably increased since harmonization efforts in Europe have intensified, but also 
due to rising capital mobility in the last thirty years. The empirical literature has conse-
quently grown heavily in recent years leading to an abundance of empirical studies that 
consider the impact of taxation on patterns of capital mobility. We update and methodo-
logically extend former meta-analyses on FDI and taxation. The precision weighted 
6 Introduction Chapter 1 
 
average tax semi-elasticity of FDI based on 704 primary estimates is 2.55 in absolute 
terms.  
Chapter 6 puts forward a meta-study investigating the tax effect on corporate capital 
structure. The study fills a gap in the literature because it quantitatively examines the 
factors which determine the high variation and disagreements in the empirical evidence 
on this issue. For this purpose, we extract 1,143 point estimates of the marginal tax ef-
fect on the debt ratio out of 46 studies. Synthesizing the evidence by means of meta-
regression analyses, we conclude that the tax impact on debt is indeed substantial. Our 
results suggest that, in particular, the tax rate proxy used for identification determines 
the outcome of primary analyses. Accounting for all potential misspecification biases, 
we predict a positive marginal tax effect on the debt ratio of 0.3. 
Chapter 7 quantitatively reviews the distinct strands of empirical research dealing 
with different strategies of multinationals to shift affiliate profits to low-tax jurisdic-
tions. Surprisingly, no attempt has yet been made to systematically compare the distinct 
shifting channels with regard to their economic significance. The meta-analysis covers 
40 studies on corporate profit shifting behavior. Based on the meta-regressions, the 
semi-elasticity of profit with regard to shifting incentives amounts to -1.71. The predict-
ed semi-elasticity of EBIT is -1.28. Furthermore, we find some tentative evidence that 
the volume of shifted tax bases is, to a large extent, i.e. approx. 80%, driven by firms’ 
inter-company transactions.  
Part IV of this dissertation brings together the behavioral algorithms developed in Part 
I and the information on the values of the behavioral response intensities obtained from 
the meta-analyses in Part II of the dissertation. The functioning of the model is tested 
and illustrated by applying it to one of the most prevalent topics in corporate tax policy 
analysis: tax harmonization in the European Union. 
Chapter 8 explains how the behavioral algorithms of ZEW TaxCoMM are parameter-
ized. While household microsimulation models exploit sample data for the purpose of 
model parameterization, the parameterization of ZEW TaxCoMM will be based on prior 
information on the response elasticities. The simulation sample covers three years and is 
a purely national dataset. The variation in tax rates would thus be insufficient to produce 
reliable estimates of the behavioral response elasticities. In view of the abundant empir-
ical literature and the sophisticated meta-analyses in Part II, we conclude that the possi-
ble advantage of exploiting direct sample information is outweighed by the high quality 
of prior knowledge.  
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Finally, Chapter 9 provides evidence on the impact of the harmonized corporate tax 
base definition, as proposed by the European Commission (2011), on German firms and 
aggregate German tax revenue. Our simulation shows that, in the economic environ-
ment of the period from 2005 to 2007, a switch from current German tax law to the pro-
posed harmonized tax base definition, in the short term and without considering the 
behavioral response of firms, would reduce aggregate tax revenue of the corporate in-
come tax incl. solidarity surcharge, and the trade tax by 8.6%. This effect is mainly due 
to a massive frontload of tax depreciation allowances. Plausibly assuming that the Ger-
man government follows a balanced budget rule and adjusts the corporate income tax 
rate, we investigate the behavioral responses of firms to this supposedly revenue-neutral 
reform. The simulation results show that the behavioral responses of firms would pre-
vent the reform from being effectively revenue-neutral. By contrast, considering the 
short term responses of corporate debt policies, marginal investment and profit shifting 
activity, aggregate tax revenue is simulated to decline by 1.2% relative to the bench-
mark levels under the current German tax regime. Taking a deeper look into the future, 
the tax revenue would decrease by 1.9%. If we, in addition, simulate the responses in 
the location decisions of multinational firms and also account for the reform’s impact on 
the decision to incorporate, the behavior induced loss of tax revenue collected from the 
corporate share of business could rise to -7%. The simulated behavioral adjustments of 
firms imply a behavioral tax base elasticity of  -0.1 in the very short term and, depend-
ing on the considered response margins, of -0.2 to -0.6 in the long-term. This is fully in 
line with the existing empirical evidence on the aggregate tax base elasticity.  
Chapter 10 in Part V presents a summary and a brief outlook on possible future re-
search directions. 
  
Note that Chapter 5 draws upon Feld and Heckemeyer (2011). Chapter 6 is based on 
Feld, Heckemeyer and Overesch (2011). The enhancement of the microsimulation mod-
el and, in particular, the simulation analysis in Chapter 9 is based on joint efforts with 
Katharina Finke. 
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Chapter 2 
The ZEW TaxCoMM 
2 The ZEW TaxCoMM 
2.1 Introduction 
Economists have long since analyzed the distortions which taxation creates in business 
decisions. Empirical analyses, inter alia, rely on the neoclassical investment theory 
(Jorgenson, 1963; Hall and Jorgenson, 1967; Devereux and Griffith, 1999, 2003), use 
sophisticated model firm approaches (Spengel, 1995) or they disclose the tax influence 
on cost-benefit trade-offs underlying corporate financing choices (Modigliani and Mil-
ler, 1963; Graham, 1996a, 1999). Experience from recent business tax reforms, howev-
er, shows that ex-ante reform appraisals based on such approaches were, in a sense, in-
complete. In particular, they lacked a well-founded assessment of the consequences for 
aggregate tax revenue and, at the micro-level, the characteristics of reform winners and 
losers.1   
For this reason, we develop a new approach and employ micro-level accounting data 
in order to calculate firm-specific taxes due under different tax policy scenarios. Using a 
micro-based simulation approach, we are able to quantify tax reform consequences for a 
business population of firms which, according to their economic, financial and tax sta-
tus, may be affected by tax policy in very different ways. The geographical focus of the 
microsimulation model, which we call ZEW TaxCoMM, is currently restricted to Ger-
many. In principle, however, the approach could be generalized to cover a variety of 
countries. In this chapter, we will introduce the overall concept of the microsimulation 
model (Section 2.2), the main logic of its tax assessment algorithms (Section 2.3) and 
put it into perspective with related approaches (Section 2.4). 
                                                 
1  For example, in the run-up to the 2008 business tax reform in Germany, revenue effects were only 
roughly evaluated but prominently discussed. See, for example, Bundestag Printed Paper 16/4841. 
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2.2 The Overall Concept of the Model 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the overall concept of ZEW TaxCoMM. The model compares a 
benchmark scenario with one or more counter-factual reform scenarios. Scenarios are 
defined with respect to the tax law in effect. Under the benchmark scenario, the simula-
tion computes firm-specific tax burdens according to the tax law of a pre-defined status 
quo. The reform scenario considers a modified tax law. Modifications might refer to 
statutory tax rates or the tax base definition of the major taxes levied on corporations in 
Germany: the corporate income tax including solidarity surcharge, and the local trade 
tax. The comparative analysis between the benchmark and the tax reform scenario pro-
ceeds in two steps.  
Figure 2.1: Overall Concept of the ZEW TaxCoMM Micro-Simulation Model 
 
In the first step, ZEW TaxCoMM accounts for the effects arising immediately from the 
modification of the tax legislation, holding the accounting input data and, thus, the re-
flected economic activity of firms constant. We denote these effects as “first round” 
effects. In a second step, the economic activity of firms is simulated to respond to the 
reform, and the input data is accordingly adjusted. The simulated effects on the tax base 
and revenue are now denoted by the term “second round” effects. According to this un-
derstanding, first and second round effects do not necessarily differ with respect to the 
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time dimension considered, but with respect to whether firm behavior is taken into ac-
count.  
In both steps of the analysis, the tax due is assessed for each firm. The firm-specific 
simulation results can be aggregated up to an industry or the overall national level. 
2.3 The Simulation of the First Round Effects of Tax Reforms 
The author of this dissertation has contributed to the conception and programming of 
the tax assessment procedures required for the first round analysis (Reister, 2009; 
Reister et al, 2008; Finke et al., 2010).  However, the conceptual work on this first stage 
of analysis is not an integral part of this dissertation. For clarity, the intuition of the 
simulation will be briefly explained.  
ZEW TaxCoMM uses firm-specific financial accounting data taken from the 
DAFNE database, which is provided by Bureau van Dijk. DAFNE contains detailed 
financial information on 900.000 German corporations for the years from 1999 to 2010. 
The model requires a balanced firm data panel over three years. The financial data is 
complemented by data from additional sources provided by the Federal Statistical Of-
fice on municipal business tax rates and survey data on German tax accounting practice 
(Reister, 2009). The survey was conducted among executive certified tax consultants 
and certified public accountants, and investigated the tax accounting practice in the 
fields of applied depreciation methods, loss-offsetting patterns and the valuation of 
goodwill, accrued/deferred items or provisions. Insights gained from this survey have, 
in addition to a careful consideration of all relevant tax and commercial law provisions, 
contributed to approximate and finally overcome the gap between financial and tax ac-
counting.  
ZEW TaxCoMM starts, for each firm in each simulation year, from the reported 
profit on ordinary activities. Adjustments of ordinary profit take into account differ-
ences between financial and tax accounting schemes. For that purpose, the model refers 
directly to profit and loss accounts or simulates required information on the basis of 
balance sheet data. Generally, the simulation procedure follows a modular structure. 
Each module is attributed to one distinct item which needs to be modified for tax pur-
poses. This structure easily adapts to different tax policy scenarios. A general descrip-
tion of the tax assessment algorithms is provided in a separate technical documentation 
(Reister, 2009; Reister et al., 2008).  
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The model’s tax assessment procedures bring in line reported balance sheet data with 
periodical flows. These flows enter the firm’s profit and loss account and are assessed 
for tax purposes. The assessment exploits and never contradicts all available infor-
mation from financial statements. It consistently traces firm-level developments over 
the simulation period of three assessment years. The main idea is to think of balance 
sheet carrying amounts as displaying a certain generational structure, in terms of layers 
which have been acquired at different points in time. The tax base consequence of, for 
example, a change in depreciation rates on periodical depreciation amounts, can only be 
assessed assuming a certain generational structure of the depreciated assets. The true 
generations of assets are, however, unobserved. It therefore seems plausible that, e.g., 
fixed movable assets are assumed to have been acquired continuously. The inferred 
generational structure of assets allows adjusting the depreciation of newly acquired as-
sets in each of the three simulation periods to any type of tax law scenario. The same 
idea applies to the inference of current appropriations to provisions. These can also be 
brought in line with observed provision carrying amounts in the balance sheet. Again, 
appropriations are generally assumed to occur continuously. If there are differences in 
recognition2 or measurement3 between financial and tax accounting, the inferred flows 
are adjusted for the assessment of the tax base. 
After it all, we simulate taxable profit for each firm in each of the three assessment 
years. We thereby account for all relevant tax regulations governing, for example, the 
treatment of interest expenses (add-backs for trade tax purposes, deduction limits under 
the German earnings stripping rule), integrated fiscal units, and tax exempt income (for-
eign permanent establishments, dividend income). The tax base is obtained by deduct-
ing available tax-loss carry-forwards according to the loss-offset regulation of the ana-
lyzed tax policy scenario. By applying the prevailing tax rates, the final tax due can be 
computed for each individual firm.  
ZEW TaxCoMM’s capacity to approximate the true tax base of firms was thoroughly 
validated based on accounting data, tax statistics, and tax law as of 2004. The validation 
was based on a two-step comparison of the model’s tax assessment results with infor-
mation from official German tax statistics.4 First, firms were classified according to 
                                                 
2  Provisions for maintenance deferred by more than three months are only recognized for financial but 
not for tax accounting purposes.  
3 For example, specific provisions for warranty obligations are discounting at a rate of 5.5% according 
to German tax law. They remain undiscounted for financial accounting purposes.  
4 See Reister et al., 2008. 
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type of industry and turnover size. The simulation sample was extrapolated by multiply-
ing each firm within the distinct industry-turnover classes with a factor obtained from 
comparing, for each class, the number of firms in the sample with the turnover statistics 
for corporate firms (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2006). While the simulation sample is 
statistically not representative, this method can smooth out structural biases of our sam-
ple, in particular any potential overrepresentation of large firms.5 
Subsequently, we counted the number of firms in clusters defined by industry and 
gross taxable corporate income in the extrapolated sample. If the tax assessment algo-
rithms work without any severe bias, the number of firms must, respectively for each 
cluster defined by industry and taxable income, match with the number of firms dis-
played in the corporate income tax statistics. This was indeed the case.6 We conclude 
that the tax assessment generally works without systematic error. This should also hold 
true for future applications of the model because its conception and functioning remain 
unaffected by changes in tax law parameters.   
2.4 The ZEW TaxCoMM in Perspective 
The appeal of microsimulation modeling is already acknowledged by Orcutt et al. 
(1976). As microsimulation models process data on a vast number of economic units, 
they can provide a broad basis for the ex-ante assessment of the effects from policy re-
forms. While numerous microsimulation models focus on private households (for sur-
veys with a focus on Germany, see Wagenhals, 2004 or Peichl, 2005), the number of 
models referring to firm data is still limited. Besides the ZEW TaxCoMM approach, 
two sophisticated micro-simulation models concerned with the evaluation of corporate 
tax policy are publicly documented.  
The Italian DIECOFIS project developed a corporate micro-simulation model under 
the aegis of the Italian statistical office ISTAT (Castellucci et al., 2003; Oropallo and 
Parisi, 2005). The DIECOFIS model represents a one-periodic approach based on cross-
sectional financial accounting data. The statistically representative dataset (29,196 cor-
porations, reporting year 2000) underlying the DIECOFIS model has been assembled 
from numerous sources comprising published financial statements and survey data on 
Italian firms. In order to simulate the corporate tax burden of companies, the given fi-
                                                 
5 Note that the same extrapolation procedure is applied to corporate balance sheet statistics by the Ger-
man Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1998). 
6 For details, please refer again to Reister et al., 2008. 
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nancial accounting data are first transformed into tax data. Subsequently, the firm-
specific corporate income is computed in detail and multiplied by the statutory corpo-
rate income tax rate.  
Similar to the DIECOFIS model, the ZEW TaxCoMM uses financial accounting data 
as a primary input because access to highly detailed firm-level tax accounts is restricted 
for confidentiality reasons. An additional obstacle to the use of primary tax data is that 
the official disaggregate statistics are only published in three-year intervals. We there-
fore take advantage of the fact that tax accounts are linked to much more accessible 
financial statements through the so-called German authoritative principle.7 More pre-
cisely, we use the operating profit as a nexus between the financial and the tax account-
ing sphere and adjust it, when necessary, for tax purposes.  
Another sophisticated corporate tax microsimulation model besides DIECOFIS and 
ZEW TaxCoMM is put forward by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW). 
The model is called BizTax. It differs from the ZEW TaxCoMM mainly in regard to the 
employed data. Meanwhile, a common feature is its exclusive focus on Germany: Biz-
Tax has been primarily designed to evaluate selected aspects of the German corporate 
tax reform of 2008 (Bach et al., 2007, 2008). It is based on a statistically representative 
firm-level dataset sampled from official individual local trade tax and income tax files 
for the year 2001. The input data is updated to the year 2008 (or further, if required) by 
means of yearly turnover tax statistics. Despite the far-reaching data update, BizTax is a 
one-periodic simulation model based on cross-sectional data. The available tax data 
restricts the simulation of reform-induced changes in the tax base to lump-sum adjust-
ments of benchmark profits. 
Notwithstanding some consistencies, ZEW TaxCoMM presents features which dis-
tinguish it from DIECOFIS and BizTax. ZEW TaxCoMM simulates a multi-periodic 
tax assessment, covering three consecutive years under each analyzed policy scenario. 
The multi-periodic framework enables the model to capture the effects from dynamic 
features of the tax code, such as depreciation patterns or loss-offset regulation. Further-
more, with the enhancements introduced in this dissertation, the model considers behav-
ioral responses of firms to changes in tax legislation. The integration of behavioral re-
sponses extends the scope of analysis beyond mere first round reform effects. To the 
best of our knowledge, there exists only one behavioral corporate tax microsimulation 
                                                 
7  See Schoen (2005) for an introduction and a discussion of the linkage between the computation of 
corporate taxable income and the profit an loss statement in the financial accounts under German law.    
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model. The model, CorpSim, is put forward by Creedy and Gemmell (2009, 2010). The 
model is, however, of limited use for the detailed evaluation of tax policy reforms 
broadly altering the tax base definition (see Section 3.2.2). After all, we consider ZEW 
TaxCoMM the first sophisticated corporate tax micro-simulation model designed for 
second round tax policy evaluation.  
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Chapter 3 
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Reform 
3 Extension of ZEW TaxCoMM: Behavioral Responses to Tax Reform  
3.1 Decomposing the Aggregate Tax Base Elasticity 
Theory and empirical evidence suggest that taxable corporate income is elastic with 
respect to tax rates, yet, a careful look at the literature reveals that there still is no clear 
consensus about the size of the aggregate tax elasticity of taxable corporate income. 
Clausing (2007), Brill and Hassett (2007) and Devereux (2007a) put forward empirical 
analyses based on aggregate OECD data. According to this literature, the top of the cor-
porate income tax Laffer curve is reached if the corporate income tax rate ranges around 
30%. At this point, the aggregate tax base elasticity takes on a value of -1. Hence, ag-
gregate revenue from corporate income taxation would be irresponsive to a change in 
tax rates because any such change induces an inversely proportional change of the cor-
porate income tax base. According to this evidence, high taxing countries like the Unit-
ed States or Germany should find themselves on top or on the decreasing segment of the 
Laffer curve, with elasticity values equal to or less than -1. This conclusion is, however, 
not corroborated by recent studies based on more disaggregate industry-level data. For 
the United States, Gruber and Rauh (2007) report an elasticity of taxable corporate in-
come with respect to the effective marginal tax rate of -0.2. For Germany, Dwenger and 
Steiner (2008) document an elasticity of about -0.5. According to these results, both 
countries are clearly on the rising segment of the Laffer curve.  
Despite the heterogeneous empirical evidence on the size of the aggregate tax base 
response, any appraisal of tax reform consequences ignoring the implications of firm 
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behavior would be incomplete. By definition, a micro-based modeling approach should 
thus try to account for the tax base effects which run via the behavioral responses at 
various corporate tax margins. We will therefore decompose the aggregate tax base re-
sponse into partial elasticities associated with the distinct behavioral tax margins of the 
firm. Then, we will simulate the responses “bottom-up” from the micro-level.  
Formally, the aggregate semi-elasticity of taxable corporate income, e, is known to 
decompose into five parts (De Mooij and Ederveen, 2008): 
N D N INV M PS F LOC OFe w e w e w e w e e      (3.1) 
where De  represents the marginal tax effect on the debt ratio of the firm while the other 
response intensities, measured as semi-elasticities, refer to, respectively, the response in 
the marginal investment distortion ( INVe ), multinational profit shifting ( PSe ),  the infra-
marginal effect on location choices ( LOCe ) and the choice of organizational form ( OFe ). 
The variables Nw  , Mw and Fw represent, respectively, the share of normal return on 
equity in the total corporate tax base, the share of profits made by multinationals, and 
the share of assets owned by multinationals. As the ZEW TaxCoMM is based on a sam-
ple of firm-level data, these shares will be implicit in the simulation and do not have to 
be set exogenously.  
3.2 Behavioral Responses to Tax Reform: Related Modeling Approaches 
Given that we are breaking new ground in the implementation of behavioral responses 
into a corporate tax microsimulation model, we will seek inspiration in related modeling 
approaches. In different contexts and fields of research, economic agents’ behavioral 
response to tax is captured in behavioral household microsimulation models (see Sec-
tion 3.2.1), in a behavioral corporate microsimulation framework put forward by Creedy 
and Gemmell (2009, 2010) (see Section 3.2.2), and in computable general equilibrium 
frameworks with a focus on tax policy analysis (see Section 3.2.3). Some microeconom-
ic principles of firm behavior which can, to some extent, guide the incorporation of be-
havioral responses in ZEW TaxCoMM will also be discussed (see Section 3.2.4). The 
considerations in this Section 3.2 will guide the basic modeling choices made in Section 
3.3. 
3.2.1 Behavioral Household Microsimulation Models 
The aim of household tax-benefit microsimulation modeling is very similar to what mo-
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tivates corporate tax microsimulation, i.e. the ex-ante evaluation of relevant policy re-
form proposals (Harding, 1996; Gupta and Kapur, 2000). These models use a detailed 
representation of a tax system and they are also based on micro data. The main differ-
ence is, evidently, that household microsimulation models are concerned with house-
hold and/or individuals instead of firms. 
There are various realizations of tax-benefit household microsimulation models 
which are used for empirical analysis of the impacts of taxes, social security contribu-
tions, and transfers on the income and labor supply of private households.8 Household 
microsimulation models may differ with respect to whether analyses are performed up-
on a population of agents at a given point in time (static models) or whether agents are 
subject to dynamic aging. Furthermore, independent of their static or dynamic nature, 
household microsimulation models vary in the way they integrate agents’ behavioral 
responses to policy reforms. Microeconomic theory suggests that changes in tax-benefit 
regimes affect factor supply, factor demand, and the demand for goods. By far the most 
commonly modeled response margin in household microsimulation is the labor supply 
response (for a discussion, see Peichl, 2005). Microeconomic labor supply functions are 
estimated directly on the basis of the simulation data sample. In some cases, the regres-
sion equations are of reduced form; more structural models (e.g. the STSM model put 
forward by ZEW (Jacobebbinghaus and Steiner, 2003; Clauss and Schubert, 2009) or 
the FiFoSiM put forward by Fuest, Peichl and Schaefer (2005) refer to an explicitly 
modeled household utility function.9 
The reform-induced responses of factor demand are much less frequently considered 
in household microsimulation models. According to Peichl (2005), the reason for the 
common neglect of the factor demand response is that information requirements are 
high and, at the same time, difficult to meet because access to relevant firm data is lim-
ited. Furthermore, simulated changes in labor demand depend heavily on the assumed 
structure and competitiveness of the labor market. Similarly, the response of the de-
mand for goods is difficult to model because price elasticities are difficult to identify on 
the basis of the available micro data (Peichl, 2005).  
Even in the rich field of household microsimulation, the representation of behavioral 
responses thus remains a challenge if the ambition is to model adjustments beyond the 
                                                 
8  See Wagenhals (2004) for an overview of models applied to the German economy. 
9  A common assumption in structural models is that preferences are represented by a translog utility 
function as proposed by Van Soest (1995). 
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standard labor supply reaction. In particular, the simulation of the factor demand re-
sponse originating from adjustments in firm behavior is still open for research. 
3.2.2 The Microsimulation Model by Creedy and Gemmell (2009, 2010) 
Creedy and Gemmell (2009, 2010) develop a simple corporate tax microsimulation 
model, CorpSim. In Creedy and Gemmell (2009) the model is employed to explain the 
high volatility of corporate tax revenue in the UK relative to the growth of profits. In 
Creedy and Gemmell (2010) the CorpSim framework is used to illustrate variations of 
the tax base elasticity over the business cycle.  
The general approach of the CorpSim model presented by Creedy and Gemmell 
(2009, 2010) is to obtain an initial simulated distribution of gross taxable profits. For 
this purpose, a mixture of lognormal distributions is fitted to UK company profit data in 
2003-04. After the initial period, firm profit develops according to systematic and sto-
chastic elements: In addition to a trend growth rate, cyclical behavior is captured via a 
sine wave together with a stochastic component which allows for firm heterogeneity.  
In contrast to the ZEW TaxcoMM, the model put forward by Creedy and Gemmell is 
not based on observed individual firm data in the form of firm-specific balance sheets or 
profit and loss accounts. Firm-level heterogeneity is instead introduced by defining ini-
tial taxable profit as a random variable. Furthermore, profit development over time is 
subject to random shocks.  
Similar to the elasticity decomposition shown in equation (3.1), the behavioral re-
sponse margins modeled in the CorpSim framework relate to the real economic activity 
of firms and, in addition, to profit shifting. However, the rationale underlying equation 
(3.1) is to view the tax base as the sum of ordinary returns on equity and economic 
rents. The amounts of ordinary and excess returns entering the tax base result from the 
economic decisions of firms. These are affected by tax at different margins. Thus, equa-
tion (3.1) establishes a direct link between the behavioral margins affected by tax and 
the overall tax base response. By contrast, Creedy and Gemmel (2009, 2010) take an-
other view: The partial elasticities in the CorpSim model do not relate to the economic 
decisions of firms but to the two technical tax base components: gross profit and tax 
deductions. These variables are simulated to be tax responsive but it is less clear which 
economic choices are actually supposed to drive the responses. In particular, investment 
activity is not modeled to be directly tax responsive. By contrast, profits are considered 
the principal determinants of firms’ economic activity. The rationale for investment 
being determined by profit is that capital markets are imperfect and all firms are credit-
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constrained. This is a strong assumption.10  
The behavioral responses incorporated into the ZEW TaxCoMM will not assume im-
perfect capital markets. Furthermore, in line with the notion underlying equation (3.1), 
we will explicitly model the response of economic decisions to changes in the tax envi-
ronment. These responses will have implications for taxable income which have to be 
simulated explicitly. This contrasts with the approach chosen in CorpSim which directly 
refers to the “behavioral” response of technical tax base components.    
3.2.3 Firm Behavior within CGE Frameworks: CORTAX and IFOmod 
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models analyze the impact of exogenous shocks 
on the whole economy. As such, these models are not limited to the business sector but 
include the household sector, the public sector, and a foreign sector in order to capture 
general equilibrium interactions between these economic sectors which run, primarily, 
via induced price changes in labor and goods markets. A more recent CGE model with a 
particular focus on tax policy analysis within the European context is CORTAX, put 
forward by Bettendorf and van der Horst (2006) and extended in several applications 
(Bettendorf et al., 2010; De Mooij and Devereux, 2011). Furthermore, Keuschnigg et al. 
(2005) and Radulescu and Stimmelmayr (2010) present IFOmod, a dynamic calculable 
general equilibrium growth (DCGE) model, calibrated to the German economy. 
A CGE model relies, in general, on a very structural microeconomic framework. 
Each economic sector is represented by at least one type of representative economic 
agent. Thus, in the simplest case the business sector is modeled by just one type of rep-
resentative firm. More refined CGE models with a focus on business taxation, however, 
tend to distinguish between different but still stylized firm types. The CORTAX model 
integrates three firm types: a domestic firm, a multinational parent company and a mul-
tinational subsidiary (Bettendorf and van der Horst, 2006). IFOmod models a domestic 
corporate firm and one multinational corporate firm. Furthermore, it also considers a 
non-incorporated firm (Keuschnigg et al., 2005). Agents’ decisions and responses to 
reform are derived directly from the underlying microeconomic optimization problem. 
With regard to the corporate sector, the marginal investor is supposed to maximize firm 
value, i.e. the present value of expected dividends, yet, all CGE approaches have to 
cope with model complexity which is steeply increasing in the level of modeling detail. 
Thus, complexity often turns out to be a limiting factor.  
                                                 
10  See Section 3.3, p. 32,  for a discussion. 
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In particular, the simultaneous modeling of all potentially relevant decision margins 
of the firm from microeconomic principles is very difficult. For this reason, the COR-
TAX model, which tries to cover the most relevant corporate behavioral margins pre-
sumably responsive to tax, resorts to a simple ad-hoc extension when it comes to the 
integration of multinational location decisions. The IFOmod is less comprehensive with 
regard to multinational response margins. In return, it is structurally more complete in 
other aspects. Notably, the disruption cost function related to capital stock adjustment is 
explicitly modeled in IFOmod while disruption costs associated with investment are 
ignored in CORTAX. We thus conclude that these models trade off the number of con-
sidered response margins against the refinement and structuredness of their representa-
tion in the model. 
There are also important similarities between CORTAX and IFOmod. Both models 
are dynamic in that they refer to intertemporal optimizing behavior. Moreover, the insti-
tutional detail of the two CGE models remains rather limited as compared to a sophisti-
cated corporate tax micro-simulation model. The corporate tax base basically comprises 
the returns on investment and depreciation allowances while other important tax base 
components are ignored. As a result, neither model provides a basis for the analysis of 
disaggregate reform impacts nor the evaluation of tax revenue implications from re-
forms that broadly modify the definition of the tax base.  
3.2.4 Some Basic Microeconomic Principles of Firm Behavior 
This section highlights some basic principles of value-maximizing firm behavior. In 
particular, we use a simplified version of the corporate sector model implemented in the 
general equilibrium model CORTAX and described in Bettendorf and van der Horst 
(2006) to derive the first order conditions for two essential corporate decision margins 
affected by tax: capital structure choice and capital demand. While the presented micro-
economic framework is simple and, for now, leaves aside any short-term dynamics, it 
will serve as guidance for the implementation of marginal investment and financing 
decisions into the ZEW TaxCoMM framework.  
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The firm model starts with the assumption that the corporate firm produces with a 
Constant-Elasticity-of-Substitution (CES) production function of employment L and 
capital K .11 
1
 L KY L K
        (3.2) 
where 1   and   is the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital. L and 
K  are share parameters. The value of the representative firm is equal to the discounted 
stream of future dividends which follow from the cash flow restriction 
  t t t 1 t 1 t tΠ I d K d Kt t t t t t tDiv Y w L d r z K            (3.3) 
where w  denotes the wage rate, d  is the debt-to-capital ratio, r  is the real market in-
terest rate, z  denotes debt-related cost associated, in particular, with financial distress 
(Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973) or agency conflicts between equity and debt claimants 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977). Π  is the corporate income tax base. t  is 
the subscript index for year. The corporate income tax base Π is defined as   
 t t t t τ tΠ z δ DˆY Kt t tw L d r      (3.4) 
where  is the deductible fraction of interest payments,   ˆ 1 1 1r r      is the nom-
inal market interest rate with r  as the real market interest rate and   as the rate of in-
flation.   is the depreciation rate of capital for tax purposes and D represents the fiscal 
book value of physical capital. The equations of motion for fiscal and physical capital 
are, respectively,  
 1 t1 Dt tD I      (3.5) 
 1 t1 Kt tK I      (3.6) 
where I  stands for gross investment,   is again the depreciation rate for tax purposes 
and  k  denotes the real economic depreciation rate. The Lagrangian function reflecting 
the representative firm’s value maximization problem is thus written as   
                                                 
11  For the sake of clarity and brevity, we set the share of value added in production to 100% and ignore 
complicating factors such as location-specific capital and personal taxes. These factors do not affect the 
fundamental nature of the first order conditions of optimal firm behavior which we aim to investigate. 
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      s s 1 1 s s 1 1 k sDiv λ 1 δ D μ 1 δ Ks s s s s
s t
L D I K I R   



          (3.7) 
, where sR  is the discount factor of the investor defined as s t 11(1 r)sR   . Differentiating 
(3.7) with respect to the debt-to-capital ratio d yields the first-order condition for debt 
policy 
ˆ
1
z r
d


    (3.8) 
The optimality condition requires the marginal after-tax cost of an incremental change 
in the debt ratio to equal the tax saving from an additional unit of debt interest expense.  
To derive the first-order condition for capital, equation (3.7) is differentiated with re-
spect to K . Using   11t trR R    and the first order condition of investment 1 A    
with  / ˆA r     as the present value of the stream of depreciation allowances in 
terms of tax savings for one unit of capital12, the resulting optimality condition 
       1 1 1 1 1ˆ 0t t t t t k t t t t
t
Y z d r d R d R
K
                      
 (3.9) 
simplifies to 
Y c
K
   (3.10) 
where the user cost of capital c and the marginal cost of finance r are defined as:  
    1 1
1 1
ˆ
1
k k
k
r A r A d rc r z
     
          

 (3.11) 
     ˆ 1  1r d r r d r z        (3.12) 
Obviously, in the Bettendorf and van der Horst (2006) framework, the marginal cost 
of finance r (see equation (3.12)) reflects the overall capital structure of the firm. The 
marginal debt-equity mix is unobservable, so that the convention is to use average debt 
shares, i.e. the debt-to-assets ratio d, as a proxy for the debt share in marginal financing. 
                                                 
12  This formula is for declining balance depreciation. More generally, the present value of the stream of 
depreciation allowances in terms of tax savings for one unit of capital is defined as  1 ˆ1
T
t
t
t
A
r



  with 
t  as the rate of depreciation in percent of the acquisition cost and T as the depreciation period. 
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Remember that the debt ratio itself is again influenced by tax considerations (see equa-
tion (3.8)). 
The desired target level of capital input in the long term is easily derived from insert-
ing the derivative of (3.2) with respect to K  into the optimality condition (3.10): 
KK Y c
      (3.13) 
Taking the logarithm of (3.13) gives the standard static log-linear capital demand 
function:  
ln ln ln lnKK Y c      (3.14) 
Evidently, the elasticity of substitution   is also the user cost elasticity of capital de-
mand. Equation (3.14), augmented with short-term dynamics, will be one of the central 
concepts exploited within the ZEW TaxCoMM’s behavioral framework which will be 
discussed in full detail in the following Section 3.3. 
Complicating this framework and introducing a multinational parent with (at least) one 
foreign subsidiary, one can formally show that profit shifting is another tax margin in 
the multinational parent’s profit maximization problem. Tax aggressive transfer pricing 
is attractive a long as the organizational cost associated with charging a different price 
less than the real cost are less than the associated tax benefit. As we do not have the data 
to simulate transfer price adjustments in detail, we abstain from formally elaborating on 
this margin. We instead refer the reader to Bettendorf and van der Horst (2006: 13-15) 
for the details. In Section 3.3, in particular Section 3.3.2.1.3, we describe how the simu-
lation accounts for multinational firms’ profit shifting activity. 
To the best of our knowledge, due to excessive complexity, no formal microeconomic 
model of the firm has ever jointly incorporated all five tax margins which are known to 
drive the tax base elasticity. In particular, discrete response margins are, if at all, intro-
duced in the form of ad-hoc extensions (Bettendorf and van der Horst, 2006; Bettendorf 
et al., 2010). For similar reasons, we will not simulate the discrete responses of location 
choice and choice of legal form at the firm level, but account for them at the aggregate 
level.  
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3.3 Modeling Behavior in the ZEW TaxCoMM Framework 
3.3.1 Basic Modeling Choices 
Standard household microsimulation models tend to put a focus on just one behavioral 
tax margin: individual labor supply. The number of relevant behavioral margins com-
posing the tax base elasticity in a firm model is considerably higher. This is clear from 
the elasticity decomposition in equation (3.1) and the previous attempts to model corpo-
rate behavioral responses to tax reform, as made in Creedy and Gemmell (2009, 2010) 
or sophisticated CGE approaches like CORTAX or IFOmod. The set of behavioral mar-
gins includes both real economic and shifting responses to tax, thus affecting firm deci-
sions on investment, financing, the location of production, the firm’s legal form and 
paper profit shifting (De Mooij and Ederveen, 2008). The economic significance of 
each of these partial responses has been confirmed by a broad empirical literature. At 
the same time, these tax margins have never been considered simultaneously in a single 
model framework without resorting to some plausible, yet ad-hoc elements. Further-
more, the focus of the most stringent approaches presented so far was clearly on the 
long-run response to tax reform.  
With regard to the integration of behavioral responses into the ZEW TaxCoMM 
framework, the challenge is thus to consistently reflect the complete set of the most im-
portant behavioral tax margins. Moreover, given that the ZEW TaxCoMM traces reform 
consequences – both first round and second round – over three simulation periods after 
the simulated reform shock, it must also be able to consider the short-term dynamics of 
the adjustments in firm behavior. Eventually, firm-level heterogeneity present in the 
simulation sample data must be consistently embedded. 
Despite these complexities, the model will be designed in such way that consistency 
with established microeconomic principles of firm behavior is guaranteed. In particular, 
the representation of financing and marginal investment decisions will be in line with 
what we can infer from the standard microeconomic optimization problem of the firm 
(see the previous Section 3.2.4). This is, to a certain extent, consistent with the approach 
chosen in standard household microsimulation models, which also take the underlying 
microeconomic optimization problem as a point of departure. Nevertheless, these 
household models are able to arrive at an estimable labor supply equation and can thus 
exploit the simulation sample data for the purpose of model parameterization. By con-
trast, the parameterization of the behavioral algorithms in the ZEW TaxCoMM frame-
work will be based on prior information on the response elasticities obtained from the 
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empirical literature. Given that the ZEW TaxCoMM simulation sample covers no more 
than three years and, in addition, is a purely national dataset, the variation in tax rates 
would clearly be insufficient to produce reliable estimates of the behavioral tax-rate 
elasticities. In view of an abundant empirical literature on the considered behavioral tax 
margins, we conclude that the possible advantage of exploiting direct sample infor-
mation is outweighed by the high quality of prior knowledge. In the course of the pa-
rameterization, we can, in addition, set response intensities in a way that reflects empir-
ically found interdependencies between the different margins. This holds in particular 
for the profit shifting and investment margins modeled at firm-level. The detailed 
paramterization of the behavioral algorithms explained in this Section 3.3 will be dis-
cussed in detail in Chapter 8.  
Another difference with both standard cross-sectional household microsimulation 
models and CGE approaches is that ZEW TaxCoMM does not just take a deep look into 
the future, but instead has the ambition to trace reform consequences consistently over 
time within a three-year horizon. In the presence of disruption costs, a mere focus on 
long-term responses and optimality conditions would miss out on the short-term dynam-
ics of the adjustment process. Still, modeling the adjustment process within a formal 
framework is hardly feasible. Too little is known, both theoretically and empirically, 
about the exact shape of the disruption cost functions and resulting patterns of, e.g., cap-
ital stock adjustment (see the survey by Bond and van Reenen, 2007). We therefore 
adopt a simple partial adjustment model of the level of the capital stock which has been 
quite successful in empirical work (Bond and van Reenen, 2007; Buettner and Wamser, 
2009a; Overesch and Wamser, 2009). Capital demand equations which take some form 
of a simple partial adjustment model are derived both from reduced form approaches 
and from more structural representations of the investment process (Bond and van 
Reenen, 2007). The plain partial adjustment model is also the standard model in dynam-
ic empirical investigations of corporate capital structure choices (see, e.g., Flannery and 
Rangan, 2006; Lemmon et al., 2008; Huang and Ritter, 2009). We will thus use it to 
simulate the short-term dynamics of corporate debt ratios, too. 
3.3.2 Behavioral Algorithms Implemented in ZEW TaxCoMM 
In the following, we describe in detail how corporate behavioral responses to tax reform 
are integrated into the ZEW TaxCoMM model. Continuous responses are modeled di-
rectly at the firm-level (see Section 3.3.2.1). Section 3.3.2.1.1 deals with tax reform 
effects on corporate debt policy. Section 3.3.2.1.2 explains how the model captures the 
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tax effect on firms’ marginal investment decisions. Section 3.3.2.1.3 focuses on the 
profit shifting response of multinational firms. Consequences from behavioral adjust-
ments in discrete choices of location and legal form are captured at the aggregate level 
(see Section 3.3.2.2). The parameterization of the algorithms will be discussed in Chap-
ter 8. 
3.3.2.1 Behavioral Responses Modeled at the Micro Level 
3.3.2.1.1 Corporate Debt Policy Response 
According to most tax systems, interest expenses are deductible from corporate taxable 
income while equity payouts are generally not. The resulting corporate tax advantage of 
debt financing rises with the marginal tax rate (MTR) applicable on the next unit of tax-
able income.13 The marginal tax rate, i.e. the tax incentive to finance with debt, must be 
computed individually for each firm because it depends on the firm’s tax status. A very 
refined method to capture the firm-specific tax advantage of debt is put forward by Gra-
ham (1996a, 1999), who employs a sophisticated simulation procedure (see Chapter 6 
for details).14 Still, the so-called dichotomous tax rate is an easily available and efficient 
proxy for the tax incentive to finance with debt (Graham, 1996b). The dichotomous tax 
rate for a profitable firm with positive taxable income takes on the value of the statutory 
tax rate; otherwise it is 0. We use a refined version of the simple dichotomous tax rate 
which is supposed to capture the tax advantage even more precisely. It takes into ac-
count the fact that even for profitable firms, interest expenses might not always be fully 
deductible so that the tax savings from one additional unit of interest are effectively 
reduced. For each company h  in the simulation sample, we define the tax rate on inter-
est expenses as Dh,t ,
STR
h,t h t  , where ,STRh t  is the statutory tax rate and  , 0,1h t   repre-
sents the share of incremental interest expense which is effectively tax deductible. ,h t  
shrinks to 0 if firm h is loss-making15 or if the deduction of interest is effectively re-
stricted by a binding interest deduction ceiling. By contrast, ,h t  shows a value of 1 if 
                                                 
13  In principle, the net tax advantage of debt, i.e. after accounting for personal taxes levied on interest 
income, should determine corporate financial policy. However, the tax position of the (marginal) investor 
is generally unknown. Empirically, the gross corporate tax advantage turns out to significantly drive the 
corporate debt ratio (Graham, 1999; see also Chapter 6).  
14 Recently, Blouin et al. (2010) have suggested a non-parametric procedure to estimate marginal tax 
rates; Graham and Kim (2009) extend the original Graham approach by using an autoregressive process 
(instead of assuming a simple random walk) to simulate firm-specific time series of EBIT. 
15 In the simulation, we define a firm to be loss-making if it reports losses in at least two of the three sim-
ulation periods. In this case, we assume that current losses or existing loss carry-forwards reduce the 
effective tax rate reduction from using debt to zero. 
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interest is fully deductible.16 In Germany, ,h t  generally has values below 1 due to in-
terest add-backs for trade-tax purposes.  
We now consider the adjustment process with which capital structures are simulated 
to respond to a change in the tax incentive to finance with debt. In line with recent con-
tributions by Flannery and Rangan (2006), Lemmon et al. (2008) and Huang and Ritter 
(2009), we assume that these financial policy adjustments are costly. As a result, capital 
structures do not adjust immediately toward new target structures. Again in line with the 
above literature, we assume that a fraction  of the gap between the actual debt ratio 
, 1 h td   and target leverage 
*
,h td  is closed in each period, leading to the following partial 
adjustment model:  
 *, , , 1h t h t h td d d     (3.15)  
By rearranging, we obtain the difference equation 
  *, , 1 ,1  h t h t h td d d     (3.16) 
Iterating forward yields the solution of  (3.16), i.e. a trajectory that satisfies the equation 
(3.16) at any point in time.  
   1 *, , ,0
0
1 1
t
i t
h t h t i h
i
d d d   

     (3.17) 
For each firm h, the trajectory in (3.17) describes the actual debt level in terms of the 
debt ratio ,h td  as a function of past and current target leverage
*
, h t id   and an initial value 
,0hd . Note that the debt targets 
*
,h t id   , which drive the trajectory  ,h td  , are themselves 
unobserved. Immediately observed are only the actual debt ratios ,h td realized under the 
benchmark tax regime.  
However, it is now possible to describe ,h td for potential reform scenarios which are 
supposed to differ from the benchmark scenario underlying the trajectory in (3.17) only 
with regard to the tax regime. All other non-tax micro and macro determinants of firm’s 
debt targets are held constant. The trajectory  ,Rh td , where the superscript “R” stands 
                                                 
16
 ,t h
 might immediately change in the course of a reform either because interest deductibility is gener-
ally restricted or, in the German case, regulation on interest add-backs to the German trade tax base are 
changed. Meanwhile, it can also change due to second round behavioral responses of firms which run into 
or out of binding deduction limits while adjusting their capital structures. The ZEW TaxCoMM algo-
rithms take into account these complexities in order to correctly reflect effective marginal incentives to 
finance with debt. 
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for “reform scenario”, results if, starting from the initial period of analysis, a modified 
tax regime applies while, in every period t, all non-tax micro and macro conditions af-
fecting debt targets will be exactly the same as in the benchmark scenario: 
    
1
* *
, , ,0
0 d
1 ( d ) 1
D D
h
t
i tR
h t h h t i h
i e
d d d d

   
  
      (3.18) 
, where *d hd  is the decisive shift in long-run debt targets which is exclusively caused by 
the modified tax environment as compared to the benchmark scenario. Note that equa-
tion (3.18) assumes *d dD Dh hd e    to be the same in each period t . It is easy to re-
formulate (3.18) to capture year-specific shocks in the tax incentive.17 
For clarity, we now mark the first trajectory described in (3.17) with the superscript 
“B” for “benchmark scenario”. Having defined the trajectories in (3.17) and (3.18), we 
can look at the difference in debt ratios under the two scenarios for each firm in each 
period t. All variables and parameters unaffected by the tax regime change cancel out 
and are thus fully controlled for in the simulation. 
    1 t*, ,
0
1  d 1 1 λ d
t
iR B D D
h t h t h h
i
d d d e  

       (3.19) 
As is clear from equation (3.19), the gap between the two scenarios is increasing 
over time and converges to the long-run debt response to the tax regime change, with  
 , ,lim dR B D Dh t h t ht d d e    .  
In principle, we could, for each firm h in each period t , consistently calculate the 
debt ratio under the tax reform scenario on the basis of observed benchmark capital 
structure as  , , , ,R R B Bh t h t h t h td d d d   . As outlined in Chapter 2, the benchmark input data 
for the microsimulation covers three periods  1,2,3t  . Thus, the analysis of the re-
form scenario trajectory will be limited to these periods, i.e.  3, 1Rh t td  . 
Note that both the long-term tax sensitivity of debt targets, as expressed by the size 
of the marginal tax effect on the debt ratio Dhe  , and the speed of adjustment (SOA) to-
ward target debt ratios, , are empirical issues. These behavioral parameters depend on 
                                                 
17 The formula with year-specific incentive shocks reads quite similarly to (3.18):  
   
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the magnitude of the tax advantage and the relative importance of debt-related costs 
which offset this advantage at the margin. These costs may be in particular related to 
financial distress (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973) or agency conflicts between equity 
and debt claimants (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977). A comprehensive quan-
titative assessment of the empirical literature on the tax effect on corporate capital struc-
ture choices (see Chapter 6) will guarantee a plausible parameterization of the simulated 
financial policy response to tax reform. The parameterization itself will be discussed in 
Chapter 8. 
3.3.2.1.2 Corporate Marginal Investment Response 
According to neo-classical theory, firms accumulate capital as long as decreasing mar-
ginal returns to scale cover at least the cost of finance and depreciation. The minimum 
pre-tax rate of return on investment required by the investor is called the cost of capital 
(Jorgenson 1963; Hall and Jorgensen 1967). Thus, a firm is supposed to invest up to the 
point where the marginal investment project earns just the cost of capital (see equation 
(3.11) in Section 3.2.4). Consequently, the standard approach to investigating the mar-
ginal investment disincentive caused by taxes refers to the tax impact on the cost of cap-
ital. If saving is perfectly elastic, general equilibrium effects are absent and production 
is described by a CES function, the user cost elasticity is indeed the sole determinant of 
the impact on the capital stock for a given change in the cost of capital (Chirinko, 
2002). In particular, ZEW TaxCoMM does not model any tax reform effects via poten-
tial effects on the liquidity position of firms. While there is voluminous literature on the 
relationship of investment and financial variables, current profits or cash flow (for a 
survey, see Hubbard, 1998), there is increasing evidence challenging the standard finan-
cial constraint model18 or even indicating that any identified investment sensitivities to 
cash flow could indeed be spurious (Bushman et al., 2008).  
With regards to the user cost elasticity of capital, there is a broad empirical literature 
which investigates the relationship between business investment and the cost of capital. 
However, the tax distortion is often not expressed in terms of the cost of capital, but in 
terms of the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR). The EMTR is defined as the relative 
wedge between the cost of capital c and the required post-tax real rate of return on in-
                                                 
18  In their survey of the financial constraints literature, Hassett and Newmark (2008) conclude that the 
general financial constraint model is challenged on three grounds: First, cash flow effects could simply be 
due to measurement error in standard empirical investigations. Second, existent cash flow effects might 
actually not be caused by liquidity constraints. Third, even if financial constraints exist, cash flow sensi-
tivity need not necessarily increase in the degree of the constraint. 
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vestment. Ignoring personal taxes levied on investment income, the required post-tax 
return equals the real capital market interest rate r  and the EMTR (denoted as EMTR ) is 
just a monotonous transformation of the cost of capital,  EMTR c r c    . However, the 
EMTR is easier and much more convenient to interpret. In particular, it conveys more 
information on the tax wedge introduced in the costs of capital and, thus, the degree to 
which optimality conditions are distorted. The EMTR is also the standard measure of 
investment disincentives in the major CGE models focusing on corporate taxes.19 
Recalling the definition of the cost of capital from equation  (3.11) in Section 3.2.4,20 
it is clear that, in the presence of taxes, the cost of capital depends on the source of 
funds used to finance the marginal investment. This raises the question of which type of 
funds, equity or debt, is actually financing the marginal investment. Due to the tax de-
ductibility of interest, the cost of debt finance is all but unaffected by the corporate in-
come tax.21 Thus, if debt was indeed the preferred marginal source of funds, taxes 
would exert very little effect on the marginal investment decision. Still, equity financing 
is frequently observed in practice. Moreover, as it is the cost of equity which is primari-
ly affected by corporate taxes, one could also argue that induced marginal investment is 
predominantly financed with equity (De Mooij, 2005). Following a standard convention 
(see Egger et al., 2009a; De Mooij and Devereux, 2011), we strike the balance between 
the two views and assume that marginal investment is financed by a mix of funds which 
is identical to the average financing structure of the firm. The weighted average cost of 
capital is a standard discount rate used in corporate finance (Brealey et al., 2008). Ac-
cordingly, ZEW TaxCoMM computes the firm-specific benchmark cost of capital con-
sidering the benchmark tax law and observed benchmark debt ratios, while the cost of 
capital under the reform scenario take into account the new tax regulation and reform-
adjusted capital structures, i.e. financing weights. The reform-induced change in the 
cost of capital is thus not only determined by the direct influence of the reform changes 
                                                 
19  See Bettendorf and van der Horst (2006). 
20  The cost of capital as defined in (3.11) and used for the purpose of the mircosimulation captures the 
impact of depreciation allowances for the considered type of asset and of the applicable statutory tax rates 
on the required pre-tax rate of return. Differences between equity and debt financing are also reflected. 
21 For a debt financed investment, the net cost of capital amounts to the real market interest rate if depre-
ciation schemes are neutral, i.e. correspond to economic depreciation. Otherwise, taxes have an influence 
via the present value of the reduction in tax from depreciation allowances. The EMTR then is usually 
negative. 
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in depreciation allowances and statutory tax rates, but also driven by any reform trig-
gered adjustments in the capital structure of the firm.22  
Importantly, we take the capital market interest rate as given. In applications of ZEW 
TaxCoMM we will set the nominal interest rate according to the average yield on do-
mestic industry bonds outstanding, as published by the German Federal Bank. Inflation 
rates are obtained from the German Statistical Office.23 In addition, we perform sensi-
tivity analyses with alternative interest values to check the robustness of results. Fur-
thermore, we compute financing-weighted EMTRs both for immovable fixed assets 
(buildings) and movable tangible fixed assets (equipment and machinery). Assuming 
that the marginal investment bundles both asset types according to their average propor-
tions reported in the firm’s balance sheet, the scenario-specific EMTR for each firm 
represents a weighted average of the two asset-specific EMTRs. For companies with tax 
losses we set the EMTR to zero, assuming that all marginal returns are shielded from 
taxation due to sufficient current losses or loss carry-forwards.24 
Knowing the tax distortions for marginal investment as expressed by each firm’s 
EMTR under the benchmark and the reform scenario, we have to deal with the invest-
ment response to the reform change in these distortions. Indeed, a considerable amount 
of research has dealt with the relationship between corporate taxation and domestic 
business investment (for reviews, see, for example, Hassett and Hubbard, 2002; Bond 
and van Reenen, 2007). However, much of this research has focused on aggregate data. 
By contrast, there is only a “dearth of microeconometric studies that focus on estimating 
the sensitivity of investment to changes in taxes” (Bond and van Reenen, 2007).25 Still, 
there is a consensus in both the theoretical and empirical literature that capital cannot 
adjust without external or internal costs preventing immediate adjustment to target lev-
els. At the same time, however, there is no general consensus on the dynamic time pat-
tern of the capital adjustment.  
                                                 
22  For the structural representation of this interrelation derived from the firm’s optimization problem, see 
Section 3.2.4. Note that, in line with the empirical literature, costs of financial distress are ignored in the 
cost of capital formulation because these are unobservable to us. Thus, we slightly deviate from the ex-
pression in (3.11).   
23  In the application of the model in Chapter 9 which is based on a simulation sample covering the peri-
od from 2005 to 2007, the nominal interest rate determined accordingly is 4.3% (Deutsche Bundesbank, 
2011) and the inflation rate is 1.8% (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2011a). Thus, the real interest rate is 2.5%.  
24 In the simulation, we define a firm to be loss-making if it shows tax losses in at least two of the three 
simulation periods. 
25 An exemption is the literature on the relationship of foreign direct investment and host country taxa-
tion. For a comprehensive quantitative survey, see Chapter 5. Still, adjustment dynamics are ignored in 
most of this literature. 
Chapter 3 Extension of ZEW TaxCoMM: Behavioral Responses to Tax Reform 35 
 
 
Chirinko et al. (1999) investigate adjustment patterns over time by means of an ad-
hoc distributed lag model; but their results contradict established notions on the long-
run user cost elasticity of capital (Cummins et al., 1994; Hasset and Hubbard, 2002; 
Dwenger , 2010). More structural models explicitly integrate adjustment cost functions 
to derive the short-term dynamics. For the sake of convenience, however, these func-
tions are often modeled to be convex in investment volumes. This simplifying assump-
tion is, again, not beyond debate (Caballero et al., 1995; Cooper and Haltiwanger, 
2006). In their literature survey, Bond and van Reenen (2007) therefore conclude that 
the actual adjustment process appears very complex and that empirical research has not 
been very successful in characterizing it. To account for short-term dynamics, we thus 
adopt a simple but empirically well-proven partial adjustment model of the level of the 
capital stock (see, for example, Buettner and Wamser, 2009; Overesch and Wamser, 
2009). Static capital demand, interpreted as the desired level of capital in the long run, 
is easily derived within microeconomic frameworks (see equation (3.14) in Section 
3.2.4; Bond and van Reenen, 2007; Nickell, 1978). Partial adjustment models account 
for the fact that these desired capital levels are not reached immediately. Please note 
that, in this respect, the following computation of the between-scenario differences in 
capital levels is similar to the simulation of the debt response to tax reform (see Section 
3.3.2.1.1), which has also used a partial adjustment framework to model short-term dy-
namics.  
We assume that firm h closes a fraction   of the gap between the actual capital stock 
in logarithms, , 1ln h tK  , and the desired capital stock in logarithms, 
*
,ln h tK .26 Thus, we 
have 
  ,*, , , 1
1
Δln ln ln h th t h t h t
t
I
K K K
K
 

     (3.20) 
, where the term on the right-hand side of (3.20) is the net investment rate. ,h tI is gross 
investment and   is the economic depreciation rate. We rearrange and iterate forward to 
the solution of the partial adjustment model which describes for each firm h  the real-
ized capital stock, ,ln h tK , as a function of past and current capital targets, 
*
,ln h t iK  , and 
an initial capital stock, ,0ln hK :  
                                                 
26  For the purpose of the simulation, capital is defined as tangible fixed assets which we observe in the 
firms’ balance sheets. 
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   1 *, , ,0
0
ln  1 ln  1 ln  
t i t
h t h t i h
i
K K K   

     (3.21) 
Note that the capital targets, *,ln h t iK  , which drive the trajectory  ,ln h tK  are them-
selves unobserved. Only the realized capital levels under the benchmark scenario,
 ,ln h tK  are observed in the simulation input data. Yet, it is again possible to define the 
trajectory  ,ln h tK for different scenarios which are supposed to differ from the bench-
mark scenario underlying the trajectory in (3.21) exclusively with regard to the tax re-
gime. All other non-tax micro and macro determinants of firms’ capital targets are held 
constant. The trajectory   ,ln Rh tK  , where the superscript “R” stands for “reform scenar-
io”, results if, starting from the initial period of analysis, a modified tax regime applies 
while, in every period t , all non-tax micro and macro conditions affecting capital tar-
gets are exactly the same as in the benchmark scenario: 
   1 * *, , ,0
0
d
ln 1 ( d ln ln ) 1 ln 
INV EMTR
h
t
i tR
h t h h t i h
i
e
K K K K

   
  
       (3.22) 
, where *d ln hK  is the decisive shift in long-run capital targets which is exclusively 
caused by the modified tax environment as compared to the benchmark scenario. Re-
calling equation (3.14) in Section 3.2.4, we know that the long-run capital target, *,ln h tK , 
will respond to a reform shock in the cost of capital with intensity , INV UCC  . For 
expository purposes, we transform the user cost elasticity of the capital stock  t  into the 
semi-elasticity with respect to effective marginal tax rate INVe  which is more common 
in empirical research.27 Note that equation (3.22) assumes *d ln dINV EMTRh hK e   to be 
the same in each period t.  It is again easy to re-formulate (3.22) to capture year-specific 
shocks in the EMTR.28 
We again mark the first trajectory described in (3.21) with the superscript “B” for 
“benchmark scenario”. Having defined the trajectories in (3.21) and (3.22), we can now 
look at the difference in capital levels under the two scenarios in each period ?. All vari-
                                                 
27  Simple algebra shows that we just have to divide by  1 EMTR , i.e.  , / 1INV EMTRINV UCCe    . 
28  The formulas have to be adjusted just analogously to what we did in Footnote 17 for the debt re-
sponse. 
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ables and parameters unaffected by the tax regime change cancel out and are thus fully 
controlled for in the simulation. 
    1 t*, ,
0
ln ln 1  d ln 1 1 d
t
iR B INV EMTR
h t h t h h
i
K K K e   

       (3.23) 
Analogous to what was shown with regard to the debt response, the gap between the 
two scenarios is increasing over time and converges to the long-run response to the tax 
regime change, here with  , , lim ln ln dR B INV EMTRh t h t ht K K e    .  
For each firm h in each period t , we calculate  the capital stock under the tax reform 
scenario on the basis of observed benchmark capital stock as 
 , , , ,ln ln ln lnR R B Bh t h t h t h tK K K K   . Again, due to the restricted time horizon of the 
benchmark and first round simulations, the analysis of the reform scenario trajectory 
will be limited to  3, 1ln Rh t tK  . 
Plausible values for the two main behavioral parameters, INVhe  and the adjustment 
speed of capital  , will be distilled from the literature. In particular, with regard to the 
investment response of multinational affiliate companies, Chapter 5 provides a compre-
hensive quantitative meta-analysis. The detailed parameterization based on this meta-
study will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
3.3.2.1.3 Corporate Profit Shifting Response 
Given separated affiliate accounts, multinational companies have enhanced tax planning 
opportunities by means of cross-border profit shifting. In particular, transfer pricing of 
intra-group trade, in addition to the internal reallocation of debt, can serve as a channel 
to shift profits between jurisdictions. Against this background, transfer pricing audits 
aim to ensure compliance with the arm’s length principle. In return, multinational firms 
may tend to internally transfer firm-specific assets and services for profit shifting pur-
poses. Such assets and services provide for higher discretion in setting transfer prices 
because they are specific to the firm and not traded on an external market. Overesch and 
Schreiber (2010) show that firms with a strong focus on R&D, a natural proxy for the 
firm-specificity of assets, indeed exploit additional opportunities to manipulate the 
quantities and prices of intra-group transactions. Moreover, the location of intangible 
assets, e.g. patents and licenses, is documented to be driven by tax considerations 
(Karkinski and Riedel, 2009; Dischinger and Riedel, 2011).  
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It is generally difficult to minutely trace intra-group transactions in accounting data 
and, in particular, to disentangle their impact on taxable corporate income. With our 
simulation input data being restricted to Germany, we cannot observe the allocation of 
intangible assets within the multinational firm either. Still, we can indirectly model the 
between-scenario difference in profit shifting activities by drawing on the profit re-
sponse to tax reform as the ultimate result of a firm’s profit shifting efforts. Ideally, we 
would be interested in the portion of economic profit that is actually reported in the 
books. Evidently, neither information on unreported profits nor on the proportion of 
underreporting is directly identifiable. Fortunately, however, a considerable amount of 
empirical literature has quantified the tax sensitivity of reported profits, holding eco-
nomic returns constant. Thus, we can model the implications from a tax reform-induced 
change in the proportions of profit shifting activity.  
The tax incentive to shift profits abroad is measured by a plain (combined) statutory 
tax rate, ,
STR
h t .29 In line with the seminal study on profit shifting activities put forward by 
Huizinga et al. (2008), we focus on a firm’s earnings before interest and tax (EBIT). 
EBIT is supposed to capture those shifting activities which run via the route of related-
party transactions, i.e. transfer prices and/or trade quantities. Those tax planning strate-
gies which are built around the financial structure of a firm are already captured by the 
debt policy response modeled in Section 3.3.2.1.1.30 
 Equally in line with prior evidence, we assume that profit shifting is based on flexi-
ble tax planning strategies and adjusts quickly to a change in international tax incen-
tives. Thus, the shifting response unfolds fully from the first period of simulation on-
ward and in the reform scenario the targeted shift in declared EBIT will be immediately 
achieved, given that all other determining factors are held constant. Multiplying the 
semi-elasticity of EBIT with respect to the international tax rate difference, 
,ln
( )
h t
h f
EBITPS
he  

  , by the reform change in the statutory tax rate, d STRh , gives the reform-
induced shift in periodical EBIT in logarithms: 
, ,ln ln  d
R B PS STR
h t h t h hEBIT EBIT e     (3.24) 
                                                 
29 Profit shifting incentives result from exploitable international tax rate differences. Yet, as ZEW Tax-
CoMM exclusively focuses on the analysis of German tax policy scenarios, foreign tax rates are implicit-
ly held constant. Thus, any changes in the domestic German tax rate will consistently measure the corre-
sponding change in the incentive to shift profits abroad.   
30 The international shifting incentives which, for the case of multinational firms, adds to the purely 
domestic tax incentive to finance with debt will be taken into account by implementing increased values 
for the marginal tax effect on the debt ratio (see Chapter 8). 
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where the superscripts “R” and “B”, respectively, mark the reform and benchmark sce-
nario values.  
Based on observed benchmark values of EBIT for each firm h  in each of the three 
simulation periods, we can calculate the reform’s impact on EBIT via the partial profit 
shifting response. The parameterization of the profit shifting response will be discussed 
in Chapter 8. It will be based on the comprehensive meta-study on the tax sensitivity of 
profit shifting activity put forward in Chapter 7. In particular, we will be able to capture 
empirically found interdependencies between the capacity to shift profits abroad and the 
sensitivity of investment decisions to local tax rates (Overesch and Schreiber, 2010).  
3.3.2.1.4 Profit Implications from the Responses at the Micro Level 
The firms’ behavioral responses to reform will have implications for firm profit which 
will then be subject to tax. These behavior-induced implications for profit add to the 
respective consequences arising merely from the change in the tax law captured by the 
first round reform simulations of ZEW TaxCoMM. To distinguish the second round 
behavioral effects from the purely technical reform consequences due to changes in the 
tax legislation, we isolate the behavior-induced change in affected profit components 
and mark them with the superscript “2R”. 
We first compute the income consequences arising from the simulated adjustments in 
both capital stock and capital structure in the three simulation periods  1,2,3t  . Giv-
en that the reform-induced upward or downward shift in capital stock in each period t  
is exclusively induced by a change in the marginal effective tax rate on investment, it 
seems plausible to assume that the contribution to ordinary income, before deduction of 
financing expenses, equals the marginal cost of finance in nominal terms. Thus, if the 
reform scenario generally shows a higher capital stock as compared to the benchmark 
level, we assume a rate of return equal to ,ˆ
R
h tr , the nominal cost of finance in the reform 
scenario.31 If, instead, the reform scenario comes along with an increase in the cost of 
capital and capital stocks are accordingly reduced as compared to the benchmark, the 
corresponding profit loss is calculated using the benchmark nominal financing cost, ,ˆ
B
h tr , 
as the return of marginal benchmark investment which is not produced in the reform 
                                                 
31
    , , , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ1ˆSTRh t h t h t h tr d r r d r     , with rˆ  as the nominal capital market interest rate. Through-
out the model, we ignore the presence of risk and, as a consequence, any differences between rates of 
return on equity and debt. 
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scenario. The reform-induced change in each firm’s annual EBIT which is caused ex-
clusively by the shift in capital stock, 2 ,
R INV
h tEBIT , is thus calculated according to 
equation (3.25). 
   
   
, , , , ,2
,
, , , , ,
ˆ ,      0
ˆ ,      0
B R B R B
h t h t h t h t h tR INV
h t R R B R B
h t h t h t h t h t
r K K K K
EBIT
r K K K K
       



  (3.25) 
Please recall that the scenario-specific cost of capital for each firm in each period al-
so reflects the scenario-optimal debt ratio as simulated in Section 3.3.2.1.1. The scenar-
io-adjusted debt ratio in combination with the information on the between-scenario dif-
ferences in capital stocks (Section 3.3.2.1.2) allows calculating the difference in the 
debt level , ,
R B
h t h tD D  and corresponding interest expenses as another important part of 
the tax base implications of switching from the benchmark to the reform scenario. The 
according shift in the absolute amount of debt is given by , , , , , ,
R B R R B B
h t h t h t h t h t h tD D d K d K   . 
Given a nominal interest rate rˆ which remains unchanged in both the reform and the 
benchmark scenario, the tax base implication of this difference in debt levels, i.e. the 
reform-induced shift in interest expenses, 2 ,
R
h tIE , is  
   2 , , , , , , ,ˆ ˆR R B R R B Bh t h t h t h t h t h t h tIE D Dr d K d Kr     (3.26) 
Furthermore, we have to take into account the reform-induced EBIT shift caused by 
adjusted profit shifting efforts of multinational firms, 
2
, , ,ln ln
R PS R B
h t h t h tEBIT EBIT EBIT  , as immediately calculated in equation (3.24) of 
Section 3.3.2.1.3. In sum, the firm-specific reform impact on profit, 2 ,
R
h tP , which is 
due to behavioral responses in investment, financing, and profit shifting behavior in 
each simulation period t adds up to  
2 2 2 2
, , , ,
R INV PS D R INV R PS R
h t h t h t h tP EBIT EBIT IE
        (3.27) 
As illustrated with Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2, these behavior-induced changes in profit 
components will enter the ZEW TaxCoMM tax assessment algorithms, which will then 
compute the gross and net taxable income for, respectively, corporate income and trade 
tax purposes for each firm h in each simulation period t . 
 
Chapter 3 Extension of ZEW TaxCoMM: Behavioral Responses to Tax Reform 41 
 
 
3.3.2.2 Behavioral Responses Modeled at the Macro Level 
3.3.2.2.1 Corporate Infra-Marginal Investment Response 
In the transnational investment decision multinational firms face, the discrete choice of 
where to locate a profitable and indivisible investment project precedes continuous de-
cisions on the scale of investment and on the allocation of income from capital (Deve-
reux, 2007b). The tax impact on location choice is thus an integral part of the overall tax 
base response. Still, as it refers to the geographical allocation of an economic rent, loca-
tion choice is not affected through the effective marginal tax rate, but through the effec-
tive average tax rate, reflecting the proportion of the pre-tax economic rent taken by the 
government (Devereux and Griffith 1999, 2003). A main driver of the effective average 
tax rate (EATR) on profitable investment is the statutory tax rate. At the company level, 
the EATR is effectively a linear combination of EMTR and the statutory tax rate. The 
impact of the statutory tax rate is increasing with the proportion of excess return in total 
returns on investment. In the following, we will assume that discrete and indivible in-
vestment projects subject to the location decision earn considerable rents. As a conse-
quence, we refer to the combined statutory tax rate to capture the effective tax burden 
on infra-marginal investment. 
As the tax burden on infra-marginal investment influences the probability of seeing 
such profitable investment projects undertaken, tax reforms impacting on the statutory 
tax rate will eventually have an effect on the number of multinational affiliates located 
in Germany. However, simulating this effect at the micro level by making the simula-
tion sample dynamic in the sense of allowing for the birth (new location) and death (re-
location) of multinational affiliates requires a stochastic mechanism, generating or elim-
inating firm observations. Under the assumption that probabilities of affiliate birth or 
death are uniformly distributed and independent of affiliate characteristics, however, a 
reform-induced relative change in the number of multinational affiliates should entail a 
proportional shift in aggregate tax revenue from multinational activity. We can there-
fore implement the behavioral response with respect to location choice at the aggregate 
level. Correspondingly, the ZEW TaxCoMM model captures the reform shock via the 
change in the pooled sample median of the firm-specific statutory tax rates, d STRmedian .32 
                                                 
32 In Germany, variation in the firm-specific combined statutory tax rate, STR , comes from variation in 
local trade tax multipliers between municipalities. 
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The partial effect which the behavioral response to d STRmedian  exerts on the aggregate cor-
porate tax revenue is given by equation (3.28).  
, 2 , 1 1
, d
M
LOC R LOC R LOC STR R
t t median h t
h H
CTR CTR e CTR

    (3.28) 
1
,
R
h tCTR  is the corporate tax due in period t simulated in the first round of the reform sce-
nario for firm h. The sum over all firms within the subsample of multinational affiliates
MH  gives the aggregate corporate income tax revenue originating from multinational 
activity, , 1LOC RtCTR .
33 Correspondingly, , 2LOC RtCTR  describes aggregate corporate in-
come tax revenue collected from multinationals located in Germany after behavioral 
responses in location choice are taken into account. The response intensity is measured 
as the semi-elasticity of the number of foreign locations ( nol ) with regard to the local 
statutory tax level, ln STRLOC nole 

 .  
The consequences caused by reform effects on location choice for the trade tax reve-
nue are calculated accordingly.  
, 2 , 1 1
, d
M
LOC R LOC R LOC STR R
t t median h t
h H
TTR TTR e TTR

    (3.29) 
1
,
R
h tTTR  is the trade tax due in period t simulated in the first round of the reform scenario 
for firm h. The sum over all multinational firms gives the respective aggregate trade tax 
revenue from multinational activity, , 1LOC RtTTR . Correspondingly, 
, 2LOC R
tTTR  represents 
aggregate trade tax revenue collected from multinationals after behavioral responses in 
location choice, ignoring all other responses. All other parameters and variables are as 
defined above. 
The response intensity  LOCe linked to the reform-induced tax rate variation can be in-
ferred from the literature. To guarantee a plausible parameterization, we again benefit 
from meta-analytical techniques synthesizing the related empirical evidence (see Chap-
ter 5). The parameterization of the response in location choice following from this quan-
titative literature survey will be discussed in Chapter 8. 
                                                 
33  To identify multinational firms we resort to ownership information provided in the DAFNE database. 
A firm is defined to be multinational if it is either directly or indirectly majority-owned by a foreign par-
ent or if it directly or indirectly holds the majority in a foreign subsidiary. 
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3.3.2.2.2 Response in Choice of Legal Form 
Non-tax institutional and economic factors have long been considered to dominate the 
choice of legal form (MacKie-Mason and Gordon, 1997; Goolsbee, 1998). Entrepre-
neurs were, in particular, supposed to weigh the benefits linked to the limited liability of 
incorporation or better access to external financing and the costs related to, for example, 
legal reporting obligations. In more recent years, however, empirical research has pro-
vided evidence that tax-related aspects also play a significant role for the choice be-
tween running an incorporated or a non-incorporated firm (Goolsbee, 2004; De Mooij 
and Nicodème, 2008; Elschner, 2010). Profits generated by partnerships and sole pro-
prietorships are passed through and immediately subject to tax as income from business 
on the owner's level. Corporations, on the other side, pay a separate corporate income 
tax while personal taxes apply only to dividend pay-outs or realized capital gains from 
the disposal of shares.  
Similar to the simulation of tax reform impacts on location choice described in Sec-
tion 3.3.2.2, the response with regard to the choice of organizational form is modeled at 
the aggregate level. The response in each period t  is linked to the reform-induced 
change in the pooled sample median of the difference between the overall corporate tax 
burden (at company and shareholder level) and the overall tax rate of a pass-through 
entity, d DIFFmedian .34 Equation (3.30) formally describes the partial reform impact on the 
aggregate corporate income tax revenue, i.e. ignoring all other tax distortions.   
, 2 , 1 1
,d
OF R OF R OF DIFF R
t t median h t
h H
CTR CTR e CTR

    (3.30) 
1
,
R
h tCTR  is again the corporate tax due simulated for firm h in period t . 
, 1OF R
tCTR and
, 2OF R
tCTR  are again the respective aggregates before and after behavioral adjustment. 
This time , 2OF RtCTR  reflects the partial response to legal form choice, all other firm 
decisions held constant. OFe  is the semi-elasticity of the size of the corporate sector with 
regard to the tax rate difference between non-pass-through and pass-through entities. 
                                                 
34 This scenario-specific difference between the overall corporate tax burden and the tax burden of a 
pass-through entity is calculated assuming a 50% payout ratio for corporations:
   0.5 0.5( (1 )(1 )) ( )(1 )DIFF STR STR SH SC STR PIT TT TT SCcredit                 , where STR  is again the combined 
statutory tax rate at the corporate level, SH is the tax rate on dividends at shareholder level, SC  is the 
solidarity surcharge at shareholder level, PIT is the (top) personal income tax rate on earned income, TT is 
the local trade tax rate and TTcredit is the trade tax credited against personal income tax. 
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The partial impact on trade tax revenue is calculated accordingly in equation (3.31). 
1
,
R
h tTTR  is again the trade tax due simulated for firm h in period t . 
, 1OF R
tTTR and
, 2OF R
tTTR  
represent, respectively, aggregate trade tax revenue before and after behavioral adjust-
ment. All other parameters are as defined above. 
, 2 , 1 1
, 
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
    (3.31) 
The parameterization of the response in choice of legal form will be discussed in Chap-
ter 8, where we also explain the parameterization of all other modeled response mar-
gins. 
3.3.3 Some Potential Qualifications – A Discussion 
We are convinced that ZEW TaxCoMM’s approach to incorporating behavioral re-
sponses provides valuable insights on second round tax reform consequences. Some 
potential qualifications should still not be ignored. First, the simulation does not capture 
all of the various effects at work when the economy adjusts to policy shocks. Second, 
the aggregation of micro-level implications ignores spillovers between firms. Third, we 
discuss whether the simulation is vulnerable to the so-called “Lucas critique”. 
ZEW TaxCoMM’s simulation of firm-level responses focuses on partial responses to 
tax reform. It thus ignores general equilibrium interactions. As a consequence, the simu-
lation model only captures the immediate investment response to tax reform through the 
user cost of capital; instead, it will not consider any effects from induced changes in the 
scale of production.35 Potential effects running via the capital market interest rate are 
not considered, either. The interest rate is held constant across all tax policy scenarios. 
In short, we trade off a general equilibrium perspective against a high level of institu-
tional detail and a broad representation of firm-level heterogeneity. Nonetheless, we 
consider the information loss associated with the disregard of general equilibrium inter-
actions to be fairly limited. The direct channel via the factor price is indeed shown to be 
the key determinant of capital formation (Fox and Fullerton, 1991). Furthermore, given 
high international capital mobility, interest rates should indeed be irresponsive to 
changes in capital demand in one country.  
                                                 
35  Scale effects on capital accumulation add to the effect via the cost of capital and, for a fall in the cost 
of capital, result both from higher production due to decreasing operating costs. These might again be 
compensated through lower production following from countervailing decreases in government expenses 
required to balance the government’s revenue loss from the tax policy (Chirinko, 2002). 
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ZEW TaxCoMM aggregates micro-level reform consequences up to the macro level. 
Potential spillover effects on, e.g., productivity, between firms are ignored. According 
to endogenous growth theory, however, externalities of economic activities could matter 
when going from the micro-level to aggregate outcomes. The simulation thus does not 
consider this type of between-firm interactions and considers the aggregate tax reform 
consequence to be the sum of individual firm implications.   
The third qualification goes back to Lucas (1976). In his famous “Lucas critique”, 
Lucas raised the concern that estimated behavioral parameters, which naturally refer to 
the past, may not be robust to new and unprecedented situations. This concern would be 
particularly relevant if the empirical approaches are ad-hoc and of reduced form, mixing 
structural behavioral parameters with the expectation-formation process. In these cases, 
identified causalities would not be invariant to breaks in the expectation formation of 
economic agents. Such breaks are likely to occur when there are fundamental changes 
in tax policy.  
Although the Lucas critique has been reported to be of minor relevance in applied re-
search (Stanley, 2000a), it still poses a challenge. However, ZEW TaxCoMM’s behav-
ioral simulation algorithms are in line with established microeconomic models of the 
firm and reflect behavioral patterns which can be derived from such frameworks. Still, 
due to the multitude of response margins considered and due to the various dimensions 
of firm-level heterogeneity, the responses are not explicitly derived from one unified 
structural model of the firm.  Furthermore, in light of the critique, it seems appropriate 
not to be arbitrarily selective but to base the parameterization on a comprehensive syn-
thesis of high-quality empirical evidence. This is what is done here. 
After all, these potential qualifications must be kept in mind when interpreting the 
simulation results. These should be considered with appropriate care. Yet, this does 
generally hold for all ex-ante evaluations of policy reforms and therefore is no particu-
larity of the ZEW TaxCoMM approach. We are convinced that the microsimulation is a 
complementary instrument for the appraisal of tax policy reform due to its hitherto 
unachieved capacities in capturing the existing heterogeneity of reform impacts across 
firms. 
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4 The Econometric Framework for Meta-Analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
Meta-analysis is a form of quantitative literature survey. It relies on econometric meth-
ods to systematically disentangle the quantitative impact of explicit or implicit choices 
of study design on obtained empirical evidence. Exploiting the virtues of statistical 
analyses, meta-analysis reasonably complements high-quality narrative surveys (Stan-
ley, 2001). Various applications of meta-analysis are put forward in several fields of 
economics.36 In a meta-regression, an effect size index, often a regression parameter, 
extracted from primary analyses is taken as the dependent variable and modeled as a 
function of (mostly) dummy variable predictors which represent differences in method, 
design, and data used by the primary estimation. Meta-regression analysis thus helps to 
systematically explain the considerable variation found in empirical research. In other 
words, it helps to “offer specific reasons, based on the studies themselves, why the evi-
dence on a certain question may appear contradictory or overly varied” (Stanley, 2001: 
132).  
Sophisticated meta-studies suggest a broad range of meta-analytical techniques. In-
structive examples are e.g. Stanley (2005, 2008), Brons et al. (2008) and in particular 
                                                 
36  For a comprehensive introduction and a thorough discussion of the concept of meta-analysis in eco-
nomics, see Florax et al. (2002). Meta-analysis is applied, for example, in the field of international eco-
nomics by Havranek and Irsova (2011) and Goerg and Strobl (2001) on productivity spillovers associated 
with multinational firm activity, by De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) on taxation and foreign direct invest-
ment; in the field of labor economics by Card and Krueger (1995) on minimum wage effects, by Stanley 
and Jarrell (1998) on gender wage discrimination and by Card et al. (2010) on labor market policy evalua-
tions; or in the field of environmental economics by Smith and Huang (1995) on property value models. 
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Brons (2006) and Bom and Ligthart (2008).37 We follow these more sophisticated ap-
proaches and present the full set of meta-analytical estimators in a formally integrated 
framework.  
4.2 Classical Meta-Analysis 
In an initial step, meta-analytical techniques are used to combine single study results to 
produce an overall estimate which subsequently can be tested for significance. One pos-
sible way to directly uncover the overall statistical significance of the empirical rela-
tionship of interest would be to perform Fisher’s combined test on p-values of the indi-
vidual estimates. However, this test suffers from several shortcomings. In particular, it 
does not indicate the sign of the effect that was tested for significance (Jarrell and Stan-
ley, 2004). Therefore we concentrate on the computation of pooled effect estimates via 
the use of fixed or random effects meta-analysis.  
In this section and all other sections of Chapter 4, the effect size index used in the 
meta-analysis is supposed to be a semi-elasticity. However, the econometric framework 
applies without change to all other types of uniformly scaled effect size indices estima-
ble in regression analyses, i.e. regression parameters such as elasticities or marginal 
effects.  
Conceptually, all “traditional” meta-analytical estimators are based on weighted least 
squares (WLS) techniques. These are efficient if estimation models are heteroskedastic 
and the nature of heteroskedasticity is known. WLS estimation uses inverse (condition-
al) error term variances as analytic weights in order to give observations with smaller 
variances a larger weight and therefore greater influence in the estimates (Greene, 2003, 
Ch. 11.5).  
Turning to the most basic meta-analytical model, the fixed effects (FE) meta-analysis 
assumes exactly one true effect to underlie all primary estimates.38 Let 0  denote this 
true semi-elasticity. The primary estimates iˆ  sampled from studies 1,...,i N  are sup-
posed to deviate from the true coefficient due to sampling error alone. Put differently, 
primary estimates iˆ  are solely explained by an intercept 0 and a random error term 
                                                 
37  The very foundations of meta-analysis, also in a technical sense, have meanwhile been laid by inter 
alia Hedges and Olkin (1985), Hunter and Schmidt (1990), Stanley and Jarrell (1989, 1998), Jarrell and 
Stanley (1990) and Stanley (1998, 2000a, b). 
38 The term “fixed” (vs. “random”) thus refers to the characteristics of the underlying true semi-
elasticity. Therefore, the meta-analytical terminology should not be confused with the homonymous panel 
econometric approaches. 
Chapter 4 The Econometric Framework for Meta-Analysis 51 
 
 
2(0, )
ii
N    representing primary sampling error. To obtain a meta-estimate   of the 
common true semi-elasticity, observed primary estimates iˆ  are only regressed on a con-
stant 1x  . Equation (4.1) formally depicts the fixed effects model.  
 0iˆ i     (4.1) 
This model is easily shown to be heteroskedastic. For each primary semi-elasticity 
estimate, susceptibility to sampling error is reflected by its variance ˆ( )iV  . The degree 
of sampling error depends fundamentally on sample size which differs from study to 
study. From equation (4.1) it is obvious that 2ˆ( )
ii
V   . Thus, i  is heteroskedastic. 
The nature of this heteroskedasticity is well known as estimates of ˆ( )iV   can be imme-
diately obtained from primary regression results.39 Therefore it is easy to account for by 
using WLS estimation with analytic weights 2 ˆ ˆˆ1 1 ( )
ii i
w V   .40 The conventional 
(WLS) fixed effects meta-estimator   of 0  is given by  
1
1
ˆ
,
N
i i
i
N
i
i
w
w

 




 (4.2) 
with all variables and parameters as defined above. 
In contrast to fixed effects meta-analysis, random effects (RE) meta-analysis explicit-
ly allows for heterogeneity of primary effect size estimates beyond pure sampling error. 
Let iˆ  be the tax effect estimate sampled from studies 1,...,i N  and i  a random dis-
turbance term representing sampling error with moments as defined above, then the true 
unobserved semi-elasticity is not assumed fixed but supposed to contain a study-specific 
random component 2(0, )i iid    such that   
0iˆ i i       (4.3) 
                                                 
39 Generally, studies indicate estimated standard errors ˆ ˆ( )
i
V   of primary coefficients.  Although statis-
tical problems (e.g. error-in-variables bias) might arise from the use of weights which are themselves 
estimates (Macaskill et al., 2001), precision weighted meta-analyses have proved to be quite reliable in 
simulation studies (Stanley, 2008). 
40  Note that the weights iw  referred to throughout this section are the so-called analytic weights used for 
WLS estimation. If one thinks of WLS estimation as applying OLS to weighted observations, the obser-
vation weights correspond to the square root of the analytic weights (e.g. Greene, 2003, Ch. 11.5; Baum, 
2006, Ch. 6.21). 
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The pooled estimator is described by formula (4.2), but the (efficient) weights ap-
plied to calculate   are different. The nested meta-disturbance varies with 
 2 2( ) ii iV        . Obviously, it includes an additive (between) variance compo-
nent 2  which represents that part of the variance ˆ( )iV   beyond pure sampling error. 
While information on 2
i  is obtained from primary study results, 2  has to be estimat-
ed in a first step of the WLS meta-regression.41 After all, inverse variance weights are 
computed as  2 2ˆ ˆ1 iiw     . 
Since the underlying assumptions of fixed and random effects meta-analysis are mu-
tually exclusive, there is a need to choose the adequate estimator for the data at hand by 
using statistical tests. A common test for the null hypothesis of between-study homoge-
neity, i.e. a between-study variance 2  of zero, is the Q-test which is based on the 2 -
distributed Q-statistic given by  
L
1
i=1
1
2
2 2
ˆ
ˆQ (L 1),
L
i
L
i
i i
i i
i
w
w
w

 

      
   (4.4) 
with all variables as defined above and iw  as the fixed effects weights.  
As soon as the computed Q-statistic allows the rejection of the null hypothesis of be-
tween-study homogeneity, the simple fixed effects meta-analysis is no longer applica-
ble. But even classical random effects meta-analysis remains limited in scope as it does 
not attempt to systematically explain this excess variability of primary effect size esti-
mates.42 
4.3 Meta-Regression Analysis 
Consequently, most modern meta-studies turn to meta-regression and go beyond classi-
cal meta-analysis based on “empty models” by introducing relevant explanatory varia-
                                                 
41 In regards to the estimation of 2 , Thompson and Sharp (1999) describe various estimators which are 
applicable. Precisely, we will rely on residual maximum likelihood (REML) techniques to estimate 2 . 
42  This simple decision between fixed and random effects is further complicated by the presence of pub-
lication selection, as we find here. With publication bias, the fixed effects weighted average is less biased 
than random effect meta-analysis (Stanley, 2008; Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2007). Also, publication bias 
may, in part, be caused by selection across these random effects. In which case, all random effects meta-
analyses are no longer strictly valid.   
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bles. Since these meta-regression models imply a conceptual extension of classical ran-
dom effects meta-analyses, the underlying econometric models remain relatively 
straightforward. The notation chosen hereafter will take account of the fact that many 
meta-studies follow the suggestions by Bijmolt and Pieters (2001) to use the infor-
mation from all estimated models in primary studies for meta-regressions (so-called 
multiple sampling).43 
Depending on whether all the heterogeneity beyond sampling error can be systemati-
cally captured by the moderator variables, meta-regression analysis can be classified 
into fixed effects versus random (also called mixed) effects meta-regression.  
The fixed effects meta-regression model is given by 
0ˆ  is is     i isx β z δ  (4.5) 
where iˆs  represents the sth effect size estimate sampled from study i. 0  is the inter-
cept and ix and isz  are vectors with respectively study-specific and model-specific vari-
ables. is is the error term with conditional moments  , 0isE  i isx z  and  
  2,
isis
V  i isx z . 
Correspondingly, the random (also called mixed) effects meta-regression can be writ-
ten as  
0ˆ  is is is       i isx β z δ  (4.6) 
where 2(0, )is iid    is the remaining unexplained heterogeneity.44 All other variables 
are as defined in (4.5).  
Generally, both fixed effects and random effects meta-regression models are estimat-
ed by WLS in order to account for heteroskedasticity. The employed analytical weights 
isw  correspond to the reciprocal conditional (nested) error term variances. In the case of 
a fixed effects meta-analytic framework, the nature of the heteroskedasticity is known. 
In analogy to the classical fixed effects analysis, it is easy to see from equation (4.5) 
                                                 
43  The following discussion on clustered error structures could, in principle, also apply to classical meta-
analysis if this were already based on multiple sampling. For brevity and clarity reasons we put the focus 
on meta-regression analysis. It also seems more appropriate in this context as meta-regression explicitly 
aims at the econometrically most refined breakdown of heterogeneity beyond sampling error. 
44  In principle, these models might be extended to more complex forms known as random coefficient 
models (see e.g. Goldstein, 1995). Also more than two levels might be considered. Econometrically, this 
affects the definition of the nested error terms.  
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that  2 ˆ ,
is is
V  i isx z . Remember that we can derive information on  ˆ ,isV  i isx z  
from documented primary results. Analytical weights employed in WLS estimation are 
thus  2 ˆ ˆˆ1 1 ,
isis is
w V   i isx z . 
Furthermore, if WLS is applied to estimate a random effects meta-regression model, 
efficient variance weights contain an additive component. It holds that 
  2 2,
isis is
V       i isx z . Thus, employed weights are given by  2 2ˆ ˆ1 isisw     . 
As in classical random effects meta-analysis, 2  must be estimated in a first step. 
Again, 2ˆ
is  is generally given in the primary literature. 
Estimates of model (4.6) should be preferred over those of model (4.5) if the Q-test 
for heterogeneity still rejects the null of no unobserved heterogeneity after the introduc-
tion of the meta-regressors.  
None of the estimators outlined so far, however, explicitly account for the cluster-
sample characteristics of the meta-dataset and the implied possibility of dependency of 
observations originating from study-specific unobserved heterogeneity. When model 
(4.6) is transformed, it shows a hierarchically nested error structure. Efficient estimation 
then has to be based on cluster-econometric techniques that account for the observation 
dependency within studies. The meta-analytical literature in this case often refers to 
hierarchical or multilevel models. As opposed to the fixed and mixed effects meta-
regressions, multilevel models account for non-zero off-diagonal elements of the vari-
ance-covariance-matrix, e.g. for within-study correlation resulting from the unobserved 
study-specific effects. Basically, these models correspond to random effects models in 
cluster-econometric terms and as such can be written as 
0ˆ  is i is       i isx β z δ  (4.7) 
with 2(0, )i iid    being the unobserved heterogeneity at the study-level.  
Such multilevel estimation should, however, be considered with caution. If unob-
served study-level heterogeneity is present, it might be correlated with the meta-
regressors. Then, neither multilevel meta-analysis nor any pooled estimators will be 
consistent. In this case only a fixed effects cluster-econometric approach is viable. 
However, fixed effects estimation does not allow to identify the impact of study charac-
teristics on the reported evidence. Following Wooldridge (2002: Ch. 11.5), it might also 
make sense to stick to pooled OLS but making inference robust to within-study correla-
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tion. In practice, both alternatives may be used according to the main parameters of in-
terest (study or model level) and robustness can be checked by applying some of the 
alternative estimators.   
Figure 4.1 shows the schema of meta-analytical estimators and their conceptual rela-
tionships. Furthermore, it indicates the tests used to choose the most suitable meta-
regression estimator for the structure of the meta-data at hand. 
Figure 4.1: A Schema of Meta-Analytical Estimators 
 
4.4 Publication Selection 
So far we have focused on the methodological framework integrating all meta-analytical 
estimators. However, another important issue in meta-analysis is the identification and 
remedy of publication bias.45 Either party involved in the scientific publication process, 
i.e. authors as well as journal editors or reviewers, may prefer empirical results which 
                                                 
45  For a concise methodological survey see Stanley (2005). Stanley has been pioneering meta-analysis in 
economics with a focus on publication bias (see also Stanley, 2001, 2008).  
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meet fundamental expectations concerning the effects and relationships assessed. Con-
sequently, research results which in significance and/or sign do not correspond to the 
presumed or real standards might be doomed. In the strand of research dealing with FDI 
and taxation, for example, there might exist an expectation of an adverse tax effect on 
FDI. Fortunately, meta-analysis can assess whether unexpected results are systematical-
ly discarded from the literature and significant adverse effects are thereby over-
represented. 
The intuition is straightforward. If only or primarily significantly adverse estimates 
survive the publication process, published semi-elasticities are correlated with their 
primary standard errors.46 Put differently, when effect size compensates for estimation 
uncertainty, results will more likely find approval and be reported. Meta-regression 
analyses, however, are able to provide a more fundamental backing to this idea (Stan-
ley, 2005; Stanley, 2008; Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2007): 
In the absence of publication selection, observed primary semi-elasticities should 
vary symmetrically around the genuine pooled effect. Any imprecision in the estimates 
is supposed to be purely random (see Section 4.1). In the presence of publication selec-
tion, the distribution of semi-elasticities will be truncated. Systematically dropping es-
timates with the “wrong” sign or low significance skews the published semi-elasticities 
in the desired direction. Thus, if publication selection is present, pooling the observed 
semi-elasticities clearly overstates the adverse tax effect on FDI.  
Standard sample selection models (Heckman 1979) refer to the inverse Mills ratio in 
order to capture distortions in the (conditional) mean of an incidentally truncated de-
pendent variable. However, identifying the inverse Mills ratio for each observation in 
the selected sample requires information about non-selected observations. By definition, 
information on unpublished primary results is not available to the meta-analyst. Still, an 
econometric remedy is available. The degree of sampling error which causes repeated 
estimates to scatter around the true effect depends fundamentally on sample size, which 
again differs between studies. Thus, the variation of estimates around the genuine semi-
elasticity is clearly heteroskedastic (also see Section 4.2).  Intuitively, the bias induced 
by truncating a random distribution of estimates, ceteris paribus, increases with its dis-
persion. Consequently, identification of selection bias in meta-analysis is not based on 
the inverse Mills ratio, but on heteroskedastic standard deviations (Stanley and Doucou-
                                                 
46  Remember that we argue based on semi-elasticities which have been pre-multiplied by -1, such that 
high semi-elasticities represent high adverse tax effects on FDI.   
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liagos, 2007). In more formal terms, classical meta-analysis is extended as follows to 
capture the bias in observed semi-elasticities iˆ :   
0ˆ ii iv       (4.8) 
0 again represents the fixed true underlying effect. iv  is the disturbance term, which 
either represents pure sampling error (fixed effects meta-analysis), or additionally nests 
excess random heterogeneity (random effects meta-analysis).  is the inverse Mills ra-
tio, and  represents the coefficient of correlation between iv  and the disturbance of the 
underlying selection process (not shown here, for details see Greene, 2003, Ch. 22.4; or 
Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2007). Standard selection models in a first step identify  
for each observation i and use it for identification of the term
i . Though the meta-
analyst has no prior information on , he benefits from the fact that the estimate, ˆ
i , of 
the primary standard error is known (see Section 4.1). Thus, some function of ˆ
i can be 
employed to identify publication bias. After all the considerations, the classical meta-
analysis equation extended to account for publication selection reduces to a very simple 
MRA: 
0ˆ ˆ ii iv      (4.9) 
Testing whether 0   provides for a test on the presence of publication bias. The 
disturbance term iv  differs according to whether meta-analytical models assume fixed or 
random underlying effects. In order to account for the heteroskedasticity in iv , equation 
(4.9) is estimated with WLS as discussed in Section 4.2. The resulting estimate of the 
intercept 0 is regularly considered as the bias-corrected pooled effect (Sutton et al., 
2000; Macaskill et al., 2001; Stanley, 2005).  
Notably, the inverse Mills ratio is known to be a non-linear function of factors that 
determine sample selection. In particular, Stanley and Doucouliagos (2007) argue that it 
is not constant with respect to the primary standard error. Therefore, they propose to 
base the test for publication bias on squared standard errors included in the meta-
analytical models. 
This meta-analytic methodology of publication bias correction, of course, is not re-
stricted to the bivariate context. It is highly advisable to integrate the correction into 
multiple meta-regressions. Otherwise, asymmetries in observed semi-elasticities which 
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are due to underlying heterogeneity systematically produced by different data sets, dif-
ferent time periods, or different countries might misleadingly be attributed to publica-
tion selection (Stanley, 2005).  
Based on simulation analyses, Stanley (2008) and Stanley and Doucouliagos (2007) 
show that both the linear and the non-linear model variant effectively account for publi-
cation bias in reported primary effects.  
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5 A Meta-Study on FDI and Company Taxation 
5.1 Introduction 
The political interest in tax competition, coordination, and harmonization has remained 
high in Europe for more than 45 years (see the Neumark-Report in 1963). Most recent-
ly, the EU considers harmonization of corporate taxation in form of a common consoli-
dated corporate tax base (CCCTB) combined with formula apportionment (Weiner, 
2006; Schoen et al., 2008). Not surprisingly, the scientific interest in international tax 
competition has considerably increased since harmonization efforts in Europe intensi-
fied, but also due to rising capital mobility in the last thirty years. Theoretical studies in 
public economics highlight numerous and heterogeneous conditions for tax competition 
to be harmful and tax coordination to be useful (see the surveys by Wilson, 1999; Feld, 
2000; Wilson and Wildasin, 2004; Fuest, Huber and Mintz, 2005). Without referring to 
empirical evidence, no unambiguous predictions could however be obtained. The em-
pirical literature on tax competition has consequently grown heavily in recent years 
leading to an abundance of empirical studies that consider the impact of taxation on 
patterns of capital mobility, notably foreign direct investment (FDI). These empirical 
studies also report heterogeneous results leaving us with a similarly diverse picture as 
the theoretical analyses (see the surveys by Hines, 1997, 1999; Devereux 2007b). Re-
garding diverse empirical results, economists could adopt meta-analytical methods to 
gain clearer insights as to the effects of international taxation (Jarrell and Stanley, 1989,  
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2005; Stanley, 2001). De Mooij and Ederveen (2003, 2005, 2006, and 2008) pioneer 
this approach in the economics of international taxation. Empirical analyses on the rela-
tionship of FDI and taxation vary widely with respect to central characteristics such as 
data and estimation approach. Our meta-study uses this variation to explain the hetero-
geneity in the estimated tax response of FDI.  
Precisely, we extend former meta-analyses on FDI and taxation put forward by De 
Mooij and Ederveen (2003, 2005, 2006, and 2008) in three ways. First, we add 16 more 
recent publications.  Second, we code additional meta-regressor variables to address 
potentially important issues in research on FDI and taxation. Third, we present a struc-
tured statistical strategy to choose the meta-regression model and estimator most suita-
ble for the meta-data at hand. Finally, this meta-study yields additional insights into the 
primary empirical evidence and its most important driving factors. As compared to prior 
surveys, this meta-analysis is based on a much broader methodological basis and a con-
siderably richer meta-dataset.  
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: In Section 5.2, we provide a 
brief review of the empirical evidence on the effect of host country corporate taxes on 
FDI. In Section 5.3 we present descriptive statistics of the meta-dataset. Furthermore, in 
Section 5.4 we set out the study characteristics coded to explain the heterogeneity in the 
primary evidence. Detailed results of both classical meta-analysis as well as sophisticat-
ed meta-regression analysis are discussed in Section 5.5. Finally, Section 5.6 concludes. 
5.2 Qualitative Literature Review 
Following theoretical analyses on the impact of international tax differentials on FDI 
(Fuest, Huber and Mintz, 2005), multinationals’ options for location choice are the start-
ing point for empirical analyses. In particular, studies in international economics distin-
guish horizontal expansions from vertical investment decisions and analyze both issues 
separately. Multinationals that engage in horizontal investments want to establish pro-
duction abroad in order to serve local markets. In contrast, vertical investments serve to 
geographically allocate a company’s production chain with the aim of exploiting inter-
locational differences in relative factor endowments. Based on these insights, Horst-
mann and Markusen (1992) develop an instructive theory on horizontal FDI. They show 
that a multinational will locate production in direct proximity to a foreign market if the 
corresponding reduction of distance-related costs is advantageous as compared to the 
reduced potential of exploiting economies of scale at the plant-level. The more im-
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portant economies of scale, the less likely local production will be, at least in small for-
eign countries. As for vertical FDI, Helpman (1984, 1985) argues that splitting the value 
chain is driven by the multinational’s aim to reduce total production costs. As long as 
reductions in production costs, due to lower factor prices abroad, exceed corresponding 
set-up costs, the multinational firm will engage in foreign unskilled-labor intensive pro-
duction. Coherently, Overesch and Wamser (2009) find that cost-driven vertical FDI is 
more tax-sensitive than horizontal cross-border investments. Markusen (1997, 2002) 
presents the so-called knowledge-capital model as a unified approach that explains both, 
horizontal and vertical, motivations for foreign investment. This model has become 
standard in theoretical FDI research. 
Some recent empirical studies on the effect of corporate taxes on FDI refer to the 
above-mentioned concepts in order to come up with a theoretically solid estimation 
strategy (e.g. Devereux and Lockwood, 2006). Other studies opt for a gravity set-up as 
successfully applied in the empirical trade analyses (e.g. Bellak et al., 2009). The gravi-
ty approach explains inter-country FDI patterns through a combination of mass varia-
bles (e.g. GDP, population) and distance variables. This basic set-up is regularly aug-
mented by presumably important policy and locational factors. These are – in addition 
to a measure of corporate tax levels – indicators for e.g. political risk, openness or infra-
structure. Thus, they often employ sets of explanatory variables whose importance is 
also justified by theoretical considerations.47 
Pioneering empirical studies on the tax sensitivity of FDI, however, relied on a very 
different foundation. Taking investment models based on “Tobin’s q” as a starting 
point, these early approaches regress time-series of aggregate bilateral FDI inflows into 
the US on proxies for its marginal rate of return (Hartman, 1984; Boskin and Gale, 
1987; Newlon, 1987; Young, 1988; Murthy, 1999).48 As a major result, these studies 
report a lower tax sensitivity of FDI financed by transfers of funds as compared to FDI 
financed by retained earnings. Slemrod (1990) fundamentally reconsiders this prior re-
search. In contrast to the earlier studies, he documents that retained earnings are less tax 
sensitive than transfers of funds. Moreover, his analysis accounts for the influence of 
home country taxes and considers differences in home country double taxation relief. 
Generally, home countries of investing multinationals may tax the parent’s worldwide 
                                                 
47 For a microeconomic foundation of gravity models in FDI research, see e.g. Head and Ries (2008) or 
Kleinert and Toubal (2010). 
48 For surveys that cover this early strand of the literature in detail see Hines (1997, 1999), De Mooij and 
Ederveen (2003) or Bloningen (2005). 
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income and credit the foreign taxes paid against the home country tax liability in order 
to avoid double taxation of profits (credit system). Otherwise, they only tax domestic 
corporate income and exempt foreign profits (exemption system). If the home country 
applies a credit system and taxes profits higher than foreign host countries, host country 
taxation is not final. Instead, the final tax burden on foreign investment income will 
always correspond to the home country tax rate. Thus, FDI from (high-tax) home coun-
tries applying the credit system might be less sensitive to host country taxes. Slemrod, 
however, does not report clear-cut results on the influence of double taxation relief. In a 
later study, Jun (1994) finds that the system of double taxation relief only affects the 
influence of the home country tax rate on FDI. Instead, Wijeweera et al. (2007) confirm 
presumptions that investors from exemption countries are more responsive to tax.  
In addition to the question of double taxation relief, Slemrod (1990) touches upon 
another relevant issue in the research conducted on FDI and taxation: From a methodo-
logical point of view, it is preferable to use tax measures which reflect the forward-loo-
king nature of investment decisions. Still, the early literature in the lines of Hartman 
(1984) measures the tax-induced disincentive to investment by a “backward-looking” 
macroeconomic average tax rate, computed as total taxes paid divided by a measure of 
profits. As they are based on actual tax payments after corporate tax planning or discre-
tionary tax provisions, these tax rates capture the “true” tax burden on investments. 
However, by construction, such implicit tax rates are susceptible to endogeneity. If tax-
es paid are influenced by recent investment activity, e.g. through depreciation allowanc-
es, FDI inflows and the host country average tax rate might be simultaneously deter-
mined (Devereux, 2007b). Furthermore, simultaneity might be rooted in a high correla-
tion of foreign affiliates’ profits and retained earnings used to finance FDI (Slemrod, 
1990).49 
Forward-looking tax rates are based on neoclassical investment theory (Jorgenson, 
1963) and reflect tax-induced distortions in the cost of capital. By definition they cap-
ture the disincentive to invest at the corporate decision margin. Slemrod (1990) employs 
forward-looking effective marginal tax rates (EMTR) as do more recent studies that 
calculate effective marginal tax rates according to the methodology put forward by King 
and Fullerton (1984) and extended by Devereux and Griffith (1999, 2003). Devereux 
and Griffith (1999, 2003) develop a consistent neoclassical approach to compute effec-
                                                 
49  However, macroeconomic or microeconomic implicit tax rates are still employed in a series of later 
studies (Grubert and Mutti, 1991, 2000; Hines and Rice, 1994; Mutti and Grubert, 2004). 
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tive average tax rates (EATR). These reflect national or bilateral tax incentives on the 
discrete choice of where to locate profitable, i.e. infra-marginal, investment projects.50 
Effective tax rates which capture cross-border tax regulations perform well in recent 
empirical analyses (Bellak et al., 2009; Egger et al., 2009b).  
Moreover, the number of studies focusing on discrete location choices has multiplied 
during recent years. The reason for this is improved data availability. While US econo-
mists have had access to firm-level panel data for many years (e.g. Bartik, 1985; Papke, 
1991; Swenson, 2001a), micro data for Europe has become available only recently.51 As 
a consequence, a rising number of studies focus on one or both distinct stages of the 
transnational investment decision: discrete location choice and/or continuous choice of 
investment levels, underlining that the scope of investment is chosen conditional on the 
location decision. Studies based on aggregate FDI data can hardly disentangle these two 
consecutive firm choices (Devereux, 2007b).52 Micro data studies are also appealing 
because they can directly refer to (tangible) fixed assets when analyzing continuous 
investment decisions (Buettner and Wamser, 2009a; Overesch and Wamser, 2010a). 
This balance-sheet item measures real economic activity more precisely than FDI in its 
broad definition. Aggregate FDI flows in general do not only reflect changes in the real 
capital stock of foreign affiliates, but they also comprise purely financial transactions 
(e.g. M&A) to acquire existing real capital.  
An important strand of mainly the US literature, however, aggregates firm-level data 
on tangible fixed assets, referred to as property, plant and equipment (PPE). They thus 
capture real economic activity while keeping an aggregate perspective (Grubert and 
Mutti, 1991, 2000; Hines and Rice, 1994; Hines, 1996; Altshuler et al., 2001; Devereux 
and Lockwood, 2006; Bobonis and Shatz, 2007). Firm-level analysis of tax influences 
on discrete location choice is either based on count data approaches (Papke, 1991; 
Stoewhase, 2005a; Overesch and Wamser, 2009, 2010a) or latent variable models, no-
tably conditional logit estimation (Bartik, 1985; Devereux and Griffith, 1998; Swenson, 
2001a). Some authors also apply fixed effect logit estimation to their micro data panels 
                                                 
50  Equally, Devereux and Griffith (1999) integrate bilateral tax regulation into the computation of effec-
tive tax rates on marginal investments. 
51 The very rich Microdatabase Direct Investment (MiDi) publicly provided by the Deutsche Bundes-
bank since 2003 has lead to a rising number of studies with a focus on German and European cross-
border investments. In contrast, studies employing aggregate panel data have focused much earlier on 
European or OECD FDI patterns (e.g. Devereux and Freeman, 1995; Billington, 1999; Buettner, 2002; 
Gorter and Parikh, 2003; Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2005; Demekas et al., 2007; or Wolff 2007). 
52  Some studies based on aggregate data, however, employ two-stage selection methods in order to ac-
count for the sequential transnational investment decision (Razin et al., 2005; Wolff, 2007). 
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in order to control for unobserved firm-specific location preferences (Buettner and Ruf, 
2007; Buettner and Wamser, 2009a). Unobserved variables which are possibly correlat-
ed with taxes might lead to biased estimates of the tax effect on FDI. Aggregate location 
conditions are supposed to be insufficiently captured by observed variables (Becker et 
al., 2006). Therefore, authors of both aggregate and micro panel data studies regularly 
control for unobserved time constant country effects in their empirical analyses. Macro-
economic time fixed effects might affect FDI patterns, as well. Consequently, in many 
panel data analyses, they are equally accounted for by inclusion of time dummies. Con-
trolling for unobserved fixed effects can indeed alter the size and particularly the signif-
icance of tax effect estimates. Apparently, tax incentives can sometimes be hardly dis-
tinguishable from unobserved country and time characteristics (Wolff, 2007; Good-
speed et al., 2007).  
Related to the issue of – more or less observed – location characteristics is the inclu-
sion of public expenditure variables into regression models assessing the determinants 
of FDI. The impact of public spending on multinationals’ investment decisions has only 
recently gained attention. Adopting the traditional Tieboutian (1956) perspective on 
inter-jurisdictional tax differences, the spending side must however not be neglected. 
This has been recognized by theoretical studies (Keen and Marchand, 1997; Sinn, 2003) 
and has been much emphasized in a recent empirical analysis by Bénassy-Quéré et al. 
(2007).53 Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007) find that the overall effect of taxation on FDI is 
moderated by public spending. The immediate adverse tax effect is compensated for if 
tax receipts finance better public inputs. Baldwin and Krugman (2004) show that ag-
glomeration effects in geographic centers might allow governments to tax business 
more heavily. Some studies therefore put an additional focus on the agglomeration ef-
fects (e.g. Bobonis and Shatz, 2007; Goodspeed et al., 2007). 
5.3 The Meta-Dataset 
The meta-dataset used for this analysis includes 29 studies taken from the earlier meta-
studies on FDI and taxation by De Mooij and Ederveen (2003, 2005, 2006, and 2008) 
plus 16 additional papers or journal articles. The new studies have been detected by 
comprehensively searching the EconLit database for empirical literature on the tax sen-
                                                 
53  If spending is broadly defined as comprising those factors which generally reflect the quality of public 
inputs, studies accounting for infrastructure endowment or education levels also belong to this strand 
ofliterature (e.g. Bellak et al., 2009). 
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sitivity of FDI. Precisely, we searched the database for the central keywords “FDI and 
tax” as well as “multinational and tax.” Furthermore, we conducted internet searches 
and scanned appropriate journals as well as working paper series.54 
We sample all tax effect estimates from individual primary studies. Such multiple 
sampling allows for more powerful tests and more accurate estimates due to a larger 
underlying sample as compared to single estimate sampling. Moreover, choosing one 
estimate from each study must rely on predefined sampling rules, which might be less 
than fully objective.55 Eventually, our meta-sample contains 704 observations. This cor-
responds to an increase of the meta-dataset by 65% as compared to the one employed in 
De Mooij and Ederveen (2005, 2006, 2008).56 
The consistent effect size index referred to in this meta-study is the tax-rate elasticity 
of FDI, also known as semi-elasticity. If original estimates do not conform to this index 
they are consistently transformed.57 Semi-elasticities resulting from such transformation 
are evaluated at the sample mean of the dependent variable. Precisely, the semi-
elasticity indicates the percentage change in the response variable (here: some measure 
of FDI) in reaction to a one percentage point change in the explanatory variable (here: 
some measure of the host country tax rate). It is thus a coherent and concise measure of 
the tax influence on FDI. Equation (5.1) illustrates this interpretation more formally:  
ln 1semi-elasticity
  
FDI FDI
tax rate FDI tax rate
      (5.1) 
                                                 
54  Please note that we did not evaluate studies on non-EU transition or developing economies.  
55  Meta-analyses based on multiple sampling of estimates are e.g. found in Feld et al. (2007), De Mooij 
and Ederveen (2003, 2005, 2006, 2008) and Abreu et al. (2005). The question whether one estimate or all 
results should be sampled from primary studies, however, is not fully beyond controversy. For a discus-
sion of pros and cons, see e.g. Stanley (2001). 
56  The sample underlying the meta-analyses in De Mooij and Ederveen (2005, 2006, 2008) comprises 
six more studies than exploited in De Mooij and Ederveen (2003). We evaluate and integrate these studies 
ourselves as we have access to the meta-sample of 2003 only. Note that one study (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 
2001) contained in the 2003 sample is updated by a more recent version (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2005). 
Unfortunately, we were not able to derive semi-elasticities from fixed effect logit estimates in Buettner 
and Ruf (2007) as well as Buettner and Wamser (2009a). Due to missing information on primary standard 
errors, results from fixed effect logit estimation in Barrios et al. (2009) were not included in the meta-
sample, either. Furthermore, after carefully looking at the meta-data, we consider the highest and lowest 
percentile of tax effect estimates as outliers. Thus, we exclude them from the meta-sample (14 observa-
tions). Lastly, two estimates from Billington (1999) are excluded due to surprisingly low standard errors 
(<0.00015). Because these standard errors are based on only 56 observations, we regard these two esti-
mates as “precision outliers”. Both estimates together would take up a weight of more than 95% in the 
classical fixed effect meta-analysis based on median estimates and would thus dominate the remaining 98 
percent of this research  literature. 
57 Linear models with a log-level specification directly produce point estimates of semi-elasticities. Oth-
er specifications yield coefficients which represent e.g. marginal effects or elasticities. Whether such 
transformation was required is documented in Table A.1 in the Appendix A. 
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The semi-elasticity of FDI with respect to tax rate changes as defined in (5.1) is ex-
pected to be negative. In order to facilitate the interpretation of results, we pre-multiply 
each semi-elasticity in our meta-dataset by (-1). Consequently, the higher, i.e. the more 
positive, the semi-elasticities reported hereafter, the more important is the implied ad-
verse tax effect on FDI. 
Table 5.1 lists the results of the literature sampling procedure. Among the 45 studies 
contained in the meta-dataset, 15 analyses are dated 2006 or later. The sample thus co-
vers a considerable number of very recent contributions to the empirical evidence. Ref-
erences are marked with “P” if they have already been published in refereed economic 
journals or in a book. Referring to the number of studies, the share of published work in 
the meta-sample amounts to 78% (35 studies). The 592 estimates sampled from these 
publications make up for 84.1% of all primary estimates contained in the meta-sample. 
Obviously, studies differ considerably with respect to the quantity of reported semi-
elasticities. Precisely, the number of estimates obtained per study varies between 2 and 
95. Most importantly, the literature evaluated for the purpose of this meta-study is in-
deed heterogeneous with respect to reported tax effects on FDI. The mean semi-
elasticity per study ranges from -1.26 in Swenson (1994) to a value of 9.80 as docu-
mented by Hines (1996). Correspondingly, both studies report extreme median esti-
mates of respectively -2.72 and 9.99. Furthermore, the mean semi-elasticity of the over-
all meta-sample is 3.35. Remarkably, the median estimate amounts to a lower value of 
2.49. The minimum semi-elasticity of -8.80 is sampled from Slemrod (1990). The same 
study also contributes the maximum estimate contained in the meta-sample (32.62). 
This considerable span shows that tax effect estimates are not only heterogeneous 
across, but also within studies. This is clearly illustrated by the study-specific standard 
deviations of estimates in column 7 of Table 5.1. Nine references display standard devi-
ations exceeding a value of 5. But there are also studies which report far less dispersed 
semi-elasticities.  
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Table 5.1: Papers on the Tax Sensitivity of FDI Included in the Meta-Analysis: Reference, 
Number of Estimates and Descriptive Statistics 
      Semi‐elasticities 
Study 
  
No. of 
estimates   Mean  Median  Min  Max  Std.Dev. 
                       
1  Altshuler et al. 2001, P  20  2.74  2.58  1.38  4.02  0.79 
2  Bartik 1985, P  3  6.90  6.55  5.69  8.46  1.42 
3  Bellak and Leibrecht 2007*, P  11  3.10  4.10  ‐0.70  6.60  3.17 
4  Bellak et al. 2009*, P  11  4.48  4.90  3.60  5.50  0.77 
5  Bénassy‐Quéré et al. 2005** , P  17  4.79  4.00  0.20  14.29  3.75 
6  Bénassy‐Quéré et al. 2007*, P  19  4.13  4.38  ‐0.16  6.21  1.64 
7  Bobonis and Shatz 2007*, P  14  1.66  1.30  ‐8.39  9.86  5.66 
8  Boskin and Gale 1987, P  12  5.80  2.68  ‐0.26  21.19  7.56 
9  Broekman and Vliet 2001  3  3.35  3.51  2.51  4.02  0.77 
10  Buettner, 2002  23  1.48  1.59  ‐0.53  2.76  0.69 
11  Buettner and Wamser 2009a*, P  28  1.03  1.01  ‐0.30  1.83  0.53 
12  Cassou 1997, P  15  2.89  2.31  ‐3.10  10.69  3.96 
13  Demekas et al. 2007*, P  8  3.31  1.30  ‐0.60  11.50  4.83 
14  Desai et al. 2004a, P  2  0.64  0.64  0.62  0.66  0.03 
15  Devereux and Freeman 1995, P  4  1.56  1.55  1.41  1.70  0.12 
16  Devereux  Griffith 1998, P  10  0.84  0.94  0.05  1.20  0.40 
17  Devereux and Lockwood 2006*  7  0.36  0.36  0.15  0.48  0.12 
18  Egger et al. 2009b*, P  20  2.62  1.92  0.06  7.78  2.43 
19  Egger et al. 2009c*  6  0.46  1.62  ‐2.18  1.99  2.05 
20  Goodspeed et al. 2007*  4  2.20  2.25  1.60  2.70  0.54 
21  Gorter and Parikh 2003, P  28  4.20  4.20  ‐5.07  17.22  4.52 
22  Grubert and Mutti 1991, P  6  1.71  1.59  0.62  3.27  1.18 
23  Grubert and Mutti 2000, P  15  3.97  4.24  1.69  5.84  1.21 
24  Hajkova et al. 2006*  45  2.48  2.10  ‐1.20  6.10  1.73 
25  Hartman 1984, P  6  2.60  3.46  ‐2.04  4.05  2.30 
26  Hines 1996, P  44  9.80  9.99  1.10  31.90  6.47 
27  Hines and Rice 1994, P  3  3.72  3.33  1.24  6.59  2.69 
28  Jun 1994  10  0.50  1.26  ‐5.89  5.39  3.17 
29  Murthy 1989, P  4  0.62  0.71  ‐0.54  1.60  1.00 
30  Mutti and Grubert 2004*, P  11  2.39  2.15  0.37  4.84  1.27 
31  Newlon 1987, P  2  0.42  0.42  ‐3.45  4.28  5.47 
32  Overesch and Wamser 2009*, P  51  2.12  2.14  ‐1.40  6.59  1.53 
33  Overesch and Wamser 2010a*, P  12  0.97  0.93  0.55  1.33  0.25 
34  Pain and Young 1996  6  1.51  1.38  0.39  2.77  1.22 
35  Papke 1991, P  2  4.85  4.85  0.90  8.80  5.59 
36  Razin et al. 2005*  3  2.59  3.46  0.68  3.64  1.66 
37  Slemrod 1990, P  53  3.70  3.51  ‐8.80  32.62  7.07 
38  Stoewhase 2005a**, P  14  4.74  4.41  ‐5.45  20.31  7.09 
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Table 5.1 (Continued) 
      Semi‐elasticities 
Study 
    
No. of 
estimates   Mean  Median  Min  Max  Std.Dev. 
39  Stoewhase 2005b, P  14  5.26  4.30  2.08  10.78  2.71 
40  Swenson 1994, P  10  ‐1.26  ‐2.72  ‐5.08  8.07  4.25 
41  Swenson 2001a, P  95  3.95  3.19  ‐8.00  29.92  8.39 
42  Wei 1997  5  5.20  5.00  4.67  6.19  0.64 
43  Wijeweera et al. 2007*, P  8  4.90  5.57  ‐4.01  10.58  5.30 
44  Wolff 2007*, P  8  1.35  1.55  ‐0.79  2.73  1.24 
45  Young 1988, P  12  1.05  2.07  ‐5.29  9.23  4.17 
   Overall  704  3.35  2.49  ‐8.80  32.62  5.16 
Notes: 
* Study is new to the meta‐sample and was not subject to meta‐analysis before. 
** An updated study version was included as compared to De Mooij and Ederveen (2006, 2006, 2008). 
P marks studies which are published in refereed economic journals or books. 
The detailed sample distribution of primary tax effect estimates is depicted in Figure 
5.1. Clearly, the distribution is positively skewed. The right tail of the histogram docu-
ments infrequent but fairly high tax effect estimates. 
Figure 5.1: Histogram of Estimated Tax Semi-Elasticities of FDI as a Fraction of the Me-
ta-Sample (N = 704) 
 
As the median tells, 50% of reported semi-elasticities take on values below 2.49. 
Moreover, the 1st quartile of the sample distribution is as small as 0.89. Still, only 94 
estimates, i.e. a sample fraction of 13.4%, are zero or negative, reflecting an attracting 
tax effect on FDI. Another 25% of primary estimates ranges between the median and a 
semi-elasticity of 4.88, representing the 3rd quartile of the sample distribution.  
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5.4 The Meta-Regressor Variables 
Not only did we add 16 new studies to the meta-sample, we also coded additional study 
characteristics at the overall paper or single estimate level. Based on the insights gained 
from the literature review in Section 5.2, we believe these characteristics to be crucial in 
explaining the heterogeneity in tax effect estimates.  
In particular, we try to capture model specifications in more detail; more specifically, 
we code for whether primary studies control for unobserved country and/or time fixed 
effects. As discussed in the literature review (Section 5.2) unobserved location and time 
characteristics might play an important role in empirical analyses on the tax sensitivity 
of FDI. We therefore divide primary estimations into five categories, each coded as a 
binary dummy variable. It takes on a value of one if the primary estimates fall under the 
stated category and a value of zero otherwise. We differentiate time series analyses (bi-
nary dummy: TS), (pooled) cross-section studies with control for neither country nor 
time fixed effects (NO_FIX), studies with control for country fixed effects only 
(C_FIX), studies with control for time fixed effects (T_FIX), and studies with control 
for both country and time fixed effects (CT_FIX).  
Regarding tax burden measures employed in primary work, we classify employed ef-
fective tax rates in detail by evaluating whether the effective tax rate reflects only host 
country provisions or also encloses cross-border tax regulations (e.g. withholding tax-
es). Therefore, we code two new binary dummy variables: one for estimates based on 
the bilateral effective marginal tax rate (BEMTR) and one for estimates on the basis of 
bilateral effective average tax rates (BEATR). Instead, the two dummies EMTR and 
EATR respectively stand for pure host country effective marginal or average tax rates. 
If implicit tax rates are used, we differentiate whether these have been calculated at the 
macroeconomic (binary dummy MAC_ITR) or at the microeconomic level 
(MIC_ITR).58 Primary regressions referring to statutory tax rates instead of implicit or 
effective tax burdens are captured by the binary dummy STR. 
The literature review in Section 5.2 shows considerable differences in dependent var-
iables across studies. Therefore, we precisely categorize whether a study analyzes the 
determinants of aggregate FDI stocks (binary dummy: FDI_STOCK), aggregate FDI 
flows (FDI_FLOW), foreign affiliates’ fixed assets at the firm-level (FIRM_FA), for-
                                                 
58  Note that even microeconomic implicit tax rates are generally not firm-specific. Primary regressions 
regularly refer to the median microeconomic implicit tax rate for each host country. 
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eign affiliates’ fixed assets at the aggregate country level (AGG_FA), counts of affili-
ates in foreign locations (COUNT), or discrete response variables. In line with De 
Mooij and Ederveen (2003), we differentiate whether studies refer to discrete invest-
ment choice in general (DISCRETE), M&A investment (DISCRETE M&A) or explicit-
ly the creation/extension of new plants (DISCRETE PLANTS). In particular, we pre-
sume that tax semi-elasticities of FDI positions and incremental FDI are not identical. 
By definition, stocks should be more sluggish in reaction than flows. We also presume 
that results from firm-level analysis differ from those based on aggregate data. Further-
more, the classification allows analyzing if location choice is empirically more or less 
tax sensitive than continuous investment. 
As a lot of new evidence on the tax-responsiveness of FDI patterns in Europe has 
emerged in recent years, we code a binary dummy for studies focused exclusively on 
European countries as investment targets (INVEST_EU).  
Moreover, we introduce a binary dummy variable (PUB_SPEND) taking a value of 
one if the primary estimation controls for public spending on productivity enhancing 
inputs.59 Meta-analysis offers the opportunity to put the results reported by Bénassy-
Quéré et al. (2007) or Goodspeed et al. (2007) into a broader context. In econometric 
terms, we assess if the omission of public spending variables biases the estimated tax 
effects. Intuitively, we regard results from primary regressions which do not explicitly 
account for the expenditure side as estimates of an overall tax effect on FDI. In a speci-
fication without control for public spending, tax-financed public inputs can implicitly 
moderate the estimated tax impact on foreign activity. Instead, if public spending is con-
trolled for, the expenditure side is held constant. Thus, the tax coefficient reflects the 
pure ceteris paribus disincentive to invest caused by the tax system. In this logic, the 
coefficient for the meta-regressor PUB_SPEND compares the effect taxes exert ceteris 
paribus on foreign investments with their overall impact after accounting for tax-
financed public investments.  
Other explanatory characteristics at study or estimate level are adopted from the prior 
meta-analyses by De Mooij and Ederveen. They can also be inferred from the literature 
review in Section 5.2 and are plausibly the source of the heterogeneous empirical evi-
dence on the tax sensitivity of FDI. In detail, the list of meta-regressors contains binary 
dummies for the double taxation relief system employed in investors’ home countries. 
                                                 
59  Productivity-enhancing inputs are captured by variables reflecting e.g. infrastructure endowment, 
education expenses, or public investment levels in general. 
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The dummy CREDIT takes on a value of one if the parent country applies the credit 
system and zero otherwise. The dummy EXEMPT marks estimates based on firm data 
where parent countries exempt foreign income. Whether foreign direct investments are 
financed by retained earnings or transfers of funds is captured by the binary dummies 
FIN_RE and FIN_TR. Furthermore, the binary meta-regressors MAN and NONMAN 
respectively mark estimates based on investment data taken from the manufacturing 
industry or from non-manufacturing industries, in particular the financial and services 
industry. The dummies HORIZON_FDI and VERT_FDI mark estimates which exclu-
sively refer to horizontal or vertical investment. Moreover, the PUB_SPEND variable 
introduced above does not remain the only dummy variable referring to controls used in 
primary regressions. Binary dummies also capture whether population size (POP), 
Gross Domestic Product  (GDP), openness of the economy (OPEN), wage levels 
(WAGE) or agglomeration effects (AGGLO) have been controlled for in the estimation 
of tax effects on FDI. In particular, the latter meta-regressor AGGLO is closely related 
to the issues discussed in the realm of controls for public spending. As noted in the lit-
erature review, agglomeration effects might enhance private productivity and moderate 
the tax sensitivity of investors. Whether home country tax levels have been integrated 
into the primary specification is coded by the binary dummy HOME. The dummy 
POINT marks point estimates of the semi-elasticities where no prior transformation was 
required.  Finally, the mean sample year and the standard error are also employed as 
meta-regressors.  
Table 5.2 gives the integrated list of meta-regressor variables available for analysis. 
Furthermore, it indicates the overall number of semi-elasticities as well as the number 
of significant estimates showing these respective characteristics. According to the table, 
each characteristic seems to be sufficiently represented in the sample as to allow for its 
consideration in empirical meta-analysis. Moreover, the meta-sample counts 387 signif-
icant semi-elasticities which make up 55% of all 704 estimates. Generally, this pattern 
is also observed for the individual study characteristics. Only in a few categories, there 
is considerable over- or underrepresentation of significant results. Semi-elasticities 
based on bilateral effective average tax rates are significant in almost 100% of the ob-
served cases. 
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Table 5.2: Coded Study Characteristics: Observations and Significance 
  Semi‐elasticities 
 
Semi‐elasticities 
Overall  Significant  Overall  Significant 
Total sample  704  387  Total sample  704  387 
Dependent variable        Double taxation relief     
FDI        Credit system (CREDIT)  177  105 
Stock (FDI_STOCK)  111  73  Exemption system (EXEMPT)  275  122 
Flow (FDI_FLOW)  227  120  Mixed  252  160 
Fixed asset positions         Motivation for FDI       
Aggregate (AGG_FA)  125  73  Horizontal (HORIZON_FDI)  9  5 
Firm‐level (FIRM_FA)  36  33  Vertical (VERT_FDI)  9  6 
Counts of affiliates (COUNT)  86  36  Mixed  686  376 
Discrete response         Type of industry       
Unspecified invest. (DISCRETE)  47  26  Manufacturing (MAN)  265  139 
M&A (DISCRETE M&A)  24  7  Non‐manufacturing (NON‐
MAN) 
37  16 
New plants (DISCRETE PLANTS)  48  19  Mixed  402  232 
Data type/unobservables        Target region       
Country & time fixed effects 
(CT_FIX) 
208  122  Only Europe (INVEST_EU)  212  129 
Country fixed effects (C_FIX)  217  106  Not exclusively Europe  492  258 
Time fixed effects (T_FIX)  106  65  Type of primary tax effect       
No fixed effects (NO_FIX)  74  53  Semi‐elasticity (POINT)  262  170 
Time series (TS)  99  41  Transformation required  442  217 
Type of tax data        Controls       
Statutory tax rate (STR)  259  112  Public spending (PUB_SPEND)  159  109 
Effective marginal tax rate        No control  545  278 
National (EMTR)  126  60  GDP (GDP)  460  272 
Bilateral (BEMTR)  51  39  No control  244  115 
Effective average tax rate        Population (POP)  167  116 
National (EATR)  51  32  No control  537  271 
Bilateral (BEATR)  43  41  Openness (OPEN)  110  73 
Implicit tax rate        No control  594  314 
Microeconomic (MIC_ITR)  115  77  Agglomeration effects (AG‐
GLO) 
174  89 
Macroeconomic (MAC_ITR)  59  26  No control  530  298 
Source of finance        Wage level (WAGE)  158  102 
Retained earnings (FIN_RE)  45  21  No control  546  285 
Transfers of funds (FIN_TR)  70  30  Home country taxes (HOME)  149  81 
Mixed  589  336  No control  555  306 
 
5.5 Results 
5.5.1 Classical Meta-Analysis 
Before plunging into econometric analyses, we seek to get a feeling as to whether publi-
cation selection is of concern in the empirical literature on FDI and taxation. For this 
purpose, we resort to an illustrative graphical representation, generally referred to as the 
funnel plot (Egger et al., 1997). The funnel plot basically picks up the fundamental idea 
of publication selection outlined in Chapter 4. More precisely, it graphically plots pri-
mary effect estimates against their respective standard errors. With rising sampling er-
ror, estimated tax semi-elasticities of FDI are expected to scatter more widely. Howev-
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er, estimates are supposed to symmetrically disperse around the genuine empirical ef-
fect. If, instead, semi-elasticities are scattered asymmetrically, there is a first indication 
for publication selection.60 
Figure 5.2 shows the funnel plot for our meta-sample of 704 estimated semi-
elasticities. Interestingly, the evidence gained from the graphical representation is not 
clear-cut. For rather low standard errors the estimates scatter in a quite – though not 
perfectly – symmetrical pattern around the pooled semi-elasticity. With increasing im-
precision, however, there is a tendency towards high semi-elasticities. Strikingly, almost 
no unexpected (i.e., attracting), tax effects on FDI are reported by studies coping with 
large sampling errors. One might speculate here that publication selection is more pro-
nounced if authors or reviewers are faced with high imprecision of their estimates, mak-
ing them even more eager to meet fundamental expectations. 
To conclude, in all subsequent econometric analyses, we will account for publication 
selection using the approaches discussed in Chapter 4. However, since first indications 
for publication selection are not overly strong, we will also provide meta-analytical es-
timations without publication bias correction in order to check robustness. 
Figure 5.2: Funnel Plot of 704 Estimated Tax Semi-Elasticities; Including the Pooled Fixed 
Effects Estimate  (Solid Line) with a Pseudo 95% Confidence Interval (dashed lines) 
 
The results of the classical meta-analysis are given in Table 5.3. The first sample 
contains the studies’ median estimates, and the second sample is the overall meta-
                                                 
60  In its logic, the funnel plot is closely related to the fixed effects model, see Stanley and Doucouliagos 
(2010) for details.  
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dataset, including all estimates extracted from the 45 studies covered. Furthermore, on 
each sample we estimate three models which differ in the way they account for potential 
publication bias (see Section 4.2 for the details). The first model we estimate does not 
correct for publication bias. The second copes with publication bias by including prima-
ry standard errors in the first power. The third model employs primary standard errors in 
squares to correct for publication selection. 
Table 5.3: Results of Classical Meta-Analysis: Random and Fixed Effects, Publication Bias 
Estimates sampled 
and meta‐estimator  
No publication bias 
correction 
Publication bias correction based on 
standard errors  squared standard errors 
Pooled 
effect  CI 95% 
Pooled 
effect  CI 95%  PB 
Pooled 
effect  CI 95%  PB 
Median Estimates                 
Random Effects  2.14 
(0.00) 
1.71 
‐2.58 
1.16 
(0.00) 
0.56 
‐1.75 
1.15 
(0.00) 
1.90 
(0.00) 
1.45 
‐2.36 
0.18 
(0.02) 
Fixed Effects  1.07 
(0.00) 
0.87 
‐1.28 
0.57 
(0.00) 
0.35 
‐0.79 
1.84 
(0.00) 
1.00 
(0.00) 
0.80 
‐1.20 
0.45 
(0.00) 
All estimates                 
Random Effects  2.55 
(0.00) 
2.31 
‐2.79 
1.57 
(0.00) 
1.25 
‐1.91 
0.79 
(0.00) 
2.28 
(0.00) 
2.04 
‐2.53 
0.09 
(0.00) 
Fixed Effects  1.24 
(0.00) 
1.13 
‐1.35 
0.77 
(0.00) 
0.64 
‐0.90 
1.52 
(0.00) 
1.19 
(0.00) 
1.08 
‐1.30 
0.18 
(0.00) 
Notes:  
Pooled effects are from fixed and random effects meta‐analysis (WLS). CI 95% represents 95% confi‐
dence interval limits. PB (Publication bias) shows coefficients  ˆ for standard error or squared stand‐
ard error respectively. P‐values are given in parenthesis. 
Preferred estimates are from random effects meta‐analysis. Results from Q‐test for each considered 
combination of sample and specification are available upon request. 
In each case, we run both a pooled fixed effects as well as a pooled random effects 
classical meta-analysis, giving the estimated pooled semi-elasticities,  .61 In addition, 
we report corresponding p-values and the 95% confidence limits for the pooled semi-
elasticity. The coefficients, ˆ, on the standard errors indicate the presence of publication 
selection.  In all cases, the Q-test easily rejects the null hypothesis of no heterogeneity 
beyond sampling error at all common significance levels. Thus, the Q-test provides evi-
dence for using the random effects meta-analysis. Results based on random effects me-
ta-analysis are therefore highlighted in Table 5.3. Moreover, we will primarily refer to 
these random effects estimates when discussing the results of the classical meta-
analysis. 
Turning to the detailed results, Table 5.3 documents that the pooled tax semi-
elasticity of FDI is indeed statistically significant (p < 0.01) no matter how it is calcu-
                                                 
61  Based on the “all estimates” sample, we also ran regressions taking into account fixed cluster, i.e. 
study, effects.The results, which are available upon request from the authors, are very close to the pooled 
random effects estimates shown in Table 5.2. 
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lated. This result is highly robust to varying samples as well as different forms of publi-
cation bias correction. We find that the pooled semi-elasticity estimated on the full me-
ta-sample (  = 2.55) is close to the one obtained from the sample of median results   (  
= 2.14), as long as publication selection is not accounted for. If publication selection is 
(linearly) controlled for, bias-corrected pooled semi-elasticities shrink considerably as 
compared to the uncorrected results. The sample of median estimates in this case yields 
a pooled semi-elasticity of 1.16, while the pooled effect obtained from the full meta-
sample amounts to only 1.57.62 
However, Stanley and Doucouliagos (2007) note that pooled effect estimates may be 
biased downwards in the case of linear publication bias correction, i.e. when standard 
errors enter the meta-analytical model rather than their squares. Furthermore, they show 
that this bias is largely remedied when the included standard errors are squared. Look-
ing at the results from the model including squared standard errors, publication bias 
corrected pooled effects are indeed less slashed than in the case of linear correction. 
Although publication selection still turns out to be statistically significant, pooled ef-
fects are rather close to those from the uncorrected model.  
In sum, the pooled tax semi-elasticity of FDI is highly significant. High host country 
tax rates indeed cause a disincentive to invest in that country. Furthermore, there seems 
to be statistically significant publication selection in the literature on FDI and taxation. 
The induced bias in reported tax effects on FDI is, however, “economically small”.  
5.5.2 Meta-Regression Analysis 
The meta-analytic schema as set out in detail in Section 4.3 suggests a coherent strategy 
to find the most suitable meta-regression estimator (see Figure 4.1). The list of relevant 
characteristics at the study and estimate level was given in Section 5.4 (see Table 5.2). 
All meta-regressions use the full meta-sample of 704 primary semi-elasticities. 
First, we will explicitly test for presence of unobserved cluster effects. More specifi-
cally, we do not solely argue based on the results of a standard Breusch-Pagan LM test. 
Instead, we additionally employ a test proposed by Wooldridge (2002, Ch. 10.4.4) 
which is in particular robust to heteroskedasticity of the regression error terms.  
                                                 
62  If the two precision-outlying estimates drawn from Billington (1999), see remarks in footnote 56, are 
included, pooled semi-elasticities based on medians go down to 0.13 (no publication bias control),  0.08 
(linear publication bias control) and 0.13 (non-linear publication bias control). Almost the same reduction 
is observed for the “all estimates” sample. In contrast, random effects estimates turn out to be robust to 
these ‘precision outliers.’ 
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Under the null hypothesis of no within-cluster correlation, this statistic is distributed 
asymptotically as standard normal. Not rejecting the null clearly advocates the use of 
pooled estimators. The test statistic’s null distribution, however, is only asymptotically 
valid. With 45N   studies we are clearly at the lower bound of the sample size needed 
for reliable asymptotic inference. Still, we are confident that the test yields important 
insights. 
If there is evidence for unobserved study-specific heterogeneity, we check whether 
the nested error is uncorrelated with the meta-regressors. The standard tool in this re-
gard, i.e. the Hausman test, is not robust to heteroskedasticity in the disturbances. 
Therefore, we alternatively propose the robust artificial regression approach described 
in Wooldridge (2002, CH. 10.7.3) to test the null hypothesis of no correlation between 
individual error component and the independent variables. 
Table 5.4: Tests to Identify the Preferred Meta-Regression Estimator 
  Unobserved heterogeneity 
at the study level? 
Excess 
heterogeneity at 
the primary esti‐
mate level? 
  (1)  (2) (3) 
Test: 
H0 Hypothesis: 
Breusch Pagan LM Test
 
No unobserved  
effects 
Wooldridge Test
 
No unobserved  
effects 
Q‐Test 
 
No excess  
heterogeneity 
Specification 1 
No control publica‐
tion bias  
BP = 0.30 
p‐value: 0.585 
WO = ‐0.451 
p‐value: 0.652 
  Q = 2565.83 
p‐value: 0.000 
Specification 2 
Control for publica‐
tion bias (linear) 
BP = 0.64 
p‐value: 0.424 
WO = ‐0.739 
p‐value: 0.460 
  Q = 2398.53 
p‐value: 0.000 
Specification 3 
Control for publica‐
tion bias (squared) 
BP = 1.26 
p‐value: 0.262 
WO = ‐1.001 
p‐value: 0.317 
  Q = 2480.35 
p‐value: 0.000 
Notes: 
BP, WO and Q denote test statistics of the BP LM test, the Wooldridge‐type test and the Q‐test respec‐
tively. P‐values are given below the test statistics. 
1. Study‐specific unobserved effects: The Breusch Pagan LM test and the Wooldridge‐type test assume 
a null of no unobserved study‐specific effects. Under the null the Breusch Pagan LM test is χ²‐
distributed, while the Wooldridge‐type test is asymptotically distributed as standard normal under the 
null. Both tests do not reject the null at standard significance levels. 
2. Excess heterogeneity at primary estimate level: The Q‐test is based on a test statistic which is χ²‐
distributed under the null of no excess heterogeneity. Here, the null of no heterogeneity is rejected at 
very high significance levels. 
 
Table 5.5 (at the end of this section) shows the results of the meta-regression analy-
sis. Reported coefficients represent ceteris paribus changes in the expected tax semi-
elasticity on FDI, if the respective binary meta-regressor variable switches from zero to 
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one. Put differently, coefficients depict the expected effect on estimated semi-
elasticities triggered by a deviation from a pre-defined benchmark model. For each fam-
ily of characteristics at the study and estimate level, the respective benchmark character-
istics is indicated in parenthesis. Only a few meta-regressor variables are continuous 
(standard error, squared standard error, and the mean sample year). Accordingly, their 
coefficients represent standard marginal effects. 
Table 5.5 reports results for three different specifications which again are estimated 
by three different estimators. Similar to the classical meta-analysis, the first model does 
not account for publication selection. Both other specifications, however, include a term 
which captures possible bias from publication selection. Again, one of these models 
includes primary standard errors in the first power, while the second model includes 
them in squares. We apply three pooled estimators to these specifications. Both the 
standard Breusch Pagan LM test for unobserved effects as well as the Wooldridge test 
for unobserved effects provide no indication for unobserved study-specific heterogenei-
ty. Both tests do not reject the null hypothesis of no cluster effects at any common sig-
nificance level for any specification. Test results are given in Table 5.4. 
We conclude that the comprehensive list of meta-regressor variables sufficiently ex-
plains study-level heterogeneity. Therefore, our estimation techniques do not have to 
account for any cluster effects. As the results of a Q-test tell, there is, however, unob-
served heterogeneity at the estimate level (Table 5.4, column 3). Clearly, the meta-data 
show properties of a mixed effects meta-regression model. Thus, our preferred estimator 
is mixed effects pooled WLS, accounting for the excess heterogeneity in its weighting 
scheme. Still, we are interested in the robustness of results to the application of less ef-
ficient estimators. Therefore, we additionally resort to fixed effects meta-regression 
(pooled WLS) as well as simple pooled OLS. In contrast to the WLS estimators, pooled 
OLS does not remedy the inherent heteroskedasticity of the meta-regression disturb-
ances. Therefore, we base statistical inference on robust Huber-White standard errors.63 
Pooled OLS has been used to estimate prior meta-analyses of the empirical evidence on 
the relationship of FDI and taxation (De Mooij and Ederveen, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2008). 
                                                 
63  We also ran a standard RESET test on all three specifications employed. The results forced us to re-
ject the null of correct specification. We truncated our meta-sample at its high end and successively reran 
the test until the null is no longer rejected. Considering the results from meta-regressions on this truncated 
sample, no qualitative differences occur with respect to the insights obtained on the basis of the full meta-
sample. 
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Thus, OLS results reported in Table 5.5 are directly comparable and should isolate the 
mere effect of considerably updating the meta-database.  
Table 5.5 reveals that most coefficients are indeed robustly estimated across all spec-
ifications and estimators.64 Notably, we find robust evidence for publication selection in 
the research strand focusing on the tax semi-elasticity of foreign investment. Independ-
ent of the power of the standard error, respective coefficients are significantly different 
from zero according to all estimates run. In addition, meta-regression analysis permits 
detailed conclusions on underlying sources of heterogeneity beyond publication bias. 
Although out-of-sample predictions must be interpreted with care, researchers might 
want to get a feeling for the existing evidence. The detailed results are organized in the 
following broad topics: 
Results for Type of Data Employed and Treatment of Unobservables 
FDI stocks are more sluggish than incremental FDI flows. What is intuitively clear, gets 
confirmed by our meta-regression results. Moreover, the types of investment subject to 
primary analyses might vary in tax-responsiveness. Fixed assets reflect investment in 
real productive capital, while FDI in its broad definition also contains financial transac-
tions. The pooled OLS results without publication bias correction (Table 5.5, column 1) 
indeed suggest aggregate fixed asset positions to be more tax responsive than mixed 
capital data such as broadly defined FDI. This has been documented before by De 
Mooij and Ederveen (2008). The result is, however, not robust to control for publication 
selection and weighting for the precision of the estimates. Both fixed and mixed effects 
meta-regressions suggest that tax effects on aggregate financial assets are not different 
from those on aggregate FDI in its more general definition. Instead, meta-regression 
results underscore that studies using firm-level information on fixed assets produce par-
ticularly small semi-elasticities. We conclude that the level of aggregation seems to play 
a more important role for estimated tax effect sizes than the composition of examined 
capital data.  
Table 5.5 also documents that discrete response models generally produce small 
semi-elasticities. However, this result is not confirmed for studies exploiting counts of 
foreign affiliates (Table 5.5, columns 7-9). We thus hesitate to attribute the negative 
coefficients for the discrete choice dummy to a particularly low tax-responsiveness of 
                                                 
64  As the evidence is fairly robust across estimators, there is no need to restrict the focus on only one of 
them. If for some issues the insights gained from the meta-regressions are ambiguous, we will primarily 
refer to our preferred estimator, i.e. mixed effects WLS.    
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location choices in general. Instead, the level of aggregation might again make the dif-
ference. Count data models most often refer to aggregate counts, while discrete choices 
are, by definition, examined at the micro level.  
Last but not least, discrete choice analyses identify a pronounced difference in tax-
responsiveness between M&A transactions and real capital investments in plants. While 
conforming to earlier findings of De Mooij and Ederveen (2003, 2005, 2008), this result 
is somewhat contrary to the reported equivalence of the tax sensitivity of aggregate FDI 
in its broad definition and aggregate fixed assets. We conclude that any heterogeneous 
tax effects on discrete real and financial capital investments apparently disappear in 
comprehensive FDI statistics. These do not only mix real productive investments with 
financial transactions, but arise from both discrete and continuous investment decisions. 
Data Structure and Control for Unobserved Effects 
The regression results confirm that the treatment of unobservables in primary studies 
significantly influences outcomes. The benchmark study set in the meta-regressions 
relies on panel data with full control for country and time fixed effects. The tax-
responsiveness of FDI reported on the basis of this econometrically prudent model in-
deed drops behind what is documented in econometrically less conservative estimates. 
Either of the binary dummies for time series analysis or pooled estimations is robustly 
significant and positive. Both set-ups do not econometrically capture any potential un-
observed error components. Obviously, these play a role. Which effects are at work here 
might become clearer when considering the coefficients for the two remaining binary 
dummies in this category of study characteristics. Studies exclusively controlling for 
time fixed effects do not produce results different from those obtained from the bench-
mark specification. Instead, semi-elasticities gained from specifications which exclu-
sively control for country fixed effects are systematically larger than the benchmark 
estimates with full control for country and time fixed effects. We conclude that unob-
served aggregate location factors are less of a concern than general macroeconomic time 
trends. If these are econometrically captured by time dummies, the partial effect of taxa-
tion on FDI patterns becomes significantly less discernible.  
The Type of Tax Data 
The meta-regression coefficients shown in Table 5.5 reveal that the bilateral effective 
average tax rate (BEATR) very effectively captures the disincentive on FDI caused by 
the tax system. Interestingly, the pure host country effective average tax rate (EATR) 
80 A Meta-Study on FDI and Company Taxation Chapter 5 
 
 
does not lead to significantly different semi-elasticities as compared to the benchmark 
study which is set to use statutory tax rates. While it contrasts with earlier findings of 
De Mooij and Ederveen (2003, 2006), this result is plausible. Both the statutory tax rate 
and the EATR are indeed highly correlated. Excess returns are effectively taxed at statu-
tory rates. Thus, on highly profitable investments the statutory tax rate determines large 
parts of the effective tax burden. We conclude that the inclusion of bilateral tax regula-
tions into the effective tax rate makes the difference. Reflecting the findings of Egger et 
al. (2009b), bilateral effective tax rates are successfully tailored to capture tax incentives 
on cross-border investments.  
The results with respect to effective marginal tax rates are less clear-cut. The coeffi-
cient for application of the national EMTR in primary studies shows a negative sign in 
all meta-regressions. It is, however, not statistically different from zero in some of the 
specifications. The mixed effects meta-regression estimates which control for publica-
tion selection (Table 5.5, Columns 8-9) do not show a significant difference in semi-
elasticities as compared to studies employing statutory tax rates. While equally not ro-
bust across all meta-regression estimates, the coefficients for the use of bilateral effec-
tive marginal tax rates are instead positive according to pooled OLS and mixed effects 
results. Integration of bilateral tax regulation seems to foster the identified intensity of 
adverse tax effects on cross-border investments. Importantly, results suggest that the tax 
sensitivity of FDI is less pronounced for both bilateral and national effective marginal 
tax rates as compared to the effective average tax rates. In accordance with De Mooij 
and Ederveen (2008) we carefully interpret these results as indication for continuous 
investments being at least slightly less responsive to taxes than discrete location deci-
sions. However, tax incentives on marginal investments might in general be more diffi-
cult to capture than tax effects on the location of discrete infra-marginal investment pro-
jects.  
As for the impact of using macroeconomic or microeconomic implicit tax rates in 
primary analyses, fixed effects meta-regressions report significant and positive coeffi-
cients for microeconomic ITR; pooled OLS results suggest significant and negative co-
efficients for macroeconomic ITR. These results are, however, not confirmed by the 
mixed effects meta-regressions. Although arguably prone to endogeneity problems, 
backward-looking measures of the average tax burden on investments thus do not seem 
to systematically distort empirical outcomes. 
Chapter 5 A Meta-Study on FDI and Company Taxation 81 
 
 
Public Spending 
Strikingly, we do not identify a significant omitted variable bias if the expenditure side 
is not controlled for. In other words, public spending implicitly adjusting to tax changes 
does not moderate tax effects as compared to specifications which explicitly control for 
the provision of public inputs. This result contradicts theoretical presumptions. It might, 
in part, be explained by hitherto insufficiently precise proxies for relevant public inputs. 
Possibly, these do not effectively capture effects arising from the provision of public 
infrastructures. On the other hand, the link between corporate taxes and public infra-
structure endowments might be too weak to translate into empirical effects. 
Europe as FDI Target Region 
We also test whether tax effects significantly differ if studies focus exclusively on Eu-
ropean countries. The benchmark model is defined by those studies which examine a 
mix of regions, typically a broad set of OECD countries, or put a focus on the US. Ac-
cording to results from mixed effects meta-regression, however, estimated adverse tax 
effects on FDI do not significantly differ depending on the target region.  
Further Characteristics of Exploited Data and Employed Specifications 
The meta-regression specifications documented in Table 5.4 include a number of meta-
regressor variables reflecting further study characteristics which in particular refer to the 
underlying data or controls (see Section 5.4). Generally, most of our results are in line 
with earlier findings by De Mooij and Ederveen. The results from recent studies added 
to the meta-sample thus do not stand in contrast with the earlier evidence.  
Notably, we find that semi-elasticities increase with average sample years underlying 
the primary estimates. However, the qualifications put forward by De Mooij and 
Ederveen (2008) apply. Increasing tax semi-elasticities over time might plausibly be 
attributed to ever increasing capital mobility. However, improvements in econometric 
techniques can also lead to more pronounced empirical tax effects on FDI.  
Furthermore, the type of industry assessed in primary analyses is at the source of het-
erogeneity in reported empirical evidence. Investment responses to tax changes are 
more pronounced for analyses with a focus on manufacturing industries as compared to 
studies exploiting mixed data. Surprisingly, the same result holds for studies which ex-
amine non-manufacturing industries. Probably, many analyses focusing on non-
manufacturing firms actually use datasets which do not cover the exact complement to 
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manufacturing industries. Thus, it should be highly mobile financial and service compa-
nies which drive the results for “non-manufacturing” data samples.    
If primary studies focus on a specific business motivation for engaging in foreign ac-
tivity, results are not systematically different from studies not specifying any motiva-
tions. Reported coefficients in Table 5.5 are smaller for horizontal FDI as compared to 
vertical FDI. For pooled OLS meta-regressions (Table 5.5, columns 1-3), the coefficient 
on horizontal FDI is negative, though insignificant. These differences in coefficient 
magnitude reflect the results by Overesch and Wamser (2009), who report vertical FDI 
to be more sensitive to tax. 
There is no empirical consensus about the impact of home country tax relief on the 
tax sensitivity of investment choices. According to the mixed effects meta-regressions, 
neither a focus on investors from credit countries nor a focus on multinationals exclu-
sively headquartered in exemption countries leads to systematically different semi-
elasticities as compared to mixed data.  
Insights on the tax-responsiveness of differently financed investments are corrobo-
rated as well. Meta-regression results in Table 5.5 document that investments financed 
by transfers of funds turn out to be less affected by host country taxes. No robust in-
sights are obtained for the impact of most variables in our list of controls (GDP, popula-
tion, agglomeration effects) which might be correlated with tax. However, we find that 
identified tax effects on FDI are significantly reduced as soon as the openness of the 
host economy is controlled for. This is indeed plausible. Winner (2005) shows that eco-
nomic openness is negatively related to the tax burden on capital. In the case of no con-
trol for openness, the FDI enhancing effect of economic openness might be mistakenly 
attributed to low taxes.  
The meta-dummy reflecting control for home country taxes in primary regressions 
displays a negative coefficient, as well. However, the effect is not significant in the case 
of mixed effects meta-regression. Finally, point estimates of semi-elasticities drawn 
from primary studies do not robustly differ from those semi-elasticities which were ob-
tained by transformation. 
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Table 5.5: Results of Meta-Regression Analysis 
Standard errors (in the case of WLS estimation) or robust Huber‐White standard errors (POLS estimation) are given in parentheses. ***/**/* denotes significance at 
the 1%/5% /10%  level. Primary semi‐elasticities haven been pre‐multiplied by (‐1). All study/model characteristics except “standard error” and “sample mean” are 
coded as dummy variables. Dummy variable names as described in Section 3.2 are given in block capitals. A benchmark model represents the characteristics redun‐
dant to the variables explicitly included. The benchmark characteristics are indicated in parenthesis for each study dimension, written in bold letters. Estimated coeffi‐
cients of the dummies indicate the effect on primary semi‐elasticities of choosing a characteristic in lieu of the benchmark specification. Preferred estimates are from 
random effects meta‐regressions (WLS). 
Dependent variable:  
Semi‐elasticities 
Pooled OLS  Fixed effects meta‐regression (Pooled WLS)  Mixed effects meta‐regression (Pooled WLS) 
No correction  
for publication 
bias 
Publication bias  
correction based on  No correction 
for publication 
bias 
Publication bias 
correction based on 
No correction for 
publication bias 
Publication bias  
correction based on 
standard 
errors 
squared 
standard 
errors 
standard 
errors 
squared 
standard 
errors 
standard 
errors 
squared 
standard 
errors 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Dependent variable  
(FDI stocks)               
   
FDI flows, FDI_FLOW  2.850***  2.276***  2.550***  1.305***  1.085***  1.199***  1.706***  1.386***  1.530*** 
  (0.716)  (0.696)  (0.690)  (0.376)  (0.365)  (0.371)  (0.530)  (0.513)  (0.515) 
Firm Assets, FIRM_FA  ‐1.978**  ‐0.998  ‐1.734*  ‐1.632***  ‐1.470***  ‐1.680***  ‐1.838***  ‐1.383**  ‐1.743** 
  (0.987)  (0.906)  (0.899)  (0.440)  (0.427)  (0.433)  (0.709)  (0.684)  (0.686) 
Aggregate Assets, AGG_FA  2.462***  0.705  1.073  ‐0.442  ‐0.434  ‐0.514  0.203  ‐0.160  ‐0.162 
  (0.871)  (0.849)  (0.859)  (0.408)  (0.395)  (0.402)  (0.620)  (0.600)  (0.605) 
Counts of foreign affiliates, 
COUNT  1.097  0.253  0.725  ‐0.727*  ‐1.091***  ‐0.874**  0.063  ‐0.350  ‐0.176 
  (1.071)  (1.011)  (1.025)  (0.409)  (0.400)  (0.404)  (0.598)  (0.579)  (0.581) 
Discrete choice, DISCRETE  ‐1.591  ‐2.287**  ‐2.220**  ‐2.368***  ‐1.947***  ‐2.341***  ‐2.213***  ‐2.173***  ‐2.370*** 
  (1.128)  (1.039)  (1.051)  (0.501)  (0.489)  (0.493)  (0.738)  (0.711)  (0.717) 
DISCRETE M&A   ‐7.190***  ‐8.462***  ‐7.837***  ‐7.407***  ‐8.462***  ‐7.988***  ‐8.005***  ‐8.848***  ‐8.551*** 
  (1.883)  (1.741)  (1.783)  (1.146)  (1.119)  (1.134)  (1.084)  (1.062)  (1.063) 
DISCRETE PLANTS  3.589**  2.213  2.908*  3.252***  1.858*  2.469**  2.656***  1.612*  1.989** 
  (1.598)  (1.472)  (1.506)  (0.983)  (0.973)  (0.981)  (0.959)  (0.946)  (0.943) 
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Table 5.5(continued) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Data structure/ 
Unobservables 
(Panel with country and time 
fixed effects)               
   
Time series, TS  2.562**  0.908  1.528  2.423***  2.259***  2.364***  2.425***  1.975***  2.137*** 
  (1.163)  (1.178)  (1.147)  (0.484)  (0.469)  (0.476)  (0.743)  (0.719)  (0.722) 
No fixed effects, NO_FIX  2.445***  2.790***  2.577***  1.215***  1.131***  1.239***  1.854***  1.905***  1.936*** 
  (0.546)  (0.541)  (0.535)  (0.240)  (0.233)  (0.237)  (0.417)  (0.402)  (0.405) 
Time fixed effects, T_FIX  ‐1.132**  ‐0.566  ‐0.701  0.220  0.0118  0.202  ‐0.259  ‐0.202  ‐0.123 
  (0.499)  (0.501)  (0.494)  (0.166)  (0.163)  (0.163)  (0.343)  (0.329)  (0.332) 
                   
Country fixed effects, C_FIX  1.954***  2.025***  1.949***  0.611**  0.581**  0.607***  1.556***  1.460***  1.561*** 
  (0.555)  (0.540)  (0.536)  (0.237)  (0.229)  (0.233)  (0.386)  (0.372)  (0.374) 
Type of tax data  
(Statutory tax rate)               
   
EMTR  ‐1.233**  ‐0.594  ‐0.874  ‐0.445*  ‐0.466**  ‐0.401*  ‐0.666*  ‐0.483  ‐0.508 
  (0.546)  (0.551)  (0.548)  (0.230)  (0.222)  (0.226)  (0.375)  (0.362)  (0.365) 
Bilateral EMTR, BEMTR  0.836**  1.206***  0.860**  ‐0.165  ‐0.026  ‐0.111  0.602  0.808**  0.674* 
  (0.388)  (0.384)  (0.373)  (0.244)  (0.237)  (0.240)  (0.402)  (0.387)  (0.389) 
EATR  0.138  0.709  0.373  0.132  0.064  0.140  ‐0.013  0.137  0.114 
  (0.465)  (0.444)  (0.449)  (0.187)  (0.181)  (0.184)  (0.392)  (0.377)  (0.380) 
Bilateral EATR, BEATR  3.355***  3.484***  3.307***  1.517***  1.454***  1.531***  2.572***  2.507***  2.583*** 
  (0.520)  (0.521)  (0.511)  (0.287)  (0.278)  (0.282)  (0.445)  (0.428)  (0.431) 
Microeconomic  ITR, MIC_ITR  ‐1.310**  ‐0.688  ‐0.890  0.496*  0.544**  0.525**  ‐0.368  ‐0.212  ‐0.218 
  (0.630)  (0.623)  (0.630)  (0.261)  (0.253)  (0.257)  (0.389)  (0.376)  (0.379) 
Macroeconomic ITR, MAC_ITR  ‐2.152*  ‐1.640  ‐1.911*  ‐0.594  ‐0.126  ‐0.420  ‐0.844  ‐0.422  ‐0.645 
  (1.189)  (1.078)  (1.112)  (0.462)  (0.452)  (0.456)  (0.602)  (0.584)  (0.585) 
Double taxation relief  
 (Mixed)        
  
Credit System, CREDIT  ‐0.191  ‐0.623  ‐0.335  0.175  0.377  0.189  0.371  0.337  0.312 
  (0.546)  (0.565)  (0.544)  (0.289)  (0.281)  (0.285)  (0.381)  (0.368)  (0.370) 
Exemption system, EXEMPT  2.011***  0.458  1.143**  ‐0.475**  ‐0.519**  ‐0.558**  0.196  ‐0.350  ‐0.194 
  (0.618)  (0.571)  (0.560)  (0.234)  (0.227)  (0.231)  (0.357)  (0.355)  (0.353) 
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Table 5.5 (continued) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Type of industry  
(Not specified)               
   
Manufacturing, MAN  1.635***  1.941***  1.794***  0.475  0.607**  0.537*  1.338***  1.358***  1.390*** 
  (0.544)  (0.493)  (0.507)  (0.315)  (0.305)  (0.310)  (0.386)  (0.373)  (0.375) 
Non‐manufacturing, NONMAN  1.148  1.166  1.160  2.178***  2.349***  2.240***  1.885***  1.948***  1.919*** 
  (0.859)  (0.862)  (0.843)  (0.371)  (0.360)  (0.365)  (0.497)  (0.479)  (0.482) 
Motivation for FDI 
(Mixed)               
   
Vertical FDI, VERT_FDI  0.227  0.402  0.293  0.854  0.649  0.850  0.661  0.680  0.722 
  (0.446)  (0.494)  (0.464)  (0.812)  (0.787)  (0.799)  (0.831)  (0.802)  (0.807) 
Horizontal FDI, HORIZON_FDI  ‐0.442  ‐0.0738  ‐0.352  0.203  0.253  0.262  0.016  0.230  0.124 
  (0.449)  (0.511)  (0.467)  (0.641)  (0.620)  (0.631)  (0.776)  (0.747)  (0.752) 
Type of Finance 
 (Mixed)               
   
Retained earnings, FIN_RE  2.422  2.477*  2.130  ‐0.385  ‐0.0729  ‐0.276  0.433  ‐0.0545  ‐0.233 
  (1.537)  (1.440)  (1.401)  (0.379)  (0.370)  (0.374)  (0.615)  (0.596)  (0.598) 
Transfers of Funds, FIN_TR  ‐1.041  ‐0.647  ‐0.912  ‐0.714**  ‐0.419  ‐0.610*  ‐1.103**  ‐0.881*  ‐0.948** 
  (0.720)  (0.776)  (0.743)  (0.322)  (0.314)  (0.317)  (0.484)  (0.467)  (0.470) 
FDI Target Regions 
(Not exclusively Europe)               
   
Europe, INVEST_EU  ‐0.816  0.012  ‐0.406  ‐0.862***  ‐0.643***  ‐0.794***  ‐0.545  ‐0.259  ‐0.391 
  (0.528)  (0.505)  (0.506)  (0.247)  (0.241)  (0.243)  (0.355)  (0.344)  (0.345) 
Control Variables 
(Not included)               
   
Publics spending, PUB_SPEND  ‐0.002  0.330  0.174  0.155  0.175  0.162  ‐0.042  ‐0.000  ‐0.00837 
  (0.407)  (0.410)  (0.401)  (0.218)  (0.211)  (0.214)  (0.302)  (0.291)  (0.293) 
GDP  ‐1.189*  ‐0.560  ‐0.880  ‐0.0155  0.166  0.022  ‐0.427  ‐0.251  ‐0.291 
  (0.640)  (0.631)  (0.621)  (0.273)  (0.265)  (0.269)  (0.379)  (0.366)  (0.368) 
Population size, POP  1.385**  1.175**  1.363**  0.387  0.185  0.328  0.921**  0.732*  0.850** 
  (0.595)  (0.570)  (0.565)  (0.261)  (0.254)  (0.257)  (0.427)  (0.411)  (0.414) 
Openness, OPEN  ‐2.061***  ‐1.761***  ‐1.860***  ‐1.381***  ‐1.383***  ‐1.379***  ‐1.795***  ‐1.716***  ‐1.764*** 
  (0.447)  (0.461)  (0.443)  (0.270)  (0.262)  (0.266)  (0.392)  (0.377)  (0.379) 
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Table 5.5 (continued) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Agglomeration effects, AGGLO  ‐1.632***  ‐0.812  ‐0.972  0.545*  0.616**  0.594*  ‐0.426  ‐0.221  ‐0.243 
  (0.610)  (0.650)  (0.641)  (0.307)  (0.298)  (0.303)  (0.407)  (0.394)  (0.396) 
Wage level, WAGE  1.136**  0.474  0.895*  ‐0.111  0.006  ‐0.0825  0.727**  0.565  0.607* 
  (0.525)  (0.521)  (0.505)  (0.231)  (0.224)  (0.227)  (0.363)  (0.351)  (0.353) 
Control for home taxes, HOME  ‐0.597  ‐1.304*  ‐1.027  ‐0.614*  ‐0.636*  ‐0.649*  ‐0.446  ‐0.641  ‐0.603 
  (0.825)  (0.787)  (0.775)  (0.337)  (0.326)  (0.331)  (0.429)  (0.415)  (0.417) 
                   
Mean sample year  0.127**  0.089*  0.093*  0.163***  0.161***  0.165***  0.114***  0.116***  0.115*** 
  (0.0502)  (0.048)  (0.0485)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.0190)  (0.032)  (0.0308)  (0.031) 
                   
Publication bias                    
Standard error    0.646***      0.873***      0.685***   
    (0.161)      (0.128)      (0.115)   
Squared standard error      0.036***      0.110***      0.081*** 
      (0.012)      (0.0229)      (0.015) 
Primary tax effect 
(transformation  
required)               
   
Semi‐elasticity (POINT)  ‐0.826  ‐0.451  ‐0.696  ‐0.924***  ‐0.518**  ‐0.814***  ‐0.699*  ‐0.427  ‐0.592 
  (0.595)  (0.577)  (0.580)  (0.255)  (0.254)  (0.252)  (0.372)  (0.361)  (0.361) 
                   
Constant  ‐250.3**  ‐176.4*  ‐183.3*  ‐323.0***  ‐319.4***  ‐327.1***  ‐225.7***  ‐230.1***  ‐226.5*** 
  (99.57)  (95.86)  (96.24)  (38.25)  (37.01)  (37.64)  (63.54)  (61.06)  (61.53) 
                   
N  704  704  704  704  704  704  704  704  704 
R2  0.278  0.337  0.321  0.587  0.614  0.601  0.336  0.372  0.366 
F‐test  
(H0: all coefficients = 0)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
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5.6 Conclusions 
Tax competition and harmonization are among the central themes in public economics. 
Proof of this contention is the ever increasing amount of theoretical and empirical stud-
ies. Although meta-analyses of these empirical studies exist, we provide new insights on 
the implications of publication selection, data type and aggregation, treatment of unob-
served effects, the type of tax data employed as well as the moderating influence of con-
trol variables, in particular public spending, on the estimated tax rate effects on FDI.  
The median tax semi-elasticity of FDI based on 704 primary estimates is 2.49 in ab-
solute terms. The precision weighted average of the full sample of semi-elasticities is 
2.55, again in absolute terms. Remarkably, our meta-analysis finds robust evidence for 
publication selection in the primary literature. Accommodating this publication selec-
tion reduces this semi-elasticity to 2.28 or even down to 1.19 when the fixed-effects 
MRA is used.  
Elaborate meta-regressions show that studies based on aggregate data report signifi-
cantly larger semi-elasticities than firm-level analyses. Precisely, semi-elasticities esti-
mated on the basis of micro data fall below results from aggregate studies by approxi-
mately 1.8. Furthermore, the econometric treatment of unobserved variables in primary 
specifications significantly impacts estimated tax effects on FDI. Notably, tax effects 
might be difficult to discern from macroeconomic time trends. Integrating bilateral tax 
regulations into effective tax rates indeed leads to more effective measurement of ad-
verse tax incentives on foreign investment. Regarding the control variables, it is most 
interesting that primary estimates are not significantly affected by the inclusion of pub-
lic spending. According to most estimates in the literature, the spending side does not 
moderate the tax rate effects. The results reported by Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2007) thus 
do not find general support. This might be due to the fact that only crude measures of 
public inputs are used in many studies. Certainly, more research is needed to find out 
whether the provision of public goods is empirically related to tax rate effects or wheth-
er this is really a pure tax competition game. 
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Chapter 6 
A Meta-Study on Capital Structure 
Choice and Company Taxation* 
6 A Meta-Study on Capital Structure Choice and Company Taxation 
6.1 Introduction 
Theoretical arguments for the tax sensitivity of capital structures are convincing. Empir-
ical findings, on the other hand, have for years been rather weak. Only 12 years ago, 
Parrino and Weisbach (1999: 39) concluded:  
"Despite over 40 years of research, we still know surprisingly little about the de-
terminants of capital structure. There is general agreement that debt has a tax ad-
vantage over equity, but disagreement over the magnitude of this tax advantage and 
the relative importance of the costs of debt that offset this tax advantage at the 
margin." 
Even today, despite a surge of studies providing point estimates for the tax effect on 
corporate capital structure, the empirical evidence remains ambiguous. Surprisingly, 
however, no study has ever quantitatively examined the factors which determine the 
variation in empirical evidence. The contribution of this study is to fill in this gap. We 
do not put forward another direct estimate of the tax effect on corporate capital struc-
ture. We present instead a meta-analysis of the empirical literature, using econometric 
methods to synthesize the previously obtained evidence. By taking recourse to meta-
regression analyses, we can systematically relate variation in sign and size of reported 
tax effects on capital structure to underlying primary study and data characteristics 
(Stanley, 2001). Our study thus complements excellent qualitative surveys of the tax 
response of capital structure choices (e.g., Graham, 2003). 
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The fundamental argument for a tax effect on corporate financial policy relies on an 
important benefit associated with debt financing, which is the interest tax shield. Ac-
cording to most tax systems, interest expenses are deductible from corporate taxable 
income while equity payouts are not. The value of the implied tax shield from interest 
deductions clearly grows with the marginal tax rate (Modigliani and Miller, 1963). Sev-
eral theoretical models explain capital structure choices of firms as result of a trade-off 
between the benefit and the cost of debt financing. While cost is, for example, related to 
financial distress (Kraus and Litzenberger, 1973) or agency conflicts between equity 
and debt claimants (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977), the tax shield signifi-
cantly contributes to the benefit of debt.65 The general tax advantage of debt is also 
acknowledged if capital structure choices follow other concepts (Gordon, 2010), like 
pecking order (Myers and Majluf, 1984) or market timing theory (Baker and Wurgler, 
2002). 
This study provides a comprehensive quantitative assessment of the existing empiri-
cal evidence on the marginal debt response to tax. We thus aim to shed light on the un-
derlying causes of the disagreements highlighted by Parrino and Weisbach (1999). For 
this purpose, we extract 1,143 point estimates of the marginal tax effect on the debt ratio 
out of 46 studies. While a lot of primary studies indeed report positive tax effects on 
debt financing, surprisingly, a number of studies also find robust evidence suggesting a 
negative effect of taxes on leverage (e.g., Booth et al., 2001; Huang and Ritter, 2009). 
Synthesizing the evidence by means of meta-regression analyses, we conclude that the 
tax impact on debt is indeed substantial. Our results suggest that, in particular, the tax 
rate proxy used for identification determines the outcome of primary analyses. More 
refined measures like the simulated marginal tax rate suggested by Graham (1996a, 
1999) avoid a significant downward bias in estimates for the debt response to tax. 
Moreover, we find that debt characteristics, the econometric specification, the set of 
control-variables, and publication selection in primary studies exert significant influ-
ence on estimated tax effects. Accounting for all potential misspecification biases, we 
predict a positive marginal tax effect on the debt ratio of 0.3. 
Some recent studies focus on capital structures and related tax planning activities of 
multinational firms. We extensively deal with this literature as well. Generally, our re-
                                                 
65  Non-tax explanations for a benefit of debt are discussed in the literature, as well. Jensen (1986) and 
Stulz (1990), e.g., argue that debt can help to reduce agency problems between managers and stockhold-
ers. 
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sults suggest that the tax effects on debt are higher in the case of multinational firms. 
We conclude that tax incentives associated with multinational activity should be mod-
eled very carefully, with an emphasis on the additional incentives arising from cross-
border profit shifting opportunities. Furthermore, evaluating all relevant studies in the 
literature, we can securely conclude that intra-company debt is the most flexible device 
to respond to tax incentives.   
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we survey the 
empirical evidence on the impact of taxes on capital structure choices. Thereafter, in 
Section 6.3, our meta-sample is presented and the meta-variables are described in Sec-
tion 6.4. The results of the meta-regressions are presented in 6.5. Finally, Section 6.6 
concludes. 
6.2 Qualitative Literature Review 
Theoretical arguments for the tax sensitivity of companies’ capital structures are strong. 
By contrast, empirical support has for long been rather weak. Faced with the discrepan-
cy between theory and observed evidence (Myers, 1984; Parrino and Weisbach, 1999), 
empirical researchers accepted the challenge. During the last two decades, numerous 
studies have indeed documented a significant tax effect on the debt policy of firms. A 
first strand of literature avoids the use of direct marginal tax rate (MTR) proxies alto-
gether (see MacKie-Mason, 1990; Dhaliwal et al., 1992; Trezevant, 1992; Downs, 
1993; Barklay and Smith, 1995; Graham and Tucker, 2006). Instead, these studies ex-
ploit the DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) finding of a significant correlation between non-
debt tax shields and the unobserved true MTR. While these studies indirectly confirm a 
significant tax impact on debt financing by reporting strong effects of non-debt tax 
shields, another strand of literature has directly estimated quantitative effects of taxes. 
Since the aim of our study is a quantitative assessment of the existing empirical evi-
dence, we review those studies which provide point estimates for the marginal tax effect 
on capital structure choices.66 
The identification of the quantitative tax effect on corporate debt levels hinges upon 
an adequate approximation of the unobserved marginal tax incentive to finance with 
                                                 
66  Some studies do not examine tax effects on debt, but focus on related variables such as leasing or 
interest expenses (see e.g. Sharpe and Nguyen, 1995; Ayers et al., 2001). As we are interested in the di-
rect quantitative impact of a change in the MTR on capital structure choices, we exclude these papers 
from the following survey. For the same reason, we do not consider studies that refer to incremental debt 
(see e.g. Graham, 1996a; Alworth and Arachi, 2001; Amromin and Liang, 2003) or bond offerings (see 
e.g. Newberry and Dhaliwal, 2001). For a thorough survey see Graham (2003). 
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debt. Importantly, the tax benefit of debt is a function of not only statutory tax rates but 
various dynamic features of the tax code. It results from firm-specific characteristics 
which interact with various details of the tax code like non-linear tax scales, investment 
tax credits, or loss carry-back and carry-forward rules. Still, empirical researchers have 
been quite innovative in capturing the marginal tax advantage of debt. A milestone in 
this respect was set by Shevlin (1990) and Graham (1996a, 1999). They simulate firm-
specific marginal tax rates over a forecasted stream of taxable income, integrating the 
most important dynamic features of the tax code.67 
Graham et al. (1998) and Graham (1999) regress debt-to-firm-value of U.S. compa-
nies on these simulated tax rates. In addition, Graham (1999) extensively examines the 
role of personal taxes. Under most tax regimes, personal taxes inflict a tax penalty on 
interest income relative to returns on equity. Graham shows that the net tax benefit of 
debt significantly influences corporate debt financing. The same holds true for the gross 
tax advantage at the corporate level, and in addition, for the personal tax penalty itself. 
In an application to debt-to-value ratios of a cross-section of large listed U.S. firms, 
Graham et al. (2004) extend the simulation of MTRs and include employee stock option 
deductions.   
Graham (1996b) and Graham and Mills (2008) document that the simulated marginal 
tax rate indeed is the best available proxy for the unobserved true marginal tax rate. 
Still, due to the complex nature of the simulation procedure, empirical analyses are of-
ten based on proxies which are easier to calculate. Many studies consider information 
on firm-level tax payments and compute an average tax rate as taxes paid divided by the 
pre-tax income of the firm. Booth et al. (2001) resort to average tax rates when analyz-
ing the determinants of capital structures in various developing countries. Like several 
papers that consider average tax rates, however, they report only insignificant or even 
negative tax effects on the use of debt financing.  
A straightforward but much simpler approximation of the tax benefit of debt is the 
statutory corporate income tax rate. The studies by Gordon and Lee (2001, 2007) take 
advantage of the progressive corporate income tax scale in the U.S. and exploit varia-
tion in relative statutory tax rates.  
                                                 
67 Recently, Graham and Kim (2009) and Blouin et al. (2010) suggest new procedures to simulate mar-
ginal tax rate measures. Yet, we know of no study that uses these new tax measures in a capital structure 
regression. Therefore, these measures cannot be considered by our meta-study. 
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In particular, average or statutory tax rates suggest themselves as proxies for the tax 
incentive in studies which focus on international accounting and tax data. In these cases, 
the identifying variation emerges from international differences in tax legislation. Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) were the first to look at systematic determinants of capital structure 
choices across countries. Based on consolidated financial statements, their analysis re-
mains rather descriptive. Inspired by this first approach, numerous studies use cross-
country data to disentangle the determinants of corporate financial policies. Some of 
these papers exploit cross-country samples but keep a focus on domestic firms 
(Overesch and Voeller, 2010). However, new important research questions arise if mul-
tinational firms are considered. As these have subsidiaries in more than just one coun-
try, additional tax incentives affect corporate debt policy. Precisely, subsidiaries of mul-
tinational firms do not exclusively rely on debt from external sources. They can also 
borrow internally from their parent company or from other affiliated companies. This 
opens up possibilities to reallocate debt within the multinational and to exploit interna-
tional tax rate differentials in a way that the overall company tax burden is reduced. 
Papers dealing with tax incentives at work within the multinational group necessarily 
deviate from Rajan and Zingales (1995) in that they use non-consolidated financial 
statements of subsidiaries. Only on the basis of this unconsolidated data, host-country 
taxes can be attributed to internal leverage. 
Altshuler and Grubert (2003) and Desai et al. (2004b) were the first to examine bal-
ance sheet data of foreign subsidiaries of multinational corporations. More recently, 
improved data availability favored the assessment of tax effects on capital structures of 
European multinationals (Huizinga et al., 2008; Buettner et al., 2009; Mintz and 
Weichenrieder, 2010). Altshuler and Grubert (2003) and Mintz and Weichenrieder 
(2010) find significant tax effects only on internal debt ratios. By contrast, Desai et al. 
(2004b) and Buettner et al. (2009) report significant effects for both external and intra-
company debt. While the marginal tax effect on companies’ debt ratio is higher for 
third-party debt, the tax elasticity, however, turns out to be more pronounced for intra-
company debt financing.  
By means of an internal reallocation of debt, multinationals can shift profits from 
high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdictions.68 Huizinga et al. (2008) empirically split 
                                                 
68  Since debt financing is a potential channel through which profits are shifted from high- to low-tax 
countries, there are attempts to restrict the use of inter-company loans by introducing what is called thin-
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the total tax effect on the debt policy of multinational firms into a purely domestic effect 
and an international profit shifting incentive. The latter is identified by the tax rate dif-
ferential between the host-country tax rate and a weighted average of the statutory tax 
rates available within the multinational firm. Their results document that ignoring the 
shifting motive significantly underestimates the overall tax response. Moreover, some 
empirical studies focus on the tax asymmetries between subsidiary and parent company. 
Mills and Newberry (2004) find a negative impact of the tax level of parent companies 
on debt financing of foreign controlled subsidiaries in the U.S.  
This brief survey shows that numerous studies provide point estimates for the mar-
ginal tax effect on capital structure choices; however, the reported evidence and the em-
pirical approaches vary significantly. Studies particularly differ in the employed proxy 
for the marginal tax rate, their focus on tax incentives (e.g., corporate taxes, personal 
taxes, and international taxation), the type of firms (e.g., domestic firms, multinational 
firms) and in the data sources. In the following sections, we analyze whether and to 
what extent these different study characteristics systematically explain the heterogene-
ous estimates for the tax effect on the corporate debt ratio.     
6.3 The Meta-Dataset 
For the purpose of this meta-study we thoroughly surveyed 46 primary studies in total. 
These were identified by comprehensively searching the EconLit database for empirical 
literature on the tax sensitivity of corporate capital structure choices. Precisely, we 
searched the database for the central keywords “Capital Structure” and “Tax”. Further-
more, we conducted additional internet searches and scanned relevant journals as well 
as working paper series.69 
In this meta-study, we refer to the marginal tax effect on the corporate debt ratio es-
timated in primary studies as our effect size index. The marginal effect on the corporate 
debt ratio represents the percentage point change of the debt ratio in response to a one 
percentage point change in the tax rate. It indicates the debt change in percent of total 
assets, triggered by a one percentage point change in the tax rate. Generally, the litera-
ture provides point estimates of this marginal tax effect. 
                                                                                                                                               
capitalization or earning stripping rules. The effects of thin-capitalization rules are considered by some 
recent studies like Buettner et al. (2008) and Overesch and Wamser (2010b). 
69  We particularly searched through the Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Review of 
Financial Studies, Journal of Public Economics, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Journal 
of Corporate Finance, Financial Management, European Financial Management, National Tax Journal, 
International Tax and Public Finance, and the SSRN working paper database.  
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Equation (6.1) illustrates the marginal tax effect on the corporate debt ratio ( De ) 
more formally, where d represents the debt ratio as defined by debt D and total assets A 
and τ is the tax rate:    
D
 
 de
  
D
A
 
         (6.1) 
We sample all tax effect estimates found in each relevant primary study. Such multi-
ple sampling allows for more accurate estimates and inference due to a larger underly-
ing sample as compared to single estimate sampling. Otherwise, selecting one single 
estimate from each study would require predefined and - most importantly - objective 
sampling rules, which can hardly be justified. Moreover, the additional heterogeneity 
obtained from considering all robustness checks reported in a study is welcome in statis-
tical meta-analyses. 
Our basic sample (Sample A) of primary study results contains all marginal tax ef-
fects on the debt ratio which mainly result from variation in the domestic tax rate. In 
some cases these effects might jointly reflect both domestic tax incentives and the inter-
national profit shifting incentive. In addition, in our Sample B we even more rigorously 
exclude all tax effects estimated on the bases of multinational company data. In return, 
we define a Sample C of tax effect estimates drawn from studies which focus exclusive-
ly on multinational subsidiaries. Here, we also add effect estimates which exclusively 
reflect profit shifting incentives. After all, the three subsamples join to a full meta-
dataset of 1,143 observations obtained from the 46 studies, each representing one esti-
mated marginal tax effect on the corporate debt ratio. Table 6.1 provides descriptive 
statistics for every single primary study. At the bottom of the table, descriptive statistics 
at sample level are shown. Most studies contribute either to the non-international sam-
ple (Sample B) or the international sample (Sample C); some studies contribute to both. 
In total, our basic sample includes primary estimates from 43 studies, while Sample B 
and Sample C respectively regroup evidence from 29 and 19 studies. 
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Table 6.1: Papers on Capital Structure Choice Included in the Meta-Analysis 
Study Sample No.  of effects 
Marginal tax effects on debt 
Mean Median Min Max Std. 
1  Aggarwal & Kyaw, 2008  C    12  0.24  0.23  0.03  0.44  0.12 
2  Altshuler & Grubert, 2003  A, C    6  0.17  0.13  ‐0.02  0.39  0.16 
3  Antoniou et al., 2008  A, C    23  0.00  0.00  ‐0.05  0.04  0.02 
4  Barion et al., 2010  A, B    4  0.39  0.37  0.29  0.52  0.10 
5  Bartholdy & Mateus, 2008  A, B    81  0.05  0.00  ‐2.30  2.59  0.44 
6  Bauer, 2004  A, C    8  0.07  0.05  ‐0.05  0.24  0.12 
7  Booth et al., 2001  A, B    78  ‐0.03  ‐0.03  ‐0.47  0.3  0.13 
8  Buettner et al., 2008  A, C    9  0.10  0.16  ‐0.10  0.20  0.12 
9  Buettner et al., 2009  A, C    6  0.18  0.18  0.14  0.24  0.04 
10  Buettner & Wamser, 2009b  A 
C 
  73 
  115 
0.05 
0.06 
0.03 
0.08 
‐0.07 
‐0.07 
0.14 
0.14 
0.06 
0.05 
11  Byoun, 2008  A, B    8  ‐0.05  ‐0.05  ‐0.11  0.00  0.04 
12  Charalambakis et al., 2008  A, B    10  0.04  0.05  0.01  0.06  0.02 
13  Chen & Strange, 2005  A, B    4  0.00  0.00  ‐0.02  0.03  0.02 
14  Cheng & Green, 2008  A, B    6  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01 
15  De Jong et al., 2008  A    42  ‐0.06  0.00  ‐1.10  0.10  0.19 
16  Desai, Foley & Hines, 2004b  A, C    32  0.18  0.17  0.05  0.40  0.09 
17  Dischinger et al., 2010  A 
C 
  50 
  72 
0.31 
0.23 
0.30 
0.24 
0.09 
0.02 
0.67 
0.67 
0.14 
0.16 
18  Dwenger & Steiner, 2009  A, B    13  1.88  2.14  ‐0.84  3.82  1.45 
19  Faulkender & Petersen, 2006  A, B    1  ‐0.14  ‐0.14  ‐0.14  ‐0.14  . 
20  Gordon & Lee, 2001  A, B    9  ‐0.02  0.05  ‐0.42  0.30  0.23 
21  Gordon & Lee, 2007  A, B    29  0.10  0.11  ‐0.07  0.30  0.08 
22  Graham, 1999  A, B    97  0.11  0.12  ‐0.04  0.25  0.06 
23  Graham et al., 1998  A, B    2  ‐0.03  ‐0.03  ‐0.13  0.07  0.15 
24  Graham et al., 2004  A, B    15  0.17  0.18  0.06  0.31  0.06 
25  Green & Murinde, 2008  A, B    8  ‐0.01  0.01  ‐0.22  0.05  0.09 
26  Hebous & Weichenrieder, 
2010 
A, C    28  0.11  0.09  ‐0.95  2.05  0.61 
27  Homaifar et al., 1994  A, B    14  0.36  ‐0.05  ‐2.13  3.32  1.93 
28  Huang & Ritter, 2009  A, B    24  ‐0.24  ‐0.29  ‐0.95  0.69  0.34 
29  Huizinga et al., 2008  A 
B 
C 
  58 
  54 
  6 
0.23 
0.22 
0.21 
0.21 
0.21 
0.22 
0.11 
0.11 
0.09 
0.34 
0.32 
0.34 
0.05 
0.05 
0.10 
30  Jog & Tang, 2001  A 
B 
C 
  13 
  3 
  12 
0.42 
0.49 
0.38 
0.41 
0.52 
0.38 
‐0.08 
0.41 
‐0.08 
0.89 
0.53 
0.89 
0.28 
0.07 
0.30 
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Table VI
(Continued) 
 
Study  Sample  No.  of effects
Marginal tax effects on debt 
Mean  Median  Min  Max  Std. 
31  Kesternich & Schnitzer, 2010  A, C    7  0.20  0.20  0.18  0.22  0.01 
32  Klapper & Tzioumis, 2008  A, B    10  0.06  0.05  0.03  0.19  0.05 
33  Lasfer, 1995  A, B    6  0.00  0.00  ‐0.01  0.01  0.00 
34  Liu & Tian, 2009  A, B    12  0.02  0.01  ‐0.02  0.08  0.03 
35  López‐Gracia & Sorgorb‐Mira,  A, B    6  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
36  Michaelas et al., 1999  A    3  ‐0.04  ‐0.03  ‐0.05  ‐0.03  0.02 
37  Moore & Ruane, 2005  A, C    43  0.32  0.34  ‐0.02  0.83  0.13 
38  Mills & Newberry, 2004  C    2  0.31  0.31  0.12  0.49  0.26 
39  Mintz & Weichenrieder, 2010  A, C    42  0.10  0.08  ‐0.13  0.44  0.12 
40  Oeztekin, 2009  A, B    76  0.00  0.00  ‐0.19  0.34  0.06 
41  Overesch & Voeller, 2010  A, B    22  0.14  0.12  ‐0.29  0.44  0.19 
42  Overesch & Wamser, 2010b  C    15  0.34  0.21  0.19  0.78  0.23 
43  Pfaffermayr et al., 2008  A, B    20  0.61  0.71  0.19  1.02  0.24 
44  Ruf, 2010  A, C    3  0.45  0.45  0.45  0.47  0.01 
45  Ramb & Weichenrieder, 2005  A 
C 
  8 
  12 
0.03 
0.02 
0.03 
0.02 
‐0.02 
‐0.04 
0.14 
0.14 
0.05 
0.05 
46  Shivdasani et al., 2010  A, B    3  0.04  0.05  0.01  0.06  0.03 
Basic Sample  1012  0.13  0.07  ‐2.30  3.82  0.42 
Excluding Pure Multinational Studies (B)  660  0.11  0.03  ‐2.30  3.82  0.48 
Exclusively Multinational Studies (C)  453  0.16  0.11  ‐0.95  1.05  0.22 
Overall Meta‐Dataset  1143  0.13  0.08  ‐2.30  3.82  0.39 
Notes: Sample A denotes the basic sample containing all marginal tax effects on the debt ratio which 
mainly result from variation in the domestic tax rate. In some cases these effects might jointly reflect 
both domestic tax  incentives and the  international profit shifting  incentive. Sample B excludes esti‐
mates based on pure multinational firm data. By contrast, Sample C contains only tax effect estimates 
drawn from studies which focus exclusively on multinational subsidiaries. 
 
Table 6.1 shows that with a value of 0.16 the mean marginal tax effect is most pro-
nounced in Sample C, which includes those studies with an exclusive focus on multina-
tional firms. Instead, the mean marginal tax effect in Sample B, which in return ex-
cludes these studies, amounts to 0.11. Consistently, the Basic Sample A as well as the 
overall meta-dataset display means of 0.13. Median marginal effects are below the 
means in all meta-samples, hinting at sample distributions which are positively skewed. 
Notably, in Sample B, 50% of all primary estimates report marginal tax effects less than 
0.03. Still, the range of values is considerable. In particular, the relative dispersion of 
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estimates turns out to be high. The relative standard deviation, calculated as the ratio of 
the absolute standard deviation to the mean, is above 3 and 4, respectively, in Samples 
A and B, and still exceeds a value of 1 in Sample C. The descriptive statistics at study-
level corroborate this finding of high variation in marginal tax effects. Within a consid-
erable number of studies, relative standard deviations are again above 1. Obviously, the 
variation in our meta-samples has its origin not only in varied evidence between studies 
but also within studies. We aim to systematically explain both between and within-study 
variance of reported marginal tax effects by meta-regressions. 
6.4 The Meta-Regressor Variables 
A central challenge in conducting a quantitative meta-study is to find an agreement over 
which study characteristics, i.e. meta-regression moderator variables, are the important 
ones to include in the analysis (Stanley, 2001). Regarding the literature on the tax sensi-
tivity of capital structure, however, we are convinced that the essential study character-
istics can be inferred from the narrative review of the empirical evidence in Section 6.2. 
Furthermore, the primary studies themselves often raise and discuss pivotal issues in 
empirical research on corporate capital structure. Finally, we clearly benefit from in-
sightful work put forward by, for example, Graham (2003), Frank and Goyal (2007) or 
Lemmon et al. (2008).  
After all, we presume six main groups of study characteristics to substantially drive 
the varied empirical results on the tax sensitivity of capital structures. We will therefore 
consider them as explanatory variables in our meta-regressions.  
Proxies for the Marginal Tax Incentive 
A central focus is, of course, on the tax measure employed for analysis. The literature 
survey in Section 6.2 highlighted that researchers have used different tax measures to 
capture the marginal tax advantage of debt. Therefore, we carefully classify proxies for 
the marginal tax incentive according to their degree of refinement and computational 
complexity. 
An easily available proxy for the marginal tax incentive is the statutory corporate in-
come tax rate. It might, however, only be a rough approximation. Unless the corporate 
tax scale is progressive, this measure does not capture any firm-specific information on 
the corporate tax status. If a firm finds itself near tax exhaustion due to low profitability, 
accrued non-debt tax shields or tax-loss carry-forwards, its marginal tax incentive to 
finance with debt is going to fall short of what the statutory tax rate suggests. Identified 
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effects of the statutory tax rate on debt might therefore underestimate the true relation-
ship between the marginal tax rate and capital structure choices. Consequently, some 
empirical researchers refrain from using statutory tax rates in their capital structure re-
gressions. Instead, they use more refined approaches to take into account information on 
the actual tax status of the firm.  
The previous empirical literature employs mainly two methods to approximate the 
tax incentive of debt financing more carefully. The first group opts for an average tax 
rate computed as paid taxes divided by pre-tax income. The tax payments which figure 
in the numerator of the average tax rate implicitly capture the degree of tax exhaustion 
and its implications for the incentive to finance with debt.  
Still, some caveats remain which keep the average tax rate from being a precise 
proxy for the effectively decisive economic marginal tax rate.70 First, in the terminology 
of Graham (2003), the average tax rate is still to be qualified as a rather static proxy. It 
clearly misses the fact that a firm’s economic tax status considerably depends on its 
future profitability. Second, the average tax rate by definition reflects the tax burden on 
an average dollar of income. Additional interest deductions will, however, shield mar-
ginal income from taxation. Thus, the exact tax benefit of debt at the corporate decision 
margin is systematically missed.  
As highlighted in the literature survey of Section 6.2, Shevlin (1990) and Graham 
(1996a, 1999) therefore propose a different method and put forward a sophisticated sto-
chastic simulation technique to compute firm-specific effective marginal tax rates. The 
simulation procedure according to Graham accounts for the most important dynamic 
features of the US tax code, i.e. net operating loss carry-forwards and carry-backs, in-
vestment tax credits, and the alternative minimum tax.71 
Another pivotal issue in the conception of a proxy for the marginal tax rate is that the 
corporate tax status is endogenous to debt levels (Graham, 2003). If a company issues 
debt, it reduces its taxable income through interest deductions. The amount of taxable 
income has again direct influence on the statutory tax rate in progressive tax systems, on 
average tax rates or on simulated tax rates. If no precautions are taken in the computa-
                                                 
70  The economic marginal tax rate according to Scholes and Wolfson (1992) is defined as the present 
value of current and future taxes owed on an extra dollar of income earned today. 
71  Simulated marginal tax rates are calculated for each firm and year separately by assuming that taxable 
income follows a random walk with drift over 18 years into the future. Then, the present value of the tax 
bill is calculated. Afterwards, it is recalculated after adding one dollar to taxable income in the current 
period. Results from 50 simulations (based on 50 separate forecasts of taxable income) are averaged to 
finally represent the firm-specific marginal tax rate. 
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tion of the tax variable, the reported tax effects on debt policy might be negatively bi-
ased. This has been thoroughly examined by Graham et al. (1998) for the case of simu-
lated tax rates. Their study shows that simulated proxies based on taxable income before 
financing expenses are immune to these endogeneity concerns. In regard to average tax 
rates, however, only a few studies tend to neutralize the impact of financial decisions by 
referring to before-financing profits (e.g. Lasfer, 1995; Charalambakis et al., 2008) or 
by considering the host country median of average tax rates (e.g. Desai et al., 2004b). 
To contrast studies employing the statutory tax rate with more sophisticated ap-
proaches, we code two binary dummy variables ATR and SMTR, which mark tax effect 
estimates respectively gained from average tax rates and the Graham simulated margin-
al tax rate.  
Debt Characteristics 
Generally, primary studies focus on different measurements and types of debt. Since we 
only consider studies in our meta-sample which have estimated the impact of a change 
in the MTR on capital structure choices, the dependent variable of the primary studies is 
always a share of debt in total funds; yet, the measurement of the debt share varies. The 
considered primary studies use debt measured at book values or at market values. In 
order to test if the definition of the dependent variable affects the tax effect, we consider 
a dummy variable Debt Measured at Book Value in our meta-regressions which is one if 
debt is measured at book values and zero if measured at market values. 
Moreover, primary estimations often distinguish between debt items of different ma-
turity. It is an empirical question whether debt maturity exerts a significant impact on 
the tax sensitivity. On the one hand, a smaller tax response of long-term debt can be 
expected because it is difficult to adjust to yearly fluctuations in the marginal tax incen-
tive. On the other hand, long-term debt is associated with higher amounts of interest 
deductions, as compared to short-term debt items containing, for example, trade paya-
bles that do not carry any interest deductions. As tax-deductible interest causes the tax 
advantage of debt over equity financing, long-term debt could be more tax responsive. 
In order to analyze whether reported tax effects systematically depend on debt maturity, 
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we code a dummy variable Long-Term Debt, which has the value one if a tax effect re-
fers exclusively to long-term debt and the value zero otherwise.72 
Econometric Specification of Primary Studies 
The empirical literature dealing with capital structure choices has traditionally tried to 
explain changes in the capital structure of a firm with contemporaneous changes of 
capital structure determinants; but an immediate adjustment of the capital structure is 
not in line with the existence of adjustment costs. Therefore, some recent studies have 
modeled dynamic aspects of capital structure adjustment.73 By considering the lagged 
value of the debt share, a partial adjustment process is identified. Notably, a dynamic 
specification carries an important implication for the coefficient estimated for the tax 
rate. The coefficient only reflects the short-term adjustment toward a target debt ratio, 
while the long-term effect is calculated by taking into account the adjustment speed. In 
our meta-regression analysis, we therefore consider a dummy variable Dynamic Speci-
fication, which marks tax coefficients from dynamic specifications. 
Lemmon et al. (2008) show that corporate capital structures are to an important ex-
tent determined by unobserved time-invariant firm-specific factors. Some empirical 
analyses of the tax effect on corporate capital structure control for such unobserved 
firm-specific heterogeneity, which indeed might be correlated with tax levels. This, 
however, comes at the cost that the variation of tax rates between firms is absorbed by 
the firm-fixed effects. Gordon and Lee (2001) point out that in numerous studies, e.g. 
Graham et al. (1998) and Graham (1999), the identification of tax effects is indeed pre-
dominantly based on cross-sectional variation of tax rate proxies between firms. On the 
one hand, controlling for unobserved firm-fixed effects might therefore reduce reported 
tax effects on corporate capital structure. On the other hand, it might correct for un-
known omitted variable bias. To find out, we explicitly define a binary dummy variable 
Firm Fixed Effects Included which marks estimates resulting from analyses where un-
observed firm-fixed effects are modeled.  
A firm’s individual corporate tax status varies over time and so does the marginal tax 
incentive to finance with debt. Nevertheless, there can also be unobserved time trends 
                                                 
72  We abstain from separately analyzing the tax response of short-term debt because in our meta-sample 
the number of primary estimates that refer to short-term debt is very low (1.5%). By contrast, 16.3% of 
our primary estimates refer to long-term debt, 
73  Studies which estimate a dynamic model of the capital structure choice comprise Fama and French 
(2002), Flannery and Rangan (2006), Antoniou et al. (2008), Lemmon et al. (2008) and Huang and Ritter 
(2009).   
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affecting all firms equally. Reasons why the general attractiveness of debt financing 
might change over time are, for example, general business cycle effects, financial crises 
or changes in the institutional environment. Leaving such time trends unmodeled in 
panel data analyses could affect the identification of tax effects on debt policy. We 
therefore code a binary dummy variable Time Fixed Effects Included marking primary 
estimates free of any potential biases resulting from unmodeled time trends. 
Control Variables in Primary Studies 
The isolation of the tax effect in capital structure regressions requires control for other 
non-tax factors which determine corporate debt ratios and are possibly correlated with 
tax. Indeed, their omission could considerably affect reported results. 
Frank and Goyal (2007) thoroughly identify a core set of six observable capital struc-
ture determinants. Their list of the most relevant explanatory variables includes controls 
for firm size, tangibility, profit, inflation, firm-specific growth options and industry me-
dian leverage. Whether the disregard of these core determinants indeed influences re-
ported partial tax effects on the debt ratio is an empirical question. In order to answer it, 
we code six binary dummy variables, one for each of these determinants. If estimates 
are obtained from regressions including such a control variable, the respective dummy 
is one. Otherwise it has the value zero.74 
Data Sample Characteristics 
The 46 primary studies in our meta-sample are based on 20 different databases, which 
differ in terms of geographic coverage and types of firm represented. Some databases, 
e.g. Compustat, exclusively cover national firm data from only one country. Others, e.g. 
Compustat Global Vantage, cover cross-country firm data. In regard to the types of 
firms represented in the data, some databases only contain information on publicly 
listed firms; others also include unlisted small and medium sized firms. Furthermore, 
some of the international databases focus exclusively on subsidiaries of multinational 
firms, e.g. Bureau of Economic Analysis data. Finally, the data coverage varies due to 
very different reporting obligations and data collection procedures across countries. In 
                                                 
74  To mark estimates that rely on a specification taking into account a certain control variable, we group 
the control variables used in primary studies according to the classification chosen by Frank and Goyal 
(2007). For example, studies controlling for firm assets or firm sales are regrouped as controlling for firm 
size. Moreover, we consider industry fixed effects as a control for the typical leverage in that respective 
industry.   
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order to capture the heterogeneity of data used in primary studies, we will control for 
database fixed effects in our meta-regressions. 
Furthermore, the data used in primary empirical studies is disclosed at very different 
dates. While, for example, Gordon and Lee (2001) have estimated tax coefficients based 
on data for a period from 1954 to 1995, other studies, e.g. Graham et al. (2004), provide 
evidence based on year 2000 data. The response to taxes might, however, vary over 
time because tax advisors are always searching for new tax planning strategies. Still, it 
is an empirical question whether the refinement in tax-optimal structures is not offset by 
the introduction of specific anti-avoidance rules. We therefore take into account a varia-
ble Average Sample Year which is the average disclosure year of the data used in the 
underlying estimation.  
Publication Selection 
It is an established conjecture that academic journals might have a tendency to publish 
papers with statistically significant results (De Long and Lang, 1992). Furthermore, the 
parties involved in the scientific publication process, i.e. both authors and journal re-
viewers, may prefer empirical results which comply with standard predictions concern-
ing the direction of the assessed relationships. Consequently, research results which do 
not correspond to conventional economic theory in significance or sign might be 
doomed (“file-drawer problem”). If publication bias is indeed present, it can be statisti-
cally tested: If (and only if) there is publication selection in the literature, coefficient 
estimates and their associated standard errors will be correlated. The sign of the correla-
tion will indicate the direction of the bias (Card and Krueger, 1995; Egger et al., 1997; 
Stanley, 2008).  
6.5 Meta-Regression Analysis 
6.5.1 Main Results 
Our main results are displayed in Table 6.2. The regressions are based on Sample A as 
described in Section 6.3. That is, we consider 1012 estimates of the marginal tax rate 
effect on debt shares provided by the literature. The meta-regression we estimate takes 
the linear form depicted in equation (6.2), where y corresponds to the vector of estimat-
ed marginal tax effects drawn from primary analyses and X is a matrix of predominantly 
dummy variables that reflect various study or model characteristics. 
 
 y Xβ ε          (6.2) 
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To analyze whether study characteristics systematically explain differences in report-
ed tax coefficients, we thus regress marginal tax effects found in a primary empirical 
study on a set of meta-variables. These dummy variable regressions implicitly define an 
underlying benchmark study. The coefficients for each dummy variable reflect the aver-
age impact on reported tax effects if the study design deviates from the benchmark in 
that specific aspect. Respective benchmark characteristics are indicated in brackets for 
every control dummy in Table 6.2. 
Since y includes estimated coefficients which are derived from models which in their 
great majority conform to the assumptions of the classical linear model, the meta-
regression errors ε should be normally distributed. Equation (6.2) is, however, clearly 
heteroskedastic as the variance of the primary estimates is related to the characteristics 
of a study. 
One approach in the literature to deal with the presence of heteroskedasticity is to use 
OLS with robust standard errors; but, in the clear presence of heteroskedasticity - as it is 
the case in meta-regression analysis - least squares can be extremely inefficient (Greene, 
2003: 226). Fortunately, in the case of meta-regression, a measure of the heteroskedas-
ticity is readily available: Coefficient standard errors are given in nearly all primary 
results tables. Thus, weighted least squares (WLS) with inverse squared primary stand-
ard errors as analytic weights is the obvious method of obtaining efficient meta-
regression estimates (Stanley, 2008; Greene, 2003; Hedges and Olkin, 1985). Techni-
cally, efficiency is obtained by giving those reliable primary estimates of the marginal 
tax effect a greater influence, which are less affected by sampling error and thus show 
small variances.75 
Column (1) shows results of a baseline regression using ordinary least squares 
(OLS). Significant meta-regression coefficients suggest that econometric specification 
and control variables included in primary studies indeed affect the reported marginal tax 
effect. In column (2), we thoroughly analyze the impact of distinct tax rate measures 
which are frequently used in the literature. We include two dummy variables marking 
primary estimates referring either to simulated marginal tax rate or the average tax rate. 
Our benchmark is the statutory tax rate. 
 
 
                                                 
75 For more details, please refer to Chapter 4. 
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Table 6.2: Meta-Regression of Reported Marginal Tax Effects on Debt Ratios, Base Sample 
Regressions of the marginal tax effect  found  in primary studies on respective study characteristics. All study/model characteristics are coded as 
dummy variables (except Average Sample Year and Primary Standard Error). Thus, a base model represents the characteristics redundant to the 
variables explicitly  included. The benchmark characteristics are  indicated  in parentheses for each study dimension. Estimated coefficients of the 
dummies indicate the effect on primary marginal effects of choosing a characteristic in lieu of the base specification. All regressions include a con‐
stant (not reported). The regressions are based on Sample A. Columns (1) – (4) of Table 6.2show OLS‐regression results; columns (5) and (6) are 
from WLS estimation. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses; ***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5% /10% level. 
  OLS  WLS 
  .(1)  .(2)  .(3)  .(4)  .(5)  (6) 
Proxies for the Marginal Tax Incentive                    
SMTR (Statutory Tax Rate)    0.2856***  0.2607***  0.1138  0.1069***  0.0567*** 
     (0.0743)  (0.0707)  (0.0906)  (0.0176)  (0.0174) 
ATR (Statutory Tax Rate)    0.0440  0.0488  0.0320  ‐0.0055  ‐0.0310*** 
     (0.0380)  (0.0337)  (0.0668)  (0.0083)  (0.0085) 
Debt Characteristics             
Long‐Term Debt (Maturity not Specified or Short‐Term)  0.1371**  0.2115***  0.1576***  ‐0.0024  ‐0.0054  0.0078* 
   (0.0662)  (0.0707)  (0.0581)  (0.0356)  (0.0086)  (0.0044) 
Debt Measured at Book Values (Market Values)  ‐0.0449  0.0511  0.0746*  0.0038  ‐0.0064**  ‐0.0006 
   (0.0355)  (0.0456)  (0.0450)  (0.0276)  (0.0029)  (0.0013) 
Econometric Specification of Primary Studies             
Dynamic Specification (Static Specification)  ‐0.1558***  ‐0.0926**  ‐0.0831*  ‐0.1864***  ‐0.0559***  ‐0.1210*** 
   (0.0395)  (0.0454)  (0.0451)  (0.0682)  (0.0102)  (0.0132) 
Firm Fixed Effects Included (no)  ‐0.0340  ‐0.0232  ‐0.0044  ‐0.0019  ‐0.0062***  0.0166 
   (0.0242)  (0.0262)  (0.0186)  (0.0221)  (0.0020)  (0.0124) 
Time Fixed Effects Included (no)  0.0742*  0.0783**  0.1049***  0.0418  0.0330***  0.0378*** 
   (0.0382)  (0.0386)  (0.0332)  (0.0453)  (0.0100)  (0.0130) 
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Table 6.2 (Continued) 
  .(1)  .(2)  .(3)  .(4)    .(5)  (6) 
Control Variables in Primary Studies             
Control for Profitability (no)  0.1238***  0.1123***  0.1529***  0.0723**  0.1077***  0.1220*** 
   (0.0410)  (0.0432)  (0.0429)  (0.0347)  (0.0208)  (0.0206) 
Control for Size (no)  0.1568***  0.1537***  0.1054*  0.0516  ‐0.0700***  ‐0.0137 
   (0.0573)  (0.0580)  (0.0539)  (0.0503)  (0.0124)  (0.0168) 
Control for Firm Growth (no)  ‐0.1817***  ‐0.2306***  ‐0.2319***  ‐0.1390***  ‐0.1317***  ‐0.1652*** 
   (0.0321)  (0.0421)  (0.0404)  (0.0301)  (0.0198)  (0.0232) 
Control for Collateral (no)  ‐0.2666***  ‐0.2826***  ‐0.2257***  ‐0.1206**  ‐0.0061***  ‐0.0574** 
   (0.0596)  (0.0604)  (0.0540)  (0.0574)  (0.0020)  (0.0285) 
Control for Inflation (no)  0.1047***  0.1405***  0.1219***  0.1116**  0.0332***  0.0380*** 
   (0.0370)  (0.0430)  (0.0383)  (0.0525)  (0.0100)  (0.0130) 
Control for Industry‐Typical Leverage (no)  0.2226***  0.2356***  0.2149***  0.1184***  0.0984***  0.0867*** 
   (0.0396)  (0.0385)  (0.0372)  (0.0325)  (0.0131)  (0.0150) 
Data Sample Characteristics             
Average Sample Year      ‐0.000997  ‐0.00302  7.11e‐05  0.000118*** 
       (0.00171)  (0.00473)  (5.75e‐05)  (3.33e‐05) 
Publication Selection             
Primary Standard Error      0.3911  0.1426  1.1496***  0.9614*** 
       (0.3089)  (0.3264)  (0.2267)  (0.2055) 
             
Database dummies included in meta‐regression  No  No  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Number of primary estimations  1012  1012  1012  1012  984  984 
Adj. R2 0.144  0.162  0.194  0.318  0.470  0.660 
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Specification (3) is augmented by the average sample year and the standard error of 
the tax coefficient in the primary study. Unlike the other variables used in our meta-
regressions, the variables Average Sample Year and Primary Standard Error are no 
dummy variables.  Consequently, no benchmark case can be denoted. In specification 
(4) we include database fixed effects. We presume that not only different econometric 
specifications and definitions of variables but also the type of data used in primary stud-
ies should affect the estimated tax response of capital structures. The increase in the R2 
in column (4) compared to that reported in column (3) highlights the additional explana-
tory power of a specification including database fixed effects. There is a slight change 
in the magnitude of the coefficients in our meta-regression. Even so, inferences are af-
fected for some variables. This does not come as a surprise because several databases 
are used by only one primary study. As some study characteristics vary only rarely 
within studies, database effects remove an important share of variation from our meta-
data.   
It seems obvious to exploit potential efficiency gains in the meta-regression estima-
tion. A starting point is the appropriate treatment of the heteroskedasticity inherent to 
meta-analyses. Inferences in specifications (1) – (4) are based on OLS estimation with 
standard errors robust against heteroskedasticity using the Huber-White sandwich for-
mula. Although this technique generally produces consistent coefficient estimates with 
correctly estimated standard errors, it is not at all the most efficient technique feasible 
given that information on the nature of the heteroskedasticity is readily available. In our 
meta-sample, the variance of reported primary marginal tax effects is generally known. 
This information is the natural candidate to define a more efficient weighting scheme 
for the meta-regression.  
Therefore, as it is the standard in meta-studies (cf. Stanley, 2008); we directly ad-
dress the heteroskedasticity by using weighted least squares (WLS) techniques. Precise-
ly, in columns (5) and (6) of Table 6.2, observed primary estimates, i.e. the meta-
regression observations, are weighted with the inverse of their standard error before 
applying standard OLS.76 By giving precise and reliable observations a greater influ-
ence, the meta-regression estimation becomes much more precise (in this line of reason-
ing, see, e.g., Greene, 2003: 225). For this reason, columns (5) and (6) are our most pre-
ferred specification. For most of our explanatory variables, we find an impact on the 
                                                 
76 The number of observations falls slightly because in a few cases primary studies do not provide in-
formation on standard errors. 
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marginal tax rate effect of debt financing, which is qualitatively very similar to what we 
found in the OLS estimations.   
The results in column (6) show that we are able to identify statistically significant ef-
fects of various study characteristics, even in the presence of database fixed effects. 
Identification of the impact of study features that do rarely vary across studies using the 
same database, however, remains weak. Furthermore, database effects also remove an 
important share of between-study variation. Because the variation in empirical specifi-
cations between studies is an important information source in a meta-analysis, we sub-
sequently discuss results of both specifications with and without control for database 
fixed effects.  
For a detailed discussion of the results, it is helpful to begin with the benchmark 
study, which is implicitly defined by the specification of our meta-regression equation. 
The benchmark study is a hypothetical primary analysis of the tax effect on corporate 
debt policy, and the explanatory dummy variables included in the meta-regression re-
flect deviations from this particular benchmark specification. Accordingly, we are able 
to carefully predict a typical marginal tax effect for such a hypothetical benchmark 
analysis (and any possible enhancements). For this purpose, we further take into ac-
count the constant of the meta-regression equation and the sample mean of the two con-
tinuously defined variables Average Sample Year and Primary Standard Error. Consid-
ering, for example, specification (5), we finally get a predicted marginal tax effect of 
about 0.143.77 Hence, the hypothetical benchmark study predicts the debt-to-asset ratio 
to increase by 0.143 percentage points if the tax rate rises by one percentage point. Note 
that the benchmark specification expected to yield such a result displays the study char-
acteristics denoted in brackets on the left hand side of Table 6.2. While almost no spe-
cific primary study in our meta-sample fulfills all characteristics of the benchmark case, 
the predicted marginal tax effect for this hypothetical case, however, is a good starting 
point for a systematic discussion of the meta-regression results.  
We begin the discussion of the meta-regression results depicted in columns (5) and 
(6) of Table 6.2 with a look at the definition of the tax measure. We distinguish the 
three common proxies for the marginal tax incentive. In comparison to the use of the 
statutory tax rate, reported tax effects are significantly higher if simulated marginal tax 
rates are used. In comparison to, for example, the marginal tax effect of about 0.143 
                                                 
77 For specification (5), a constant of about -0.1059 is estimated.The mean value of the Average Sample 
Year amounts to 1995.088 and the mean value of the Primary Standard Error is 0.093. 
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predicted for the hypothetical benchmark study, the simulated marginal tax rates yields 
estimates that almost double the benchmark values. By contrast, the estimates are 
smaller if primary capital structure regressions employ average tax rates as opposed to 
statutory tax rates. These apparent differences highlight the importance of a thoughtful 
selection of the tax measure to be used. Because they at best approximate the truly per-
ceived marginal tax incentive to finance with debt, simulated tax rates identify the most 
pronounced empirical impact. Conceptually, average tax rates are less sophisticated 
than simulated tax rates. Nevertheless, they are still more refined as compared to statu-
tory tax rates. But without further precautions, average tax rates introduce serious en-
dogeneity into capital structure regressions as they are directly affected by past and cur-
rent financial decisions. We interpret the significantly negative ATR dummy coefficient 
in column (6) to reflect the downward bias in reported tax coefficients due to endogene-
ity, which remains unaddressed in many primary studies.78 
Moreover, we consider the influence of characteristics of the debt items. In column 
(6), we observe higher marginal tax effects if primary estimates refer to long-term debt. 
An explanation might be that such long-term debt carries higher amounts of tax-
deductible interest. There are, however, arguments for long term debt to be more slug-
gish and thus less sensitive to temporarily changing tax incentives.79 Still, the additional 
tax sensitivity of long-term debt which we identify is very small and almost economi-
cally insignificant. Furthermore, we find that the tax effect is slightly smaller if debt is 
measured at book values rather than at market values. This result however is not robust 
if unobserved heterogeneity between databases is controlled for.  
Regarding the influence of the econometric specification of the primary analyses, our 
meta-regression confirms that estimated tax coefficients are significantly smaller if a 
dynamic specification is chosen. This is in accordance with our prediction because the 
tax coefficient found in a dynamic specification reflects only the short-term response to 
taxes. However, in the presence of adjustment costs, the total effect will be higher in the 
long-term. When taking into account recent evidence on the adjustment speed of capital 
                                                 
78  Rather than taking into account future profitability, average tax rates are affected by current profitabil-
ity. Accordingly, Booth et al. (2001: 118) point out that the average tax rate might be an alternative 
measure of profitability. This can also explain why the average tax rate tends to have a negative effect on 
debt ratios. 
79  Some studies, e.g. Gordon and Lee (2001), indeed identify stronger tax effects for short term debt, but 
their findings do not translate into our meta-regression results, which reflect evidence from a large num-
ber of estimates. 
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structures, our results suggest that long-term tax effects estimated in dynamic specifica-
tions are higher compared to evidence based on static specifications.80 
Furthermore, we find that reported tax coefficients are generally only slightly affect-
ed by the inclusion of firm fixed effects in capital structure regressions. While column 
(5) suggests that controlling for firm fixed effects is associated with a statistically sig-
nificant but small reduction of marginal tax effects, this finding is not robust against 
control for database fixed effects. Apparently, in numerous studies, the identifying vari-
ation in tax rates is not exclusively between firms. Accounting for unobserved time con-
stant firm heterogeneity does not necessarily prevent or significantly hamper the isola-
tion of partial tax effects on the corporate debt ratio. At the same time, there is no evi-
dence for important omitted variable bias, if the fixed firm effects are not modeled. This 
is a somewhat comforting result for empirical researchers dealing with tax effects on 
corporate debt policy. The qualifications made by Lemmon et al. (2008) on the time 
persistence of corporate capital structures appear less discouraging, given that there 
seems to be sufficient “space” left for reliably identifiable tax effects.      
Instead, the effect of leaving common time trends unmodeled in capital structure re-
gressions turns out to be much more important for reported tax coefficients. Column (5) 
suggests that holding time series influences constant significantly increases the identi-
fied marginal tax effect on the debt ratio by 0.033 percentage points on average. The 
cross-sectional variation in tax rates between firms or countries not only allows for the 
identification of tax effects when time-series effects are held constant: Not taking these 
time effects into account seems, on average, to abet an underestimation of the partial tax 
effect on corporate capital structure. Interestingly, direction and magnitude of this bias 
as identified in our meta-regression in column (5) almost exactly correspond to earlier 
findings reported by Graham (1999). 
Generally, empirical studies include a rich set of explanatory variables to isolate un-
biased partial effects on the debt ratio. Six important non-tax determinants of capital 
structure are identified by Frank and Goyal (2007). Our meta-regression results in col-
umns (5) and (6) suggest that the selection of non-tax control variables is indeed im-
portant for reported tax effects on corporate debt policy. We find that disregarding one 
                                                 
80  Let us, for example, assume the typical marginal tax effect predicted for our benchmark case of about 
0.143. In the case of a dynamic specification, the short-run effect is predicted to amount to only 0.087, 
but the long-run tax effect is significantly higher. Take, for example, the speed of adjustment found by 
Huang and Ritter (2009) of about 17 – 23%. Accordingly, the long-run tax effect is approximately 4.4-5.9 
times higher than the short-run effect. Then, in our case, the long-run tax effect ranges between 0.38 - 
0.51.  
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of the six core variables listed in Frank and Goyal (2007) significantly affects reported 
tax effects. Controlling for firm size, collateral or firm growth is associated with smaller 
primary estimates of the marginal tax effects on the corporate debt ratio. The inclusion 
of indicators for firm profit, inflation and industry-specific leverage into the capital 
structure regressions raises reported tax effects. In particular, the positive impact of in-
cluding profitability as a control variable does not come unexpected. Assuming that 
profit is negatively related to leverage (see, e.g., Titman and Wessels, 1988; Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995) but generally correlates positively with the firm-specific tax rate, there 
should be a downward bias in reported tax effects if firm profitability is omitted. That is 
exactly what the respective meta-regression coefficient indicates.  
Regarding the remaining five determinants identified in Frank and Goyal (2007), we 
refrain from generalizing on the identified meta-dummy coefficients and do not con-
front them with any expected effects of variable inclusion or omission because either 
the sign of the determinants’ effect on debt policy is ambiguous and empirically uncer-
tain ex-ante, or the way these variables correlate with the tax rate is rather unclear. Fur-
thermore, a qualification might apply: The meta-dummy coefficients in Table 6.2 im-
plicitly assume that the effect of controlling for a determinant is fully independent of the 
set of controls already included in the capital structure regression. This, however, need 
not necessarily be the case. While we therefore tend to interpret these specific results 
with adequate caution, we are still convinced that the identified meta-coefficients yield 
valuable insight on the importance of selected non-tax controls. In particular, we take 
note of the empirical finding that controlling for the core determinants ceteris paribus 
has significant consequences for the isolated tax effects. The effects are also qualitative-
ly quite important. Controlling, e.g., for profitability leads to reported tax effects that 
are 75% higher compared to the benchmark case in column (5).  
In regard to underlying data characteristics, the respective coefficient in column (6) 
suggests that reported marginal tax effects seem to rise with an increasing average sam-
ple year. The effect size, however, is very small. Furthermore, the significantly positive 
relationship between primary tax coefficients and their associated standard error indeed 
hints at the presence of publication selection for significantly positive tax effects on 
debt. Put differently, to a certain extent, specification-searching and publication bias, 
induced by editors’ and authors’ tendencies to look for positive and statistically signifi-
cant estimates of the tax effect on the corporate debt ratio, seems to be present in the 
literature. 
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Generally, the regression results depict significant influence of study characteristics 
on estimates for the marginal tax effect. While the marginal tax effect for the hypothet-
ical benchmark case assumed in column (5) amounts to 0.143, the results differ signifi-
cantly, if more refined specifications are chosen. Let us, for example, assume a study 
that deviates from the benchmark case with respect to all study characteristics that prove 
to be significant in regression (5) of Table 6.2, with the exception of keeping a statutory 
tax rate and a static specification. Then, the predicted marginal tax effect is 0.195. Now, 
let us vary the proxy for the tax incentive. If a simulated marginal tax rate is substituted 
for the statutory tax rate, the predicted tax effect rises to 0.302.  
6.5.2 Robustness Analyses 
In Table 6.3 we provide some robustness checks. While specifications (4) and (6) of 
Table 6.2 controlled for database effects, in column (1) of Table 6.3 we consider a full 
set of study fixed effects to capture unobserved characteristics that have affected all 
estimates taken from the same study. For example, estimates from a certain study might 
share the same data sampling procedure. The results in column (1) show that including 
study fixed effects in our meta-regression has consequences for the identification of 
some study characteristics. While the results on the impact of the different proxies for 
the marginal tax incentive are qualitatively unaffected, the impact of econometric speci-
fications and control variables used in primary studies is no longer significant at con-
ventional levels. Meanwhile, the signs of the coefficients remain mostly unchanged. 
This hints at identification difficulties that arise if study characteristics vary indeed be-
tween studies, but only rarely within studies. Carefully considering our results, we argue 
that the study fixed effects are associated with identification difficulties while we do 
not, however, feel that the results point at serious omitted variable biases in estimations 
with unmodeled study fixed effects.  
In column (2) of Table 6.3 we take into account the dependency of primary estimates 
taken from the same study by using standard errors clustered at the study level. Results 
turn out to be, again, quite robust.  
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Table 6.3: Meta-Regression of Reported Marginal Tax Effects on Debt Ratios, Robustness Analyses 
Regressions of the marginal tax effect found in primary studies on respective study characteristics. All study/model characteristics are coded as dummy 
variables (except Average Sample Year and Primary Standard Error). Thus, a base model represents the characteristics redundant to the variables explicitly 
included. The benchmark characteristics are indicated in parentheses for each study dimension. Estimated coefficients of the dummies indicate the effect 
on primary marginal effects of choosing a characteristic in lieu of the base specification. All regressions include a constant (not reported). The regressions 
are based on Sample A. All regressions are from WLS estimation. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses; ***/**/* denotes significance 
at the 1%/5% /10% level. Column (1) includes a full set of study dummies. In column (2) standard errors are clustered at the study level. Columns (3) and 
(4) consider only primary estimates from studies published in journals or books. Columns (5) and (6) include only primary tax effects that are significant at 
the five percent level. 
  Study  Dummies   
Clustered  
Standard Errors    Published Studies  Significant Estimates 
  .(1)    .(2)    .(3)  (4)   .(5)  (6) 
Proxies for the Marginal Tax Incentive                 
SMTR (Statutory Tax Rate)  0.1325***    0.0567**    0.1109***  0.2629***  0.1346***  0.0753*** 
   (0.0312)    (0.0268)    (0.0203)  (0.0293)  (0.0279)  (0.0165) 
ATR (Statutory Tax Rate)  ‐0.0132***    ‐0.0310*    0.0207  0.0813**  ‐0.0119  ‐0.0332*** 
   (0.0038)    (0.0180)    (0.0133)  (0.0407)  (0.0132)  (0.0103) 
Debt Characteristics                     
Long‐Term Debt (Maturity not Specified or Short‐Term)  0.0114***    0.0078*    0.0059  0.0105***  ‐0.0145  0.0100*** 
   (0.0025)    (0.0045)    (0.0051)  (0.0027)  (0.0109)  (0.0033) 
Debt Measured at Book Values (Market Values)  0.0003    ‐0.0006    ‐0.0090  0.0030  ‐0.0041  ‐0.0001 
   (0.0012)    (0.0010)    (0.0108)  (0.0085)  (0.0041)  (0.0019) 
Econometric Specification of Primary Studies                 
Dynamic Specification (Static Specification)  ‐0.0084    ‐0.1210***    ‐0.0265*  0.0567**  ‐0.0813***  ‐0.1244*** 
   (0.0157)    (0.0202)    (0.0144)  (0.0265)  (0.0150)  (0.0135) 
Firm Fixed Effects Included (no)  ‐0.0037    0.0166    ‐0.0184*  ‐0.0199  ‐0.0071**  0.0299** 
   (0.0123)    (0.0156)    (0.0108)  (0.0162)  (0.0031)  (0.0125) 
Time Fixed Effects Included (no)  0.0132    0.0378**    0.0185*  0.0438**  0.0568***  0.0285* 
   (0.0127)    (0.0154)    (0.0102)  (0.0216)  (0.0137)  (0.0145) 
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Table 6.3 (Continued) 
  .(1)    .(2)    .(3)  (4)  .(5)  (6) 
Control Variables in Primary Studies                 
Control for Profitability (no)  0.0138    0.1220***    0.0462**  0.1485***  0.1774***  0.1180*** 
   (0.0259)    (0.0324)    (0.0188)  (0.0236)  (0.0218)  (0.0172) 
Control for Size (no)  0.0343    ‐0.0137    ‐0.0411***  ‐0.0650***  0.0132  ‐0.0694** 
   (0.0274)    (0.0218)    (0.0134)  (0.0237)  (0.0210)  (0.0285) 
Control for Firm Growth (no)  ‐0.0199    ‐0.1652***    ‐0.0415***  ‐0.0249*  ‐0.1523***  ‐0.1640*** 
   (0.0147)    (0.0544)    (0.0124)  (0.0147)  (0.0274)  (0.0259) 
Control for Collateral (no)  0.0018    ‐0.0574    ‐0.0089  ‐0.0648*  ‐0.0480*  0.0470 
   (0.0158)    (0.0500)    (0.0130)  (0.0349)  (0.0250)  (0.0350) 
Control for Inflation (no)  0.0134    0.0380**    0.0906***  0.0564**  0.0570***  0.0288** 
   (0.0127)    (0.0154)    (0.0136)  (0.0235)  (0.0137)  (0.0145) 
Control for Industry‐Typical Leverage (no)  ‐0.0112    0.0867***    0.0476***  0.0869***  0.1504***  0.0891*** 
   (0.0151)    (0.0250)    (0.0115)  (0.0178)  (0.0217)  (0.0152) 
Data Sample Characteristics                 
Average Sample Year  0.000118***    0.000118***    0.00105  ‐0.000391  0.000102**  0.000148*** 
   (3.38e‐05)    (2.73e‐06)    (0.000720)  (0.00233)  (5.04e‐05)  (9.44e‐06) 
Publication Selection                 
Primary Standard Error  1.0186***    0.9614**    0.8908***  0.3955**  2.3259***  2.0153*** 
   (0.2197)    (0.4352)    (0.1987)  (0.1802)  (0.4060)  (0.3802) 
                 
Database Dummies Included in Meta‐Regression  No    Yes    No  Yes  No  Yes 
Study Dummies Included in Meta‐Regression  Yes    No    No  No  No  No 
Number of Primary Estimations  984    984    581  581  589  589 
Adj. R2 0.745    0.660    0.495  0.623  0.593  0.726 
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In column (3) and (4) of Table 6.3 the focus is exclusively on published studies. The-
se regressions might give some further indication about the possible presence of publi-
cation biases. Furthermore, as most of the published articles in the meta-sample ap-
peared in high-quality journals, selecting only published estimates into the meta-sample 
is also an effective quality filter. In columns (5) and (6) we consider only primary tax 
estimates that were statistically significant at the five percent level. Still, looking exclu-
sively at published studies or respectively at significant primary estimates implies a 
sharp reduction of the meta-sample which drops by about 40%.  
Generally, the regression results presented in columns (3) - (6) confirm most of our 
findings based on the full sample. Regarding the influence of the tax measures, the re-
sults confirm a significantly higher tax coefficient if simulated marginal tax rates are 
used. Interestingly, based on the estimates taken from the published studies, we do not 
find any negative effect on reported tax coefficients if average tax rates are employed. 
By contrast in column (4), where we include database fixed effects in the meta-
regression, the meta-coefficient for the average tax rate suggests that identified tax ef-
fects are even significantly higher as compared to statutory tax rates. One may speculate 
that the review process in the run-up to publication often forces a more careful treat-
ment of the endogeneity problems associated with average tax rates, thereby eliminating 
downwardly biased tax effect estimates.   
6.5.3 Exclusion of Multinational Subsidiaries 
The tax incentives and determinants of capital structures might be very distinct for for-
eign subsidiaries as compared to domestic firms. In this section, we therefore exclude 
all 352 primary tax effect estimates that exclusively refer to subsidiaries of multination-
al firms from the meta-regression analysis. We are thus left with Sample B as described 
in Section 6.3, containing 632 observations. Table 6.4 presents regression results using 
this subsample of primary estimates. Specification (1) in Table 6.4 considers our basic 
set of meta-variables, in column (2) we also control for database fixed effects. General-
ly, the results are very similar to those found for the full meta-sample in columns (6) 
and (7) of Table 6.2.   
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Table 6.4: Meta-Regression of Reported Tax Effect on Debt Ratios, Excluding Multinational Subsidiaries 
Regressions of  the marginal  tax effect  found  in primary  studies on  respective  study  characteristics. All  study/model  characteristics are 
coded as dummy variables (except Average Sample Year and Primary Standard Error). Thus, a base model represents the characteristics 
redundant to the variables explicitly included. The benchmark characteristics are indicated in parentheses for each study dimension. Esti‐
mated coefficients of the dummies indicate the effect on primary marginal effects of choosing a characteristic in lieu of the base specifica‐
tion. All regressions include a constant (not reported). The regressions are based on Sample B (primary estimates referring to multinational 
subsidiaries are excluded). All regressions are  from WLS estimation. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors  in parentheses; ***/**/* 
denotes significance at the 1%/5% /10% level. 
  .(1)  .(2)  .(3)  .(4)  .(5) 
Proxies for the Marginal Tax Incentive           
SMTR (Statutory Tax Rate)  0.0838***  0.0655***  0.0974***  0.1153***  0.1115*** 
   (0.0211)  (0.0183)  (0.0177)  (0.0206)  (0.0353) 
ATR (Statutory Tax Rate)  ‐0.0140  ‐0.0389***  ‐0.0333***     
   (0.0101)  (0.0101)  (0.0088)     
ATR is Immune to Endogeneity (Statutory Tax Rate)        0.0042  0.0042 
         (0.0355)  (0.0357) 
ATR is Potentially Endogenous (Statutory Tax Rate)        ‐0.0392***  ‐0.0392*** 
         (0.0086)  (0.0086) 
Personal Taxes Included (Only Corporate Taxes)          0.0067 
           (0.0413) 
Debt Characteristics           
Long‐Term Debt (Maturity not Specified)  ‐0.0107  0.0111***  0.0096**  0.0102***  0.0103*** 
   (0.0097)  (0.0040)  (0.0039)  (0.00383)  (0.0038) 
Debt Measured at Book Values (Market Values)  ‐0.0074**  ‐0.0004  ‐0.0005  ‐0.0005  ‐0.0005 
   (0.0031)  (0.0012)  (0.0012)  (0.0012)  (0.0012) 
Econometric Specification of Primary Studies           
Dynamic Specification (Static Specification)  ‐0.0680***  ‐0.1223***  ‐0.1487***  ‐0.1382***  ‐0.1387*** 
   (0.0133)  (0.0172)  (0.0166)  (0.0209)  (0.0211) 
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 Table 6.4 (Continued) 
  .(1)  .(2)  .(3)  .(4)  .(5) 
Firm Fixed Effects Included (no)  ‐0.0057***  0.0229*  0.0021  ‐0.0100  ‐0.0106 
   (0.0020)  (0.0136)  (0.0125)  (0.0153)  (0.0161) 
Time Fixed Effects Included (no)  0.0439***  0.0330**  0.0469***  0.0586***  0.0583*** 
   (0.0124)  (0.0154)  (0.0151)  (0.0187)  (0.0184) 
Control Variables in Primary Studies           
Control for Profitability (no)  0.0864***  0.1588***  0.1966***  0.1958***  0.1925*** 
   (0.0275)  (0.0272)  (0.0295)  (0.0276)  (0.0367) 
Control for Size (no)  ‐0.0639***  0.0023  0.2207***  0.2264***  0.2275*** 
   (0.0148)  (0.0306)  (0.0609)  (0.0584)  (0.0594) 
Control for Firm Growth (no)  ‐0.1328***  ‐0.1669***  ‐0.1482***  ‐0.1510***  ‐0.1504*** 
   (0.0218)  (0.0308)  (0.0273)  (0.0272)  (0.0274) 
Control for Collateral (no)  ‐0.0057***  ‐0.0974**  ‐0.1826***  ‐0.1699***  ‐0.1676*** 
   (0.0020)  (0.0480)  (0.0479)  (0.0491)  (0.0519) 
Control for Inflation (no)  0.0440***  0.0332**  0.0471***  0.0588***  0.0585*** 
   (0.0124)  (0.0154)  (0.0151)  (0.0187)  (0.0184) 
Control for Industry‐Typical Leverage (no)  0.0906***  0.0857***  0.1402***  0.1381***  0.1395*** 
   (0.0150)  (0.0215)  (0.0225)  (0.0225)  (0.0250) 
Data Sample Characteristics           
Average Sample Year  7.73e‐05  0.000118***  0.000117***  0.000117***  0.000117*** 
   (5.47e‐05)  (3.34e‐05)  (3.38e‐05)  (3.36e‐05)  (3.36e‐05) 
Loss‐Making Firms Excluded (not excluded)      0.2595***  0.2657***  0.2669*** 
       (0.0571)  (0.0539)  (0.0552) 
Publication Selection           
Primary Standard Error  0.7651***  0.7200***  0.6713***  0.5888**  0.5898** 
   (0.2675)  (0.2588)  (0.2512)  (0.2491)  (0.2503) 
           
Database Dummies Included in Meta‐Regression  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of Primary Estimations  632  632  632  632  632 
Adj. R2 0.457  0.657  0.684  0.684  0.684 
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The meta-regression results again allow predicting marginal tax effects that account 
for potential misspecification biases. Let us, for example, consider the results of column 
(1) of Table 6.4. Then, a marginal tax effect of 0.201 is predicted for a hypothetical 
study where the statutory tax rate, a static econometric specification and all other char-
acteristics that prove to be statistically significant are chosen. However, if a simulated 
marginal tax rate is considered, we obtain a significantly larger predicted marginal tax 
effect on debt financing of about 0.285. 
Given the clear focus of the subsample, we proceed with a thorough analysis of how 
the approximation of the marginal tax incentive affects tax effects estimated in the liter-
ature. For this purpose, we define some extra dummy variables. First, in column (3) we 
consider an additional dummy Loss-Making Firms Excluded that marks those primary 
analyses which rely on statutory rates but try to overcome related shortcomings by ex-
cluding loss-making companies from the data sample used by the respective study. Put 
differently, we identify primary studies that do not consider firms that are likely to be 
tax-exhausted. Our regression results provide striking evidence that, in fact, marginal 
tax effects are more pronounced if loss making firms are excluded from the sample con-
sidered by the primary analysis.    
Second, in column (4) we distinguish between studies using effective average tax 
rates that explicitly cope with endogeneity concerns (ATR Immune to Endogeneity) and 
others that do not address this problem (ATR is Potentially Endogenous).81 Our results 
support the view that the negative effect found for average tax rates is driven by a nega-
tive downward bias due to endogeneity. While we find a statistically smaller tax effect 
if average tax rates are potentially endogenous, average tax rates immune to endogenei-
ty do not exert significant differences in tax effects, compared to statutory tax rates.  
Finally, we code a dummy Personal Taxes which takes on a value of one, if personal 
taxes are included in the tax term and zero otherwise. While the interest deductibility 
creates the corporate tax incentive to use debt, shareholder taxation often differentiates 
between the types of capital as well. Still, the tax data used in the primary literature 
mostly reflects the pure corporate tax advantage of debt. The seminal work by Miller 
(1977), however, suggests that both corporate profit taxes and personal capital income 
taxes affect capital structure choices. If the personal tax status of capital providers is 
                                                 
81 Some studies employing average tax rates (e.g. Lasfer, 1995; Charalambakis et al., 2008) neutralize 
the impact of interest deductions by putting tax payments derived from pre-interest profits in the numera-
tor and by consistently relating it to those before financing profits. 
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known, capital structures are supposed to adjust to the after-personal-tax benefit of 
debt.82 Some studies have included personal taxes in the measure for the marginal tax 
incentive to use debt financing. In column (5) we test whether estimated tax effects dif-
fer if the tax measure also includes personal taxes imposed on capital income. However, 
we do not find any statistically significant impact of the inclusion of personal taxes in 
the tax rate proxy.  
6.5.4 Tax Response of Multinational Firms 
In recent years, the debt policy of multinational firms has attracted increasing attention 
in the literature. Therefore, we run some further meta-regressions on Sample C of our 
meta-data, containing tax effect estimates derived on the basis of pure multinational 
subsidiary data. Table 6.5 shows the respective meta-regression results. In columns (1) 
to (4), we again regress the marginal tax effects found in primary studies on a set of 
study characteristics.83 While regressions shown in columns (1) and (2) do not include 
the 101 pure profit shifting effects, they are additionally considered in columns (3) and 
(4), which themselves only differ with respect to the inclusion of database effects. To 
conclude, columns (3) and (4) present the most extended and complete meta-regression 
specifications. We rely primarily on these results when turning to interpretations. How-
ever, most coefficients are robust in sign and significance across columns (1) to (4) in 
Table 6.5. 
Interestingly, in the case of multinational firms, we find that identified tax effects on 
debt policy are more pronounced if an average tax rate is considered instead of a statu-
tory tax rate. An explanation for this finding might be that, in this Sample C, most pri-
mary estimates which refer to average tax rates successfully cope with the endogeneity 
concern.84 Moreover, the important cross-country tax code differences are implicitly 
captured by average tax rates.  
                                                 
82  Since in most countries personal taxes imposed on interest income are equal or even higher than the 
taxes on dividends or capital gains, personal taxes are typically associated with a tax penalty of debt 
(Graham, 1999). 
83  Compared to the specifications run on Samples A and B in subsections A to C, we generally cannot 
control for debt-maturity, the measurement of debt, and the implications of a dynamic specification. 
There is almost no variation with respect to these properties in analyses focusing on multinational subsid-
iaries. For the same reason, we are not able to test whether a simulated tax rate would be associated with 
higher tax effects. 
84  In Sample C, the lion’s share of primary estimates using average tax rates is from Desai et al. (2004b) 
and Aggarwal and Kyaw (2008), who in fact have dealt with endogeneity concerns by considering host 
country median average tax rates.  
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Table 6.5: Meta Regression of Reported Tax Effects on Debt Ratios, Multinational Subsidiaries 
Regressions of  the  tax effect  found  in primary studies on  respective study characteristics. All study/model characteristics are coded as dummy 
variables (except Average Sample Year and Primary Standard Error). Thus, a base model represents the characteristics redundant to the variables 
explicitly included. The benchmark characteristics are indicated in parentheses for each study dimension. Estimated coefficients of the dummies 
indicate the effect on primary marginal effects of choosing a characteristic in lieu of the base specification. All regressions include a constant (not 
reported). All regressions are from WLS estimation. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses; ***/**/* denotes significance at the 
1%/5% /10% level. The regressions are based on Sample C (only primary estimates referring to multinational subsidiaries). In columns (1) and (2) 
primary estimates are excluded that reflect a pure tax effect due to cross‐border profit shifting.  In columns (1) – (4) the dependent variable is the 
marginal tax effect found in primary studies; in columns (5) – (6) the dependent variable is the tax semi‐elasticity of the debt ratio. 
  Marginal Tax Effects    Tax Semi‐Elasticities 
  .(1)  .(2)  (3)  .(4)    (5)  (6) 
Proxies for the Marginal Tax Incentive               
ATR (Statutory Tax Rate)  0.1829***  0.2133***  0.1301***  0.2177***    0.7667***  1.0232*** 
   (0.0285)  (0.0370)  (0.0293)  (0.0426)    (0.1160)  (0.1908) 
Tax Effect Controlled for Profit‐Shifting (Total Tax Incentive)      ‐0.0340**  ‐0.0478***    0.0291  ‐0.0159 
       (0.0134)  (0.0133)    (0.0452)  (0.0503) 
Profit‐Shifting Tax Effect (Total Tax Incentive)      ‐0.0074  ‐0.0259**    ‐0.1677***  ‐0.2147*** 
       (0.0118)  (0.0115)    (0.0313)  (0.0384) 
Credit System (Exemption System)      ‐0.0017  ‐0.0008    ‐0.0896  ‐0.0459 
       (0.0047)  (0.0044)    (0.0609)  (0.0287) 
Debt Characteristics               
Intra‐Company Debt (Total Debt)  ‐0.0920***  ‐0.0919***  ‐0.0784***  ‐0.0681***    0.1563**  0.2879*** 
   (0.0166)  (0.0173)  (0.0161)  (0.0164)    (0.0615)  (0.0686) 
Econometric Specification of Primary Studies               
Subsidiary Fixed Effects Included (no)  ‐0.0600*  ‐0.0226  ‐0.0540  0.0014    ‐0.4895***  ‐0.0931 
   (0.0349)  (0.0436)  (0.0348)  (0.0364)    (0.1296)  (0.1322) 
Parent Fixed Effects Included (no)  ‐0.0736**  ‐0.0693*  0.0015  0.0248    0.0366  0.0441 
   (0.0329)  (0.0411)  (0.0322)  (0.0329)    (0.1304)  (0.1593) 
Time Fixed Effects Included (no)  0.1709***  0.1837***  0.1250***  0.1422***    0.5814***  0.4782*** 
   (0.0405)  (0.0431)  (0.0426)  (0.0420)    (0.1788)  (0.1775) 
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Table 6.5 (Continued) 
  .(1)  .(2)  (3)  .(4)    (5)  (6) 
Control Variables in Primary Studies               
Control for Profitability (no)  ‐0.0047  ‐0.0206  ‐0.0167  ‐0.0328**    ‐0.0207  ‐0.0179 
   (0.0166)  (0.0198)  (0.0117)  (0.0129)    (0.0233)  (0.0245) 
Control for Size (no)  0.0236  0.0073  ‐0.0014  ‐0.0011    0.1029  ‐0.0717 
   (0.0156)  (0.0167)  (0.0112)  (0.0112)    (0.0839)  (0.0872) 
Control for Firm Growth (no)  ‐0.2211***  ‐0.0921**  ‐0.1327***  ‐0.0449    ‐0.0477  0.1007 
   (0.0303)  (0.0435)  (0.0224)  (0.0409)    (0.0565)  (0.1069) 
Control for Collateral (no)  ‐0.0297  ‐0.0201  ‐0.0226*  ‐0.0237*    ‐0.4147***  ‐0.1902** 
   (0.0182)  (0.0172)  (0.0134)  (0.0127)    (0.0719)  (0.0843) 
Control for Inflation (no)  ‐0.0139  ‐0.0021  ‐0.0026  ‐0.0013    ‐0.0200  ‐0.0299 
   (0.0225)  (0.0279)  (0.0175)  (0.0188)    (0.0318)  (0.0335) 
Control for Industry Typical‐Leverage (no)  ‐0.0348*  ‐0.0024  0.0030  0.0121    ‐0.0930  0.1065 
   (0.0180)  (0.0177)  (0.0142)  (0.0132)    (0.0703)  (0.0735) 
Control for Capital Market Conditions (no)  ‐0.0342*  ‐0.0054  ‐0.0348*  ‐0.0083    ‐0.0887*  ‐0.0378 
   (0.0194)  (0.0206)  (0.0185)  (0.0220)    (0.0486)  ÿ0.0422) 
Control for Political Risk (no)  0.2128***  0.1327***  0.1434***  0.1017***    0.2887***  0.1472 
   (0.0345)  (0.0387)  (0.0278)  (0.0315)    (0.0624)  (0.0932) 
Control for Market Growth  (no)  0.0461  0.0614  0.0079  0.0077    0.1567*  0.2691*** 
   (0.0462)  (0.0505)  (0.0468)  (0.0533)    (0.0802)  (0.0851) 
Data Sample Characteristics               
Average Sample Year  0.00255  0.000843  0.00484***  0.00371*    0.0499***  0.0434 
   (0.00188)  (0.00281)  (0.00186)  (0.00200)    (0.00921)  (0.0293) 
Publication Selection               
Primary Standard Error  1.8541***  0.9491***  1.8187***  1.2863***       
   (0.2038)  (0.2450)  (0.1839)  (0.1951)       
               
Database Dummies Included in Meta‐Regression  No  Yes  No  Yes    No  Yes 
Number of Primary Estimations  352  352  453  453    428  428 
Adj. R2 0.777  0.807  0.726  0.754    0.568  0.649 
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Generally, the observed international differences in corporate tax levels should affect 
the allocation of debt within a multinational firm.85 Multinational firms can issue bonds 
preferentially in high tax countries (Newberry and Dhaliwal, 2001). They might, in ad-
dition, fine-tune taxable profits of high-taxed subsidiaries by using intra-company loans 
(Desai et al., 2004b). To capture the distinctive features of multinational debt financing, 
we again extend the basic set of meta-regressors and consider some extra dummy varia-
bles.  
First, we code an additional dummy variable Intra-Company Debt that marks tax ef-
fect estimates exclusively referring to inter-company loans, as opposed to third-party or 
total debt.86 By definition, the marginal tax effect on total debt is most pronounced, as 
the marginal tax effects on the two debt components, intra-company and external debt, 
add up. Consistently, in columns (1) to (4), the coefficient for Intra-Company Debt is 
significant with a negative sign.  
Second, we consider the way primary studies model unobserved cross-sectional firm 
effects in more detail. Precisely, we distinguish whether unobserved subsidiary-fixed 
effects or unobserved parent-fixed effects are considered. According to the results, 
however, the inclusion of neither of these two types of fixed effects seems to have an 
impact on the identification of marginal tax effects. Instead, in accordance with our 
former results, we find that a careful modeling of unobservable time-effects drives iden-
tified tax effects upward. Interestingly, the magnitude of this effect seems to be particu-
larly pronounced in the case of multinational debt financing.  
Primary studies using cross-country data must control for the various differences in 
the economic and institutional environment possibly affecting capital structures of sub-
sidiaries. We identify three main groups of extra control variables which are used in 
international studies. These capture the conditions of the host country capital market, 
political risk, and market growth. We code three additional dummy variables respective-
ly indicating if these aspects are included in primary studies. However, the meta-
regressions in columns (3) and (4) of Table 6.5 suggest that only the inclusion of politi-
cal risk has a particular influence on identified tax effects in international capital struc-
ture regressions. This finding is very reasonable if political risk and host country tax 
                                                 
85  While in 2009, for example, the statutory tax rate of the federal corporate income tax was 35% in the 
US, the corresponding tax rate was below 25% in several European countries. The corporate tax rate in, 
e.g., Ireland was as low as 12.5%. 
86  By far most estimates in Sample C refer to total debt or intra-company debt, only 35 primary tax ef-
fects are derived on the basis of external debt. We therefore abstain from considering a dummy for exter-
nal debt. 
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levels are supposed to be negatively correlated. More risky host countries, e.g., in East-
ern Europe, indeed tend to have lower tax rates in order to attract FDI. Furthermore, 
recent studies suggest that multinationals finance subsidiaries in high risk countries par-
ticularly with heavy debt (Desai et al., 2008; Kesternich and Schnitzer, 2010). Disre-
garding political risk in capital structure regressions should thus be associated with a 
downward bias of the identified tax effect. Consistently, the meta-coefficient for con-
trolling for political risk in columns (3) and (4) is significant and positive. The effect of 
0.143, for example, in column (3) is also qualitatively important. 
Regarding the magnitudes of the reported tax effects, let us, for example, consider 
specification (3) of Table 6.5. If we consider a hypothetical study that considers total 
debt and simply employs the statutory tax rate but at the same time takes on all other 
characteristics that are statistically significant in column (3), a marginal tax effect of 
about 0.198 is predicted. If an average tax rate is considered, the predicted tax effect is 
even higher and amounts to 0.327.  
The nature of the tax influence on capital structures of multinational subsidiaries 
however is complex. To be precise, primary estimates of the tax effect on debt policy 
differ in capturing either the incentives coming from the domestic tax system or, in ad-
dition, from the interplay of domestic and potentially numerous foreign tax regimes. In 
a purely domestic context, the marginal tax rate reflects the tax advantage of debt over 
equity financing. Its variation thus implies changes in the value of the corporate interest 
tax shield, prompting the firm to rebalance debt and equity financing. If multinational 
firms are involved, they might, in addition, adjust the intra-company allocation of inter-
nal funds in response to the shift in the relative tax attractiveness of a location. This 
international tax effect on a subsidiary’s debt ratio then adds to the domestically moti-
vated adjustment of corporate debt policy.87 
By sample composition or by matter of econometric specification, a few primary 
studies empirically split up the overall tax effect on debt. In other words, they isolate 
what is called the international tax effect from the pure impact of the domestic tax sys-
tem on debt ratios. To gain insight on the relative importance of both effects constitut-
ing the overall tax impact, we code a dummy variable Profit-Shifting Tax Effect which 
takes on the value of one if estimates refer to purely profit-shifting incentives and a val-
ue of zero if the total tax effect is reflected. We also consider an additional dummy Tax 
                                                 
87  For a thorough discussion see Huizinga et al. (2008).   
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Effect Controlled for Profit-Shifting Effect that marks estimates reflecting the tax effect 
of the domestic tax system, i.e. the remaining tax effect if the profit-shifting effect is 
already controlled for. The two respective meta-regression coefficients in columns (3) 
and (4) of Table 6.5 show a negative sign but the effect for the profit-shifting activity is 
only statistically significant if database fixed effects are considered. The estimated ef-
fects are also rather small. Consequently, each effect deviates only slightly from the tax 
effect found in studies that less carefully model the complex tax incentives in multina-
tionals. This means that the total tax effect almost doubles if a study carefully accounts 
for the international tax incentive, because a subsidiary is simultaneously confronted 
with both incentives from the host-country tax and from cross-border profit-shifting 
opportunities. 
An example helps to clarify the complex nature of tax incentives associated with 
multinational activity. Let us, once again, consider column (3) and look at the afore-
mentioned hypothetical study taking on all significant study characteristics except elab-
orate tax variables and intra-company debt. First, the results suggest that a rising host 
country tax rate exerts a marginal effect on debt-to-asset ratios of about 0.164. Second-
ly, due to cross-border profit shifting incentives, the tax-rate differential between the 
host-country tax level and the tax level at other locations of the multinational firm en-
tails an additional marginal tax effect of about 0.198. Consequently, the debt ratio of a 
multinational subsidiary is affected by variation in both the host country tax level and 
the tax level at the other locations of the multinational group. If the host country tax rate 
rises by one percentage point, the regression results suggest an increase of the debt ratio 
by 0.362 because the internal reallocation of debt financing within the multinational 
group adds to the generally higher attractiveness of debt financing. Not surprisingly, 
this predicted marginal tax effect for the tax response of multinational subsidiaries is 
much higher than marginal tax effects predicted for estimates excluding multinational 
firms.  
We can compare our results, for example, with predicted effects using regression re-
sults found for the sample that excludes studies focusing exclusively on multinational 
subsidiaries (see subsection C). The marginal tax effect predicted for a corresponding 
specification is 0.201.88 This effect size is surprisingly close to what can be expected to 
be found in multinational firm data analyses (0.198) if they do not adequately account 
                                                 
88  We refer to column (1) of Table 6.4 and consider a case where the statutory tax rate, a static economet-
ric specification and all other characteristics that prove to be statistically significant are chosen.    
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for the complex tax incentives at work in a multinational. Thus, our findings support the 
view that the complex nature of the tax incentives associated with multinational activi-
ties needs very careful consideration in an empirical analysis of capital structures. Tak-
ing our numerical examples seriously, a study that does not disentangle the different tax 
incentives of multinational subsidiaries tends to significantly underreport the tax re-
sponse of capital structures. 
The international tax system entails an additional impact on financial policy within 
multinational firms. Generally, two different systems of double taxation avoidance are 
applied. One group of countries simply exempts foreign dividends (exemption system). 
In this case, a multinational firm immediately benefits from reductions in foreign tax 
payments due to tax optimal debt financing. By contrast, in some countries, e.g. the US, 
foreign source income is taxed but foreign tax payments can be deducted from domestic 
tax liabilities (credit system). Under the credit system, benefits from tax avoidance 
abroad are offset by tax payments at the parent-company level when profits are repatri-
ated. Therefore, we construct a dummy variable Credit System to identify estimates 
which rely on data of parent firms resident in home countries that apply the credit sys-
tem. Our regression results, however, do not confirm that tax effects differ across dif-
ferent systems of international taxation. 
If a primary study only refers to intra-company debt, the results of column (3) sug-
gest that the marginal tax effect is reduced by 0.078. However, there are sound reasons 
to expect that intra-company debt reacts more intensively to tax rate changes. Desai et 
al. (2004b) point out that tapping internal capital markets might come along with signif-
icant cost advantages as compared to external funding if local capital market conditions 
are weak. Furthermore, for multinational firms, the fine-tuning of internal finances can 
serve as an important tax planning tool, used to minimize companywide tax payments. 
Yet, Desai et al. (2004b) carefully hint at external debt generally taking up a larger 
share in total debt than intra-company borrowing. The meta-regressions in columns (1) 
to (4) suggest that the arguments discussed above have not translated into larger mar-
ginal tax effects on intra-company debt ratios. However, marginal tax effects are not 
normalized with respect to initial debt shares and potentially hidden build-up costs. By 
contrast, the semi-elasticity is an instructive indicator if the interest does not lie in the 
absolute response of debt ratios but in relative response intensities. 
Therefore, we consistently transform the marginal tax effect found in primary studies 
into a semi-elasticity of the debt ratio. The latter reflects the percentage change in the 
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debt ratio in response to a one percentage point change in the tax rate. As almost all 
primary estimates sampled from the literature represent marginal tax effects, we can 
only evaluate the semi-elasticities at the respective sample means of the debt ratio. 
Equation (6.3) illustrates the semi-elasticity (semi) more formally, where d represents 
the corporate debt ratio and τ is the tax rate:  
 d 1semi
d  
    (6.3) 
In columns (5) and (6) of Table 6.5 the dependent variable of the meta-regressions is 
now the tax semi-elasticity as defined in equation (6.3).89 The regression results suggest 
that the relative response of intra-company debt to taxes is indeed significantly more 
intense as compared to other debt items.  
With regard to the magnitudes of the estimated effects, let us consider column (5) of 
Table 6.5. If we begin, once again, by assuming the aforementioned hypothetical study 
that produces a marginal effect of 0.164, the semi-elasticity of the debt ratio to a rising 
host country tax rate is predicted to be 0.313. The corresponding semi-elasticity for a 
fall in the tax level at other locations of the multinational group is 0.146. If however 
only intra-company debt is considered, predicted semi-elasticities are significantly 
higher and amount to 0.470 or 0.302, respectively. Generally, on the basis of all primary 
evidence, intra-company debt is confirmed to be a flexibly-used tax planning device. 
6.6 Conclusions 
The empirical evidence with regard to the tax impact on corporate debt policy is strong-
ly varied. This gives reason to provide a first quantitative survey of the literature. Tak-
ing recourse to meta-regression analysis, we offered explanations for why reported tax 
effects appear heterogeneous. After we have synthesized the evidence from 1,143 point 
estimates of marginal tax effect on the corporate debt ratio sampled out of 46 primary 
analyses, we conclude that capital structure choices are indeed positively affected 
through taxes. The effect is also quantitatively important.  
Our findings suggest that very small or even negative tax estimates found in a couple 
of studies do not reflect the true debt response to taxes. By contrast, accounting for all 
potential misspecification biases, we predict a marginal tax effect on the debt ratio of 
                                                 
89  In columns (5) and (6) of Table 6.5, the number of observations falls slightly because information 
provided in the study by Jog and Tang (2001) does not allow to calculate semi-elasticities of debt ratios. 
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0.30, based on results in column (6) of Table 6.2. Hence, the debt-to-assets ratio rises by 
3 percentage points if the simulated marginal tax rate increases by 10 percentage points. 
A comparison with other capital structure determinants puts the magnitude of the 
predicted tax effect into perspective. Let us, for example, consider tangibility which is 
usually defined as the ratio of tangible assets to total assets. According to a recent study 
by Frank and Goyal (2007) the marginal response of capital structures to tangibility 
oscillates around 0.126. Accordingly, the debt response to tangibility is only one-third 
of the response to taxes. The empirical results of our meta-study thus support the view 
that taxes are quite an important determinant of capital structure choices. 
Furthermore, our meta-regression results show that the point estimates of tax effects 
are, in particular, affected by the tax rate proxy used for identification. We find very 
robust evidence that, as compared to statutory tax rates, simulated marginal tax rates are 
associated with significantly higher estimates for the tax coefficient. Average tax rates 
instead may introduce a significant downward bias in primary estimates which is due to 
endogeneity. In general, we can conclude that a careful consideration of the firm-
specific tax status raises the magnitude of identified tax effects on corporate debt policy.  
Moreover, the results of the meta-analysis suggest that the set of explanatory varia-
bles considered in a primary study significantly affect reported tax effects. Disregarding 
one type of control variable is indeed quantitatively important. In addition, the long-
term response of capital structures to taxes identified in dynamic models exceeds in 
magnitude the response estimated in static models. Interestingly, we find that unob-
served firm effects do not affect isolated tax effects on debt policy.   
In additional regressions, we focused on tax effect estimates with regard to multina-
tional debt financing. We document that, due to the complex nature of tax incentives 
associated with multinational activity, an empirical analysis must carefully model the 
additional effect arising from cross-border profit shifting opportunities. Moreover, our 
results suggest that the relative tax sensitivity of intercompany debt financing is particu-
larly strong. Interestingly, our meta-analysis does not corroborate the view that the in-
ternational tax system affects the tax effect on debt financing of multinational firms.  
Finally, the results of our meta-analysis may guide further empirical research: For the 
fast growing literature on multinationals’ debt financing, it might be an interesting chal-
lenge to consider the firm’s tax status more carefully, e.g., by using simulated marginal 
tax rates. Since previous dynamic estimations have predominantly referred to potential-
ly endogenous average tax rates, another challenge could be to estimate a dynamic 
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model with a better proxy for the marginal tax incentive. Generally, future research can 
benefit from the insights on how various study characteristics quantitatively affect esti-
mated tax effects. 
128 A Meta-Study on the Tax-Responsiveness of Profit Shifting Chapter 7 
 
 
Chapter 7 
A Meta-Study on the Tax-
Responsiveness of Profit Shifting  
7 A Meta-Study on the Tax-Responsiveness of Profit Shifting 
7.1 Introduction 
A wealth of empirical literature deals with corporate profit shifting behavior. Several 
strands of research have emerged. Numerous studies provide indirect evidence for profit 
shifting by investigating the correlation between reported profits and tax levels. Some 
research focuses on profit shifting via the route of inter-company transactions, in partic-
ular the manipulation of transfer prices. Another strand of literature examines shifting 
via financial decisions, therefore dealing with capital structures and the allocation of 
internal debt.  
Surprisingly, no attempt has so far been made to systematically compare the distinct 
shifting channels with regard to their economic significance. To fill in this gap in the 
literature, we present a meta-study of the research results from 40 primary studies on 
corporate profit shifting behavior. We first transform the reported empirical results into 
a uniformly defined effect size index. Then we regress reported tax effect sizes on dif-
ferent sets of mostly dummy variables which mark, inter alia, the distinct shifting chan-
nels, the explained proxy variables for profit shifting activity, and the different econo-
metric approaches.  
Meta-regression analysis will help us to answer interesting and important questions: 
 Do the strands of empirical research on profit shifting differ with regard to 
the reported tax sensitivity of their main dependent variable?  
 If there are systematic differences, are these due to the nature of the employed 
dependent variable and the chosen econometric approaches? 
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 Do the empirical results hint at fundamental differences in the economic sig-
nificance of the distinct profit shifting channels? If so, how large are these 
differences? 
Based on our meta-regressions, we predict affiliate pre-tax profit to decline by 1.71% 
in response to a one percentage point increase in the profit shifting incentive. Mean-
while, EBIT is predicted to decrease by 1.28%. Moreover, we find that the tax-
responsiveness of pure paper profit shifting is overestimated by 20% if real economic 
location effects are left uncontrolled for in the econometric analysis. Furthermore, our 
results provide some tentative evidence that tax-motivated financial decisions explain 
around 20% of the overall profit response to international income shifting incentives. 
Inter-company transfer pricing and adjustments of transaction volumes instead seem to 
account for the larger share in shifting volumes.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.2, we survey the 
empirical evidence on the impact of tax incentives on profit shifting activity. A detailed 
description of the assembled meta-dataset is provided in Section 7.3. Thereafter, Section 
7.4 presents the results of the meta-regression estimations. Section 7.5 concludes. 
7.2 Qualitative Literature Review 
The extent of profit shifting activity is influenced by numerous factors, including anti-
tax avoidance rules and the interdependence of financial, operational, and tax decisions. 
The relative importance of the associated costs that offset the tax benefits at the margin 
is, however, unknown a priori. While there is agreement that income shifting takes 
place, its sensitivity to a variation in shifting incentives is thus an empirical issue. In the 
following, we survey the insights gained from primary research on the profit shifting 
behavior of multinational firms.90 
General Evidence for Profit Shifting 
General evidence of profit shifting activity is provided by Egger et al. (2010). In this 
study, multinational subsidiaries are matched with comparable domestic firms. The 
                                                 
90  In his representation of the essential choices facing multinational firms, Devereux (2007) refers to the 
reallocation of profit among locations as the final stage of the transnational investment decision tree. 
Please note, however, that tax planning can be associated with real economic decisions on, for example, 
group structure and intra-group trade quantities. Thus, there is often only a fine line between pure tax 
planning and the real economic sphere. This meta-analysis, however, restricts the focus, as far as possible, 
on tax planning with regard to so-called paper profit shifting, and ignores the real economic dimension. 
For a more detailed discussion of the interrelation of tax planning and real economic consequences for, 
e.g., group structures, please refer to a survey put forward by Heckemeyer and Overesch (2012). 
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findings, based on European company data from the Amadeus database (Bureau van 
Dijk) averaged over the period 1999 to 2006, are consistent with tax planning: in high-
tax countries, multinational affiliates tend to be relatively unprofitable while in low-tax 
jurisdictions their profitability is increased. 
Another innovative investigation approach is put forward by Dharmapala and Riedel 
(2011). Again based on European Amadeus firm data from 1995 to 2005, the paper 
traces how exogenous earnings shocks at the parent firm propagate within the group. 
The results show that positive earning shocks lead to a significantly positive increase of 
pre-tax profits in low-tax affiliates, relative to the effect on high-tax subsidiaries.  
An important strand of the empirical research directly exploits tax rate variation. The 
1986 US Tax Reform Act (TRA 86) offers a natural experiment here. With the US stat-
utory corporate income tax rate brought down from 45% to 34%, the US tax difference 
vis-à-vis many foreign locations switched sign, accordingly reversing income shifting 
incentives. Based on US firm-level data for the period from 1984 to 1990, Harris (1993) 
and Klassen et al. (1993) show that US multinational corporations shifted considerable 
amounts of income into the United States as a result of the TRA 86. 
The Tax-Rate Elasticity of Reported Profits and EBIT 
Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice (1994) directly estimate the tax elasticity 
of reported profitability. They aggregate 1982 Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
data of foreign subsidiaries of US corporations to the respective host country levels. The 
econometric analysis regresses measures of pre-tax profitability on local tax rates. In 
particular, Hines and Rice (1994) employ earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) as a 
dependent variable instead of using after-financing profits. Identified effects thus must 
be caused by tax planning strategies built around intra-group transactions because EBIT 
is unaffected by financial policy. 
Numerous studies follow up on this early literature. Recent contributions, equally 
based on BEA foreign subsidiary data of US multinationals, include Clausing (2009) 
and Schwarz (2009). In line with Hines and Rice (1994), many analyses focus on the tax 
sensitivity of EBIT to investigate shifting via related-party transactions (Huizinga and 
Laeven, 2008; Markle, 2010; Blouin et al., 2011).  
Markle (2010) investigates the role of tax deferral for the profit shifting behavior of 
multinationals subject to worldwide taxation. Exploiting a 2006 cross-country sample, 
he finds that shifting behavior is no different from what is observed under territorial tax 
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regimes if the residential tax system allows for the deferral of home country taxes on 
foreign income. 
Blouin et al. (2011) investigate the role of tariffs. Using a BEA sample of foreign af-
filiates engaging in related-party trade with their U.S. parents between 1982 and 2005, 
they show that tariff minimization dominates the influence of income tax rates on pre-
tax profitability.  
While the above studies focus on US outbound subsidiaries, Mills and Newberry 
(2004) examine whether the tax reporting of US inbound subsidiaries is equally affected 
by shifting incentives. Based on confidential data provided by the US Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) for 1987 through 1996, US affiliates of foreign multinationals with low 
average foreign tax rates are shown to report less taxable income than subsidiaries pay-
ing high foreign taxes.  
Improved availability of non-US firm-level data led to an increasing number of stud-
ies with a more international focus. Huizinga and Laeven (2008) use European subsidi-
ary data of 1999 from the Amadeus database. They employ a composite tax variable 
that weighs bilateral tax rate differences vis-à-vis all other firm locations with weights 
given by the relative importance of the firm’s local operations. The results of the econ-
ometric analysis substantiate the profit shifting hypothesis.  
Dischinger (2007) exploits a panel of European subsidiary-level data from 1995 
through 2005. Controlling for unobserved affiliate effects, he documents a negative re-
lationship between a subsidiary’s reported pre-tax profits and the statutory tax differ-
ence vis-à-vis the parent company.  
Using a comprehensive dataset on German FDI (Midi) provided by Deutsche Bun-
desbank, Weichenrieder (2009) offers some evidence that wholly owned affiliates’ 
shifting response to local tax rate changes is particularly pronounced.  
The evidence described so far is generally of an indirect type. Profit is clearly influ-
enced by cross-border shifting activity. Nonetheless, it gives no indication about the 
immediate response and relevance of the distinct shifting channels. Similarly, tax-
induced variation in reported EBIT can only provide indirect evidence. However, here 
we know that the underlying shifting activity must be related to inter-company trade 
rather than financial structure. It thus seems to be a good idea to compare the tax sensi-
tivity of after-financing profit and EBIT. Differences in the tax-responsiveness of these 
two indirect indicators for income shifting could shed light on the economic signifi-
cance of the two shifting channels. We will return to this question in Section 7.4. 
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The Tax Sensitivity of Related-Party Trade 
In addition to the indirect evidence, important strands of literature directly focus on the 
shifting mechanisms. A number of these more direct approaches deal with related-party 
transactions. 
Based on aggregate BEA transaction data of US outbound investments, Grubert and 
Mutti (1991) find an empirical effect of foreign host country taxes on the volume of 
trade with the US. Still, the investigation does not control for the capital location effect 
of taxes, which could also drive the observed trade patterns. Clausing (2001, 2006) 
therefore isolates the distinct tax effects on US trade patterns. One the one hand, this is 
the tax effect on real capital location. On the other hand, there are the tax effects on 
transfer prices and the tax motivated deviation from otherwise optimal trade quantities. 
Regressions run on aggregate BEA data confirm the significance of all three tax effects. 
Grubert (2003) explains variation in related-party sales and purchases with profit-
shifting incentives at the firm-level. Based on 1996 tax return data for US outbound 
subsidiaries, he provides evidence that intangibles produced by R&D activity play an 
important role in profit shifting strategies.  
Overesch and Schreiber (2010) substantiate these findings. Analyzing the claims on 
affiliated enterprises reported by German outbound subsidiaries, they show that firms 
with a strong focus on R&D have additional income shifting opportunities.  
The Tax Sensitivity of Transfer Prices 
Some studies directly exploit price data to investigate tax-motivated transfer price ma-
nipulation. Bernard and Weiner (1990) use US petroleum price data for the years from 
1973 to 1984. They regress the price gap between arm’s length and related-party trans-
actions on the difference between the industry-specific average tax rate in the host coun-
try and the US. However, their results do not back the hypothesis that US petroleum 
multinationals underinvoice oil exports from high-tax source countries.  
Another study dealing with US import prices is put forward by Swenson (2001b). 
Studying the prices of US imports from countries holding major direct investments in 
the US (Canada, France, Germany, Japan, UK), the empirical evidence indeed suggests 
that transfer prices for related-party transactions between parents and US affiliates are 
manipulated according to tax incentives. For the sample period from 1981 through 
1988, the regression analysis shows that reported prices rise when the combined effect 
of taxes and tariffs provides an incentive for firms to overstate their prices.  
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Clausing (2003) exploits monthly price data for both arm’s length and related-party 
US imports and exports. In line with the theoretical prediction, a significant reaction to 
international tax incentives is only identified for intra-firm transfer prices.  
Bernard et al. (2006) report an economically small but statistically highly significant 
tax and tariff sensitivity of the gap between related-party and arm’s length prices of US 
exports during the 1990s.   
The Tax Sensitivity of Corporate Financial Policy 
Multinational firms are able to shift income via a second major channel. This route re-
lates to financial decisions. Multinationals can geographically reallocate internal debt, 
lent and borrowed between affiliates, in a way that the overall company tax burden is 
reduced.91 
Altshuler and Grubert (2003) and Desai et al. (2004b) were the first to examine bal-
ance sheet data of foreign subsidiaries of multinational corporations. Altshuler and 
Grubert (2003) use corporate tax files of US controlled foreign companies (CFC) com-
piled by the US IRS for the year 1996 and find significant tax effects exclusively on 
internal debt ratios. Desai et al. (2004b) analyze BEA firm-level data for the years 1982, 
1989 and 1994 on US affiliated operating abroad. They confirm significant tax influ-
ences on internal debt ratios. Furthermore, some empirical studies focus on the tax 
asymmetries between subsidiary and parent company.  
Mills and Newberry (2004) find a negative impact of the tax level of parent compa-
nies on debt financing of foreign controlled subsidiaries in the US.  
More recently, improved data availability favored the assessment of tax effects on 
capital structures within European multinationals (Huizinga et al., 2008; Buettner et al., 
2009; Mintz and Weichenrieder, 2010). All studies find a significant empirical correla-
tion between internal debt ratios and tax levels. In particular, the tax elasticity turns out 
to be more pronounced for intra-company debt than for third-party debt (Desai et al., 
2004b; Feld et al., 2011).  
Given the role of debt financing in tax planning strategies, there are attempts to re-
strict the use of inter-company loans by introducing what is called thin-capitalization or 
earning stripping rules. The effects of thin-capitalization rules are assessed by Buettner 
                                                 
91  Debt financing can also be motivated by the domestic tax system which in most countries provides 
for a tax advantage of debt over equity. Here, we are only interested in the effect of the international prof-
it shifting incentives and exclude research results which relate to the purely domestic context. For a com-
prehensive meta-analysis of all tax effects influencing corporate debt policy, see Chapter 6. 
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et al. (2008) and Overesch and Wamser (2010b). Based on data for German outbound 
subsidiaries from 1996 through 2004, Buettner et al. (2008) provide evidence for con-
siderable effectiveness of thin capitalization rules in curbing tax planning via inter-
company loans. Overesch and Wamser (2010b) infer the same result from their analysis 
of German inbound investment data when taking reforms of the German thin-
capitalization rules as natural experiments. 
This qualitative literature survey shows that numerous studies provide estimates for 
the tax sensitivity of multinationals’ profit shifting behavior. The different strands of 
literature put their emphases on either indirect evidence for profit shifting or on the di-
rect analysis of profit shifting channels. Depending on the key points of analysis, the 
employed proxies for profit shifting activity differ. In the following sections, we ana-
lyze whether and to what extent these different study characteristics systematically ex-
plain differences in the reported tax-responsiveness of profit shifting behavior.     
7.3 The Meta-Dataset 
To assemble the meta-database of primary tax effect estimates, we comprehensively 
searched the empirical literature on corporate profit shifting behavior. In particular, we 
scanned the Econ-Lit and the SSRN working paper database for the central keywords 
“Tax”, “Income Shifting” and “Profit Shifting”. Furthermore, we conducted additional 
internet searches and screened relevant journals as well as working paper series.92 In 
total, we found 47 studies to match our search criteria. 
To compare the primary estimates of the tax effect on profit shifting activity, these 
must be transformed into a uniformly defined effect size index. In this meta-study, we 
refer to the semi-elasticity of profit shifting activity. The semi-elasticity indicates the 
percentage change of the respectively employed profit shifting indicator in response to a 
one percentage point change in the tax incentive to shift profits abroad. Equation (7.1) 
generally defines a semi-elasticity ( ePS ) for a given dependent variable DV used as an 
                                                 
92  We particularly searched through the Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of 
Quantitative and Financial Analysis, Journal of Public Economics, Journal of International Economics, 
National Tax Journal, International Tax and Public Finance, Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, Accounting Review, Contemporary Accounting Research, European Ac-
counting Review, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, and the Econ-Lit and the SSRN working 
paper database. 
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indicator for profit shifting behavior and endogenous to the international tax rate differ-
ence H Fdiff    .93 
 ln 1e
  
PS DV DV
diff DV diff
      (7.1) 
Linear models with a log-level specification produce point estimates of semi-
elasticities. Other specifications yield coefficients which represent, for example, mar-
ginal effects or elasticities. If the semi-elasticity is not reported as point estimate, we 
use the sample mean value of the tax rate and/or the dependent variable to transform the 
tax coefficient into a semi-elasticity.94 If the required sample means are not available, 
we have to exclude the study from our meta-analysis. Excluded studies are Bernard and 
Weiner (1990), Grubert and Mutti (1991), Jacob (1996), Grubert (1998), Conover and 
Nichols (2000) and Klassen and Laplante (2010). After all, 40 studies enter our meta-
dataset. 
Eventually, the sign of the semi-elasticities must be uniformly aligned. Otherwise the 
semi-elasticity of, for example, related-party import prices with regard to the local tax 
rates of a given country would show the opposite sign of the semi-elasticity of related-
party export prices. Pooling these results would be misleading because the two effects 
cancel out. Where required, we therefore multiply the elasticity values by (-1). In the 
end, semi-elasticities are aligned so that a higher positive value of the semi-elasticity 
indicates a higher tax-responsiveness of the underlying profit shifting activity. 
Table 7.1 lists the results of the literature sampling procedure and shows some de-
scriptive statistics for each study included in the meta-dataset.95 It also indicates which 
type of evidence or, respectively, profit shifting channel is analyzed. At the bottom of 
Table 7.1, some summary statistics are provided. 
 
 
                                                 
93  This difference can be empirically captured in manifold ways. If foreign taxes are controlled for, e.g. 
by looking at inbound subsidiaries from one single foreign home country, only the local tax rate matters. 
If the differential must be fully included, its empirical design depends on the number of locations in-
volved and on whether a weighting scheme is applied that accounts for the importance of locations. 
94  See the Appendix for details. 
95 Note that we use all reported tax effect estimates instead of picking just one result from each primary 
study. Selecting one single estimate from each study would require predefined and - most importantly - 
objective sampling rules, which can hardly be justified. Moreover, the additional heterogeneity obtained 
from considering all robustness checks reported in a study is welcome in statistical meta-analyses.  
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Table 7.1: Studies on Profit Shifting Behavior Included in the Meta-Analysis 
Study  Dep. Variable 
No. of 
effects 
Semi‐Elasticities 
Mean  Median  Min  Max  Std. 
1  Azemar, 2010  Profit  3  2.75  1.60  1.02  5.62  2.51 
2  Blouin et al., 2011  Profit  4  0.47  0.39  0.21  0.89  0.32 
3  Clausing, 2009  Profit  4  3.39  3.50  1.05  5.52  1.83 
4  Collins et al., 1998  Profit  2  0.32  0.32  ‐0.32  0.95  0.90 
5  Dharmapala and Riedel, 2011  Profit  3  1.02  1.04  0.90  1.13  0.11 
6  Dischinger, 2007  Profit  26  1.38  1.31  0.40  3.05  0.70 
7  Dischinger and Riedel, 2011  Profit  4  3.20  3.18  2.14  4.29  1.11 
8  Grubert, 2003  Profit  5  0.78  0.79  0.38  1.05  0.26 
9  Markle, 2010  Profit  15  0.98  0.94  ‐0.41  2.04  0.67 
10  Mills and Newberry, 2004  Profit  4  1.94  1.03  ‐1.16  6.86  3.79 
11  Rousslang, 1997  Profit  12  4.74  5.00  3.63  5.63  0.64 
12  Schwarz, 2009  Profit  9  2.27  2.16  ‐1.33  4.81  2.01 
13  Weichenrieder, 2009  Profit  0  0.83  0.90  0.44  1.16  0.29 
14  Bartelsmannv and Beemtsma, 
2003 
EBIT  4  0.37  0.35  ‐3.24  2.89  0.75 
15  Beuselinck et al., 2009  EBIT  4  0.65  0.74  0.21  0.89  瘣
32
16  Hines and Rice, 1994  EBIT  8  4.85  3.31  ‐2.25  12.99  3.61 
17  Hoonsawat, 2007  EBIT  2  0.61  0.61  0.60  0.61  0.01 
18  Huizinga and Laeven, 2008  EBIT  24  1.25  0.92  0.49  3.71  0.70 
19  Maffini and Mokas, 2011  EBIT  22  1.21  1.03  0.23  4.87  0.96 
20  McDonald, 2008  EBIT  9  1.15  1.03  0.60  2.14  0.44 
21  Clausing, 2001  Trade  20  1.98  1.81  ‐0.88  4.26  1.27 
22  Clausing, 2006  Trade  9  3.70  4.08  0.80  7.32  2.14 
23  Overesch, 2006  Trade  28  1.73  1.94  ‐0.85  3.38  1.14 
24  Overesch and Schreiber, 2010  Trade  4  0.84  0.85  0.63  1.04  0.23 
25  Bernard et al., 2006  Price  15  1.25  0.66  0.39  4.18  1.22 
26  Clausing, 2003  Price  10  4.00  2.92  1.99  7.91  2.05 
27  Swenson, 2001b  Price  7  1.20  0.72  0.00  4.50  1.51 
28  Aggarwal and Kyaw, 2008  Debt  3  2.57  3.30  1.08  3.33  1.29 
29  Altshuler and Grubert, 2003  Debt  2  1.04  1.04  0.66  1.42  0.54 
30  Barion et al., 2010  Debt  4  0.18  0.19  ‐0.15  0.50  0.32 
31  Buettner and Wamser, 2009b  Debt  115  0.61  0.77  ‐0.63  1.29  0.47 
32  Buettner et al., 2008  Debt  9  0.41  0.66  ‐0.39  0.82  0.49 
33  Buettner et al., 2009  Debt  3  0.65  0.62  0.54  0.77  0.12 
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Table 7.1 (continued) 
Study  Dep. Variable 
No. of 
effects 
Semi‐Elasticities 
Mean  Median  Min  Max  Std. 
34  Desai et al., 2004b  Debt  13  1.66  1.11  0.63  5.00  1.24 
35  Dischinger et al., 2010  Debt  22  0.11  0.09  0.03  0.38  0.09 
36  Hebous  and  Weichenrieder, 
2009 
Debt  22  2.01  1.04  ‐8.00  33.00  7.98 
37  Huizinga et al., 2008  Debt  28  0.13  0.13  0.01  0.30  0.05 
38  Mintz and Weichenrieder, 2010  Debt  24  1.18  1.22  ‐0.33  2.89  0.90 
39  Overesch and Wamser, 2010b  Debt  15  1.22  0.76  0.67  2.80  0.81 
40  Ramb and Weichenrieder, 2005  Debt  8  0.09  0.04  ‐0.22  0.70  0.30 
 
Profit   104  1.84  1.18  ‐1.33  6.86  1.70 
EBIT  123  1.05  0.73  ‐3.24  12.99  1.56 
Trade  61  2.04  1.88  ‐0.88  7.32  1.51 
  Price  32  2.10  1.30  0.00  7.91  2.01 
  Debt  268  0.77  0.67  ‐8.00  33.00  2.38 
  Full Sample  588  1.22  0.82  ‐8.00  33.00  2.08 
 
Among the 40 studies contained in the meta-dataset, 13 studies provide indirect evi-
dence on profit shifting behavior by estimating the sensitivity of affiliate profit to inter-
national tax differences. These studies contribute 104 semi-elasticities to the meta-
sample, ranging from -1.33 to 6.85. The mean of this group of semi-elasticities is 1.84, 
with a median effect size of 1.18. The maximum value of 6.86 is reported by Mills and 
Newberry (2004) and the smallest responsiveness is found in Schwarz (2009). 
Furthermore, Table 7.1 lists seven studies employing EBIT on the left-hand side of 
their regression equations. These analyses produce 123 semi-elasticities. The mean 
amounts to 1.05, with a slightly lower median value of 0.73. Extreme values are -3.24 
and 12.99, reported respectively by Bartelsmann and Beemtsma (2003) and Hines and 
Rice (1994). 
In addition, four studies included in our meta-dataset regress trade variables on profit 
shifting incentives. The mean effect of 61 reported empirical results, again measured in 
terms of semi-elasticities, is 2.04 (median: 1.88). The range of values is relatively small 
with a minimum semi-elasticity of -0.88, derived from Clausing (2001), and a maxi-
mum amounting to 7.32, inferred from Clausing (2006). 
The next category of literature uses detailed transaction price data. This type of data, 
however, is only scarcely available to empirical researchers. Accordingly, the number 
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of price data studies is small. The 32 estimates extracted from three studies show a 
mean semi-elasticity of 2.10 and a median of 1.30. The range of semi-elasticities com-
puted from price data studies goes from 0 to 7.91. 
The literature dealing with debt policies of multinational firms has grown to a con-
siderable size in recent years. In this paper, we only refer to those studies which either 
empirically isolate the effect of shifting incentives on the affiliate debt ratio or use in-
ternal debt as dependent variable. We are not interested in the effects arising from the 
general tax advantage of debt over equity, as present under most domestic tax systems.96 
Eventually, we include thirteen capital structure studies in our meta-sample. On aver-
age, the 268 primary semi-elasticities computed on the basis of these studies amount to 
a value of 0.77 (median: 0.67). Extreme values are as low as -8 and reach up to 33. 
Accordingly, the standard deviation of the reported tax sensitivity of profit shifting 
via the route of internal debt allocation is relatively high with a value of 2.38. Also for 
the other strands of literature, with the exception of trade data studies, the coefficients 
of variation (= standard deviation/mean) reach or even exceed the value one, hinting at 
considerable variation between studies. Moreover, the statistics shown in Table 7.1 also 
show high standard deviations within individual studies. The standard deviation in the 
full sample of all 588 primary estimates amounts to 2.08. The mean semi-elasticity 
across all strands of literature is 1.22 and the median value turns out to be 0.82. 
To shed further light on the entire sample distribution of the semi-elasticities, Figure 
7.1 shows six histograms. One is for the full sample and the remaining five represent, 
respectively, the distribution of estimates within each class of the empirical profit shift-
ing literature. In all six histograms, the mass of the sample distribution of semi-
elasticities lies within the range of 0 to 5. Empirical results for the tax sensitivity of af-
filiate profit, trade variables, and transfer prices are more widely dispersed and the 
range of values is larger as compared to the other stands of literature. All sample distri-
butions of the different types of semi-elasticities are positively skewed, i.e. the right 
tails of the histogram document relatively infrequent but high effect estimates. Only a 
few semi-elasticities contradict the proposition of profit shifting activities increasing in 
the exploitable tax differences. 
                                                 
96  For a more comprehensive meta-analysis of the literature investigating the relationship between cor-
porate capital structure choice and taxes, including domestic tax incentives to finance with debt, please 
refer to Chapter 6. 
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Figure 7.1: Histograms of Estimated Tax Semi-Elasticities as a Fraction of Respective Me-
ta-Subsamples 
 
Table 7.2 shows the distribution of our sample of semi-elasticities by publication 
year (Panel A) and by parent country of the multinationals covered in the study data 
(Panel B).97  
The figures shown in Table 7.2 (Panel A) reveal that 77% of the sampled estimates 
on corporate profit shifting behavior are dated 2005 or after. 39% of the sampled empir-
ical results provide indirect evidence for profit shifting by referring to tax-induced vari-
ation in profit or EBIT. 46% of the semi-elasticities refer to income shifting via the 
route of internal debt allocation. By contrast, direct evidence for profit shifting via the 
channel of related-party transactions is relatively scarce with only 16% of the semi-
elasticities. The two parent countries mostly referred to are the United States and Ger-
many (see Table 7.2, Panel B). 21% of the sampled evidence refers to US multination-
als, while 36% of the estimates in the meta-dataset are based on German outbound data. 
The share of German data is particularly high in the strand of literature dealing with tax-
motivated capital structure adjustments. Studies focused on German multinationals use 
the MiDi database provided by Deutsche Bundesbank. The most important data sources 
for studies dealing with profit shifting behavior of US multinational activity are provid-
                                                 
97  By publication year we mean the date of the study, no matter whether it is already published or only 
available as a working paper. 
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ed by BEA and US IRS. Empirical analyses referring to diverse parent countries make 
up 43% of the meta-sample. 
Table 7.2: Distribution of Semi-Elasticities by Publication Year and by Parent Country 
 
 
 
  All 
Routes 
 
Related‐Party Transactions 
  Internal 
Debt Allo‐
cation 
 
Total 
  Profit    EBIT  Trade  
Data 
Price 
Data 
 
Debt Ratio    abs  in % 
A. By Publication Date                   
1994      8            8  1,4 
1997  12                12  2,0 
1998  2                2  0,3 
2001        20  7        27  4,6 
2003  5    54    10    2    71  12,1 
2004  4            13    17  2,9 
2005              8    8  1,4 
2006        37  15        52  8,8 
2007  26    2            28  4,8 
2008  13    33        40    86  14,6 
2009  13    4        140    157  26,7 
2010  18      4      65    87  14,8 
2011  11    22            33  5,6 
Total  104    123  61  32    268    588 
100 in %  17,7    20,9  10,4  5,4    45,6     
B. By Parent Country                     
United States  40    17  29  20    18    124  21,1 
  BEA  17    8  29      16    70  11,9 
  Compustat  2                2  0,3 
  US IRS  20    9        2    31  5,3 
  Orbis  1                1  0,2 
  Other          20        20  3,4 
Germany  5      32      173    210  35,7 
  MiDi  4      32      173    209  35,5 
  Orbis  1                1  0,2 
Mixed  59    106    12    77    254  43,2 
  Amadeus  36    28        54    118  20,1 
  Midi (Inbound)  6            23    29  4,9 
  Orbis  13    22            35  6,0 
  US IRS (Inbound)  4                4  0,7 
  Other      56    12        68  11,6 
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7.4 Results of the Meta-Regression Analysis 
We now turn to the meta-regression analysis. The meta-regression we estimate takes the 
linear form depicted in equation (7.2), where y corresponds to the vector of estimated 
semi-elasticities drawn from primary analyses and X is a matrix of predominantly 
dummy variables that reflect various study or model characteristics. 
 y Xβ ε  (7.2) 
Since y includes estimated coefficients derived from models which in their great ma-
jority conform to the assumptions of the classical linear model, the meta-regression er-
rors ε should be normally distributed. Equation (7.2) is, however, clearly heteroskedas-
tic as the variance of the primary estimates is related to the characteristics of a study. 
One approach in the literature to deal with the presence of heteroskedasticity is to use 
OLS with robust standard errors; but in the clear presence of heteroskedasticity - as is 
the case in meta-regression analysis - ordinary least squares can be extremely inefficient 
(Greene, 2003: 226). Fortunately, in the case of meta-regression, the pattern of het-
eroskedasticity is sufficiently known because coefficient standard errors are given in 
nearly all primary results tables. Thus, weighted least squares (WLS) estimation with 
inverse primary standard errors in squares as analytic weight is the obvious method to 
obtain efficient meta-regression estimates (Stanley, 2008; Greene, 2003; Hedges and 
Olkin, 1985).98 Technically, efficiency is obtained by assigning greater influence to 
those reliable primary estimates of the marginal tax effect which are less affected by 
sampling error and, thus, show small variances. 
Our meta-regression results are displayed in Table 7.3 and Table 7.4.  
7.4.1 Pooling the Fundamental Strands of Profit Shifting Literature 
The regressions in Table 7.3 are based on the full sample as described in Section 7.3. 
That is, we consider 588 estimates of the semi-elasticity of profit shifting activity. To 
analyze whether study characteristics beyond differences in the employed dependent 
variable and the respective shifting routes systematically explain the variation in the 
reported tax sensitivity of profit shifting behavior, we regress the semi-elasticities on an 
extended set of meta-regressors.  
                                                 
98  See Chapter 4 for details. 
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Type of Dependent Variable 
Regarding the different categories of dependent variables employed in the literature, we 
regroup the relatively small numbers of studies using price and trade variables into one 
larger category of literature on related-party transactions. The literature on the EBIT 
response to international shifting incentives is also assigned to this category. Eventually, 
we will thus compare three major types of research on profit shifting behavior by means 
of the meta-regression analysis depicted in Table 7.3.  
Type of Employed Tax Measure 
Besides the employed dependent variables considered in the primary literature, a focus 
is put on the tax measure used for analysis. Studies can rely on exploitable statutory tax 
rate differences to capture profit shifting incentives. By contrast, they can also resort to 
average tax rates, defined as (foreign) taxes paid divided by corresponding pre-tax in-
come. Whether average tax rates reflect the incentives at work better than a mere statu-
tory tax rate is basically an empirical question. In principle, the tax incentive to shift 
paper profits between jurisdictions should indeed be driven by tax savings associated 
with one additional unit of shifted income. The statutory tax rate should thus reflect the 
marginal tax incentive to shift profits. However, special tax regimes like tax holidays or 
firm-specific characteristics like loss carry-forwards are not considered by statutory tax 
measures. While an average tax rate based on actual tax payments entirely includes the-
se impacts, it might be biased by tax exempt profits and tax allowances that do not af-
fect the marginal unit of shifted income. 
The Level of Aggregation 
Furthermore, the primary literature shows considerable variation with respect to the 
level of aggregation of the analyzed data. Many studies focus on the micro-level and 
exploit original firm-level information. An important strand of mainly US literature, 
however, uses data aggregated at the country level. Becker et al. (2006) explain that, 
particularly in the case of aggregate data analyses, unobserved variables correlated with 
taxes can lead to biased empirical results because they are more difficult to control at 
the aggregate level.  
Average Sample Year 
Moreover, the data used in primary empirical studies is disclosed at very different dates. 
Hines and Rice (1994) estimate tax coefficients based on cross-sectional data for 1982. 
Huizinga and Laeven (2008) provide evidence based on year 1999 data. Dischinger and 
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Riedel (2011) again use panel data for the period from 1995 through 2005. The intensity 
of the behavioral response to taxes might vary over time because tax advisors are al-
ways searching for new tax planning strategies. Still, it is an empirical question whether 
the refinement in potential profit shifting strategies is offset by the introduction of spe-
cific anti-avoidance rules. We therefore take into account a variable Average Sample 
Year, which is the average disclosure year of the data used in the underlying estimation.  
Publication Selection 
In addition to these new meta-regressor variables, we again include the standard error as 
a control for publication selection.  
Column (1) of Table 7.3 shows results of a baseline regression using ordinary least 
squares (OLS). Concerning the interpretation of results, please note that dummy varia-
ble regressions implicitly define an underlying benchmark study. The coefficients for 
each dummy variable reflect the average impact on reported tax effects if the study de-
sign deviates from the benchmark in that specific aspect. Respective benchmark charac-
teristics are indicated in brackets for every control dummy in Table 7.3. 
Significant meta-regression coefficients confirm that studies dealing with affiliate 
debt policy as a route to shift profits abroad identify semi-elasticities of affiliate debt 
ratios which are significantly lower than the semi-elasticities of after-financing profit. 
On the one hand, this difference in the response intensities could be due to the fact that 
accumulated measures of debt policy, such as the debt ratio, by definition react less in-
tensively to changes in tax as compared to contemporaneous flow measures of profit. 
On the other hand, the difference could be due to the fact that the response in after-
financing profits is the consequence of adjustments in profit shifting activities running 
both via the route of financial policy and related-party transactions. If related-party 
transactions play an important role, we should indeed see a considerable difference in 
the tax sensitivity of overall profits and a measure of tax-motivated adjustments in affil-
iate capital structures. Interestingly enough, the response intensity of related-party 
transactions is, in contrast to the response of debt ratios, not significantly different from 
the tax sensitivity of profits. This result is consistent with the proposition that the tax-
responsiveness of profits is primarily driven by underlying adjustments in related party 
transactions rather than financial policies. These findings are robust to the introduction 
of the additional meta-regressor variables (columns (3) to (8)) and a switch to more ef-
ficient WLS estimation with primary coefficient variances as analytical weights (speci-
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fications (5) to (8) in Table 7.3). The introduction of a precision weighting scheme en-
hances estimation efficiency because it directly remedies heteroskedasticity in the meta-
regression error term which is caused by different degrees of sampling error in the pri-
mary estimates. Since the Q test (see Chapter 4) hints at excess heterogeneity (Q = 
11647.3, Pr > Q = 0.00), we additionally run a mixed effects WLS meta-regression with 
results displayed in Column (8). In Column (7), we use WLS estimation for the same 
specification as in Column (6), but we restrict the exploited meta-data to empirical find-
ings which have already been published in academic journals.  
Furthermore, in specifications (6) to (8) in Table 7.3, we change the benchmark type 
of the dependent variable used in primary studies from profit to affiliate debt policy. 
This allows us to directly compare the semi-elasticities of affiliate debt ratios and relat-
ed-party trade variables, while in specifications (1) to (5) we compare the two single-
channel semi-elasticities of debt and internal transactions to the responsiveness of prof-
its as the indicator for the joint tax sensitivity of both profit shifting channels. This di-
rect comparison in columns (6) and (8) of Table 7.3 reveals that related-party transac-
tion parameters indeed seem to be more sensitive to profit shifting incentives than affili-
ate capital structures. 
Moreover, we find no evidence, based on the results in Table 7.3, that the level of 
aggregation impacts on reported empirical findings. By contrast, there is robust evi-
dence for the presence of publication selection bias in the literature on profit shifting 
behavior.  
With regards to the average sample year, there is a clearly positive coefficient in all 
of the respective specifications (columns (4) to (8) in Table 7.3). Statistical significance 
at all standard levels is found for the (equivalent) specifications (5) and (6) and, at the 
10% level, for the meta-regression on published primary results in column (7).  
Concerning the influence of the type of tax rate employed to capture the international 
shifting incentives at work, we generally identify no significant impact. 
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Table 7.3:Meta-Regression of Reported Semi-Elasticities of Profit Shifting Activities, Fundamental Strands of Literature 
Regressions of the semi‐elasticity  found  in primary studies on respective study characteristics. All study/model characteristics are coded as dummy variables  (except Average 
Sample Year and Primary Standard Error). Thus, a base model represents the characteristics redundant to the variables explicitly  included. The benchmark characteristics are 
indicated in parentheses for each study dimension. Columns (1) – (4) of Table 7.3show OLS‐regression results; columns (5) ‐(7) are from simple WLS estimation and column (8) is 
from mixed effect WLS. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary within‐study correlation  in parentheses; ***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5% /10% 
level. 
  OLS  WLS 
  .(1)  .(2)  .(3)  .(4)  .(5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Type of analyzed profit shifting variable/channel 
Benchmark characteristic:  
Spec. (1) to (5): After‐Financing Profitability 
Spec. (6) to (7): Affiliate Debt Policy 
                  
   
Affiliate debt policy  ‐1.073**  ‐1.073**  ‐0.698***  ‐0.728**  ‐0.715***       
  (0.446)  (0.446)  (0.251)  (0.280)  (0.184)       
Related‐Party Transactions  ‐0.355  ‐0.355  ‐0.160  ‐0.0674  0.112  0.826***  0.918  0.748** 
  (0.543)  (0.543)  (0.319)  (0.396)  (0.185)  (0.186)  (0.557)  (0.291) 
After‐Financing Profitability            0.715***  0.786**  0.795*** 
            (0.184)  (0.367)  (0.220) 
Proxy for the Tax Incentive                  
Average Tax Rates (Statutory Tax Rates)      0.294  0.408  ‐0.0941  ‐0.0941  0.516  0.489* 
      (0.304)  (0.295)  (0.105)  (0.105)  (0.328)  (0.248) 
Data Sample Characteristics                 
Aggregate Data (Firm‐Level Data)        ‐0.140  0.00136  0.00136  ‐0.0558  ‐0.185 
        (0.457)  (0.0687)  (0.0687)  (0.137)  (0.391) 
Average Sample Year        0.0129  0.0582***  0.0582***  0.0679*  0.00376 
        (0.0291)  (0.0138)  (0.0138)  (0.0397)  (0.0212) 
      (0.425)  (0.423)  (0.452)  (0.452)  (0.450)  (0.217) 
Constant  1.842***  1.842***  0.536*  ‐25.20  ‐115.7***  ‐116.4***  ‐135.6  ‐7.560 
  (0.413)  (0.413)  (0.311)  (58.40)  (27.40)  (27.50)  (79.39)  (42.29) 
                 
Number of primary estimations  588  588  588  588  588  588  310  588 
adjusted R2  0.0403  0.0403  0.558  0.558  0.489  0.489  0.542  0.282 
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In sum, the most prominent result of the our meta-regressions on the overall meta-
sample of 588 primary estimates is the remarkably low semi-elasticity of affiliate debt 
ratios relative to the semi-elasticities of variables involving related party transactions. 
Furthermore, there seems to be some evidence for profit shifting activity to have in-
creased over time. This is interesting given that efforts to contain such activity by means 
of anti-avoidance rules have also increased in recent years.99 
7.4.2 A Detailed Analysis of the Indirect Evidence on Profit Shifting 
The analysis presented in Table 7.4 aims at providing further insight into whether the 
observed difference in tax sensitivities indeed reflects differences in the economic sig-
nificance of financial versus non-financial profit shifting mechanisms. We now restrict 
the analysis to two rather similar types of primary dependent variables. These mainly 
differ with respect to the inclusion of interest expenses: EBIT and profits after financing 
costs. By means of meta-regressions, we can isolate the variation in empirical results 
caused by the inclusion of financial policy on the left-hand side of the primary regres-
sion equations, given that all other major study characteristics are held constant. In this 
analysis, the findings thus cannot be blurred by differences in the nature of the endoge-
nous variables beyond the mere effect of capital structure policy.  
In addition to the type of profitability measure, the meta-regression specifications 
will be augmented to control for other study characteristics possibly driving the reported 
empirical results. The set of meta-regressors again includes the primary standard error 
to control for publication bias, the average sample year, the type of proxy for the tax 
incentive to shift profits, and, in particular, three meta-regressors reflecting the econo-
metric specification employed in primary analyses.100 
The first of these three specification dummies marks those primary estimates derived 
from regressions which control for unobserved time fixed effects. The second dummy 
takes on the value one if unobserved affiliate effects have been modeled in the empirical 
approach and zero otherwise. The third specification dummy takes into account whether 
the primary empirical investigation was designed to isolate pure profit shifting effects 
from capital location effects induced by international tax differences. So the dummy 
                                                 
99  Interest deductions ceilings have, for example, been introduced in Germany and Italy. Other countries 
follow suit. 
100  We introduce these fine controls only now because the econometric settings underlying the different 
strands of literature included into our previous broader assessment are too diverse. For example, price 
data, by definition, contain no information on affiliates. As a consequence, any meta-dummy for the con-
trol of affiliate fixed effects would always be zero for price data studies and thus be highly correlated with 
the respective dummy variable marking this type of studies.    
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takes on the value one either if profit is scaled by the size of local business activity, i.e. 
sales or assets, to give a consistent measure of local profitability as left-hand side varia-
ble, or if the size of local economic activity is controlled for on the right-hand side of 
the primary estimation equation. If neither is the case and the identified tax effect on 
local profits might thus reflect both the tax-motivated geographical allocation of eco-
nomic activity and paper profit shifting, the dummy is set to zero. 
Column (1) and (2) of Table 7.4 show the results of two baseline regressions using 
ordinary least squares (OLS). Columns (3) to (7) are from simple WLS estimation and 
column (8) is from mixed effect WLS (Q = 934.9, Pr > Q = 0.00). The results are gener-
ally robust across specifications and estimation methods.  
The coefficient for the after-financing dummy, which marks primary estimates of the 
tax-motivated shifting effect on affiliate after-financing profitability, is clearly positive 
in all specifications and, with the exception of column (1), significantly different from 
zero. We thus conclude that there is indeed robust evidence for a significant difference 
in the responsiveness of after-financing and before-financing profitability to interna-
tional profit shifting incentives. 
Table 7.4 also displays robust evidence that estimates which result from empirical 
approaches not controlling for the size of the local affiliate overestimate multinationals’ 
efforts to shift paper profits towards low-tax jurisdictions. Controlling for local affiliate 
capital significantly reduces reported semi-elasticities according to results shown in 
columns (2) through (8). Mixing location and shifting effects of international tax rate 
differences can thus be quite misleading with regard to identified effect sizes.  
As for the remaining meta-coefficients, the results in Table 7.4 show that modeling 
time fixed effects reduces the reported tax-responsiveness of profit shifting behavior. 
The same holds for the inclusion of firm fixed effects into primary regressions; howev-
er, the effect is not robust throughout all specifications. Furthermore, we augment the 
specification shown in column (6) of Table 7.4 with the average tax rate dummy but 
again there is no significant difference relative to the use of statutory rates. Eventually, 
publication selection again turns out to be present according to the significantly positive 
coefficients of the primary standard errors. 
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Table 7.4: Meta-Regression of Reported Semi-Elasticities of Profit versus EBIT  
Regressions of the semi‐elasticity  found  in primary studies on respective study characteristics. All study/model characteristics are coded as dummy variables  (except Average 
Sample Year and Primary Standard Error). Thus, a base model represents the characteristics redundant to the variables explicitly  included. The benchmark characteristics are 
indicated in parentheses for each study dimension. Columns (1) – (2) of Table 7.4show OLS‐regression results; columns (5) ‐(7) are from simple WLS estimation and column (8) is 
from mixed effect WLS. Standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary within‐study correlation  in parentheses; ***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5% /10% 
level. 
  OLS  WLS 
  .(1)  .(2)  .(3)  .(4)  .(5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Type of Profit Variable                     
After‐Financing  Profitability  (Before‐Financing  Profitability, 
EBIT)  0.486  0.712*  0.406***  0.425***  0.425***  0.411***  0.423***  0.410* 
  (0.276)  (0.312)  (0.0770)  (0.0754)  (0.0802)  (0.107)  (0.0840)  (0.176) 
Econometric Specification and Control Variables                 
Control for Affiliate Capital (no)    ‐0.532  ‐0.181*  ‐0.175*  ‐0.342***  ‐0.174*  ‐0.343***  ‐0.379** 
    (0.425)  (0.0857)  (0.0832)  (0.0863)  (0.0826)  (0.0875)  (0.135) 
Time Fixed Effects Modeled (no)        ‐0.219**  ‐0.198***  ‐0.219***  ‐0.196***  ‐0.102 
        (0.0629)  (0.0311)  (0.0619)  (0.0264)  (0.180) 
Firm Fixed Effects Modeled (no)        ‐0.130**  ‐0.169**  ‐0.117  ‐0.166**  ‐0.105 
        (0.0504)  (0.0589)  (0.0981)  (0.0685)  (0.140) 
Proxy for the Tax Incentive                  
Average Tax Rates (Statutory Tax Rates)            0.0187     
            (0.110)     
Data Sample Characteristics                 
Average Sample Year          0.0219**    0.0224**  0.0202 
          (0.00653)    (0.00785)  (0.0112) 
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Table 7.4 (Continued) 
     
  OLS  WLS 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Publication Bias                 
Primary Standard Error  1.416***  1.379***  2.304***  2.341***  1.971***  2.358***  1.913**  2.378*** 
  (0.253)  (0.291)  (0.347)  (0.363)  (0.422)  (0.400)  (0.733)  (0.215) 
Primary Standard Error in Squares              0.0575   
              (0.331)   
                 
Constant  0.460*  0.631  0.188***  0.389***  ‐43.25**  0.387***  ‐44.07**  ‐40.04 
  (0.234)  (0.415)  (0.0523)  (0.0483)  (12.97)  (0.0501)  (15.58)  (22.22) 
Number of Primary Estimations  227  227  227  227  227  227  227  227 
adjusted R2  0.342  0.360  0.382  0.387  0.423  0.385  0.421  0.419 
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Internal Transactions versus Financial Structure: Which Route is More Important? 
We finally want to discuss the quantitative implications of the meta-regression results 
depicted in Table 7.4. The estimation results allow predicting semi-elasticities for a hy-
pothetical study. We define this study to take on all significant study characteristics as 
identified in the meta-regressions. Consider column (7) of Table 7.4: Based on this 
comprehensive specification, we predict a semi-elasticity of -1.71 for profits after fi-
nancing cost, while EBIT is predicted to react with a semi-elasticity of -1.28.101  
Clearly, these elasticities differ primarily with regard to whether they reflect corpo-
rate financial policy or not. It is therefore tempting to infer some conclusions on the 
proportions between profit shifting via the route of internal debt allocation and shifting 
via inter-company transactions. The relation between the two elasticities is more com-
plex than it seems at first glance. Any interpretation must account for the underlying 
relation between EBIT and the profits after financing costs (i.e. earnings before taxes, 
EBT).  
First, we start off with the assumption that interest income and interest expense, on 
average, net to zero. In this case, the two elasticities would reveal that internal debt pol-
icy explains around 25%102 of the affiliate profit response to a change in shifting incen-
tives. However, taking an exemplary look at the consolidated accounts of globally oper-
ating non-financial multinationals, these generally show significant debt-to-assets ratios 
and, in particular, negative net interest income. For the financial year 2010, we find, for 
example, negative net interest income in the consolidated statements of some of the 
largest German multinationals: BASF SE, EUR -623 million; Bayer AG, EUR -499 
million; Daimler AG, EUR -646 million; Lufthansa AG, EUR -357 million; MAN SE, 
EUR -112 million; ThyssenKrupp AG, EUR -652 million.103 
 It therefore seems necessary to account for the fact that the consolidated external 
debt must somehow be allocated across the unconsolidated affiliate accounts. Thus, we 
now assume that EBIT and EBT differ. Technically, the relation of EBIT and EBT is 
determined by the affiliate’s capital structure, the average borrowing rate, and the firm’s 
pre-tax return on assets (RoA).104 In order to uncover the quantitative implications of 
                                                 
101  We put a minus sign in front of the semi-elasticity values. The meta-data underlying the results shown 
in Table 7.4 have been pre-mulitplied by (-1). This must be kept in mind when considering the coeffi-
cients. 
102  0.25 = (1.71-1.28)/1.71 
103  All cited figures are reference at the end of the bibliography of this dissertation. 
104  We define RoA as the ratio of EBIT over total assets.   
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the two identified semi-elasticities of EBIT and EBT, we will discuss some plausible 
assumptions on these parameters. The results calculated on the basis of the assumed 
parameters can then be cross-checked with the empirical evidence.  
Unfortunately, we cannot test all conceivable parameter constellations. To begin 
with, we focus on assumptions which we deem to be the most plausible. With respect to 
the ratio of interest-bearing debt to total assets, we assume a value of 35%. This debt 
share in the overall financing mix is empirically well-proven and also taken as the basis 
for sophisticated cross-country assessments of the costs of capital (e.g. Devereux et al., 
2009). Furthermore, we will apply an average borrowing rate of 5% to calculate the 
(net) interest expense. We do not explicitly infer any positive interest income. Conse-
quently, the net interest expense we derive would also be consistent with some moder-
ately higher debt share of firms given that there was some positive interest income.105 
Finally, we have to discuss the assumptions with regard to affiliate profitability: Given a 
borrowing rate of 5%, a debt ratio of 35% and, say, a statutory tax rate of 30%,106 the 
weighted average costs of capital (WACC) before taxes roughly amount to 6.4%.107  For 
the purpose of our primary calculations, we vary the assumed rate of return on assets 
between these 6.4% and a value of 18.5%.  
Starting from this first plausible but still tentative set of assumptions, we cross-check 
whether the semi-elasticities of EBIT and EBT are consistent with the general size of 
the internal debt response known, in particular, from the meta-analysis in Chapter 6.  
Table 7.5 shows the results of our calculations.108 We use the semi-elasticities of 
EBIT, -1.28, and EBT, -1.71, identified by the meta-regression in Column (7) of Table 
7.4 to simulate the effects from a one percentage point tax shock. The first striking re-
sult shown in Table 7.5 is that the independent strands of research directly and indirect-
ly investigating the mechanisms of profit shifting behavior are indeed consistent under 
plausible economic parameterization.  
                                                 
105  Considering the data underlying the microsimulation analysis in Chapter 9, the average debt ratio of 
43.7% of multinational firms located in Germany (see Table D.2 in the Appendix) thus seems to be con-
sistent with our setting. 
106  The tax rate of 30% is rather an upper bound given that the average statutory tax rate on profits, for 
example, in the EU is 23.6%  (Devereux et. al, 2009). However, most studies investigating profit shifting 
behavior look at the behavior of multinational affiliates in high tax countries such as Germany or the US.  
107  0.06 = 0.35 * 0.05 + (1-0.35) * 0.05/(1-0.3) 
108  Note that, for expository purposes, we set the capital stock to EUR 1,000. All insights gained from 
Table 7.5 are quantitatively unaffected by the actual size of the capital stock. 
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Table 7.5: Quantitative Implications of the Meta-Regression Results: Bringing in Line the Empirical Evidence 
 
Note: The amount of total assets is irrelevant for the relative implications of the tax shock. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
              Economic Assumptions 
1.  Total Assets (in EUR)  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000  1000 
2.  Debt‐to‐Assets Ratio  35%  35%  35%  35%  35%  35%  35%  50%  50%  35% 
3.  Borrowing Rate  5%  5%  5%  5%  5%  5%  5%  5%  5%  8% 
4.  Return on Assets (RoA)  6.5%  8.5%  10.5%  12.5%  14.5%  16.5%  18.5%  12.5%  14.5%  16.5% 
5.  Return on Equity (RoE)  7.3%  10.4%  13.5%  16.5%  19.6%  22.7%  25.8%  20%  24%  21.1% 
              Profit Implications 
6.= 1.x 4.  Earnings before Interest and Tax , EBIT (in EUR)  65  85  105  125  145  165  185  125  145  165 
7.= 1. x 2. x 3.  Interest expense (in EUR)  17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5  25  25  28 
8.= 6. ‐ 7.  Earnings before Tax, EBT (in EUR)  47.5  67.5  87.5  107.5  127.5  147.5  167.5  100  120  137 
                         Tax Shock: + 1 percentage point 
9. = 6. x ‐0.0128  Induced Change in EBIT (in EUR)  ‐0.83  ‐1.09  ‐1.34  ‐1.60  ‐1.86  ‐2.11  ‐2.37  ‐1.6 ‐1.86 ‐2.11
10. = 8. x ‐0.0171  Induced Change in EBT (in EUR)  ‐0.81  ‐1.15  ‐1.50  ‐1.84  ‐2.18  ‐2.52  ‐2.86  ‐1.71 ‐2.05 ‐2.34
11. = 9. ‐ 10.  Induced Change in Interest Expense (in EUR)  ‐0.02  0.06  0.16  0.24  0.32  0.41  0.49  0.11 0.02 0.23
12. = 11./(1. x 3.)  Change in the Debt Ratio (in pp)  ‐0.04  0.13  0.30  0.48  0.65  0.82  0.99  0.22  0.39  0.28 
13. = 2. + 12.  Debt Ratio after Response  34.96%  35.13%  35.30%  35.48%  35.65%  35.82%  35.99%  50.22%  50.39%  35.28% 
                       
14. =11./10.  Change in Interest Expense / Change in EBT 2.37% 6.09% 11.33% 14.89% 17.47% 19.42% 20.96% 6.43% 9.55% 9.85% 
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Remarkably, with the return on assets set to 10.5% the inferred increase in the debt 
ratio corresponds exactly to the marginal tax effect on the debt ratio of 0.30 found in 
Chapter 6 (see Row (12) of Column (3) in Table 7.5). Varying the assumed RoA in the 
plausible range from 8.5% (RoE: 10.4%) and 14.5% (RoE: 19.6%) yields effects which 
still bring in line the identified semi-elasticities of EBIT and EBT, and the literature on 
the debt response to tax (see Row (12), Columns (3) – (5) of Table 7.5).  The higher the 
assumed RoA, the more pronounced the marginal effect on the debt ratio we calculate in 
our simple framework. From Chapter 6 we know that for multinational affiliates, mar-
ginal tax effects on the debt ratio can indeed reach values of up to 0.5.  
In short, our first tentative parameterization yields plausible results which consistent-
ly reflect the empirical evidence on the semi-elasticity of EBIT, of EBT, and the mar-
ginal tax effect on the debt ratio.  
The calculations in Table 7.5 hint at another interesting fact. We again use this sim-
ple framework which, under plausible economic parameters, was shown to comply with 
the empirical relationships found in the literature. We now calculate the weight of inter-
est expenses in the overall volume of the shifted taxable base. We refer to the results in 
Columns (3) to (5) of Table 7.5 which at best bring in line realistic assumptions and the 
reported semi-elasticities of EBIT, EBT, and the marginal effect on the debt ratio. Ac-
cording to these calculations, the share of the induced interest expenses in the induced 
variation in EBT ranges between 11.33% and 17.47% (see Row (14) in Columns (3) to 
(5) of Table 7.5).  
In a number of sensitivity analyses shown in Columns (8) to (10) of Table 7.5, we try 
to figure out whether the finding of a low share of interest in the overall shifting re-
sponse is robust to a variation in the assumed economic parameters.109 Independent of 
the assumptions made and the degree of fit of the different pieces of empirical evidence, 
none of the calculations presented in Table 7.5, and also done beyond, arrive at a share 
of interest in induced profit shifting volumes above 21% (found in Column (7) of Table 
7.5). If we take the evidence found in the literature at face value and define semi-
elasticities of -1.28 for EBIT, of -1.71 for EBT and expect the marginal tax effect on the 
                                                 
109  In a first sensitivity analysis, we increase the assumed debt ratio to 50%. The return on assets, which 
makes all behavioral elasticities taken from the literature consistent, now amounts to 12.5% or 14.5% (see 
Column (8) and (9) of Table 7.5). Importantly, however, the interest expenses are of minor importance 
also under this setting. Second, we increase the assumed borrowing rate to 8%. The higher rate might 
indeed be relevant for firm data from previous decades. Our framework can still bring in line the different 
results from the previous literature (see Column (10) of Table 7.5). The return on assets which must be 
assumed, however, amounts to 16.5%. This is of considerable amount. Again, interest expenses continue 
to be of minor importance also under this setting. 
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debt ratio to be approximately 0.3, inter-company transactions are, under the assump-
tion of plausible economic parameters, the primary dimension, in terms of volume, in 
multinational responses to profit shifting incentives. From the economic standpoint, this 
result is quite plausible. By manipulating inter-company transactions, multinational 
firms can, in principle, shift the full tax base, including the economic rents. The tax-
efficient allocation of internal debt can only shield the marginal return from local taxa-
tion (De Mooij and Ederveen, 2008; Overesch and Schreiber, 2010).  
7.5 Conclusion 
In this study, we present a meta-analysis covering 40 studies on corporate profit 
shifting behavior. We first transform the reported empirical results into a uniformly de-
fined semi-elasticity for the tax effect on the analyzed profit shifting indicator. We re-
gress the assembled semi-elasticities on different sets of mostly dummy variables which 
mark, inter alia, the distinct shifting channels, the employed dependent variables serving 
as proxies for profit shifting activity, and the different econometric approaches. 
A first interesting result of the meta-regression analysis is drawn from the full meta-
sample of 588 primary estimates. We find that the semi-elasticity of affiliate debt ratios 
relative to the semi-elasticities of variables involving related party transactions is re-
markably low.  
We continue with a detailed analysis of the indirect evidence on profit shifting. This 
seems a promising approach to infer some insights on the relative economic importance 
of the distinct profit shifting channels which are either based on transfer pricing strate-
gies or the financial policy of firms. Based on our meta-regressions, we predict a semi-
elasticity of profit with regard to shifting incentives of -1.71. The semi-elasticity of 
EBIT is predicted to be -1.28. We show that econometric analyses leaving tax-induced 
real economic location effects unmodeled overestimate the tax-responsiveness of pure 
paper profit shifting by 20%. 
Our main concern throughout all meta-regression estimations is to find out whether 
we can isolate the underlying economic significance of the different profit shifting 
mechanisms. Our results indeed provide evidence that the two main profit shifting 
channels, corporate financial policy and tax-motivated adjustments of related-party 
transactions, are not equally important. In particular, we find some tentative evidence 
that the volumes of shifted tax bases are to a large extent, i.e. approx.. 80%, driven by 
firms’ inter-company transactions. From the point of view of national governments and 
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tax administrations, this finding can have important implications. The extent of tax base 
erosion is not determined by the mere responsiveness of the shifting strategies, but also 
by the tax base volume effectively shifted via the respective channels. In this regard, 
flexible adjustments of intra-group financial structures seem to be, according to our 
findings, less of a concern than intra-firm trade. Regardless of whether anti-avoidance 
measures are at all desirable,110 the discussion on multinational profit shifting and anti-
avoidance legislation is very much centered on the financial strategies of firms. Given 
our findings, doubts remain as to whether this policy matches the true proportion, in 
terms of the lost taxable bases, of the two shifting channels. If policy makers want to 
effectively restrict profit shifting opportunities of multinational firms, restricting trans-
fer pricing remains a challenging task in anti-tax-avoidance legislation.  
 
                                                 
110  The effects of tight anti-avoidance legislation on real economic decisions are empirically analysed and 
discussed in Overesch (2009). 
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Chapter 8 
Parameterization of the Behavioral 
Response Algorithms 
8 Parameterization of the Behavioral Response Algorithms 
8.1 Introduction 
Prior to a first research application of the extended ZEW TaxCoMM model, the main 
response parameters of the behavioral algorithms presented in Section 3.3.2 must be set 
to plausible values. In particular, information on the values of the partial response semi-
elasticities is needed. As outlined in Chapter 3, the available data does not allow to di-
rectly estimate these parameters. We will therefore rely mainly on prior information 
reported in the literature comprehensively synthesized by the quantitative meta-analyses 
in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. Notably, for each distortion, we refrain from simply, and some-
what arbitrarily, picking one elasticity estimate value from the literature. There is often 
more than one plausible estimate in the large number of disparate studies, depending on 
countries, time, and methodological approach. As a consequence, the selective use of 
model parameters is considered a prevalent weakness of empirical models (Steiner, 
2008).  
For this reason, we resort to the three comprehensive meta-analyses presented in 
Chapter 5 on the tax semi-elasticity of foreign direct investment (FDI), in Chapter 6 on 
the marginal tax effect on the corporate debt ratio, and in Chapter 7 on the tax effect on 
corporate profit shifting behavior. These quantitative reviews complement narrative 
literature surveys and use econometric meta-regression analyses to identify the deter-
mining primary study characteristics which drive reported elasticity estimates. Condi-
tional on a set of relevant study characteristics, we can identify a plausible consensus 
estimate of the considered behavioral parameter. On this basis, we can also decide 
whether different behavioral response intensities must be considered for different types 
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of companies. Furthermore, by referring to meta-regression analyses, we can predict 
those elasticity values which are expected if primary analyses adhere to high methodo-
logical standards. Inferred elasticities are thus supposed to be plausible and reliable. 
8.2 Parameterization of the Debt Policy Response to Tax Reform 
During the last decades, numerous empirical studies have provided point estimates for 
the marginal tax effect on the corporate debt ratio. Reported effect sizes are indeed quite 
heterogeneous. The comprehensive quantitative survey of this literature in Chapter 6 
shows that the documented effect size significantly depends on the refinement of the 
employed proxy for the marginal tax incentive to finance with debt. Particularly pro-
nounced marginal tax effects are, conditional on all other study characteristics, identi-
fied if the proxy refers to the economic marginal tax rate in the sense of Scholes and 
Wolfson (1992), representing the present value of current and future taxes owed on an 
extra dollar of income earned today (see, e.g., Graham, 1999). Only then the tax benefit 
of debt is correctly captured as a function of various dynamic and non-linear features of 
the tax code (non-linear tax scales, investment tax credits or loss-offsetting rules). The 
predicted marginal tax effect on the corporate debt ratio according to meta-regression 
results in Chapter 6 amounts to a value of 0.30 if the marginal tax rate is consistently 
simulated and a sound econometric specification (e.g., no unmodeled time trends) is 
chosen. Hence, a one percentage point increase (decrease) in the marginal tax rate 
would increase (reduce) the corporate debt ratio by 0.30 percentage points.111 Multina-
tional firms, as compared to purely domestic companies, are additionally affected by 
cross-border profit shifting incentives. In particular, they can reallocate intra-company 
debt in order to reduce their overall worldwide tax burden. The meta-regression analysis 
put forward in Chapter 6 suggests that the international profit shifting incentive entails 
an additional marginal tax effect of about 0.20.112 Thus, the marginal tax effect on the 
debt ratio of multinational firms amounts to approx. 0.50. We interpret these effects as 
long-term responses. In order to fully parameterize the partial adjustment model for 
capital structures implemented in ZEW TaxCoMM (see Chapter 3, Section 3.3.2.1.1) 
                                                 
111  For the effect of the domestic tax incentive, we refer to the meta-regression in Table 6.4 (Column 1) 
on p. 113 in Chapter 6. Defining the hypothetical study to employ a simulated marginal tax rate to capture 
the tax incentive to finance with debt and a broad set of econometric controls preventing omitted variable 
bias (i.e., all significant controls which affect the identified tax effect are presumed to be controlled for, 
unobservable effects are controlled and debt is measured in book value). Estimation precision is set to the 
sample mean (0.106) and average sample year is assumed to be 2006. 
112  See Table 6.5 (Column 3) in Chapter 6, p. 117, and the corresponding discussion. 
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we have to define the speed of adjustment towards long-run capital structure targets. In 
a comprehensive and thorough study on partial adjustment models within the capital 
structure context, Huang and Ritter (2009) identify a speed of adjustment of 17% for 
debt measured in book values. This implies a half-life of 3.7 years.113 We adopt this 
parameter value for the purpose of our simulations. 
In sum, we partition the micro-simulation sample H into one subsample of domestic 
firms DH and its complement, the subsample of multinational firms MH , so that 
 ,D MH H H .114 Furthermore, we set the values for the (long-run) marginal tax effect 
on debt Dhe  for domestic firms to | 0.30D
D
h h He    and for multinational firms to
| 0.50M
D
h h He   . The speed of adjustment  is set to 17%. 
8.3 Parameterization of the Profit Shifting Response to Tax Reform 
The capability of multinational firms to exploit certain leeway in assessing transfer 
prices may vary depending on their R&D intensity and the intra-group allocation of 
intangible assets (Overesch and Schreiber, 2010; Dischinger and Riedel, 2011; Karkin-
ski and Riedel, 2009). Unfortunately, we cannot observe the allocation of intangible 
assets within the multinational firm due to the simulation input data being restricted to 
Germany. Still, we can make use of industry-specific information on R&D intensities. 
The information is obtained from the survey among German firms provided by the 
Stifterverband für die Deutsche Wissenschaft (2006) and exploited in Overesch and 
Schreiber (2010). From these statistics we take industry-specific R&D intensities, as 
measured by R&D expenditures to sales, and accordingly group all firms in the simula-
tion sample into three categories. The first category (“low R&D intensity”) is defined to 
contain firms active in industries with an R&D intensity more than one standard devia-
tion below the average R&D intensity across all industries. The second category (“mod-
erate R&D intensity”) comprises firms belonging to industries with an R&D intensity 
ranging within the interval of one standard deviation around the average value. The 
third category (“high R&D intensity”) consequently includes companies with an indus-
try-specific R&D intensity which is at least one standard deviation above the average 
                                                 
113  The half-life indicates the number of years after which 50% of the overall adjustment to a given shock 
is complete. Half-life = ln(0.5)/ln(1-SOA). 
114  To identify multinational firms we resort to ownership information provided in the DAFNE database. 
A firm is defined to be multinational if it is either directly or indirectly majority-owned by a foreign par-
ent or if it directly or indirectly holds the majority in a foreign subsidiary. 
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for all industries.115 From regression results documented in Overesch and Schreiber 
(2010), we infer that the tax semi-elasticity of intra-group transactions for firms in the 
“low R&D” category is significantly smaller than the value found for firms with moder-
ate R&D intensity. Those firms categorized as being highly R&D intensive are instead 
predicted to show a semi-elasticity which exceeds the value for moderately R&D inten-
sive companies by about 335%.116 Since it is difficult to trace intra-group transactions in 
accounting data and, in particular, to disentangle their impact on taxable corporate in-
come, we refrain from modeling the immediate response of internal transactions (see 
Section 3.3.2.1.3 in Chapter 3). Instead, we rely on a strand of literature, which focuses 
on the impact of international tax-rate differentials on measures of profitability. These 
studies provide indirect evidence of profit shifting activities. In the meta-analysis of the 
relevant empirical evidence in Chapter 7, we find that this literature documents a value 
of -1.28 for the tax semi-elasticity of EBIT.117 This value is plausibly supposed to re-
flect the profit shifting abilities of an average, i.e. moderately R&D intensive multina-
tional. We adjust this semi-elasticity for firms active in industries which show particu-
larly low or high R&D intensities according to the categories defined above. Assuming 
that the difference in tax sensitivities of intra-group transactions fully translates into the 
ultimate response of reported EBIT, we cut the tax semi-elasticity of EBIT by 50% 
to -0.64 for firms with low R&D intensity and raise it, according to the findings by 
Overesch and Schreiber (2010), to -4.29 for firms in highly R&D intensive industries.  
In sum, for the simulation of the profit shifting response we do not only differentiate 
between domestic firms Dh H and multinational companies Mh H ; but in addition 
we classify the multinationals according to whether they are active in an industry of 
low, moderate or high R&D intensity. We correspondingly partition the subsample of 
multinational firms into three subsamples, i.e.  1 2 3, ,M M M MH H H H , reflecting, re-
spectively, the three categories of R&D intensity. Following the empirical evidence, we 
set the values for the tax semi-elasticity of EBIT to 
1|
0.64 
M
PS
h h He    , 2| 1.28MPSh h He     
                                                 
115  According to Stifterverbandfür die Deutsche Wissenschaft (2006), the average R&D intensity across 
all industries in Germany is 5.6% with a standard deviation of 3.4 percentage-points. For the purpose of 
this simulation model, we thus define an R&D intensity < 2.2% as being low, an R&D intensity > 9% as 
being high, and an R&D intensity in between these values as being moderate. 
116  This value is inferred from regression results presented in column (3) of Table (4) in Overesch and 
Schreiber (2010). 
117  See Table 7.4 in Chapter 7, p. 153, and the related discussion. 
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and 
3|
4.29
M
PS
h h He    . For purely domestic firms which, by definition, cannot shift prof-
its abroad the semi-elasticity is set to | 0D
PS
h h He   . 
8.4 Parameterization of the Marginal Investment Response to Tax Reform 
In their seminal paper on the price sensitivity of business investment, Cummins et al. 
(1994) relate the investment-to-capital ratio to the user cost of capital and focus on 
times of major tax reform. Their results imply a long-run user cost elasticity of the capi-
tal stock within the range from -0.5 to -1, a span which has been referred to as a consen-
sus in the literature (Hassett and Hubbard, 2002). Ad-hoc distributed lag (DL) models, 
however, have produced smaller elasticity estimates around -0.4 (Chirinko et al., 1999, 
2004). This deviating result is surprising given that a user cost elasticity of -1 would 
indeed be consistent with the neoclassical benchmark, assuming a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction technology (Jorgenson, 1963, Hall and Jorgenson, 1967). In a recent study, 
Dwenger (2010) solves the puzzle and shows that prior DL models insufficiently ac-
count for existing co-integration between variables. Using German firm-level panel data 
and properly modeling the equilibrium relationship between capital and its user cost, 
she identifies a user cost elasticity of -1.3. For the purpose of simulating the investment 
response, we transform the empirically found user cost elasticities of the capital stock 
into a semi-elasticity with respect to the EMTR. Simple algebra shows that we just have 
to divide by  1 EMTR . We evaluate the semi-elasticity of the capital stock at an 
EMTR level of 17.5%118 and obtain a plausible range of values going from   -0.6 to -1.6. 
We think a good compromise is to assume that the true value is in the middle of this 
range and set the semi-elasticity to -1.1. 
It is important to acknowledge that investment undertaken domestically is not neces-
sarily financed by domestic savings. In open economies there is access to the world cap-
ital market and investment can be financed by capital inflows. An important share of 
cross-border capital flows comes as foreign direct investment (FDI). Relative to the 
other channels of international capital flows, namely foreign portfolio investment and 
commercial loans, foreign direct investment brings about the most direct and most im-
portant increase in greenfield investment (Bosworth and Collins, 1999; Razin, 2004). If 
domestic saving is unaffected by cross-border capital flows, the tax sensitivity of FDI 
                                                 
118  See Devereux et al. (2009). This is the average 2009 EMTR value for the EU 27 countries, Japan and 
the US. 
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should explain a major part of the overall capital response to tax. It therefore seems ad-
visable to not just apply the aggregate elasticity of the overall capital stock to all firms 
across the board, but to separately consider the marginal response of multinational com-
panies.  
Based on results of the quantitative meta-study in Chapter 5 covering 45 studies on 
the tax-responsiveness of FDI, we predict a tax semi-elasticity of multinationals’ stock 
of property, plant, and equipment (PPE) of -2.59.119 However, there is evidence that the 
tax-responsiveness of foreign investment depends on multinationals’ profit shifting op-
portunities. If firms have sufficient leeway to shift profits to lower taxing jurisdictions, 
local host country tax rates indeed become less important for the investment decision. 
From regression results120 presented in Overesch and Schreiber (2010) we infer that the 
investment response for firms in industries characterized by low R&D intensity exceeds 
the one observed for moderately R&D intensive firms by approx. 50%. The effect is 
instead considerably dampened if firms are highly R&D intensive and, thus, in a partic-
ularly good position to shift profits abroad. 
In sum, we set the semi-elasticity of FDI for moderately R&D intensive multination-
al firms to  
2|
2.59
M
INV
h h He    . Values for multinationals with low and high R&D intensi-
ty are, respectively, 
1|
3.89
M
INV
h h He     and 3| 0.5M
INV
h h He    . In accordance with a semi-
elasticity of total investment of  -1 and an FDI share in total investment of 20%, we 
define domestic firms to respond with  | 0.7
INV
h h De    .121 Moreover, holding companies 
do not usually engage in real investment and, hence, do not react to the corresponding 
tax incentive either. We therefore set the semi-elasticity for this group of firms to zero.  
As most primary studies use static models to analyze the relationship between local 
tax rates and FDI, we again interpret the above semi-elasticities to reflect rather long-
term responses. In order to fully parameterize the partial adjustment model for the mar-
ginal investment response implemented in ZEW TaxCoMM (see Chapter 3, Section 
3.3.2.2.1), we still have to define the adjustment speed towards long-run capital targets. 
We set this parameter to 50%; a value which is identified in recent dynamic panel re-
                                                 
119  The prediction is based on Table 5.5 (Column 8) in Chapter 5 where we assume the hypothetical study 
to use affiliates’ fixed assets (PPE) as dependent variable and a bilateral EMTR as tax variable. It controls 
for all variables whose omission was identified to cause a significant bias in reported estimates. The as-
sumed study precision is set to the respective sample mean value.  
120  See Table 6 in Overesch and Schreiber (2010). 
121 20% is the average foreign ownership share of capital in European countries (Huizinga and Nicodème, 
2006).  0.7 1 0.2 2.59 0.8     . 
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gression analyses for German FDI by Overesch and Wamser (2009) as well as Buettner 
and Wamser (2009a). This speed of adjustment toward capital targets implies a half-life 
of one year. We adopt this parameter value for the purpose of our simulations. Further-
more, it may appear surprising  that capital stock is found to adjust faster than capital 
structure (see Section 8.2). In order to test whether simulation results in Chapter 9 are 
sensitive to this assumption, we will provide sensitivity analyses with slower adjustment 
speeds of capital accumulation. 
8.5 Parameterization of the Location Choice Response to Tax Reform 
The intensity with which multinationals’ location decisions respond to the reform-
induced tax rate variation can also be inferred from the meta-regression analysis pre-
sented in Chapter 5. Based on the complete primary evidence on the response of the 
expected count of multinational affiliates to a change in local company tax levels, we 
predict an aggregate semi-elasticity of | 3.17M
LOC
h h He    .122  
8.6 Parameterization of the Legal Form Choice Response to Tax Reform 
Based on US state and industry data, Goolsbee (2004) finds that tax arbitrage consider-
ably affects the share of incorporated firms in the retail sector. De Mooij and Nicodème 
(2008) also identify economically significant tax effects based on European firm data. 
They report a semi-elasticity of the number of incorporated firms of -2.9. Hence, in re-
sponse to a one percentage point decrease in the tax difference between non-pass-
through and pass-through entities, the number of incorporated firms is supposed to in-
crease by 2.9%. From results reported in Goolsbee (2004), one can instead infer a semi-
elasticity of -1.1. Moreover, De Mooij and Nicodème (2008) argue that the number of 
incorporated firms might still not be a good indicator for the corporate share of busi-
ness. In particular, the probability of switching organizational form is not uniformly 
distributed across firms because larger firms are more likely to be incorporated than 
smaller firms. Alternatively, De Mooij and Nicodème (2008) suggest inferring the par-
tial semi-elasticity of the corporate tax base from reform-induced employment changes 
in the corporate sector. The respective semi-elasticities of employment with regard to 
                                                 
122 The prediction is again based on Table 5.5 (Column 8) in Chapter 5. This elasticity value supposes the 
same hypothetical study as assumed in footnote 119 to predict the response intensity of marginal invest-
ment, but now with the count of affiliates as dependent variable and the tax level expressed as effective 
average tax rate. 
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corporate tax changes amount to -0.4 according to regression results provided by 
Goolsbee (2004) and to -1 according to the findings in De Mooij and Nicodème 
(2008).123 We follow the guide to empirical findings put forward by De Mooij and 
Ederveen (2008) and take the average of these two results for our simulation purposes 
and, thus, set the partial semi-elasticity of corporate taxable income referring to the 
choice of legal form to OFe 0.7  . 
8.7 Overview of the Behavioral Response Parameters 
Table 8.1 lists the behavioral tax margins considered in ZEW TaxCoMM and provides 
an overview of the implemented response intensities. For each margin, Table 8.1  
 
Table 8.1: Behavioral Response Parameters Implemented in ZEW TaxCoMM 
  Response intensity with respect to 
Debt Policy  Profit Shifting Activity  Marginal Investment  Location Choice 
Legal 
Form 
Choice 
Simulated at 
micro‐level?  Yes  No 
Relevant tax 
rate  STR 1  STR 2  EMTR  STR2  STR 3 
Type of firm  MNE  DO  MNE  DO  MNE  DO  HO  MNE  ALL 
1  2  3  1  2  3 
Response 
Intensity  0.50  0.30 ‐0.64  ‐1.28  ‐4.29 0.00 ‐3.89 ‐2.59 ‐0.50 ‐0.70 0.00 ‐3.17  ‐0.7 
Speed of 
Adjustment  0.17  0.17 1  1  1  ‐  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.50  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
Notes:  
Relevant tax rates are either a “refined dichotomous tax rate” (STR 1), a “combined statutory tax rate” 
(STR 2), the “statutory tax differential between non‐pass‐through and pass‐through entities” (STR 3), or 
the “effective marginal tax rate” (EMTR). 
Type of  firm  is  either  “multinational”  (MNE),  “domestic”  (DO),  “holding”  (HO) or  “all”. Multinational 
firms are classified according to R&D intensity. We categorize into “low R&D intensity (class 1), “moder‐
ate R&D intensity” (class 2) and “high R&D intensity” (class 3). 
Response  Intensity  of  debt  policy  is measured  as marginal  effect.  All  other  response  intensities  are 
measured as semi‐elasticities. 
 
provides details on whether the response is simulated at the micro or the macro level. 
Moreover, it indicates the relevant tax rate capturing the incentives which distort corpo-
rate decision making. Table 8.1 also shows whether response intensities are differentiat-
                                                 
123  Tax effects on the choice of organizational form identified by Elschner (2010) are considerably 
stronger. Her study, however, does not consider the general tax system but refers to very special tax re-
gimes (tonnage taxes). 
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ed with regard to types of firms. All elasticities displayed in the table are distilled from 
quantitative surveys of the relevant literature.  
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9 The EU Proposal for a Harmonized Corporate Tax Base: A Microsimulation 
Analysis for Germany  
9.1 Introduction 
Multinational firms in the EU have to file separate accounts for up to 27 different tax 
regimes. This is not without consequences. Firms run the risk of double taxation if tax-
ing rights conflict and losses cannot be transferred.124 Moreover, in view of the tax rate 
differentials within the EU, some governments see their national tax base erode due to 
cross-border profit shifting.  
Beginning in 2001, the European Commission has pushed for harmonized company 
taxation in the EU.125 In March 2011, a precise draft Council Directive implementing a 
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) was put on the table (European 
Commission, 2011). The CCCTB concept is based on three central elements:  
i. The determination of the tax base according to common harmonized rules.  
ii. A consolidation of cross-border income including loss compensation.
                                                 
124  For a discussion, see Spengel (2008). 
125 In 2001, the European Commission issued comprehensive proposals to harmonize company taxation 
in the EU (European Commission, 2001). 
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iii. The apportionment of the tax base to the member states according to a prede-
fined formula. 
The statutory corporate tax rates remain at the discretion of the member states.  
In this analysis, we evaluate the effects from the introduction of the common tax base 
definition in Germany. Consolidation and apportionment of profits is not part of the 
analysis.  
We think that the effect from the harmonization of tax rules is of central interest. The 
German government has announced its reluctance to implement the CCCT in one single 
swoop (Bundestag Printed Paper 17/5748 of 5 May 2011). Further strong voices are 
expressing skepticism in this regard (e.g. Ireland, the Netherlands, or Sweden). The so-
lution might thus be a two step approach. The first step includes the replacement of the 
27 national tax accounting regulations across EU member states by a single set of har-
monized tax rules. The second step of a CCCTB, consolidation and apportionment of 
the tax base, would be left to the future.126 The predicted effect on Germany from the 
tax base harmonization could thus prove important for the prospect of seeing further 
policy steps being undertaken.  
Our simulation analysis shows that, in the economic environment of the period from 
2005 to 2007, a change from current German tax law to harmonized tax legislation par-
ticularly affects capital-intensive industries such as manufacturing, construction or en-
ergy. Smaller firms, on average, benefit less from the reform. On balance, the German 
tax base definition narrows considerably. Aggregate corporate127  and trade tax revenue 
is simulated to decline by 8.6%. We assume that the German federal government in-
creases the corporate income tax rate to compensate for the first round revenue losses. 
As a result of the simulation, however, we learn that the behavioral responses of firms 
would prevent the reform from being effectively revenue-neutral. By contrast, the com-
pensating increase in the CIT rate induces substantial adjustments at several behavioral 
margins. Considering the short term responses of corporate debt policies, marginal in-
vestment and profit shifting activity, aggregate tax revenue is simulated to decline by 
1.2% relative to the benchmark levels under the current German tax regime. Taking a 
deeper look into the future, the tax revenue would decrease by 1.9%. If we, in addition, 
simulate the responses in the location decisions of multinational firms and also account 
                                                 
126  Germany and France are already moving in this direction by making plans to promote convergence of 
their tax systems. 
127  Incl. the solidarity surcharge. 
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for the reform’s impact on the decision to incorporate, the behavior-induced loss of tax 
revenue collected from the corporate share of business could rise to -7%.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 9.2 briefly summarizes the 
related literature. The microsimulation sample is described in Section 9.3. The main 
changes introduced by the draft proposal on the common definition of the tax base are 
explained in Section 9.4. Section 9.5 presents the microsimulation results which, in a 
first step, abstract from behavioral responses of firms. These first round effects techni-
cally result from the introduction of the CCTB legislation. In Section 9.6, we consider 
the effects arising from behavioral responses triggered by these changes in tax legisla-
tion. Section 9.7 concludes. 
9.2 Related Empirical Literature 
To date, little evidence exists on the efficiency implications or aggregate tax revenue 
effects arising from the harmonization of tax rules. The tax revenue effects from the 
consolidation and apportionment of profits sourced within the EU have instead been 
examined by several pieces of research (Fuest et al., 2007; Devereux and Loretz, 2008; 
Oestreicher and Koch, 2011). A comprehensive evaluation of the welfare implications 
of a CCCTB is put forward by Bettendorf et al. (2010).  
Based on a CGE analysis, Bettendorf et al. (2010) find positive but small aggregate 
welfare gains for the EU. Especially the new member states are shown to benefit from a 
CCCTB at the detriment of other countries, e.g. Germany and France. In a separate 
analysis of the efficiency effects arising only from the tax base harmonization, the study 
reveals a welfare loss amounting to 0.1-0.2% of GDP. With regard to the common tax 
base definition, however, the study only accounts for depreciation of assets.  
Devereux and Loretz (2008), Fuest et al. (2007) and Oestreicher and Koch (2011) es-
timate the potential short term revenue effects of consolidation and formula apportion-
ment under a CCCTB. Devereux and Loretz (2008) resort to financial and ownership 
data from the ORBIS database of Bureau van Dijk and simulate a hypothetical introduc-
tion of consolidation128 and formula apportionment in the period from 2000 through 
2004. They estimate an average reduction in corporate tax revenues of 2.5% for an op-
tional switch to formula apportionment and an increase of 2% for an obligatory switch. 
Country specific effects vary according to the relative endowment with apportionment 
                                                 
128 Consolidation in Devereux and Loretz (2008) is limited to cross-border loss-offset.  
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factors. For Germany, the study reveals revenue losses of about 13% if the CCCTB is 
optional and of about 5% for a compulsory CCCTB.  
According to Fuest et al. (2007), the cross-border loss-offset with formula appor-
tionment reduces the overall tax base in Europe by 20%. The reduction amounts to 17% 
for Germany. This analysis is based on German outward FDI data in the period from 
1996 through 2001 (MiDi database provided by Deutsche Bundesbank).  
With a tax revenue loss of 4.56% caused by a compulsory CCCTB, the results of 
Oestreicher and Koch (2011) lie in between the effects predicted by the two previous 
studies. For Germany, the authors predict a revenue loss of about 9%.  
All three analyses abstract from behavioral responses and the consolidation of intra-
firm profits beyond mere loss-offset. Furthermore, they do not consider the effect of 
switching from national tax base regulation to a common definition of taxable profit. 
The only study isolating the effect from a common tax base definition, irrespective of 
any formula apportionment, is presented by Oestreicher et al. (2009). On the basis of a 
model firm approach (“European Tax Analyzer”), they show that, for most EU coun-
tries, the proposed common tax rules as of 2007 (see European Commission, 2007) 
would imply a broadening of the tax base. This result is mostly attributed to less gener-
ous depreciation rules.  
In short, some of the previous studies focus primarily on efficiency effects, thereby 
only roughly modeling the proposed common tax base regulation (Bettendorf et al., 
2010). Other studies concentrate on the revenue implications of formula apportionment, 
which is conceptually the second step of CCCTB implementation (Devereux and 
Loretz, 2008; Fuest et al., 2007; Oestreicher and Koch, 2011). In those studies, the ef-
fects arising from tax base harmonization are largely ignored. The only study dealing 
with such effects centers on an average model firm without accounting for micro-level 
heterogeneity (Oestreicher et al., 2009).  
Firm-level heterogeneity is, however, relevant in at least two regards. First, predicted 
revenue consequences should reflect that firms featuring tax losses under the national 
and the CCCTB regime do not pay taxes at all. Consequently, they do not affect the 
reform-induced change in tax revenue. Second, the viability of tax base harmonization 
might also depend on how its benefits or disadvantages are distributed across corpora-
tions and how they are related to firm characteristics. Furthermore, apart from the CGE 
analysis put forward by Bettendorf et al. (2010), all previous analyses ignore behavioral 
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responses of firms. Thus, the overall revenue effect of the common tax base is still un-
clear.  
We think that the tax revenue effect of a harmonized corporate tax base is best inves-
tigated on the basis of a microsimulation approach which fully accounts for the presence 
of firm-level heterogeneity. Furthermore, behavioral responses to a change in the tax 
regulation should be considered. Our study considers these important aspects. It thus 
fills in a gap in the literature on tax harmonization in Europe. While the analytical focus 
is put on Germany, the insights obtained from our study go far beyond the German con-
text.  
9.3 The Microsimulation Sample 
Firm-specific financial accounting data used for simulation purposes is taken from the 
DAFNE database, which is provided by Bureau van Dijk. DAFNE contains detailed 
financial information on 900,000 German corporations, including public and private 
companies limited by shares and limited companies, for the years from 1999 to 2010. 
ZEW TaxCoMM requires a balanced firm data panel over three years. The financial 
data is complemented by data from additional sources provided by the Federal Statisti-
cal Office on municipal business tax rates. 
Table 9.1 illustrates the structure of the simulation sample with regard to size and 
economic activity. The employed firm-level data covers the period from 2005 through 
2007. We base our analysis on this time period because the data from years after 2007 
would be considerably affected by the financial crisis. Furthermore, we do not age the 
data to reflect current or even future years because we do not want to blur simulation 
results with forecasting error. Consequently, our analyses and the results will be based 
on the overall economic environment of the years from 2005 to 2007. 
In total, there are 25,626 corporations in our sample. Thus, our simulation is based 
on 76,878 firm-year observations. The sample includes small (34%), medium-sized 
(36%), and large corporations (29%).129 They are active in six different economic sec-
tors. The most important industry by numbers of firms is the manufacturing sector, in 
which 27% of our sample firms operate. The smallest business sector in the sample is 
                                                 
129 Company size is defined according to annual balance sheet totals. Small corporations display an annu-
al balance sheet total of no more than EUR 4,840,000. Corporations are classified as medium-sized if the 
annual balance sheet total ranges between EUR 4,840,000 and EUR 19,250,000. The balance sheet total 
of large corporations exceeds EUR 19,250,000. 
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the health care sector with 918 corporations (3.5%). “Other” economic activities include 
entertainment, education, arts, and recreation. These make up 3.58% of the sample. 
Table 9.1: Number of Companies in the Original Sample Classified According to Econom-
ic Activity and Size 
Economic activity   Small  Medium‐sized  Large  Total 
Mining and Manufacturing  1,551  3,055  2,328  6,934 
Energy and Water Supply  179  306  723  1,208 
Construction  1,135  615  302  2,052 
Trade, Hotels and Restaurants  1,859  2,574  1,199  5,632 
Transportation and Telecommunications  891  840  600  2,331 
Business Services, R&D, Technical Services  2,587  1,307  1,689  5,583 
Health  165  316  487  968 
Other  391  300  227  918 
          
Total  8,758  9,313  7,555  25,626 
Share of companies in size range  34.18%  36.34%  29.48%   
Note: The table shows absolute numbers of corporations extracted from the DAFNE database. Propor‐
tions of company size ranges are displayed  in the bottom row. Company size  is defined according to 
annual balance sheet totals. Small corporations display an annual balance sheet total of no more than 
€ 4,840,000. Corporations are classified as medium‐sized if the annual balance sheet total ranges be‐
tween  €  4,840,000  and  €  19,250,000.  The  balance  sheet  total  of  large  corporations  exceeds  € 
19,250,000. 
To smooth out potential structural biases between our microsimulation sample and 
the population of all corporations in Germany, we extrapolate the results. For this pur-
pose, we adopt the method employed by Deutsche Bundesbank (Deutsche Bundesbank, 
1998) to extrapolate financial accounts data from a sample of German corporations. 
Deutsche Bundesbank resorts to official turnover statistics, whereas we employ the cor-
porate income tax statistic of 2006 provided by the German Federal Statistical Office 
(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2011b)130. The official CIT statistic includes the full popula-
tion of German corporations. For firm clusters defined by gross taxable corporate in-
come and economic activity, we verify whether the number of firms included in our 
samples matches the number of firms indicated in the corporate income tax statistic. 
Sample observations in each activity income cluster are weighted by the reciprocal of 
the proportion of sample observations to population numbers. The weights are deter-
mined annually because firms can switch income classes. For each year, however, the 
sample data is aligned with the total business population as represented by the corporate 
income tax statistic of 2006. Table 9.2 illustrates the structure of the extrapolated sam-
                                                 
130 The Federal Statistical Office has provided us with a special evaluation of the corporate income tax 
statistic. For six industry clusters it contains respectively 14 intervals of negative income and 15 intervals 
of positive income. 
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ple, which by construction matches the population of German corporations. The share 
of large companies is reduced to 5.71%. According to their balance sheet totals, the 
large majority of firms classify as small (77.83%). 16.46% of firms are medium-sized. 
The most important economic activities are business services (44.28%), the hotel and 
restaurant industry (21.74%), and the manufacturing sector (13.44%). The smallest 
business sectors are again the health care industry with a share of 3.45% in the extrapo-
lated sample and the catchall sector “other activities” (1.84%). 
Table 9.2: Number of Companies in the Extrapolated Sample Classified According to 
Economic Activity and Size (3-year average) 
Economic activity  Small  Medium‐sized  Large  Total 
Mining and Manufacturing  75,240  31,137  9,196  115,572 
Energy and Water Supply  4,830  2,186  2,053  9,070 
Construction  77,771  11,308  1,904  90,983 
Trade, Hotels and Restaurants  134,870  44,528  7,467  186,865 
Transportation and Telecommunications  24,695  4,781  1,486  30,961 
Business Services, R&D, Technical Services  326,903  34,391  19,379  380,672 
Health  13,284  10,215  6,180  29,679 
Other  11,479  2,939  1,408  15,826 
    
Total  669,071  141,484  49,073  859,628 
Share of companies in size range  77.83%  16.46%  5.71%   
Note: The table shows absolute numbers of corporations considered by ZEW TaxCoMM after extrapo‐
lation on the basis of the corporate  income tax statistic of 2006. Proportions of company size ranges 
are displayed  in  the bottom  row. Company size  is defined according  to annual balance sheet  totals. 
Small corporations display an annual balance sheet  total of no more than € 4,840,000. Corporations 
are  classified as medium‐sized  if  the annual balance  sheet  total  ranges between € 4,840,000 and € 
19,250,000. The balance sheet total of large corporations exceeds € 19,250,000. 
 
Table 9.3 highlights how the extrapolated sample divides into domestic and multina-
tional firms and how multinational firms differ in the R&D intensity of their businesses. 
This classification is relevant for purposes of our simulation because multinationals’ 
ability to shift profits abroad is assumed to depend on their R&D intensity (for details, 
see Chapter 8).  
To identify multinational firms, we resort to ownership information provided by Bu-
reau van Dijk. A firm is considered multinational if it directly or indirectly owns foreign 
subsidiaries or is itself directly or indirectly foreign owned. The capability of multina-
tional firms to exploit certain leeway in assessing transfer prices may vary depending on 
their R&D intensity and the intra-group allocation of intangible assets (Overesch and 
Schreiber, 2010; Dischinger and Riedel, 2011; Karkinski and Riedel, 2009). 
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Table 9.3: Number of Companies According to Economic Activity, Regional Status and 
R&D Intensity 
Domestic Firms  Multinational Firms 
Economic Activity    R&D 1  R&D 2  R&D 3  Total 
Mining and Manufacturing  111,681  1,883  1,662  346  3,891 
Energy and Water Supply  9,001  69  ‐  ‐  69 
Construction  90,532  451  ‐  ‐  451 
Trade, Hotels and Restaurants  182,481  4,384  ‐  ‐  4,384 
Transportation and Telecommunications  30,323  639  ‐  ‐  639 
Business Services, R&D, Technical Services  371,813  2,854  5,839  166  8,859 
Health  29,563  116  ‐  ‐  116 
Other  15,678  148  ‐  ‐  148 
            
Total  841,072  10,544  7,501  512  18,557 
Share of companies  97.84%  1.23%  0.87%  0.06%  2.16% 
Note: The table shows how the total number of firms splits up  into domestic and multinational firms 
and how multinational firms split up according to R&D intensity. We categorize into “low R&D intensi‐
ty” (class 1), “moderate R&D intensity” (class 2) and “high R&D intensity” (class 3). 
We classify multinational firms into three categories according to whether they are 
active in industries with low, moderate or high R&D intensity (for details, see Section 
8.3 in Chapter 8). Multinationals belonging to those industries with low R&D intensity 
account for 1.23% of all firms and can be found across all economic activities. Firms 
active in moderately R&D intensive industries, e.g., the manufacturing of chemicals, 
optical instruments or firms engaging in business services make up 0.87% of firms be-
long to that category. 0.06% of the firms in our sample are multinational companies 
with high industry-specific R&D intensity. They manufacture, e.g., pharmaceutical 
products and communication equipment, or they engage in research and development 
services.  
9.4 The Draft Council Directive as of March 2011 
In March 2011, the European Commission published a detailed proposal for a Council 
Directive governing the implementation of a CCCTB in the European Union (European 
Commission, 2011). It addresses the scope of application, the definition of harmonized 
tax base, the consolidation mechanism, the apportionment formula, and anti-avoidance 
regulations. According to the focus of this study, we only refer to the common corporate 
tax base definition.  
The following paragraphs discuss the proposed common corporate tax base (CCTB) 
definition item by item and identify differences with respect to the German tax law of 
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2011.131 We explain whether and sketch how the reform changes are considered in the 
simulation model. Table 9.4 provides an overview.  
Please note the fine but important difference between the CCCTB concept which de-
scribes the full concept of a common tax base with consolidation and apportionment 
and, in contrast, the acronym CCTB which is used when referring only to the harmo-
nized tax base definition. 
The draft directive applies to corporations (Art. 2) resident in a member state for tax 
purposes and allows them to opt for the CCCTB regime or for national tax law (Art. 6). 
We consider the common corporate tax base regulations for all firms in our sample be-
cause the German government is strictly opposed to an optional system (Bundestag 
Printed Paper 17/5748 from 5 May 2011). In any case, the EU member states remain 
responsible for setting corporate income tax rates.132  
General Principles for the Determination of Taxable Income 
According to the directive, taxable income is determined as “revenues less exempt rev-
enues, deductible expenses, and other deductible items” (Art. 10). The tax balance 
sheet, in contrast, constitutes the basis for deriving taxable income under German tax 
law. This difference in principles, however, does not necessarily result in different tax 
bases. Whether such difference exists can only be determined by closely looking at the 
precise definition of tax base items defined in the draft directive and according to the 
current German tax law of 2011. 
Under both regimes, the taxable income includes trading income and financial in-
come. The directive stipulates a number of non-deductible expenses, such as profit dis-
tribution, corporate income tax or 50% of entertainment and representation cost and 
fines (Art. 14). These restrictions are very similar to the German practice.  
Depreciation 
The draft directive includes detailed regulations governing depreciation and amortiza-
tion of assets (Art. 32 - Art. 42). The CCTB regulations distinguish between short-
/medium-lived tangible assets and long-lived tangible assets, buildings and intangibles. 
The directive stipulates that long-lived assets, such as buildings and tangibles with a 
                                                 
131  A thorough discussion of the issues raised in this Section is also put forward by Scheffler and Krebs 
(2011). 
132 The 2011 German corporate income tax rate amounts to 15% (+ 5.5% solidarity surcharge). 
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useful life exceeding 15 years, are depreciated on an individual basis according to the 
straight-line method. The corresponding depreciation rates amount to 2.5% for build-
ings and 6.67% for long term tangible assets. Short- and medium-lived tangible assets 
are included in an asset pool which is depreciated at a declining balance rate of 25% 
annually. Purchased intangible assets are to be amortized individually over the period of 
legal protection or 15 years, using the straight line method.  
Under the German tax system of 2011, buildings are depreciated at a linear rate of 
3%. Movable tangible and intangible assets are depreciated according to their useful life 
as stipulated in a depreciation table issued by the Federal Ministry of Finance. With 
effect from January 2011, only straight-line depreciation is allowed.  
For short/medium term assets with a lifetime of more than four years, the CCTB thus 
provides for faster depreciation. Depreciation allowances are higher in early periods of 
useful life. This effect is, however, reversed in later years. The same applies to long-
lived assets. The more their useful life actually exceeds 15 years, the more generous the 
general CCTB depreciation rate of 6.67% for this class of assets. CCTB depreciation of 
buildings is instead slower relative to current German tax law.  
The overall effect of the proposed depreciation rules for each firm depends on the 
relative weight of the different asset classes. Fortunately, we observe the value of each 
asset class (buildings, tangibles and intangibles) in the firms’ balance sheet data. In or-
der to account for the CCTB’s different treatment of short/medium vs. long term assets, 
we resort to the following assumptions. We suppose an average useful life of seven 
years for short- and medium-lived assets and of 18 years for long-lived assets. We 
match this assumption to the industry-specific average useful lives of fixed tangible 
assets identified by Reister (2009) and infer consistent weights of short/medium and 
long-lived assets.  
Provisions 
The draft CCTB directive follows the accruals principle, under which transactions are 
recognized when they occur (Art. 17). Legal or likely legal obligations in respect of 
future payments are deductible if the amount can be reliably estimated and the eventual 
settlement would also result in a deductible expense, e.g. warranty claims.133 Deduc-
                                                 
133 Under German tax law the provisions for contingent losses from pending transactions are disallowed. 
Since from the wording of the draft directive it is not clear whether contingent losses from pending trans-
actions fit the requirements of Art. 25, we do not consider any change to German tax law in this regard. 
However, this issue is not beyond debate (Scheffler and Krebs, 2011). 
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tions should, however, be spread over time if the obligation persists for future years 
(Art. 25). Valuation is to be accomplished on an annual basis and appraisal should re-
flect past experience.  
According to the draft directive, provisions exceeding one year are to be discounted 
at the yearly average of the Europe Inter Bank Offered Rate (EURIBOR) for a maturity 
of 12 months. This rate amounts to 4.45%, 3.44%, and 2.33% for the considered years 
from 2005 to 2007. 
Pension provisions are explicitly governed by the directive (Art. 26). The discount 
rate to be applied is again the 12-month EURIBOR interest rate. The discount rate for 
pension provisions under German tax law instead amounts to 6%. Furthermore, the ac-
tuarial methods used to allocate the expenses for future pension benefits over the quali-
fying period differ between the two tax regimes. We consider these differences with 
regard to the discount rate and the actuarial method in the valuation of pension provi-
sions. 
The actuarial method applied in Germany requires that for each contract, the present 
value of pension entitlements at the beginning of the pension period is split into con-
stant annuities allocated to each year of the qualifying period. According to the CCTB 
directive, in contrast, the share of pension costs that can be allocated to each year of the 
qualifying period is increasing over time. This is due to the fact that the present value of 
pension entitlements at the beginning of the pension period is first divided by number of 
years of the contribution period. Each share of the total present value is then discounted 
according to the number of periods remaining from the total qualifying period. There-
fore in early years of the qualifying period, the allocated pension costs are lower since 
they have been discounted for a longer time. Correspondingly, the allocated pension 
costs are increasing over time.134 Under both regimes, appropriations to pension provi-
sions include the allocated pension costs and the interest on contributions accumulated 
in previous years. 
For each firm and each of the considered periods, we observe the reported value of 
pension provisions, reflecting the current value of current and future obligations as an 
aggregate. We infer from the reported provision values and their change the value of 
new entitlements.135 We then recalculate the present value of these entitlements under 
                                                 
134 This method corresponds to the projected unit credit method (IAS 19).  
135 We assume a total qualifying period of 30 years, thereof remaining on average 15 years. Furthermore, 
we assume a total duration of the pension period of 20 years, thereof remaining on average 10 years.  
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CCTB.136 The lower discount rate under CCTB results in an increase of the value of 
pension provisions, which is assumed to affect taxable income immediately. This effect 
is not compensated by the projected unit credit method applied under CCTB, which 
potentially delays appropriations to pension provisions.  
With regard to provisions for warranty claims, current German tax law stipulates a 
discount rate of 5.5%. We account for the difference to 12-month EURIBOR interest 
rate applied under CCTB. Again, the resulting difference in provision value affects the 
tax base immediately.  
Intra-Group Dividends and Income from Foreign Permanent Establishments 
According to the draft directive, income from major shareholdings is 95% tax ex-
empt.137 Under the current German tax system of 2011, identical regulations apply. The 
dividend income observed in the firm data is therefore deducted from the profit of ordi-
nary activity. The income earned from foreign permanent establishments is exempt un-
der the draft directive and also according to the German double tax treaty policy. Since 
income from foreign permanent establishments is not reported separately in the data, we 
resort to the corporate income tax statistic which reports the share of tax exempt income 
from foreign permanent establishments in total taxable income and the share of compa-
nies concerned (Reister (2009)). 
Deductibility of Interest Expenses  
According to the Commission’s draft directive, interest expenses are generally deducti-
ble.138 Under the German tax system, however, the deduction of net interest expenses is 
limited to 30% of the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA) whereas certain escape clauses exist.139 Non-deductible net interest pay-
ments can be carried forward indefinitely. Unused EBITDA may be carried forward five 
                                                 
136 The entitlement itself is held constant under both regimes.  
137 5% of the income is considered as non-deductible costs (Art. 14). 
138 Anti-abuse regulations apply. According to Art. 81, the deduction of interest expenses is denied in 
case the interest is paid to an associated enterprise resident in a third country where no agreement on the 
exchange of information applies and where the corporate tax rate is lower than 40% of the average statu-
tory corporate tax rate applicable in the member states or a special beneficial system applies. These rules 
are much less tight than current thin-capitalization rules. 
139 Interest expenses can be deducted without limitation if one of the following three conditions is met. 
The total amount of net interest expenses does not exceed EUR 3 million for financial years. The compa-
ny is a stand-alone business that does not belong to a group. The company belongs to a group but its equi-
ty ratio does not fall below the overall equity ratio of the group by more than two percentage points for 
financial years ending after 31 December 2009. 
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years. We account for this difference between CCTB and current German Tax Law in 
the computation of the respective tax base. 
Losses   
Regarding the treatment of losses, the draft CCTB directive allows for an indefinite loss 
carry-forward (Art.43). No loss carry-back is granted. According to the recent tax law 
practice in Germany, in contrast, losses up to EUR 511,500 may be carried back to the 
preceding year if the tax base had been positive in that year. Any excess losses may be 
carried forward. The loss carry-forward is unlimited in time but only the first EUR 1 
million is fully deductible. Any remaining loss may be offset against 60% of the net 
income exceeding this limit.  
ZEW TaxCoMM derives current losses endogenously in the course of the firm-
specific tax assessment. The CCTB denial of a loss carry-back used under current Ger-
man law would increase the tax due in a given period. Unused losses can be carried 
forward and potentially reduce the tax burden in subsequent years. This however pre-
supposes sufficiently high taxable profits in future years (of simulation). In addition, the 
loss-offset is not denied or restricted if substantial changes in the shareholding structure 
take place. The German tax law, in contrast, stipulates such limitations. Consequently, 
under this special condition, the tax burden under CCTB would even be reduced relative 
to the current law.  
Local Business Tax 
According to the CCTB proposal, local business taxes remain under the discretion of 
the member states. The federal basic rate for the German local business tax is 3.5%. It is 
then multiplied by a municipal coefficient varying between 200% and 490%. The tax 
base is, in principle, determined according to the same rules as for income tax purposes 
but some adjustments are required. These adjustments include, for instance, the add-
back of 25% of all interest expenses exceeding EUR 100,000. Since 2008, the local 
business tax is no longer deductible as a business expense. We assume that the German 
local trade tax system, in principle, remains unchanged under the CCTB regime. This 
means that the same adjustments of the CIT base which currently apply for trade tax 
purposes will be applied to the new CIT tax base definition. 
Table 9.4 provides an overview of the regulations that would be affected if the com-
mon tax base definition was introduced in Germany. It marks whether these changes are 
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captured by the simulation model. In addition, it shows expected consequences for 
firms’ tax burden.  
Table 9.4: CCTB Regulations: Their Consideration in ZEW TaxCoMM and Expected 
Effects on the Tax Burden 
CCTB innovations  Considered in ZEW Tax‐CoMM 
Expected effect on the tax 
burden 
Depreciation     
of buildings    ↑ 
of long term tangibles    ↓ 
of short/medium term tangibles    ↓1 
of purchased intangibles    ‐ 
Loss Treatment     
Unlimited loss carry‐forward    ↓ 
No loss carry‐back    ↑2 
No restriction in loss‐trafficking    ↓ 
Provisions     
Provisions from Legal Obligations    ↓ 
Pension Provisions    ↓ 
Interest expenses fully deductible    ↓ 
Dividend Income    ‐ 
Income from permanent establishments    ‐ 
Bad debt receivables    ‐ 
Definition of production cost    (‐) 
Simplified Valuation of Inventories    (↑,‐)3 
Instant deduction of cost for low‐value goods    (↓) 
Long‐term contracts    (↑) 
Financial assets held for trading    (↑) 
Note: The table displays the CCTB regulations for a common definition of the tax base, their consideration in ZEW 
TaxCoMM and the expected impact on the tax burden. (1) The tax burden decreases in the early years captured 
by ZEW TaxCoMM since 25% declining balance induces an earlier consideration of allowances. The effect on the 
tax burden is reversed later on. (2) The denial of loss carry‐back increases the tax burden in the period in which 
the loss carry‐back was originally offset against positive taxable income. Since losses can instead be carried for‐
ward  indefinitely,  they  reduce  the  tax burden  in  those periods  in which  they  can effectively be used.  (3) The 
switch from last‐in‐first‐out or weighted average to first‐in‐first‐out increases the tax burden in times of increas‐
ing prices. The burden remains unchanged if company applies weighted average under both tax regimes. 
As becomes clear from Table 9.4, there are only five aspects which are not modeled. 
First, we are unable to consider reform changes in the threshold for immediate deprecia-
tion of low-value goods. According to the proposed CCTB regulation, assets are imme-
diately written-off if the acquisition costs do not exceed EUR 1,000. Under German tax 
law, the threshold for immediate deduction amounts to EUR 450. Given their immediate 
write-off, low-value items are not reported in the balance sheet. Hence, we are unable to 
consider reform changes in the threshold for immediate depreciation of low-value 
goods. 
Furthermore, reform changes in the simplified valuation of inventories remain un-
considered by the simulation. The CCTB working group proposes the first-in-first-out 
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or weighted average cost methods. German tax law allows the weighted average cost 
method as well as the last-in-first-out method. We cannot model any of the potential 
effects because the consumption of inventories is unobserved in the accounting data. 
There might be no reform impact anyway if companies apply the weighted average 
method under both regimes. With regard to the definition of production costs of stock 
items, these costs would generally comprise all costs of purchase and direct costs in-
curred in bringing the stock item into present location and condition (Art. 29). Indirect 
costs might be included as far as the taxpayer included them in the past. According to 
German tax practice, the costs of stock items include direct costs and also indirect costs 
related to production. Even though we are unable to explicitly model production cost 
because the required information is unobserved, this should not matter for the simula-
tion results.  
Regarding the accrual of revenues relating to long-term contracts exceeding 12 
months (Art. 24), the draft directive proposes the percentage of completion method 
which results in earlier profit realization compared to German tax law. Under German 
tax law, according to the completed-contract method, profit is realized when the project 
is finalized. Our model does not capture this difference. Still, this regulation should only 
affect few industries, e.g. the construction industry.  
Moreover, the valuation of financial assets held for trading differs with respect to a 
risk deduction from the fair value which is necessary under German tax law but not un-
der CCTB.  
Finally, it is important to recognize that the draft directive is still rather unclear as to 
the definition of transitional rules governing the transition from national tax law to the 
new CCTB system (Spengel and Zoellkau, 2012). The following analysis assumes that 
the CCTB rules governing provisions or the depreciation of assets, respectively, apply 
to appropriations or investments made after the date on which the CCTB system has 
entered into force.  
9.5  First Round Results: Ignoring Behavioral Responses of Firms 
We analyze the first round effects in two main steps. First, firm-specific taxes due and 
aggregate short-term tax revenue are computed for the reference tax system of 2011. We 
derive how taxes due and aggregate revenue change if CCTB regulations are intro-
duced. We also calculate the CIT rate required to keep the overall revenue constant. 
Second, in a variation of the CCTB scenario, we suppose that the German federal gov-
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ernment follows a balanced budget rule and immediately adjusts the CIT rate to keep 
the CCTB reform revenue-neutral.140 In the following discussion of first round results 
we consider both variations of the CCTB implementation in Germany.   
Table 9.5 shows the aggregate revenue effect of a non-neutral CCTB introduction re-
placing 2011 tax law in Germany. The underlying firm data and, thus, the reflected eco-
nomic environment is from the period 2005 to 2007. We find that, according to our 
simulation results, the introduction of the proposed CCTB regulation would reduce col-
lected corporate income tax (incl. solidarity surcharge) and trade tax revenue altogether 
by 8.6%. The CIT rate increase required to neutralize this effect amounts to 3.1 percent-
age points. Given the current German CIT rate of 15%, the revenue-neutral CCTB 
would thus require a CIT rate of 18.1%. Please keep in mind that, at this point, behav-
ioral responses to the reform are ignored. 
Table 9.5: Revenue Consequences (in bn €) Induced by the Introduction of a CCTB and 
CIT Rate Required for Balancing the Revenue Deficit (sum over 3 years) 
  Total tax revenue  Absolute Change  Relative Change  CIT Rate 
2011  189.833      15% 
CCTB  173.585  16.248  ‐8.6%  15% 
CIT rate required to keep revenue 
unchanged        18.1% 
Note: The table displays simulated tax revenues in billion EUR for the reference and reform tax systems on the 
basis of the extrapolated sample and corresponding deviation in bn EUR and percent. Tax revenue is calculated 
by aggregation of  firm‐level annual  taxes due  (over 3 years) and  includes corporate  income  tax, solidarity sur‐
charge, and trade tax. The revenue‐neutral corporate income tax rate required to keep the tax revenue stable is 
displayed in the bottom row. Source: ZEW TaxCoMM 
 
The result of declining tax revenue hints at considerable tax base narrowing brought 
about by the CCTB regulation. At first glance, this might seem surprising. In particular, 
the European Commission repeatedly pushed for a rather broad definition of the tax 
base (European Commission, 2011).141 It is important to note that Germany has already 
gone through base broadening reforms in recent years. In the 2008 major business tax 
reform, declining balance depreciation was abolished and interest ceiling rules were 
significantly sharpened. As a consequence, the CCTB with its 25% pool depreciation 
                                                 
140 Analyzing the efficiency effects of a CCCTB introduction, Bettendorf et al. (2009) also assume that 
governments apply a balanced budget rule, thus adjusting the tax rates to compensate revenue changes.  
141 Our results contrast with findings reported by Oestreicher et al. (2009) who find that the CCTB comes 
along with a broadening of German tax base. However, their analysis departs from 2006 German tax law 
and applies an old, now-obsolete CCTB proposal (European Commission, 2007) which has been revised 
with the new version in March 2011. The old proposal included a pool depreciation of only 20% and the 
study itself disregards loss-offset regulations by looking at a profitable firm. Altogether, this explains our 
new and deviating results. 
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for short- and medium-lived assets, the decrease of the discount rate for pension provi-
sions, the unrestricted loss carry-forward and the more generous deductibility of interest 
expenses would rather attenuate the current regulation in Germany and, on balance, nar-
row the tax base.142  
Moreover, it must be kept in mind that the simulation analysis is focused on rather 
short-term revenue effects in the first three years after introducing CCTB regulations. 
The accelerated CCTB depreciation rules applying to some types of newly invested as-
sets come along with a frontload of tax depreciation which is reversed in later years. 
Assessing Heterogeneous Reform Impacts at Firm Level 
While Table 9.5 illustrates the aggregate revenue impact of a CCTB in Germany, the 
degree to which firms are affected depends on their respective economic and financial 
characteristics. Hence, the simulated reform consequences vary between firms. Table 
9.6 displays percentiles of the distribution of the relative change in taxes due across our 
extrapolated simulation sample.  
Table 9.6: Change in Taxes Due at Different Percentiles of the Distribution when Switch-
ing from 2011 to CCTB or CCTB + Adjusted CIT Rate (3-years average) 
Percentile  1%  5%  10%  25%  50%  75%  90%  95%  99% 
Relative change in taxes due in 
% (Introduction of CCTB) 
‐63.1  ‐34.0  ‐28.0  ‐6.1  ‐0.35  0  3.3  23.0  43.1 
Relative change in taxes due in 
% (Introduction of CCTB + CIT 
rate adjustment) 
‐60.5  ‐33.3  ‐22.4  0  4.1  10.3  12.9  34.0  53.6 
Note: This table displays the reform‐induced change  in taxes due  in percent compared to the reference tax re‐
gime of 2011 at different percentiles of  the distribution. The  results are based on  the extrapolated sample.  In 
order to achieve revenue‐neutrality, the tax rate is raised to 18.1% in the CCTB + CIT rate adjustment scenario. 
The tax base definition is the same under both reform scenarios. Changes in taxes due refer to corporate income 
tax, solidarity surcharge, and trade tax. Source: ZEW TaxCoMM 
The percentile values shown in the upper row of Table 9.6 reveal the distribution of 
the relative CCTB impact on taxes due if the German CIT rate is held constant. The 
lower row shows the distribution percentiles if the CCTB is kept revenue-neutral by 
raising the German CIT rate to 18.1%. Under the non-neutral scenario, firms at the third 
quartile are still indifferent between the CCTB and German benchmark tax law. The 
median corporation clearly experiences a decrease in taxes due of 0.35%. For 25% of all 
                                                 
142 Notwithstanding this general tendency, there are some regulations under the draft CCTB directive 
which actually have a broadening effect on the tax base also for Germany. In particular, the CCTB does 
no longer allow for a loss carry-back and employs a slightly stricter depreciation for buildings. For an 
overview of the reform elements and their impact on the tax burden see Table 9.4. 
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corporations, simulated tax payments even go down by more than 6%. However, there 
are also firms which are simulated to lose from the harmonized tax base. At the tails of 
the distribution, we find firms which switch their profit status. Firms with very high 
reductions in taxes due do pay corporate income tax under the current regime but show 
zero taxable profit for CIT purposes, at least in some of the three considered assessment 
years, under the new tax base definition. On the other hand, firms featuring very high 
increases in tax burden often show low investment activity and therefore do not benefit 
from the new depreciation regulation. In addition, these firms are often rather unprofita-
ble and used available loss carry-backs under the 2011 regime.   
A detailed sample split into reform winners and losers is shown in Table 9.7. Figures 
in the upper row of Table 9.7 refer again to the non-neutral CCTB reform while figures 
in the lower row refer to the revenue-neutral CCTB reform.  
Table 9.7: Share of Winners and Losers under CCTB and CCTB + Adjusted CIT Rate 
Reform Scenario  Winner  Loser  Indifferent 
Introduction of CCTB  64%  19%  17% 
Introduction of CCTB + CIT rate 
adjustment   23%  60%  17% 
Note: This table displays the share of companies which are “winner” or “loser” of the respective reform scenario 
or  indifferent between the two systems because they make permanent  losses under both regimes. The results 
are based on the extrapolated sample. In order to achieve revenue‐neutrality, the tax rate is raised to 18.1% in 
the CCTB + CIT rate adjustment scenario. The tax base definition  is the same under both scenarios. Changes  in 
taxes due refer to corporate income tax, solidarity surcharge, and trade tax. Source: ZEW TaxCoMM 
Under the non-neutral CCTB scenario, the share of losing firms in the extrapolated 
sample amounts to 19%. The increase in tax burdens observed for this part of the sam-
ple is predominantly due to the abolishment of the tax loss carry-back available under 
2011 German tax law. Corporations negatively affected by the CCTB indeed turn out to 
have made use of loss carry-backs under the 2011 German tax regime. The carry-back is 
no longer available and, for these losing firms, losses effectively become non-deductible 
because they have insufficient profits available for loss-offset in future simulation peri-
ods.143 Finally, the tax burden is unchanged for companies making permanent tax losses 
under both the 2011 benchmark tax law and the CCTB scenario in all considered simu-
lation periods. These companies make up 17% of all corporations (see Table 9.7). 
Again, in the long term, this share might vary at least slightly. 
                                                 
143A qualification, however, applies with respect to the identification of losing companies. The number of 
losing companies is not independent of the number of simulation periods covered by our model. Profits to 
set losses off against might arise in future periods not included in our three period simulation. The share 
of reform losers can thus be considered as an upper bound which could be undercut in the long term. 
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The discussion of Table 9.6 and Table 9.7 so far relates to a CCTB introduction 
which is non-neutral in terms of aggregate tax revenue. When the corporate tax rate is 
instead assumed to increase from 15% to 18.1% in order to balance the revenue losses 
incurred under a CCTB, results are changing (see the lower rows of Table 9.6 and Table 
9.7). On average, the increase in the corporate income tax rate offsets the tax base re-
ducing impact of the CCTB. At firm level, the impact again varies considerably. For 
23% of corporations, the revenue-neutral CCTB reform is still beneficial in terms of 
assessed taxes due (Table 9.7). For these firms, the tax rate increase only partly out-
weighs the narrowing of the tax base associated with the harmonized rules. According 
to Table 9.6, firms at the third quartile of the distribution of the relative reform impact 
are no longer indifferent, but instead experience a considerable increase of 10.3% in 
taxes due. Even the median corporation is faced with a 4.1% increase of its tax burden if 
the statutory tax rate is adjusted to balance any revenue losses from the tax base reform. 
While firms at the first quartile have their tax burden reduced by 6.1% in case of the 
non-compensated CCTB reform, they are barely indifferent if the government opts for a 
CIT rate increase.  
Relating Heterogeneous Reform Impacts to Firm Characteristics 
The observed between-firm heterogeneity of the CCTB implications raises the question 
of which firm characteristics actually drive the reform impact on the amount of taxes 
due. In other words, which are the characteristics that make firms benefit from the re-
form and which turn them into losers? To shed light on this issue, Figure 9.1 plots the 
reform-induced change in taxes due against the firms’ key financial ratios. Profitability 
is defined as the three-year average ratio of profit of ordinary activity to balance sheet 
total. It captures both the relevance of regulations governing loss-offset and the expo-
sure to a tax rate increase. The firms’ capital structure is captured by the three-year av-
erage of their debt-to-assets ratio. It hints at whether limitations in interest deductibility 
might actually be binding in the reference tax system of 2011. The capital intensity is 
defined as the three-year average ratio of tangible fixed assets to annual balance sheet 
total. The capital intensity reflects the importance of depreciation regulations. The left 
side of Figure 9.1 (plots a.1 to a.4) refers to the non-compensated CCTB scenario 
whereas the right side (plots b.1 to b.4) relates to the revenue-neutral CCTB implemen-
tation. 
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Figure 9.1: Change in Taxes Due (3-years average) Plotted against Key Financial Ratios  
 
Note:  All  percentages  are  expressed  in  decimal  form.  In  the  first  three  rows  of  the  figure,  the  reform‐induced 
change in taxes due under CCTB (left column) and under CCTB with adjusted CIT rate balancing the revenue deficit is 
plotted against key financial ratios. The bottom row shows the reform‐induced change in taxes due for fractions of 
the population. Profitability  is defined as  the 3‐ year average  ratio of profit of ordinary activity  to balance sheet 
total. The firm’s capital structure is captured by the 3‐year average debt‐to‐assets ratio. The capital intensity is given 
by  the 3‐year average  ratio of  tangible  fixed assets  to annual balance  sheet  total. Changes  in  taxes due  refer  to 
corporate income tax, solidarity surcharge, and trade tax. Source: ZEW TaxCoMM 
Figure 9.1, plot a.1 shows that the reform-induced reduction in taxes due is to some 
extent decreasing with profitability under the non-compensated CCTB scenario. The 
relationship is, however, highly nonlinear. The reason for this is clear. In highly profita-
ble firms, receipts exceed expenses by far and any tax base regulation, such as the path 
of tax depreciation allowances, becomes less important. Furthermore, firms reporting 
high profits throughout all simulation periods are not at all affected by the reform 
changes in loss-offset regulation. By contrast, for less profitable firms, more generous 
allowances can have a quite considerable impact on the tax burden. This is especially 
true for the first years following the reform since the declining balance method by defi-
nition yields gradually decreasing allowances for a given asset pool. Moreover, as dis-
cussed above, for less profitable firms the abolition of the tax loss carry-back under 
CCTB might lead to non-deductible tax losses, which thus remain unused for tax pur-
poses. 
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Hence, highly profitable companies tend to experience a very moderate change in tax 
burden. Rather unprofitable firms might significantly benefit from the reform due to tax 
base narrowing. At the same time, however, they can also find themselves among the 
biggest losers if tax losses become effectively non-deductible.  
This latter finding still holds true if we look at the scenario of a revenue-neutral 
CCTB. By contrast, profitable firms now are hit particularly hard by the compensating 
increase in the CIT rate. Plot b.1 in Figure 9.1 shows that firms with high rates of return 
on capital center at far more positive tax burden changes.  
In Figure 9.1, plots a.2 and b.2, the reduction in the tax burden is plotted against the 
debt ratio. No clear relation can be derived since the change in interest deductibility, i.e. 
full deductibility under CCTB in contrast to limited deduction under the German inter-
est deduction ceiling regulation only affects about 1% of firms.  
Figure 9.1, plot a.3, illustrates the partial impact of firms’ capital intensity on how 
they are affected by the harmonized tax base. Capital-intensive firms clearly benefit 
from the introduction of a CCTB. Under the revenue-neutral CCTB (Figure 9.1, plot 
b.3), they can hardly be found on the “losing side”. High capital intensity seems to pre-
vent companies from a substantial increase in taxes due. In the first years after a reform, 
they clearly benefit from the faster depreciation write-offs of newly acquired long-lived 
tangibles and the 25% declining balance pooled depreciation for short-lived tangibles. 
Again, it must be kept in mind that the simulation analysis is focused on rather short-
term revenue effects in the first three years after introducing CCTB regulations. The 
frontload of tax depreciation is reversed in later years.  
The effect from faster depreciation of tangibles is also present under the revenue-
neutral CCTB scenario. Still, the mass of firms now shifts towards higher tax burdens 
because the CIT rate increase outweighs the narrow tax base definition. 
The plots in Figure 9.1 illustrate the entire distribution of combinations of key ratios 
and relative tax burden change. In particular, at the center of each plot, the dots scatter 
very densely. In order to illustrate at which relative reform impact the mass of the dis-
tribution of firms actually centers, we include in Figure 9.1, a4 and b4, two histograms 
which show how firms are distributed along the full range of relative reform impacts. In 
the non-compensated CCTB scenario (histogram a4), the mass of the distribution clear-
ly experiences moderate reductions in taxes due. With the compensating CIT rate in-
crease this mass is shifted to less favorable reform impacts (histogram b4). This again 
reflects the insights gained from Table 9.6. 
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Characterizing Firms along the Distribution of the Relative Tax Burden Change 
For each quartile of the CCTB triggered relative change in tax payments, Figure 9.2 
shows the distribution of the key financial ratios across firms within that specific quar-
tile. Please note that Figure 9.2a refers to the non-neutral CCTB introduction while Fig-
ure 9.2b relates to the revenue-neutral policy scenario.  
The first quartile (Q1) includes the 25% of firms with the highest relative reduction 
in tax payments. The fourth quartile (Q4), includes the 25% of firms with the highest 
relative increase in tax payments. The second and third quartile (Q2 and Q3) partition 
the remaining 50% of firms. 
We employ box plots to depict the differences in profitability, debt ratio, and capital 
intensity between companies falling into different quartiles of the change in tax burden. 
Given the three characteristics we look at and the four groups of companies, the box 
plot is more convenient than histograms. The box plot for profitability is colored in dark 
gray, the plot for capital intensity is medium gray and the one for debt ratio has a light 
gray color. The boxes border at the 25th and 75th percentile of the considered financial 
ratio. The black horizontal lines mark, respectively for each box plot, the median ratio. 
Looking at Figure 9.2a, the conclusions drawn from the analysis of Figure 9.1 are 
corroborated. Companies with the highest reduction in tax burden (Q1) indeed feature a 
relatively low profitability (median 1.9%) and high capital intensity (median 4.3%). 
Companies moderately benefitting from the reform (Q2) are characterized by substan-
tially higher returns on capital (median 5.7%) and lower capital intensity (median 
37.4%). Companies facing zero change or even an increase in taxes due fall into the 
third and fourth quarter (see Table 9.6). They again show a lower profitability and fea-
ture losses throughout all years of simulation or are just too unprofitable to offset those 
losses which were under 2011 German tax law deducted as tax loss carry-backs. Similar 
to Figure 9.1, we find no remarkable differences in the distribution of the debt ratio be-
tween quartiles due to the small number of firms affected by a change in interest deduct-
ibility.  
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Figure 9.2: Distribution of Key Financial Ratios Grouped According to the Quartiles of 
the Reform-Induced Relative Change in Taxes Due (3-years average) 
 
Note: For each quartile of the distribution (Q1‐Q4) of the relative change in taxes due, the box plot displays a box 
bordered at the 25th and 75th percentile of the key financial ratios. A median line indicates the 50th percentile. Adja‐
cent lines mark the lowest/highest observation still lying within 1.5times interquartile range. Changes in taxes due 
refer to corporate  income tax, solidarity surcharge, and trade tax. Key  financial ratios are defined as explained  in 
footnote of Table 9.1. Source: ZEW TaxCoMM 
Turning to the revenue-neutral CCTB reform (Figure 9.2b), the picture changes. 
Companies experiencing zero change or even an increase in taxes burden now show up 
in the second quarter (see Table 9.6). A look at the respective box plots reveals that 
those firms hit particularly hard by the reform (Q3 and Q4) are indeed the ones with 
high returns on capital. The median return on capital in these quarters amounts to 6.3% 
(Q3) and 4.8% (Q4) whereas it reaches only 0.2% in Q1 and 2.7% in Q2. Still, some 
firms benefit from the compensated CCTB reform despite the substantial increase in the 
CIT rate (Q1). They are characterized by high capital intensity (median 45.1%) but rela-
tively low returns on capital (median 0.2%) and a high debt ratio. Thus, they are less 
affected by the increased CIT rate and, at the same time, fully benefit from favorable 
depreciation. 
Reform Implications According to Firm Size and Economic Activity  
Financial ratios represent important dimensions in which corporations differ. Two fur-
ther important firm characteristics are size and economic activity. Figure 9.3 summariz-
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es the reform-induced change in tax payments according to firm size and economic ac-
tivity.  
Figure 9.3: Reform-Induced Changes in Firm-Specific Taxes Due (3-years average) Ac-
cording to Firm Size and Economic Activity 
 
Note: For each class of  firm size and economic activity,  the box plot displays a box bordered at the 25th and 75th 
percentile of  the  reform‐induced change  in  taxes due. A median  line  indicates  the 50th percentile. Adjacent  lines 
mark  the  lowest/highest observation still  lying within 1.5times  interquartile  range. Changes  in  taxes due  refer  to 
corporate  income  tax,  solidarity  surcharge,  and  trade  tax.  Company  size  categories  are  defined  as  explained  in 
footnote 129. Source: ZEW TaxCoMM 
The distribution of the relative change in firms’ tax burden is again represented by 
box plots bordering at the 25th and 75th percentiles. The horizontal lines mark the lowest 
and highest observation still lying within 1.5 times the inter-quartile range. For each box 
plot, the median reform impact is marked by a vertical black line. We choose this form 
of representing the distribution of the reform impact across firms because it again al-
lows us to conveniently illustrate important features of the distribution for a high num-
ber of subpopulations at one glance. The box plots are colored in different shades of 
gray according to the represented type of economic activity. Furthermore, the plots are 
regrouped according to firm size. The plots for large firms are found below those for 
medium and small corporations.144 Figure 9.3a refers to the non-neutral CCTB scenario. 
                                                 
144 Company size is again defined according to annual balance sheet totals (see the definition in footnote 
129). 
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Figure 9.3b relates to the CCTB introduction with compensating CIT rate adjustment. 
Figure 9.3a reveals that for each firm cluster defined by size and economic activity the 
distribution of the reform impact is skewed. The median change marked by the black 
lines is generally small because of a high share of firms experiencing only minor or no 
changes in tax burden independent of firm size and type of business activity (see also 
Table 9.6 and the related discussion). Still, there are important differences between size-
activity clusters. First, the capital-intensive industries, such as manufacturing, construc-
tion, as well as large corporations in the energy and water supply, show the highest re-
form-induced reduction in tax payments after introducing the CCTB. In these industries, 
companies in the second and third quartiles of the impact distribution experience a re-
duction of taxes due of up to 20% (Figure 9.3a). We know from Table 9.6 that the re-
duction is around 6.1% for the corresponding fraction of all corporations. Moreover, 
large companies in the health sector show a relatively high median reduction in taxes 
due. Those companies have a very low average profitability and benefit from the unlim-
ited loss carry-forward. Furthermore, the box plot reaches reductions in tax burden of up 
to almost 25%. Small corporations with economic activity in business services, R&D or 
technical services show hardly any change in taxes due since they feature a high share 
of intangible assets and are, thus, benefitting to a smaller extent from alleviated depreci-
ation.  
We now turn to the revenue-neutral scenario (Figure 9.3b). Across almost all eco-
nomic activities, small firms within the 25th and the 75th percentile of the CCTB-
induced tax burden change are actually confronted with a higher tax burden as com-
pared to the 2011 benchmark law. The median change for small firms is generally posi-
tive whereas it is around zero for medium-sized and large corporations. In almost all 
industries, small companies feature a much lower capital intensity than their medium-
sized or large counterparts (see Table D.1 in Appendix D) and therefore benefit less 
from faster depreciation. Among small corporations, the increase in tax payments is 
especially pronounced for those active in business services, R&D or technical services. 
Comparing the distributions depicted in Figure 9.3a and Figure 9.3b,  it is clear that 
these firms benefitted little from the harmonized tax base. They thus cannot offset any 
important benefits from the new tax base definition against the statutory tax rate in-
crease.  
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An Interim Conclusion on the CCTB’s First Round Implications 
Relative to the German Tax Law of 2011, the proposed CCTB regulation narrows the 
tax base. The associated revenue loss is simulated to amount to 8.6% in the short term, 
based on the economic environment of 2005-2007. We find that, in this case, 64% of 
firms in the sample benefit from the harmonization of the tax base. The revenue loss can 
be immediately compensated by increasing the corporate income tax rate from 15% to 
18.1%. If the tax rate is adjusted, however, the share of “winners” of the compensated 
reform scenario goes down to 23%. 
Both policy scenarios reveal substantial variation of reform consequences at firm 
level. These are mainly driven by the profitability and capital intensity of firms. Capital-
intensive firms benefit to a larger extent from the faster depreciation. Highly profitable 
companies tend to experience a very moderate change in tax burden due to the introduc-
tion of the CCTB regulations. At the same time, these firms are hit particularly hard if 
the corporate income tax rate is increased. 
Comparing the reform implications according to firm size and economic activity, we 
find that small firms benefit to a smaller extent from the introduction of a CCTB. 
Hence, under the revenue-neutral scenario they mostly experience an increase in tax 
burden. Firms in the capital-intensive industries such as manufacturing, construction 
and energy benefit considerably from the introduction of a CCTB. Firms in these indus-
tries therefore still belong to the “winners” of the reform even under the revenue-neutral 
reform scenario. 
9.6  Second Round Results: Accounting for Behavioral Responses of Firms 
The analysis in the previous section ignored that firms react to a change in the tax re-
gime. The ZEW TaxCoMM microsimulation model is able to account for behavioral 
responses at five margins of decision (see Chapters 3 and 8). We will now present re-
sults including the simulation of corporate responses in financing, investment, profit 
shifting, and legal form decisions. The presentation of results will focus on the policy 
scenario of a revenue-neutral CCTB introduction. The scenario was already discussed in 
detail in Section 9.5. We assume that the government acts according to a balanced 
budget rule and adjusts corporate tax rates ex-ante, i.e. before taking into account be-
havioral responses. Our first round results indicated that the common tax base is rather 
narrow as compared to 2011 German tax law. A compensating CIT rate increase must 
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be at the order of 3.1 percentage points. The German CIT rate would thus go up to 
18.1%.  
9.6.1 Assessing Heterogeneous Behavioral Effects at the Firm-Level 
The resulting “base narrowing cum tax rate increase” reform considerably affects the 
size of tax distortions at relevant margins of decision. Tax effects on corporate decisions 
run to an important extent via the statutory tax rate. The statutory tax rate, adjusted for 
the tax deductible fraction of interest, is a good indicator for the marginal tax incentive 
to finance with debt rather than equity. Furthermore, profit shifting is motivated by po-
tential tax savings arising from international statutory tax rate differences. A change in 
the German statutory tax rate ceteris paribus reflects the change in these exploitable tax 
rate differences vis-à-vis foreign locations. The statutory corporate tax rate is also a val-
id proxy for the effective tax burden on profitable investment projects. Finally, for a 
given tax rate on pass-through entities, a change in the statutory tax rate on corporations 
reflects the change in the incentive to incorporate. These distortions are quite uniformly 
affected by the reform because the applicable CIT rate does not vary between firms.  
A Detailed Look at the Investment Response 
When it comes to heterogeneity in the reform tax shock, it is particularly interesting to 
take a closer look at the dynamic capital adjustment process. Relative to the other deci-
sion margins, the tax distortion on investment is much more uneven across firms. The 
effective marginal tax rate (EMTR), which, according to neoclassical theory, captures 
the tax impact on investment decisions at the margin, is mainly determined by the asset 
structure, the respective paths of depreciation allowances, and the sources of financing 
(equity and/or debt) of the marginal investment project. If the marginal investment is to 
a large extent debt financed, the associated interest expense will shield the normal re-
turn from taxation and, thus, considerably reduce the effective tax rate. Current losses or 
tax loss carry-forwards may provide further non-debt tax shields. In order to approxi-
mate the firm-specific tax disincentive to invest at the margin, we compute firm-specific 
EMTRs. For this purpose, we assume that the reported financial and asset structure of 
each firm also applies to the marginal investment project. We consider three types of 
assets: buildings, long-lived movable tangibles, and short-lived movable tangibles.145  
                                                 
145 The cost of capital c is calculated according to standard neoclassical definition in equation (3.11) in 
Chapter 3. Costs of financial distress are, however, ignored. The relevant economic parameters are as 
follows (for an overview see Table D.3 in Appendix D). We set the nominal interest rate at 4.3% accord-
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Figure 9.4 illustrates the reform-induced adjustment of capital levels. For this specif-
ic analysis, we consider domestic corporations and the three types of multinational cor-
porations classified according to their industry’s R&D intensity. 
Figure 9.4: Tax Shock in Terms of EMTR and Related Capital Response for the Three 
Simulation Periods 
 
Note:  This  figure  plots  the  percentage‐change  in  capital  levels  relative  to  benchmark  levels  against  the  reform‐
induced EMTR‐shock. The  lowest  line  in each of  the plots a‐d  shows  the  relationship  for  the  first year after  the 
reform. The two upper lines stand for simulation periods 2 and 3. Source: ZEW TaxCoMM 
For each firm type, Figure 9.4 plots the percentage-change in capital levels relative to 
the respective benchmark levels against the reform-induced EMTR-shock in percentage 
points. In each plot, the dots fall on three distinct lines. Each line stands for one simula-
tion period. Slopes are determined by the long-term semi-elasticity of investment, the 
speed of adjustment toward new capital targets, and the number of years passed since 
the reform. In each plot, the lowest line of dots shows the relationship between the re-
                                                                                                                                               
ing to the average yield on domestic bonds outstanding for the considered years 2005-2007 as published 
by the German Federal Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2011). The average inflation rate for these years 
amounts to 1.8% (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2011a). Thus the real interest rate is 2.5%. Moreover, we 
assume economic depreciation to follow a declining-balance at rates of 3.1% for buildings, 17.5% for 
short-lived tangible fixed assets and 6.3% for long-lived tangible fixed assets. Results for the six types of 
investment (the three types of assets financed by equity or debt) are averaged according to weights re-
ported in the firm’s balance sheet. The EMTR, EMTR , is defined as  EMTR c r c     with r as the real 
interest rate. 
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form impact on capital levels and the firm-specific EMTR change caused by the CCTB 
reform in the first year after the reform. The two upper lines stand for, respectively, 
simulation periods two and three.  
The adjustment process towards new capital targets in the hypothetical CCTB sce-
nario proceeds and reform capital levels move away from respective benchmark levels 
in each year. In other words, the plot illustrates how the reform trajectory of capital lev-
els shifts away from the trajectory of observed capital stocks under the benchmark sce-
nario. 
The four types of firms represented in Figure 9.4 differ with regard to their response 
intensities. The behavioral elasticities implemented into the microsimulation model 
were shown in Table 8.1 in Chapter 8. The literature provides robust evidence that for-
eign direct investment is an essential and highly responsive channel of cross-border cap-
ital flows (see Chapters 5 and 8). Highly R&D intensive multinational affiliates are in a 
good position to shift profits into lower taxing jurisdictions. By contrast, less R&D in-
tensive multinationals have fewer possibilities to avoid high local tax rates. As a result, 
real capital investment of multinationals with low or moderate R&D intensity is the 
most EMTR sensitive. Accordingly, Figure 9.4  shows that for a given change in 
EMTR, the induced change in capital is highest for multinationals with low R&D inten-
sity (MNE 1).  
The overall capital response to reform plotted on the y-axes of the four plots of Fig-
ure 9.4 is, however, not only determined by the behavioral response intensities but, 
equally important, by the firm-specific tax shocks triggering the response. These shocks 
are plotted on the x-axes of the plots in Figure 9.4. 
Table 9.8 illustrates in more detail how the reform-induced change in EMTR is dis-
tributed across the sample of domestic and multinational firms. For 25% of firms, the 
compensated CCTB scenario results in a substantial reduction in EMTR. These firms 
exhibit comparably high debt ratios. Correspondingly, a high share of debt in their mar-
ginal sources of funds shields normal returns from taxation. These firms benefit fully 
from the faster depreciation under CCTB. Multinationals with a moderate R&D intensi-
ty (MNE 2) stand out with comparably small tax shocks. Firms in this cluster show a 
mean debt ratio of 31% compared to 48% for domestic firms or 53% for multinationals 
with low R&D intensity (see Table D.2 in Appendix D).  
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Table 9.8: Change in EMTR (3-years average) at Selected Percentiles of the Distribution 
(%-points) 
Percentile  1%  5%  10%  25%  50%  75%  90%  95%  99%  mean 
Domestic  ‐16.4  ‐11.9  ‐9.5  ‐5.0  ‐0.1  0.0  0.0  0.5  1.4  ‐2.9 
MNE 1  ‐15.1  ‐10.6  ‐9.3  ‐5.0  ‐0.9  0.0  0.0  0.4  1.1  ‐2.9 
MNE 2  ‐9.9  ‐6.1  ‐2.9  ‐0.1  0.0  0.0  0.7  1.3  1.4  ‐0.8 
MNE 3  ‐21.3  ‐7.0  ‐5.5  ‐1.8  0.0  0.0  1.3  1.4  1.5  ‐1.4 
Note: This table displays the change  in EMTR for four types of firms at different percentiles of the distribution. 
Domestic: Domestic Firms. MNE1  (2, 3): Multinational  firms/affiliates active  in  industries with  low  (moderate, 
high) R&D intensity. 
Generally, corporations showing only a moderate EMTR decrease or an EMTR in-
crease under the compensated CCTB scenario are highly profitable and, as a result, fi-
nance large part of their investments with equity. They are thus severely hit by the statu-
tory tax rate increase. The asset composition of the marginal investment project also 
plays a role. In particular, movable tangibles benefit from a 15-year straight-line depre-
ciation under CCTB or, if they are short-lived, from a very fast pooled depreciation. The 
effect on the EMTR can be substantial because the present value of depreciation allow-
ances strongly increases. Actually, faster depreciation combines with higher tax savings 
from each unit of deducted allowance due to the tax rate increase. For 1% of domestic 
firms, the reduction in EMTR exceeds 16.4 percentage points. At the negative end of 
the spectrum, as illustrated in Figure 9.4, the reduction even reaches 40 percentage 
points. These outliers are characterized by a debt ratio close to 100% and mostly rely on 
short-lived tangible assets which are subject to the very fast pooled depreciation.  
The tax shock is zero for holding companies and other firms if these show tax losses 
in at least two out of the three simulation periods under both scenarios (see Chapter 8). 
We assume that the latter firms have sufficient losses or accumulated loss carry-
forwards to offset any return on marginal investment. Therefore, tax shocks were gener-
ally set to zero for this group of companies. On average, 34% of domestic firms and 
36% of multinational firms are loss-making (see Table D.2 in the Appendix) and, thus, 
have no tax incentive to invest. Moreover, holding companies usually do not engage in 
real investment and, hence, do not react to the corresponding tax incentive either. The 
share of holding companies is 3.2% for domestic firms and 9.5% for multinationals (see 
Table D.2 in Appendix D).  
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Impact of Behavioral Response on Tax Base Components: EBIT 
We now analyze the consequences for taxable profit, in absolute terms, arising from the 
behavioral responses to the compensated CCTB reform. Figure 9.4 illustrated the simu-
lated behavioral adjustment using the example of firms’ investment response. Now the 
focus will be on the full set of decision margins modeled at firm level. They all impact 
on earned profit.  
As discussed in the previous chapters, almost all behavioral firm responses simulated 
in ZEW TaxCoMM are expressed in relative terms.146 Accordingly, the main response 
parameters are the so-called semi-elasticties (see, e.g., Table 8.1 in Chapter 8 for an 
overview). They express the percentage-change in the endogenous decision variable in 
response to a one percentage point increase in the relevant tax rate.147  
Considering the investment margin, the absolute gap between a firm’s benchmark 
capital stock and the reform-adjusted target capital level is rising in the benchmark capi-
tal stock to which the relative response applies. So does the required marginal invest-
ment necessary to close it; and, evidently, it is the investment volume which again 
drives the associated absolute EBIT response to reform. The EBIT response to a change 
in the international shifting incentive is equally expressed in relative terms and, thus, 
dependent on benchmark EBIT levels. Capital stock and EBIT vary considerably be-
tween firms (see Table D.1 in Appendix D). 
In particular, very large firms turn out to be important outliers which drive simula-
tion results on reform-induced changes in taxable profit. Importantly, the simulation is 
able to cover the full distribution of firm characteristics and includes it into its micro-
level and aggregate analyses.  
Table 9.9 and Table 9.10 represent the distribution of the partial EBIT change in-
duced, respectively, by the firms’ marginal investment and multinationals’ profit shift-
ing responses. In Table 9.9, we take a separate look at the two fundamental types of 
corporations, i.e. domestic firms and multinationals.148 
Table 9.9 shows that a minority of both domestic and multinational corporations ac-
tually reduces capital levels as well as associated EBIT relative to benchmark levels. 
                                                 
146 The only exemption is the debt policy response where we refer to the absolute marginal tax effect on 
the debt ratio as it is standard in the literature on capital structure choice.  
147 Strictly speaking, the semi-elasticity gives the marginal tax effect on the log of the response variable.   
148 For clarity, we set aside the deeper classification of multinationals according to R&D intensity in this 
and further analyses. Detailed distributions are available upon request. 
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The highest percentile which takes on a negative value, i.e. signifies a decrease in EBIT 
relative to benchmark levels, is the 10th percentile in the case of multinational firms. 
Table 9.9: Change in EBIT (3-years average) Induced by Investment (in EUR) 
Percentile  1%  5%  10%  25%  50%  75%  90%  95%  99%  mean 
Domestic  ‐222  ‐4  0  0  7  162  1,178  2,883  17,402  2,578 
MNE  ‐8,558  ‐515  ‐48  0  38  3,253  21,977  50,776  475,132  74,201 
Note: This table displays the change  in EBIT  induced by  investment  in EUR for domestic and multinational firms 
(MNE) at different percentiles of the distribution.  
The respective EBIT reduction compared to benchmark levels is, however, small and 
amounts to EUR 48 (see Table 9.9, row 2). As discussed with Figure 9.4, firms under-
investing relative to the benchmark actually experience an increase in EMTR. Further-
more, an important number of firms do not react to reform-induced changes in the tax 
distortion on investment. The 10th and 25th percentiles of the EBIT change from the in-
vestment response show a value of zero for domestic firms and the 25th percentile of the 
EBIT change from the capital response shows a value of zero for multinationals. As 
discussed before, these non-responding firms are either loss-making or qualified as 
holding companies and are thus experiencing no tax-induced incentive to invest. The 
absolute returns from induced marginal investment remain quite small up to the median. 
Looking at Table D.1 in the Appendix, we see that the distribution of capital stock 
among German corporations is indeed highly skewed. As a result, this also holds for the 
consequences arising from reform-induced adjustments of capital input shown in Table 
9.9. The important role of relatively few but large corporations with huge amounts of 
invested capital becomes clear if we take a look at the higher percentiles depicted in 
Table 9.9. For domestic firms, the 75th percentile shows a return from reform-induced 
investment of EUR 162. Going further to the right-hand side of the distribution, the per-
centile values increase steeply. Firms at the 99th percentile raise EBIT by EUR 17,402 
by investing relative to the benchmark. This is six times the 95th percentile value and 
even 15 times the 90th percentile value.149 High percentile values for multinationals sky-
rocket even more, going up to an induced EBIT of EUR 475,132 at the 99th percentile. 
The plain average EBIT increase of EUR 2,578 for domestic firms and of EUR 74,201 
for multinationals thus hides substantial variation. Broadly capturing this heterogeneity 
                                                 
149 Evidently, the additional investment brings about consequences for interest payments as soon as they 
are to a certain extent debt-financed. The reform impact on interest expenses is discussed below with 
Table 9.11. 
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prevents the analysis from, arbitrarily, looking at fragments of the distribution of reform 
consequences across firms. Furthermore, it appears that response implications are not 
the same between domestic corporations and firms with multinational affiliation. The 
effects from multinationals’ marginal investment response are much more substantial. 
This is an important size effect revealed by the microsimulation analysis.  
Table 9.10 shows the distribution of the partial change in EBIT caused by reform ad-
justments in multinationals’ profit shifting activities.150 Profit shifting responds to ex-
ploitable international tax rate differences. Our reform scenario assumes the German 
government increases the statutory CIT rate as a compensating fiscal measure. Thus, 
there is clearly an incentive to engage in more profit shifting because, ceteris paribus, 
the tax rate difference between Germany and other foreign locations increases.  
Table 9.10: Reduction in EBIT (3-years average) Induced by Profit Shifting of Multina-
tionals (in EUR) 
%‐tile  1%  5%  10%  25%  50%  75%  90%  95%  99%  mean 
MNE  ‐3,929,903  ‐623,993  ‐221,538  ‐54,198  ‐11,528  ‐1,626  ‐124  ‐41  ‐37  ‐367,295 
Note: This table shows the reduction in EBIT implied by the profit shifting response of multinational firms (MNE). 
Source: ZEW TaxCoMM 
Table 9.10 shows that the absolute amounts of EBIT shifted in response to the CIT 
rate increase are indeed substantial. As the induced EBIT change from shifting activity 
shows a negative sign, the most pronounced behavioral responses are now on the left-
hand side of the distribution. Firms at the 1st percentile shift an additional amount of 
EUR 3,929,903, in terms of EBIT. The 5th and 10th percentile values are respectively 
EUR 623,993 and EUR 221,538. Going further to the right-hand side of the distribution, 
additional shifting effects decline but remain considerable. The median multinational 
affiliate still shifts an additional EUR 11,528 of EBIT towards lower taxing jurisdic-
tions. The 4th quarter of the distribution shows minor values.  
Table 9.10 thus reveals considerable variation across firms although the reform 
shock in the statutory CIT rate (+3.1pp) is the same for all firms. However, some 
sources of heterogeneity remain. In particular, benchmark EBIT to which induced rela-
tive responses apply varies significantly across firms (see Table D.2 in the Appendix). 
In line with the empirical literature, the behavioral response at the profit shifting margin 
is again modeled in relative terms (see equation (3.24) in Chapter 3). The economic 
reasoning is straightforward. Large multinational affiliates with high benchmark EBIT 
                                                 
150 By definition, purely domestic corporations are not able to engage in paper profit shifting. 
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and important intra-group trade can minorly adjust transfer prices and still create a sub-
stantial impact on absolute EBIT. Small firms instead can show an intensive shifting 
response which still does not mean much in absolute terms. 
In addition, our model does not simulate all multinationals to be equally responsive 
to international profit shifting incentives. As discussed earlier, we assume R&D intensi-
ty to be an indicator of the degree of discretion which firms have in setting tax-efficient 
transfer prices. The more a firm is engaged in R&D, the more firm-specific are the as-
sets and the higher is the leeway to set transfer prices for these assets. Implemented re-
sponse intensities are scaled accordingly for multinationals with low, moderate and high 
R&D intensity (see Table 8.1 in Chapter 8). 
Impact of Behavioral Response on Tax Base Components: Interest Expense 
EBIT is affected by two partial responses, investment and profit shifting. Investment is 
also one of the driving responses for the CCTB-induced change in interest expenses. In 
addition, the response in debt policy matters for the reform impact on interest expense. 
In short, the shift in a firm’s interest expense relative to the benchmark scenario reflects 
its response with regard to capital input and capital structure. The debt response is driv-
en by the marginal tax rate on the next unit of interest expense, approximated by the 
statutory tax rate adjusted for the tax-deductible fraction of interest.  
The debt-to-assets ratio of a firm with sufficient non-debt tax shields clearly re-
sponds less to a change in the statutory tax rate. The marginal incentive to finance with 
debt can be zero in this case. Furthermore, the debt response might also be influenced 
by the fact that interest ceiling rules were binding under German 2011 tax law and are 
deductible under CCTB. This concerns about 1% of all corporations. Other sources of 
heterogeneity in the absolute shift in interest expenses are the same as for the invest-
ment response because the shift in capital stock, if to a certain extent debt-financed, also 
determines the shift in interest payments.  
Table 9.11 shows the distribution of the absolute reform impact on firms’ interest 
expenses. We again show percentile values for domestic firms (upper row) and for firms 
with multinational affiliation (lower row). Again, considerable variation between firms 
becomes apparent.  
Up to the median, firms show no shift in interest expense. As discussed with Table 
9.8 and Table 9.9, a considerable share of firms are loss-making and their investment 
and capital structure choices are thus not affected by tax considerations. 
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Table 9.11: Change in Interest Expense (3-years average, in EUR) 
Percentile  1%  5%  10%  25%  50%  75%  90%  95%  99%  mean 
Domestic  0  0  0  0  11  154  972  2,381  13,068  2,017 
MNE  0  0  0  0  83  2,163  13,502  31,585  447,861  36,301 
Note: This  table displays  the change  in  interest expenses due  to capital structure choices and  the  financing of 
marginal investments for domestic and multinational firms.  
Moreover, we know from the discussion of Table 9.8 that those firms which reduce 
capital input relative to the benchmark are primarily financing with equity. Thus, even 
on the left-hand side of the distribution in Table 9.11, we do not see negative values. 
Firms at the higher percentiles, however, show considerable increases in interest ex-
pense relative to the benchmark. These are the firms with high shares of debt in their 
capital structure and with high increases in capital investment. Domestic Firms at the 
99th percentile show increases in interest expenses by EUR 13,068, which is 5.5 times 
the 95th percentile value and more than 13 times the change at the 90th percentile. The 
distribution of multinationals is even more skewed.  
Taking the discussions with respect to the change in EBIT induced by investment 
(Table 9.9) and the change in interest expenses (Table 9.11) into account, it becomes 
obvious that the increase in EBIT is, to a considerable extent, shielded from taxation.  
Impact of Behavioral Response on Firm-Specific Taxes Due 
The assessed behavioral implications for the profit components EBIT and interest ex-
pense evidently have consequences with regard to taxes due. For each firm in each of 
the three simulation periods, the shifts in EBIT and interest expense are included in the 
tax assessment. In particular, after accounting for loss-offset, interest add-backs for lo-
cal trade tax purposes, and integrated fiscal units, the tax base is finally derived. Apply-
ing local trade tax rates and a statutory CIT rate of 18.1% (+ 5.5% solidarity surcharge) 
to the respective tax bases gives the tax due for each firm in each year. 
Similar to the comparison of changes in taxes due over firm and activity clusters with 
regard to first round effects (see Figure 9.3), we look at the second round effects with 
regard to tax payments for these clusters. Figure 9.5 summarizes the reform-induced 
change in tax payments according to firm size, economic activity, and regional status. 
We take the average over the three simulated assessment years.  
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Figure 9.5: Change in Taxes Due (3-years average) for Domestic and Multinational Firms 
(in %) 
 
Note: This figure illustrates how behavioral responses affect the change in taxes due for domestic and multinational 
firms according  to  firm‐size and economic activity. For each activity‐size cluster,  the box plot displays a box bor‐
dered at the 25th and 75th percentile of the change in taxes due. A median line indicates the 50th percentile. Adja‐
cent lines mark the lowest/highest observation still lying within 1.5times interquartile range. Changes in taxes due 
refer to corporate income tax, solidarity surcharge, and trade tax.  
Figure 9.5a shows that the behavioral responses at the investment and debt policy 
margins affect taxes due of domestic firms only to a minor extent. For domestic firms, 
we hardly observe any change in taxes due. Besides the share of loss-making firms, this 
result can be attributed to the fact that in most cases the increase in EBIT induced by 
investment (first row of Table 9.9) is largely compensated by an increase in interest 
expense (first row of Table 9.11). Due to high absolute values of capital and below-
average debt ratios (see Table D.1 in the Appendix), the impact of the behavioral re-
sponse on tax payments is higher for large and medium-sized firms in the energy and 
water supply sector. 
Figure 9.5b shows much stronger relative reform effects on taxes due for multina-
tionals. Clearly, the profit shifting margin comes in for this group of firms. Profit shift-
ing via the route of related-party trade does not only affect marginal returns. Multina-
tionals can effectively circumvent taxation of the economic rents. It is thus clear that 
this response margin has considerable impact on tax payments. Furthermore, our reform 
scenario, which supposes a CCTB introduction with a compensating CIT rate increase, 
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produces a high incentive to engage in more profit shifting. Looking at differences be-
tween industries in Figure 9.5b, we see that sectors including firms with R&D intensive 
business stand out. For 25% of firms in the manufacturing sector, the reduction in tax 
burden even exceeds 5%. A similar magnitude can be observed for medium-sized and 
large firms in the service sector. The outlying value for the health sector can be ex-
plained by huge disinvestments due to an increase in EMTR. However, this concerns 
only a very small number of firms.  
Some insights into long term implications 
The benchmark accounting data on the basis of which taxes were assessed according to 
2011 tax law parameters refers to the period from 2005 to 2007. In Section 9.5, we ap-
plied CCTB regulation – with and without compensating CIT rate increase - to the same 
input data. Thus far, we looked at the implications arising from behavioral responses to 
the CCTB (+ CIT rate adjustment). We accordingly adjusted the firms’ decision varia-
bles (debt ratio, capital stock) and profit components (EBIT, interest expense) in these 
three assessed years of simulation. In short, we took the benchmark input data and add-
ed reform-induced changes.  
Moreover, the behavioral algorithms incorporated into the ZEW TaxCoMM model 
allow us to take a far deeper look into the future beyond the first three periods after in-
troducing the reform.151 We have no benchmark data available for the periods where 
capital input and capital structure adjustment to reform shocks would be complete. Still, 
some intuition as to how far our three-period microsimulation model traces reform con-
sequences can be given. Assuming that under the benchmark scenario, i.e. with no 
CCTB being introduced, economic conditions of the period 2005 to 2007 persist into 
the far future, we take average firm-level accounting data for these years and apply the 
long-term behavioral responses to this data.152 
We again derive the EBIT consequence from full adjustment in capital stocks and the 
consequence with respect to interest expense originating from adjustments in both capi-
tal levels and capital structures. To put the long-run implications into perspective, Fig-
ure 9.6a and Figure 9.6b map the average reform consequence of the simulated first 
three periods and the long-run implication on a horizontal line.  
                                                 
151 The long-term elasticities materialize with after-reform periods t going to infinity. Just take the limit 
of equations (3.19) and (3.23). 
152 This assumption is generally consistent with the logic of the ZEW TaxCoMM model, which abstracts 
from non-tax influences on firm behavior. 
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Figure 9.6: Comparison of Short Term and Long Term Implications from Adjustments in 
Capital Stock and Capital Structure 
 
Note: This figure  illustrates the mean change  in EBIT  induced by  investment and  interest expense respectively for 
the short term and long term perspective. The long term perspective considers the case in which all adjustment is 
complete. 
Since the ZEW TaxCoMM assumes a half-life153 of 3.7 years for debt ratio adjust-
ments of firms, the implications arising from the debt response in the first three years 
after the reform fall considerably short of the long-run implications. This is shown in 
Figure 9.6b. There is an 83%-distance between the average increase in interest expense 
within the first three years after the reform (EUR 2,800; marked with ) and the long-
term increase (EUR 5,100; marked with ). An important part of the interest response 
is determined by the investment response. Looking at Figure 9.6a, the long-term impli-
cation exceeds the short-term simulation results by 47%. The smaller distance between 
short-term and long-term values reflects higher speed of capital adjustment, with a half-
life set to one year. 
The focus will now turn to the aggregate tax revenue consequences arising from the 
behavioral adjustment at the firm-level plus those discrete decision margins modeled at 
the aggregate level, i.e. location choice and choice of legal form.  
                                                 
153 The half-life gives the number of years after which 50% of the gap between actual pre-reform levels 
and reform-adjusted target levels is closed. 
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9.6.2 Tax Revenue Effects with Behavioral Responses 
Table 9.12 recapitulates the revenue consequences of a compensated CCTB reform 
within the three simulated assessment years. The table shows the effect for each step of 
the analysis. In the first three years after the introduction of the common tax base regu-
lation, aggregate corporate income tax, solidarity surcharge, and trade tax revenue col-
lected from German corporations is predicted to drop by 8.6% on average. Based on the 
macroeconomic conditions of the period from 2005 to 2007, total CIT, solidarity sur-
charge, and trade tax revenue would, in sum over these three years, go down from EUR 
189.833 bn to EUR 173.585 bn. Raising the CIT rate by 3.1 percentage points brings the 
aggregate tax revenue up to pre-reform benchmark levels.154 
However, the required adjustment of the corporate tax rate is determined by pure first 
round reform effects. This assumption is generally deemed to realistically describe true 
government behavior (see Bettendorf et. al., 2010). Such a policy, however, neglects the 
revenue consequences arising from the behavioral response of firms.  
Table 9.12 shows that a CCTB reform which would be revenue-neutral from a purely 
static first round perspective is no longer neutral if firms actually respond. In particular, 
the compensating increase of the statutory tax rate triggers behavioral adjustments at 
various corporate decision margins. We simulate short-term responses at the firm-level 
for corporate debt policy, marginal investment decisions, and profit shifting activity. 
Due to these behavioral responses, aggregate revenue of corporate income tax, solidari-
ty surcharge, and trade tax decline by 1.2% relative to the benchmark. In addition, we 
determine the aggregate tax base elasticity in regard to the statutory tax rate implicit in 
our model. It amounts to a value of -0.1 (see Table 9.12). In order to disentangle the 
distinct revenue effects arising from each of the three margins considered at the firm-
level, we compute the changes in each margin separately and hold the distortions at the 
other margins constant (result not shown in Table 9.12). The partial responses of corpo-
rate capital structure policies and profit shifting activity make aggregate tax revenue 
decrease, respectively, by 0.1% and 1.6%. In contrast, the marginal investment response 
makes aggregate tax revenue increase by 0.5%. Clearly, the effects from induced mar-
ginal investment on the one hand and, on the other hand, from profit shifting and the 
debt response partially compensate. 
                                                 
154 As we model a compensating increase in the corporate income tax rate, this revenue-neutral reform 
would imply a redistribution of tax revenue from the local trade tax to the corporate income tax. 
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Table 9.12: Revenue Consequences in bn EUR (sum over 3 years) 
Reform Scenario  Total tax reve‐nue  %‐change 
Aggregate Tax 
Base Elasticity 
Pu
re
 Re
gu
la
‐
tio
n C
ha
ng
e 
 
2011  189.833     
CCTB  173.585  ‐8.6%   
CCTB + adjusted CIT rate  189.833  0%   
Be
ha
vi
or
al
  
Re
sp
on
se
s 
Short 
term 
Debt Policy, Marginal Investment 
Profit Shifting Activity  187.610  ‐1.2%  ‐0.1 
Long 
term 
Debt Policy, Marginal Investment, 
Profit Shifting Activity   186.306  ‐1.9%  ‐0.2 
+ Location Choice, Legal Form Choice   176.583  ‐7.0%  ‐0.6 
Note: This table shows the total tax revenue for different reform scenarios (CCTB; CCTB + adjusted CIT rate) and 
for different stages of behavioral responses. Tax revenue is calculated by aggregation of firm‐level annual taxes 
due (over 3 years) and includes corporate income tax, trade tax, and solidarity surcharge. The percentage change 
is expressed in relation to constant benchmark tax revenue of 2011 German tax law simulated in the economic 
environment of 2005‐2007. The total tax base elasticity is computed with respect to a change in the statutory tax 
rate.  
 
Furthermore, we consider the aggregate revenue implications from the long-term ad-
justments in capital stock and capital structure discussed with Figure 9.6 in the previous 
Section 9.6.1. Before we elaborate on details, we again stress the qualification that we 
have no benchmark data available for the periods where capital input and capital struc-
ture adjustment to reform shocks would be complete. Therefore, we assume that under 
the benchmark scenario, i.e. with no CCTB being introduced, economic conditions of 
the period 2005 to 2007 persist into the future. This allows us to apply the long-term 
behavioral responses to the average firm-level benchmark data observed from 2005 to 
2007.  
With this caveat in mind, we can still see that, according to the simulation results 
shown in Table 9.12, the percentage loss in aggregate revenue of the corporate income 
tax, solidarity surcharge, and trade tax increases to 1.9% of the benchmark revenue. The 
corresponding aggregate tax base elasticity amounts to -0.2. If we add the discrete re-
sponse margins of location choice and choice of legal form, the decline even amounts to 
7% of pre-reform revenue under 2011 German tax law. With these two additional mar-
gins included, the tax base elasticity is, evidently, most pronounced and shows a value 
of -0.6. We also include the response of legal form choice in overall long-term results 
because we want to focus on the response of tax revenue collected from the corporate 
share of business. Still, the revenue effect from shifts between the incorporated and un-
incorporated sector are not completely final from the point of view of the government. 
Only the excess tax payments which make firms actually change their legal form would 
be finally lost. If we leave out the tax margin of legal form choice, the long-term reve-
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nue loss is only simulated to amount to 5.0% with an elasticity of -0.5 (not shown in the 
Table 9.12).  
We now check whether the results obtained from the simulation of behavioral re-
sponses are in line with previous empirical evidence on behavioral tax base elasticities. 
To our knowledge, there are two empirical studies which have estimated the tax base 
elasticity on the basis of firm-level data. For the United States, Gruber and Rauh (2007) 
report an elasticity of taxable corporate income with respect to the effective marginal 
tax rate of -0.2. For Germany, Dwenger and Steiner (2008) document an elasticity of 
about -0.5. Not surprisingly, the short-term elasticity of -0.1 reported in Table 9.12 is 
below the values found by the previous studies. The simulated long-term elasticities, 
however, fall into the range defined by previous evidence. In particular, it is plausible to 
see that the simulated tax base elasticity of -0.2 reflecting rather long-term responses in 
debt policy, marginal investment and profit shifting (Table 9.12) corresponds to the 
results of Gruber and Rauh (2007). Both results ignore the infra-marginal decisions on 
location and organizational form. If we include these choices, our results closely ap-
proach those found by Dwenger and Steiner (2008) who also take infra-marginal deci-
sions into account. We conclude that our simulation results with respect to the implied 
aggregate tax base elasticity and the underlying behavioral response patterns are very 
much in line with the previous evidence on the aggregate elasticity of the tax base.  
9.6.3 Sensitivity Analyses 
We now check the robustness of our simulation results to variations in some of the be-
havioral and economic parameters of ZEW TaxCoMM.  
Variation of the Nominal Interest Rate 
First, we modify the nominal interest rate. In our main simulation analysis the nominal 
interest rate is set to 4.3% (see Table D.3), corresponding to the average of the monthly 
reported yield on domestic industry bonds during the period from 2005 to 2007, as pub-
lished by the German Federal Bank. Instead of the three-year average, we will now refer 
to the 10th and, in a second variation, to the 90th percentile of the reported monthly rates 
during 2005 to 2007. These rates are, respectively, 3.6% and 5.5%.  
Figure 9.7 illustrates the effects of the variation of interest rates. The capital market 
interest rate evidently affects the cost of capital under both the 2011 benchmark tax law 
and the considered CCTB reform scenario. As is clear from Figure 9.7c, the simulated 
shock in the effective marginal tax rate is, on average, more pronounced if we imple-
Chapter 9 The EU Proposal for a Harmonized Corporate Tax Base: A Microsimulation Analysis for Germany 209 
 
 
ment a lower interest rate of 3.6%. By contrast, the high interest rate of 5.5% is associ-
ated with a weaker reform impact on the marginal disincentive to invest.155  
Figure 9.7: Behavioral Response under Alternative Interest Rates 
 
Note: This figure illustrates the impact of a variation in interest rates. The nominal interest rate is 4.3% in our main 
simulation. In the sensitivity analyses we consider interest rates of 3.6% and 5.5%. The figure splits up into parts a‐
d: Part a. illustrates the mean change in capital. The mean change in EBIT is displayed in part b. Part c highlights the 
mean EMTR shock and part d the mean change in interest expense. 
 
This is intuitively plausible because the EMTR measures the share of the marginal 
pre-tax rate of return effectively taxed away by the government. The lower the interest 
rate, the higher the relative importance of the tax-induced wedge between pre-tax and 
after-tax rates of return. Changes in the tax code thus have a strong impact.  
Correspondingly, the induced changes in capital stocks are highest for the lower in-
terest rates. On average, the simulated capital response exceeds the response simulated 
for our standard assumption of a 4.3% interest rare by EUR 22,000. The response in 
case of the high interest rate of 5.5% instead undercuts it by EUR 19,000. Still, the im-
plications for simulated changes in reported EBIT arising from a variation of interest 
rates are almost negligible. This is due to the marginal costs of finance which are, of 
course, strongly affected by the capital market interest rate. ZEW TaxCoMM assumes 
                                                 
155  With the low interest rate, the average change in EMTR amounts to -3.7 percentage-points. The high 
interest rate implies an average change of -2.8 percentage-points. 
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that induced capital investment just earns its marginal costs of finance. As a conse-
quence, the two opposing effects of low/high interest rates leading to strong/weak re-
sponses in capital input, but with low/high rates of return cancel out. Moreover, the 
same reason explains the small effect of a variation in interest rates on simulated inter-
est expenses (Figure 9.7d). ZEW TaxCoMM is run with low/high interest rates, the cap-
ital response is strong/weak but the cost of debt financing and, thus, induced interest 
expense is low/high. Accordingly, the implied tax base elasticity and associated total tax 
revenue effects remains all but unaffected by the variation of ZEW TaxCoMM’s inter-
est rate assumptions.  
Variation of the Speed of Adjustment (Half-Life) of the Capital Response  
In our main simulation analysis, we model capital adjustment to be sluggish due to the 
presence of disruption costs. However, according to findings reported in the empirical 
literature (see, among others, Buettner and Wamser, 2009a), the speed of adjustment is 
assumed to be relatively high, with a half-life of only one year. Thus, ZEW TaxCoMM 
simulates 50% of the reform-induced gap between current and target capital stock to be 
closed already after one year. Implications of a variation of the modeled half-life of cap-
ital accumulation are shown in Figure 9.8. Assuming a half-life of five or eight years156 
implies a considerable descrease in the simulated reform-induced change in capital in-
put. As ZEW TaxCoMM simulates reform consequences for the first three years after 
the CCTB is introduced, capital adjustment is less than 50% completed at the end of the 
simulation. The mean change in capital input across all firms within the first three years 
after reform implementation amounts to EUR 16,500 if the half-life is set to eight years, 
compared to EUR 25,000 for a half-life of five years and, our main result, EUR 81,000 
if half-life is one year (Figure 9.8a). Accordingly, the simulated implications for EBIT 
which arise from the partial investment response are less pronounced if adjustment is 
slow (Figure 9.8b). In the end, the partial EBIT increase from marginal investment is 
less able to offset the important tax base contraction resulting from induced profit shift-
ing activity.  
 
 
                                                 
156  A half-life of capital accumulation of eight years is assumed in the IFOmod model (Radulescu and 
Stimmelmayr, 2005). 
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Figure 9.8: Behavioral Response for Varying Half-life Assumptions with regard to Capital 
Accumulation 
 
Note: This figure illustrates the impact of a variation in the half‐life of capital accumulation. We consider a half‐life 
of one year in our main simulation analysis. The sensitivity analyses assume a half‐life of five years and eight years. 
The figure splits up into parts a and b. Part a shows the change in capital and part b the triggered EBIT response.  
 
The effects of varying adjustment speeds on implied tax base elasticities are indeed 
measureable. If we consider the short-term responses of debt policy, marginal invest-
ment and profit shifting activity, the implied tax base elasticity declines from -0.10 (see 
Table 9.12) to, respectively, -0.14 for a half-life of five years or -0.15 for a half-life of 
eight years. The compensating effect of the marginal investment response is less pro-
nounced. Accordingly, the relative impact on aggregate tax revenue from these margins 
goes from -1.2% to -1.6%. 
We conclude from the sensitivity analyses that our simulation results reflect varia-
tions in assumed nominal interested rates or adjustment speed. While the variation of 
the nominal interest rate, however, has nearly no measureable effect on the simulation 
results, the assumed speed of capital accumulation is somewhat more influential. We do 
not see this as a caveat but consider it a strength of our model. The simulation approach 
is sufficiently sophisticated to capture the effect of these non-trivial economic assump-
tions. As a consequence, like for every output generated by economic models, the role 
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of assumptions should not be forgotten. Nonetheless, the overall results and implica-
tions drawn from the model remain largely unaffected.  
9.7 Conclusion 
By publishing a draft Council Directive for a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax 
Base (CCCTB), the European Commission renewed its ambitions to harmonize compa-
ny taxation in the European Union.  
In this paper, we presented a corporate microsimulation model to perform a coherent 
micro-based analysis of tax reform impacts on aggregate tax revenue and the distribu-
tion of the tax burden across heterogeneous firms. The model allows us to separately 
study the impact of the tax code changes on the tax revenue and, in addition, to consider 
the induced behavioral responses.  
With respect to simulated business behavior, continuous decisions are modeled at the 
level of the firm. In particular, we include tax distortions of corporate financial deci-
sions, marginal investment, and profit shifting behavior into the analysis. The discrete 
choices of location and legal form and their response to tax reform are accounted for at 
the aggregate level.   
Based on the economic environment of the period from 2005 through 2007, we find 
that a switch from 2011 German tax law to the proposed harmonized tax base definition, 
in the short term, reduces aggregate tax revenue of the corporate income tax incl. soli-
darity surcharge, and the trade tax by 8.6%. This is the isolated effect of the change in 
the legal definition of the corporate income tax base. In particular, the EU proposal with 
its 25% pool depreciation for short and medium lived assets, the decrease of the dis-
count rate for pension provisions, the unrestricted loss carry-forward and the more gen-
erous deductibility of interest expenses rather attenuate current German regulations. 
Clearly, our simulation analysis is focused on the short term and covers the first three 
years after the hypothesized reform implementation. As a consequence, the results re-
flect the frontload of tax depreciation allowances under the CCTB regime. This effect 
would, at least partly, be reversed in later years. 
In a variation of the supposed policy scenario, we assume that the German federal 
government follows a balanced budget rule. For this purpose, we calculate the increase 
of the corporate income tax rate required to compensate the 8.6% revenue loss. We find 
that the CIT rate must increase from 15% to 18.1%.  
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We investigate in detail how the consequences of both considered reform variations, 
i.e. the non-compensated and the revenue-neutral scenario, are distributed across firms. 
We find that the reform impacts on firms’ tax burden is indeed highly heterogeneous. 
The increase in the corporate income tax rate under the revenue-neutral scenario is 
clearly detrimental for profitable firms. Capital-intensive firms benefit greatly from ac-
celerated depreciation under the CCTB and thus, even under the revenue-neutral CCTB 
scenario, are hardly found among the reform losers. Moreover, we look at size-activity 
clusters of firms. The analysis shows that capital-intensive industries such as manufac-
turing, construction and energy experience the strongest decrease in tax burden. Small 
firms benefit less and, therefore, experience an increase in the tax burden under the rev-
enue-neutral reform scenario.  
The second stage of the analysis investigates the behavioral responses of firms. We 
focus on the scenario of a compensated CCTB introduction. As a result of the simula-
tion, however, we learn that the behavioral responses of firms would prevent the reform 
from being effectively revenue-neutral. By contrast, the compensating increase in the 
CIT rate induces substantial adjustments at several behavioral margins. Considering the 
short term responses of corporate debt policies, marginal investment and profit shifting 
activity, aggregate tax revenue is simulated to decline by 1.2% relative to the bench-
mark levels under the current German tax regime. Taking a deeper look into the future, 
the tax revenue would decrease by 1.9%. If we, in addition, simulate the responses in 
the location decisions of multinational firms and also account for the reform’s impact on 
the decision to incorporate, the behavior-induced loss of tax revenue collected from the 
corporate share of business could rise to -7%.  
The microsimulation of behavioral responses again reveals considerable variation in 
relative and absolute reform consequences between firms. In particular, the marginal 
investment response depends on the asset and financial structure of firms. Furthermore, 
the role of multinationals is shown to be considerable. In terms of numbers, these firms 
represent only a minor share of the overall business population. However, they generate 
a significant share of the corporate tax base. Furthermore, they dispose of additional 
response margins due to their international affiliation and can employ diverse channels 
to shift profits abroad.  
In each step of the analysis, the benefit of microsimulation becomes apparent. While 
certain isolated reform effects are not surprising, we explicitly consider their interaction, 
account for firm heterogeneity in numerous dimensions, and quantify the implied reve-
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nue consequences. Broadly considering firm heterogeneity prevents us from arbitrarily 
looking at fragments of the real distribution of firm types and characteristics. At the 
same time, the inferred implications from the behavioral response of firms to the new 
tax regime are in line with previous evidence on the aggregate tax base elasticity. The 
simulated behavioral adjustments of firms imply a behavioral tax base elasticity of  -0.1 
in the very short term and, depending on the considered response margins, of -0.2 
to -0.6 in the long-term. 
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Chapter 10 
Summary and Outlook 
10 Summary and Outlook 
The aim of this dissertation was to introduce corporate behavioral responses into a 
corporate tax microsimulation model (ZEW TaxCoMM). The contribution of this dis-
sertation is to have significantly extended the scope of analysis of the microsimulation 
model. The enhanced simulation approach is now able to evaluate tax reform effects 
beyond mere first round implications. Its application can provide valuable insight and a 
better understanding of the aggregate and firm-level consequences of business tax re-
form.  
In the dissertation, the behavioral algorithms of the simulation model are developed, 
parameterized and finally applied. It is structured accordingly. 
After Part I introduced the key issues dealt with in this dissertation, Part II put the 
focus on the incorporation of the behavioral algorithms into the model. Chapter 2 ex-
plained the overall concept of the approach. The main idea is to compare a benchmark 
scenario with one or more counter-factual reform scenarios. Each scenario is defined 
with respect to the tax law in effect. The model can consider modifications made to the 
major taxes levied on corporations in Germany: the corporate income tax incl. solidarity 
surcharge and the local trade tax.  
Chapter 3 developed the behavioral algorithms. Inspired by previous evidence, five 
margins of decision are considered. The model simulates behavioral responses of corpo-
rate debt policy, marginal investment decisions, and profit shifting activity. The long-
term effects of the tax impact on the discrete choices of location and legal form are im-
plemented at the aggregate level. Thus, the number of relevant behavioral margins is 
considerably higher than, for example, in standard household microsimulation models. 
At the same time, these tax margins have never been considered simultaneously in one 
single model framework without taking recourse to some plausible, yet ad-hoc ele-
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ments. With regard to the integration of behavioral responses into the simulation model, 
the challenge was thus to consistently reflect the complete set of the most important 
behavioral tax margins. Moreover, given that the simulation traces reform consequences 
over three simulation periods after the simulated reform shock, the short-term dynamics 
of the behavioral adjustments must be accounted for. Despite these complexities, the 
model was designed in consistency with established microeconomic principles of firm 
behavior. In particular, the representation of financing and marginal investment deci-
sions is in line with what is known from the standard microeconomic optimization prob-
lem of the firm. To model the short-term dynamics of the adjustments in corporate capi-
tal structure and capital accumulation, a partial adjustment model is adopted. In empiri-
cal investigations of capital demand and capital structures, these have proven to well 
describe the dynamic patterns of firm behavior. 
Part III of this dissertation presented three quantitative meta-analyses. A wealth of 
literature investigates the effects of taxes on business behavior. As a consequence, there 
are hundreds of elasticity estimates in the large number of disparate studies. Meta-
analysis can synthesize this evidence and, in particular, offer reasons why it can appear 
strongly varied. The econometric framework of meta-analysis was explained in Chapter 
4. Subsequently, Chapters 5 to 7 sampled and quantitatively evaluated 2,167 primary 
estimates of the tax effects on business behavior.  
Chapter 5 presented a meta-analysis on the relationship between foreign direct in-
vestment and company taxation. The study provided new insights into the implications 
of publication selection, data type and aggregation, treatment of unobserved effects, the 
type of tax data employed as well as the moderating influence of control variables, in 
particular public spending, on the estimated tax rate effects on FDI. The median tax 
semi-elasticity of FDI based on 704 primary estimates is -2.49. The precision weighted 
average of semi-elasticities is -2.55. Meta-regressions show that integrating bilateral tax 
regulations into the effective tax rates used for primary analysis lead to more effective 
measurement of adverse tax incentives on foreign investment. Regarding the control 
variables, it is most interesting that primary estimates are not significantly affected by 
the inclusion of public spending. According to most estimates in the literature, the 
spending side does not moderate the tax rate effects.  
Chapter 6 put forward a meta-study investigating the tax effect on corporate capital 
structure. For this purpose, 1,143 point estimates of the marginal tax effect on the debt 
ratio were sampled out of 46 studies. Synthesizing the evidence by means of meta-
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regression analyses, the tax impact on debt was indeed found to be substantial. The re-
sults of the meta-analysis suggest that very small or even negative tax estimates found 
in a couple of studies do not reflect the true debt response to taxes. By contrast, ac-
counting for all potential misspecification biases, we predict a marginal tax effect on the 
debt ratio of 0.30. The meta-regression results show that the point estimates of tax ef-
fects are, in particular, affected by the tax rate proxy used for identification. There is 
robust evidence that, as compared to statutory tax rates, simulated marginal tax rates are 
associated with significantly higher estimates for the tax coefficient. Average tax rates 
may instead introduce a significant downward bias in primary estimates which is due to 
endogeneity. In general, a careful consideration of the firm-specific tax status raises the 
magnitude of identified tax effects on corporate debt policy.  
Chapter 7 quantitatively reviewed the distinct strands of empirical research dealing 
with multinational profit shifting strategies. The meta-analysis covers 40 studies on cor-
porate profit shifting behavior. Based on the meta-regressions, the semi-elasticity of 
profit with regard to shifting incentives amounts to -1.71. The predicted semi-elasticity 
of EBIT is -1.28. If tax-induced real economic location effects are left unmodeled, the 
tax-responsiveness of pure paper profit shifting is even overestimated by 20%. Further-
more, we find some tentative evidence that the volumes of shifted tax bases are to a 
large extent, i.e. approximately 80%, driven by firms’ inter-company transactions. From 
the point of view of national governments and tax administrations, this finding can have 
important implications. Flexible adjustments of intra-group financial structures, accord-
ing to these findings, seem to be less of a concern than intra-firm trade. Surprisingly, the 
debate on multinational profit shifting and anti-avoidance measures taken by national 
governments have very much centered on the financial strategies. Given our findings, 
there remains doubt as to whether this policy matches with the true proportion, in terms 
of the shifted tax bases, of the two shifting channels.  
Part IV of the dissertation brought together the behavioral algorithms developed in 
Part I and the information on the values of the behavioral response intensities obtained 
from the meta-analyses in Part II of the thesis. The functioning of the model was tested 
and illustrated by applying it to one of the most prevalent topics in corporate tax policy: 
tax harmonization in the European Union. 
Chapter 8 explained how the behavioral algorithms of ZEW TaxCoMM are parame-
terized. Importantly, the parameterization accounts for differences in response intensi-
ties between multinational firms and domestic companies.  
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According to the meta-analysis in Chapter 6, the debt policy of multinationals is 
more responsive to tax incentives than the financial decisions of purely domestic firms. 
This is because subsidiaries of multinational firms can borrow internally from affiliated 
companies. This opens up possibilities to reallocate debt within the multinational and to 
exploit international tax rate differentials in a way that the overall company tax burden 
is reduced. As a result, the effect of taxes on capital structure is increased.  
Furthermore, tax planning opportunities also play a role in the parameterization of 
the investment response. If firms have the discretion to shift profits to lower taxing ju-
risdictions, local host country tax rates become less important for investment decisions. 
Many profit shifting strategies are built around the intra-group transfer of firm-specific 
assets (e.g. patents). These assets provide for higher discretion in setting transfer prices 
because they are not traded on an external market. A natural proxy for the presence of 
firm-specific assets is the multinational’s extent of R&D activity. For the purpose of the 
simulation, multinational firms’ marginal investment response to taxes is therefore ad-
justed according to their industry-specific R&D intensity.   
Finally, Chapter 9 applies the enhanced and fully parameterized simulation model to 
one of the most prevalent topics in corporate tax policy: tax harmonization in the Euro-
pean Union. By publishing a draft Council Directive for a Common Consolidated Cor-
porate Tax Base (CCCTB), the European Commission renewed its ambitions to harmo-
nize company taxation in the European Union. Based on the economic environment of 
the period from 2005 through 2007, we find that a switch from 2011 German tax law to 
the proposed harmonized tax base definition, in the short term and without considering 
the behavioral response of firms, reduces aggregate tax revenue of the corporate income 
tax incl. solidarity surcharge, and the trade tax by 8.6%. This effect is mainly due to a 
massive frontload of tax depreciation allowances. We calculate the increase of the cor-
porate income tax rate required to compensate this revenue loss. We find that the rate 
must increase from its current level of 15% to 18.1%. Plausibly assuming that the Ger-
man government follows a balanced budget rule and adjusts the corporate income tax 
rate, we investigate the behavioral responses of firms to this supposedly revenue-neutral 
reform. The simulation results show that the behavioral responses of firms would pre-
vent the reform from being effectively revenue-neutral. In contrast, considering the 
short term responses of corporate debt policies, marginal investment and profit shifting 
activity, aggregate tax revenue is simulated to decline by 1.2% relative to the bench-
mark levels under the current German tax regime. Taking a deeper look into the future, 
the tax revenue would decrease by 1.9%. If we, in addition, simulate the responses in 
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the location decisions of multinational firms and also account for the reform’s impact on 
the decision to incorporate, the behavior-induced loss of tax revenue collected from the 
corporate share of business could rise to 7%. The simulated behavioral adjustments of 
firms imply a behavioral tax base elasticity of  -0.1 in the very short term and, depend-
ing on the considered response margins, of -0.2 to -0.6 in the long-term. This is fully in 
line with the previous empirical evidence on the aggregate tax base elasticity.  
Underlying the aggregate revenue effects, the microsimulation reveals considerable 
variation in relative and absolute reform consequences between firms. The increase in 
the corporate income tax rate under the revenue-neutral scenario is clearly detrimental 
for profitable firms. For capital-intensive firms in e.g. the manufacturing, construction 
or energy sector, this negative effect is - in the considered short term - compensated by 
accelerated depreciation patterns under the harmonized tax base. Furthermore, the role 
of multinationals is shown to be considerable. In terms of numbers, these firms repre-
sent only a minor share of the overall business population. However, they generate a 
significant share of the corporate tax base. Furthermore, they dispose of additional re-
sponse margins due to their international affiliation and can employ diverse channels to 
shift profits abroad.  
Looking at the disaggregate results, the benefit of microsimulation becomes appar-
ent. While certain isolated reform effects are not surprising, we explicitly consider their 
interaction, account for firm heterogeneity in numerous dimensions, and quantify the 
implied revenue consequences. Broadly considering firm heterogeneity prevents us 
from arbitrarily looking at fragments of the real distribution of firm types and character-
istics.  
Future research should continue in these lines. The presented microsimulation ap-
proach is currently limited to the German context. In principle, its tax assessment algo-
rithms and, of course, the incorporated behavioral responses of firms can be applied to 
other countries. The extension of the geographical coverage of the model must thus be a 
next step. 
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Appendix 
For each of the meta-studies presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, the relevant primary 
studies were thoroughly evaluated. Primary estimates were sampled and transformed 
into a uniformly defined effect size index. The very large majority of primary studies 
report tax coefficients which, depending on the exact econometric specification, either 
represent a marginal effect of the relevant tax incentive on the considered tax-
dependent variable, a semi-elasticity (also called tax-rate elasticity) or a tax elasticity. 
The most frequent interpretations of primary coefficients are given below. We de-
fine DV to be the tax-dependent variable and   as the relevant tax rate measuring the 
considered tax incentive on DV. 
M
DVe 
                       , marginal effect  
ln 1
SEMI
DV DVe
DV 
       , semi-elasticity or tax-rate elasticity  
ln
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DV DVe
DV

 
       , tax elasticity 
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 
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       , elasticity with respect to the user cost of 
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These types of tax coefficients are related to each other in the following way: 
   
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Thus, once we know the required sample means of either DV  and/or  , we can 
transform primary tax coefficients into one common effect size index. The tables in 
Appendices A, B, and C list respectively for the meta-samples of the meta-studies in 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 important characteristics of the sampled primary studies and, in 
addition, state whether a transformation in the respective meta-study’s common effect 
size index was required and, if so, possible based on information from the primary 
studies themselves. 
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A. Appendix to Chapter 5 
Table A.1: Summary Protocoll for the Meta-Study on FDI and Company Taxation 
Study  Type of FDI1 
Data 
Source 
Country Coverage2  Type of data  Sample Year 
Tax rate3 
Estimation  Transformation into semi‐elasticity 
Home 
Country 
Host 
Country 
data struc‐
ture 
level of 
aggregation  first  last  Specification Method
4  required  possible 
Altshuler et al.  
 2001  PPE 
US Tax 
Returns 
(IMF) 
US  58 countries  cross‐section  aggregate 
1984  1984 
ATR  log‐log  OLS/IV  yes  yes 
1992  1992 
Bartik 
 1985  P(loc) 
Schmenner 
(1982)  row  US  panel  micro  1972  1978  STR  non‐linear  Cond. Logit  yes  yes 
Bellak and Leibrecht 
2007  FDI  OECD  7 countries  8 EU  panel  aggregate  1995  2003  FLTR  log‐level  GLS  no  ‐ 
Bellak et al.  
2009  FDI  OECD  7 countries  8 EU  panel  aggregate  1995  2004  FLTR  log‐level  GLS  no  ‐ 
Bénassy‐Quéré et al. 
2005  FDI  OECD  11 OECD  11 OECD  panel  aggregate  1984  2000 
STR, ATR, 
FLTR  log‐level  OLS/IV  no  ‐ 
Bénassy‐Quéré et al. 
2007  PPE  BEA  US  18 EU  panel  aggregate  1994  2003  STR  log‐log  OLS  yes  yes 
Bobonis and Shatz 
2007  PPE  BEA  8 countries  US  panel  aggregate  1977  1999  STR  log‐lin  OLS/IV  no  ‐ 
Boskin and Gale 
1987  FDI  BEA  row  US  time series  aggregate  1956  1984  ATR 
log‐log 
OLS  yes  yes 
level 
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Study  Type of FDI1 
Data 
Source 
Country Coverage2  Type of data  Sample Year 
Tax rate3 
Estimation  Transformation into semi‐elasticity 
Home 
Country 
Host 
Country 
data struc‐
ture 
level of 
aggregation  first  last  Specification Method
4  required  possible 
Broekman and Vliet 
2001  FDI  ‐  row  15 EU  panel  aggregate  1989  1998  ATR  level  OLS  yes  yes 
Buettner 
2002  FDI  EUROSTAT  15 EU  15 EU  panel  aggregate  1991  1998  STR, FLTR  log‐log  OLS, IV, GLS  yes  yes 
Buettner and Wamser 
2009a  PPE  MIDI  GER  22 countries  panel  micro  1996  2004  STR, FLTR  log‐level  OLS, IV  no  ‐ 
Cassou 
1997  FDI  BEA  EU  US 
time series 
aggregate  1970  1989  ATR  log‐log  OLS  yes  yes 
panel 
Demekas et al. 
2007  FDI 
OECD 
24 countries  16 EU  panel  aggregate 
2000  2002 
STR  log‐level  OLS, IV  no  ‐ 
UNCTAD  1995  2003 
Desai et al. 
2004a  PPE  BEA  US  row  panel  micro  1982  1994  ATR  log‐level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Devereux and Freeman 
1995  FDI  EUROSTAT  7 OECD  7 OECD  panel  aggregate  1984  1989  FLTR  level  OLS, IV  yes  yes 
Devereux and  Griffith 
1998  P(loc)  Compustat  US  3 EU  panel  micro  1980  1994  FLTR  non‐linear 
Conditional
Logit  yes  yes 
Devereux and Lockwood 
2006  PPE  BEA  US  19 OECD  panel  aggregate  1983  1998  STR, FLTR  log‐level  IV  no  ‐ 
Egger et al. 
2009b  FDI  UNCTAD  22 OECD  26 OECD  panel  aggregate  1991  2002  FLTR  log‐level  OLS, IV  no  ‐ 
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Study  Type of FDI1 
Data 
Source 
Country Coverage2  Type of data  Sample Year 
Tax rate3 
Estimation  Transformation into semi‐elasticity 
Home 
Country 
Host 
Country 
data struc‐
ture 
level of 
aggregation  first  last  Specification Method
4  required  possible 
Egger et al. 
2009c  FDI  UNCTAD  52 countries  45 countries  panel  aggregate  1991  2004  STR  log‐level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Goodspeed et al. 
2007  FDI  UNCTAD  53 countries  53 countries  panel  aggregate  1984  2002  ATR  log‐level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Gorter and Parikh 
2003  FDI  EUROSTAT  8 EU  8 EU  panel  aggregate  1995  1996  ATR  level  OLS, SUR  yes  yes 
Grubert and Mutti 
1991  PPE  BEA  US  33 countries  cross‐section  aggregate  1982  1982  ATR 
log‐level 
OLS 
no  ‐ 
log‐log  yes  yes 
Grubert and Mutti 
2000  PPE  BEA  US  60 countries  cross‐section  aggregate  1992  1992  ATR  log‐log  OLS  yes  yes 
Hajkova et al. 
2006  FDI  OECD  28 OECD  28 OECD  panel  aggregate  1996  1999  FLTR  log‐level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Hartman 
1984  FDI  BEA  row  US  time series  aggregate  1965  1979  ATR  log‐log  OLS  yes  yes 
Hines 
1996  PPE  BEA  7 OECD  US  cross‐section  aggregate  1987  1987  ATR  level  Tobit  yes  yes 
Hines and Rice 
1994  PPE  BEA  US  73 countries  cross‐section  aggregate  1982  1982  ATR  log‐level  OLS, IV  no  ‐ 
Jun 
1994  FDI  BEA  10 OECD  US  panel  aggregate  1980  1989  ATR  level  OLS  yes  yes 
Murthy 
1989  FDI  BEA  row  US  time series  aggregate  1953  1984  ATR  log‐log  OLS  yes  yes 
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Study  Type of FDI1 
Data 
Source 
Country Coverage2  Type of data  Sample Year 
Tax rate3 
Estimation  Transformation into semi‐elasticity 
Home 
Country 
Host 
Country 
data struc‐
ture 
level of 
aggregation  first  last  Specification Method
4  required  possible 
Mutti and Grubert 
2004  P(loc)  BEA  US  60 countries  cross‐section  micro  1996  1996  ATR  non‐linear  Probit  yes  yes 
Newlon 
1987  FDI  BEA  row  US  time series  aggregate  1956  1984  ATR  log‐log  OLS  yes  yes 
Overesch and Wamser 
2009  NOL  MIDI  GER  30 EU  panel  aggregate  1989  2005  STR, FLTR 
count data 
model  ML  no  ‐ 
Overesch and Wamser 
2010a 
NOL 
MIDI  GER  10 EU  panel 
aggregate 
1996  2005  STR, FLTR 
count data 
model  ML 
no  ‐ 
PPE  micro  log‐level  IV 
Pain and Young 
1996  FDI  ‐  2 EU  OECD  panel  aggregate  1977  1992  STR  log‐level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Papke 
1991  NOL  USEEM  row  US  panel  aggregate  1975  1982  FLTR 
count data 
model  ML  no  ‐ 
Razin et al. 
2005  FDI  OECD  17 OECD  24 OECD  panel  aggregate  1981  1998  STR  log‐log  OLS
5  no  ‐ 
Wei, 1997  FDI  OECD  14 OECD  26 OECD  panel  aggregate  1990  1991  ATR  log‐level  OLS, IV  no  ‐ 
Slemrod 
1990  FDI  BEA  row  US  time series  aggregate  1956  1987  FLTR 
level 
OLS  yes  yes 
log‐log 
Stoewhase 
2005a  FDI  EUROSTAT  3 EU  10 EU  panel  aggregate  1995  1999  ATR, FLTR  level  WLS  yes  yes 
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Study  Type of FDI1 
Data 
Source 
Country Coverage2  Type of data  Sample Year 
Tax rate3 
Estimation  Transformation into semi‐elasticity 
Home 
Country 
Host 
Country 
data struc‐
ture 
level of 
aggregation  first  last  Specification Method
4  required  possible 
Stoewhase 
2005b  NOL  RWI  64 countries  GER  panel  aggregate  1991  1998  STR, ATR 
count data 
model 
(in logs) 
ML  yes  yes 
Swenson 
1994  PPE  BEA  row  US  panel  aggregate  1979  1991  STR, FLTR  log‐log  GLS  yes  yes 
Swenson 
2001a  P(loc)  BEA  46 countries  US  panel  micro  1984  1994  STR  non‐linear 
Conditional
 Logit  yes  yes 
Wijeweera et al. 
2007  FDI  OECD  9 OECD  US  panel  aggregate  1982  2000  STR, FLTR  log‐log  OLS, GLS  yes  yes 
Wolff 
2007  FDI  EUROSTAT  24 EU  24 EU  panel  aggregate  1994  2003  STR  log‐level  OLS
5  no  ‐ 
Young 
1988  FDI  BEA  row  US  time series  aggregate  1956  1984  ATR  log‐log  OLS  yes  yes 
Notes:  
1 Types of FDI: FDI: Foreign direct investment, NOL: Number of locations, P(loc): Probability to locate, PPE: Property, plant and equipment. 
2 EU: European countries, OECD: Member countries of the OECD, row: rest of the world, US: United States.  
3 Estimation Method: GLS: Generalized least squares (i.e. random effects panel estimation), IV: Instrumental variable estimation (i.e. difference or system GMM), ML: Maximum likelihood, OLS: Ordinary least squares, 
WLS: Weighted least squares. 
4 Tax rate: ATR: Average tax rate (backward‐looking), FLTR: Forward‐looking tax rate (e.g. Devereux/Griffith methodology), STR: Statutory tax rate 
5 A two‐stage selection model is used. We only consider the results from the second stage analysis. 
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B. Appendix to Chapter 6 
Table B.1: Summary Protocol for the Meta-Study on Capital Structure Choice and Company Taxation 
Study  Type of debt1  Data Source  Exploited Variation 
Country Coverage2 
Type of 
data4 
Sample 
Year  Tax 
rate5 
Estimation  Transformation into marginal effect 
Parent 
Country3  Country  first  last  Specification  Method
6  required  possible 
Desai et al. 
2004b  Debt – All types  BEA  international  US  row  panel  1982  1994  ATR  level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Aggarwal and Kyaw 
2008  Debt – All types  BEA  international  US  62 coun‐tries  panel  1989  1999  ATR  level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Altshuler and Grubert 
2003  Debt – All types  SOI  international  US  row  cross‐section  1996  1996  STR  level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Antoniou et al. 
2008  Total debt  Datastream  international  ‐  5 OECD  panel  1989  2000  ATR  level  IV  no  ‐ 
Barion et al. 
2010  Total debt  Amadeus  international  ‐  10 EU  panel  2002  2007  STR  level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Bartholdy and Mateus 
2008  Total debt  Amadeus  international  ‐  16 EU  panel  1994  2004 
STR 
level  IV  no  ‐ 
ATR 
Bauer 
2004  Total debt  Prague STXX  national  ‐  Czech Republic 
cross‐
section 
2000  2000 
ATR  level  OLS  no  ‐ 
2001  2001 
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Study  Type of debt1  Data Source  Exploited Variation 
Country Coverage2 
Type of 
data4 
Sample 
Year  Tax 
rate5 
Estimation  Transformation into marginal effect 
Parent 
Country3  Country  first  last  Specification  Method
6  required  possible 
Booth et al. 
2001  Total debt  IFC  international  ‐  Emerging Markets  panel  1980  1990  ATR  level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Buettner et al. 
2009  Debt – All types  MIDI  international  GER  26 OECD  panel  1996  2003  STR  level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Buettner et al. 
2008  Internal debt  MIDI  international  GER  36 OECD  panel  1996  2004  STR  level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Buettner and Wamser 
2009b  Internal debt  MIDI  international  GER  79 coun‐tries  panel  1996  2005  STR  level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Byoun 
2008  Total debt  Compustat  national  ‐  US  panel  1971  2003  STR  level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Charalambakis et al. 
2008  Total debt  Compustat  national  ‐  US  panel  1950  2002  ATR  level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Chen and Strange 
2005  Total debt  ‐  national  ‐  China  cross‐section  2003  2003  STR  level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Cheng and Green 
2008  Total debt  Worldscope  international  ‐  11 EU  panel  1993  2005  ATR  level  IV  no  ‐ 
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Study  Type of debt1  Data Source  Exploited Variation 
Country Coverage2 
Type of 
data4 
Sample 
Year  Tax 
rate5 
Estimation  Transformation into marginal effect 
Parent 
Country3  Country  first  last  Specification  Method
6  required  possible 
De Jong et al., 
2008  Total debt  Global Van‐tage  international  ‐ 
42 coun‐
tries  panel  1997  2001  ATR  level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Dischinger et al. 
2010  Total debt  Amadeus  international  ‐  30 EU  panel  1998  2006  STR  level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Dwenger and Steiner 
2009  Total debt  DESTATIS  national  ‐  GER  panel  1998  2001  ATR  log‐log  OLS/IV  yes  yes 
Faulkender and Petersen 
2006  Total debt  Compustat  national  ‐  US  panel  1986  2000  SIM  level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Gordon and Lee 
2001  Total debt  SOI  national  ‐  US  panel  1954  1995  STR  level  OLS/IV  no  ‐ 
Gordon and Lee 
2007  Total debt  SOI  national  ‐  US  panel  1954  2000  STR  level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Graham 
1999  Total debt  Compustat  national  ‐  US  cross‐section  1999  1999  SIM  level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Graham et al. 
1998  Total debt  Compustat  national  ‐  US  panel  1981  1992  SIM  level  Tobit  yes  yes 
Graham et al. 
2004  Total debt  Compustat  national  ‐  US  cross‐section  2000  2000  SIM  level  Tobit  yes  yes 
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Study  Type of debt1  Data Source  Exploited Variation 
Country Coverage2 
Type of 
data4 
Sample 
Year  Tax 
rate5 
Estimation  Transformation into marginal effect 
Parent 
Country3  Country  first  last  Specification  Method
6  required  possible 
Green and Murinde 
2008  Total debt  Prowess  national  ‐  India  panel  1989  1999  ATR  level  IV  no  ‐ 
Hebous and Weichenrieder 
2010  Debt – All types  MIDI  international  GER  row  panel  1996  2006  STR  level  OLS  no  ‐ 
                           
Homaifar et al. 
1994  Total debt  Compustat  national  ‐  US  panel  1978  1988  ATR  level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Huang and Ritter 
2009  Total debt  Compustat  national  ‐  US  panel  1970  2001  STR  level  OLS/IV  no  ‐ 
Huizinga et al. 
2008  Total debt  Amadeus  international  ‐  32 EU  panel  1994  2003  STR  level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Jog and Tang 
2001  Total debt  Revenue Canada  international 
Canada/ 
US  Canada  panel  1984  1994  STR  level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Kesternich and Schnitzer 
2010  Total debt  MIDI  international  GER  row  panel  1996  2006  STR  level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Klapper and Tzioumis 
2008  Total debt  Amadeus  national  ‐  Croatia  panel  1998  2003  STR  level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Lasfer 
1995  Total debt  Exstat  national  ‐  UK  panel  1972  1983  ATR  level  OLS  no  ‐ 
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Study  Type of debt1  Data Source  Exploited Variation 
Country Coverage2 
Type of 
data4 
Sample 
Year  Tax 
rate5 
Estimation  Transformation into marginal effect 
Parent 
Country3  Country  first  last  Specification  Method
6  required  possible 
Liu and Tian 
2009  Total debt  CSMAR  national  ‐  China  panel  2006  2008  ATR  level  OLS  no  ‐ 
López‐Gracia and Sorgorb‐
Mira, 2008  Total debt  SABI  national  ‐  Spain  panel  1995  2004  ATR  log‐level  IV  yes  yes 
Michaelas et al. 
1999  Total debt  Lotus  national  ‐  UK  panel  1988  1995  ATR  level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Moore and Ruane 
2005  Total debt  Amadeus  international  ‐  16 EU  panel  2000  2003  ATR  level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Mills and Newberry 
2004  Total debt  SOI  international 
16 coun‐
tries  US  panel  1987  1996 
STR 
level  OLS  no  ‐ 
ATR 
Mintz and Weichenrieder 
2010  Debt – all types  MIDI  international  GER 
68 coun‐
tries  panel  1996  2002  STR  level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Oeztekin 
 2009  Total debt 
Global Van‐
tage  national  ‐ 
37 coun‐
tries  panel  1991  2006  ATR  level  IV  no  ‐ 
Overesch and Voeller 
2010  Total dent  Amadeus  international  n/a  23 EU  panel  2000  2005  STR  level  IV  no  ‐ 
Overesch and Wamser 
2010b  Internal debt  MIDI  international  row  GER  panel  1996  2004  STR  level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Pfaffermayr et al. 
2008  Total debt  Amadeus  international  ‐  35 EU 
cross‐
section  1999  2004  STR  level  OLS  no  ‐ 
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Study  Type of debt1  Data Source  Exploited Variation 
Country Coverage2 
Type of 
data4 
Sample 
Year  Tax 
rate5 
Estimation  Transformation into marginal effect 
Parent 
Country3  Country  first  last  Specification  Method
6  required  possible 
Ruf 2010  Total debt  MIDI  international  GER  row  panel  1996  2007  STR  level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Ramb and Weichenrieder 
2005  Debt – all types  MIDI  international 
69 coun‐
tries  GER  panel  1996  2002  STR  level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Shivdasani et al. 
2010  Total debt  Compustat  national  ‐  US  panel  1991  2003  SIM  level  OLS/IV  no  ‐ 
1 “Debt – all types” applies to studies directly or indirectly investigating both internal and total debt (incl. external debt). There are other dimensions of debt type, e.g. maturity and valuation in market and book values. 
For brevity, these are not considered in this summary table. 
2 EU: European countries, OECD: Member countries of the OECD, row: rest of the world, US: United States. 
3 Only applies if multinational firms are considered. Even then parent countries are not always considered/know.  
4 Data is always micro data. 
5 ATR: Average tax rate, SIM: Simulated marginal tax rate, STR: Statutory tax rate. 
6 Estimation Method:  IV: Instrumental variable estimation (i.e. difference or system GMM), OLS: Ordinary least squares. 
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C. Appendix to Chapter 7 
Table C.1: Summary Protocol for the Meta-Study on the Tax-esponsiveness of Profit Shifting Activity 
Study 
Type of depend‐
ent variable  
(shifting indica‐
tor) 
Data 
Source 
Country Coverage1  Type of data  Sample Year  Estimation  Transformation into semi‐elasticity 
Parent 
Country 
Affiliate 
Country 
data 
structure 
level of 
aggregation  first  last  Specification  Method
2  required  possible 
Aggarwal and Kyaw 
2008  Debt  BEA  US 
62 coun‐
tries  panel  aggregate  1989  1999  level  OLS  yes  yes 
Altshuler and Grubert 
2003  Debt  SOI  US  row 
cross‐
section  micro  1996  1996  level  OLS  yes  yes 
Azemar 
2010  Profit  US IRS  US  row  panel  aggregate  1992  2000  log‐level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Barion et al. 
2010  Debt  Amadeus  ‐  10 EU  panel  micro  2002  2007  level  OLS  yes  yes 
Bartelsmannv and Beemtsma 
2003  EBIT
3  STAN  row  16 OECD  panel  aggregate  1979  1997  log‐level  ML  no  ‐ 
Bernard and Weiner 
1990  Price  EIA  US  row  panel  micro  1973  1984  level  WLS  yes  no 
Bernard et al. 
2006  Price  LFTTD  US 
139 coun‐
tries  panel  micro  1993  2000  log‐level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Beuselinck et al. 
2009 
Profit 
Amadeus  ‐  20 EU  panel  micro  1998  2004 
level 
OLS 
yes  no 
EBIT  log‐level  no  ‐ 
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Study 
Type of depend‐
ent variable  
(shifting indica‐
tor) 
Data 
Source 
Country Coverage1  Type of data  Sample Year  Estimation  Transformation into semi‐elasticity 
Parent 
Country 
Affiliate 
Country 
data 
structure 
level of 
aggregation  first  last  Specification  Method
2  required  possible 
Blouin et al. 
2011  Profit  BEA  US  row  panel  micro  1982  2005  log‐level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Buettner and Wamser 
2009b  Debt  MIDI  GER 
79 coun‐
tries  panel  micro  1996  2005  level  OLS  yes  yes 
Buettner et al. 
2008  Debt  MIDI  GER  26 OECD  panel  micro  1996  2004  level  OLS  yes  yes 
Buettner et al. 
2009  Debt  MIDI  GER  36 OECD  panel  micro  1996  2003  level  OLS  yes  yes 
Clausing 
2001 
Intra‐group 
Trade  BEA  US 
58 coun‐
tries  panel  aggregate  1982  1994  level  OLS  yes  yes 
Clausing 
2003  Price  IPP 
US  54 coun‐tries 
panel  micro  1997  1999  log‐log  OLS  yes  yes 
54 coun‐
tries  US 
Clausing 
2006 
Intra‐group 
Trade  BEA  US 
51 coun‐
tries  panel  aggregate  1992  2000 
level 
OLS 
yes  yes 
log‐level  no  ‐ 
Clausing 
2009  Profit  BEA  US  row  panel  aggregate  1982  2004  level  OLS  yes  yes 
Collins et al. 
1998  Profit  Compustat  US  ‐  panel  micro  1984  1992  level  OLS  yes  yes 
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Study 
Type of depend‐
ent variable  
(shifting indica‐
tor) 
Data 
Source 
Country Coverage1  Type of data  Sample Year  Estimation  Transformation into semi‐elasticity 
Parent 
Country 
Affiliate 
Country 
data 
structure 
level of 
aggregation  first  last  Specification  Method
2  required  possible 
Conover and Nichols 
2000  Profit  Compustat  US  row  panel  micro  1982  1990  level  OLS  yes  no 
Desai et al. 
2004b  Debt  BEA  US  row  panel  micro  1982  1994  level  OLS  yes  yes 
Dharmapala and Riedel 
2011  Profit  Amadeus  25 EU  25 EU  panel  micro  1995  2005  log‐level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Dischinger and Riedel 
2011  Profit  Amadeus  25 EU  25 EU  panel  micro  1995  2005  log‐level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Dischinger et al. 
2010  Debt  Amadeus  ‐  30 EU  panel  micro  1998  2006  level  OLS  yes  yes 
Dischinger 
2007  Profit  Amadeus  ‐  24 EU  panel  micro  1995  2005  log‐level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Grubert and Mutti 
1991  Profit    US 
29 coun‐
tries 
cross‐
section  aggregate  1982  1982  level  OLS  yes  no 
Grubert 
1998 
Profit 
US IRS  US  row  cross‐section  micro  1990  1990  level 
OLS  yes  no 
Interest/Royalties  Tobit  yes  no 
Grubert 
2003  Profit  US IRS  US 
60 coun‐
tries 
cross‐
section  aggregate  1996  1996  level  OLS  yes  yes 
Hebous and Weichenrieder 
2009  Debt  MIDI  GER  OECD  panel  micro  1996  2006  level  OLS  yes  yes 
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Study 
Type of depend‐
ent variable  
(shifting indica‐
tor) 
Data 
Source 
Country Coverage1  Type of data  Sample Year  Estimation  Transformation into semi‐elasticity 
Parent 
Country 
Affiliate 
Country 
data 
structure 
level of 
aggregation  first  last  Specification  Method
2  required  possible 
Hines and Rice 
1994  EBIT  BEA  US 
108 coun‐
tries 
cross‐
section  aggregate  1982  1982  log‐level  OLS/IV  no  ‐ 
Hoonsawat 
2007  EBIT
4  ‐  52 coun‐tries 
52 coun‐
tries  panel  aggregate  1978  2002  log‐level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Huizinga and Laeven 
2008  EBIT  Amadeus  25 EU  25 EU 
cross‐
section  micro  1999  1999  log‐level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Huizinga et al. 
2008  Debt  Amadeus  ‐  32 EU  panel  micro  1994  2003  level  OLS  yes  yes 
Maffini and Mokas 
2011  EBIT
5  ORBIS  10 EU  10 EU  panel  micro  1998  2004  log‐level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Markle 
2010  Profit  Orbis  World  World 
cross‐
section  micro  2006  2006  log‐level  OLS  no  ‐ 
McDonald 
2008  EBIT  US IRS  US 
60 coun‐
tries 
cross‐
section  micro 
1996  1996 
level  OLS  yes  yes 2000  2000 
2002  2002 
Mills and Newberry 
2004  Profit  SOI 
16 coun‐
tries  US  panel  micro  1987  1996  level  OLS  yes  yes 
Mintz and Weichenrieder 
2010  Debt  MIDI  GER 
68 coun‐
tries  panel  micro  1996  2002  level  OLS  yes  yes 
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Study 
Type of depend‐
ent variable  
(shifting indica‐
tor) 
Data 
Source 
Country Coverage1  Type of data  Sample Year  Estimation  Transformation into semi‐elasticity 
Parent 
Country 
Affiliate 
Country 
data 
structure 
level of 
aggregation  first  last  Specification  Method
2  required  possible 
Overesch and Schreiber 
2010  Trade  MIDI  GER  row  panel  micro  1996  2005  log‐level  OLS  no  ‐ 
Overesch and Wamser 
2010b  Debt  MIDI  row  GER  panel  micro  1996  2004  level  OLS  yes  yes 
Overesch 
2006  Trade  MIDI  GER 
31 coun‐
tries  panel  micro  1996  2003  log‐level  IV  no  ‐ 
Ramb and Weichenrieder 
2005  Debt  MIDI 
69 coun‐
tries  GER  panel  micro  1996  2002  level  OLS  yes  yes 
Rousslang 
1997  Profit  US IRS  US 
91 coun‐
tries 
cross‐
section  aggregate  1988  1988  level  OLS  yes  yes 
Schwarz 
2009  Profit  BEA  US  row 
cross‐
section  aggregate  1999  2001  level‐log  OLS  yes  yes 
Swenson 
2001b  Price  TSUSA  5 OECD  US  panel  micro  1981  1988  level  GLS  yes  yes 
Weichenrieder 
2009  Profit  MIDI 
row  GER 
panel  micro  1996  2003  level  OLS  yes  yes 
GER  row 
1 EU: European countries, OECD: Member countries of the OECD, row: rest of the world, US: United States.
2 Estimation Method: GLS: Generalized least squares, IV: Instrumental variable estimation (i.e. difference or system GMM), ML: Maximum likelihood, OLS: Ordinary least squares, WLS: Weighted least squares. 
3 Value‐labor‐ratio. 
4 Value added. 
5 Total factor productivity. 
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D. Appendix to Chapter 9 
Table D.1: Key Financial Ratios and Reform-Induced Change in Taxes Due According to Firm Size and Economic Activity 
Firm Size  Economic Activity  Profitability  Debt Ratio  Capital Intensity 
Change in Taxes Due 
under CCTB 
Change in Taxes Due 
under CCTB + CIT adj 
Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
Small 
Mining, Manufacturing  2.8  2.6  60.8  68.1  22.7  15.9  ‐6.0  ‐2.2  0.9  2.0 
Energy, Water Supply  4.6  3.6  48.0  48.2  39.8  36.4  ‐2.2  ‐1.2  6.6  7.2 
Construction  3.2  2.6  67.1  73.7  16.9  11.9  ‐5.0  ‐1.9  2.4  4.3 
Trade, Hotels, Restaurants  5.9  2.1  63.8  73.0  16.7  10.1  ‐3.0  ‐0.5  3.5  3.9 
Transportation, Telecommunication  5.2  3.1  55.0  59.5  22.1  10.4  ‐3.6  ‐0.7  3.2  3.5 
Business Services, R&D, Technical Services  4.4  3.9  30.5  10.8  24.1  13.0  ‐2.3  0.0  5.0  7.9 
Health  ‐0.4  0.5  41.5  36.4  28.5  18.2  ‐4.0  0.0  0.9  0.0 
Other  ‐0.5  2.0  41.5  38.2  27.4  19.8  ‐3.2  ‐0.3  3.6  4.5 
Overall   4.3  3.0  46.3  48.7  20.6  12.5  ‐3.3  ‐0.2  3.8  5.8 
Medium‐
sized 
Mining, Manufacturing  6.2  3.3  57.3  61.4  26.1  21.9  ‐8.9  ‐4.4  ‐2.8  0.0 
Energy, Water Supply  4.5  3.0  55.7  61.9  44.8  54.1  ‐4.6  ‐1.6  1.6  1.7 
Construction  2.3  1.8  65.7  68.7  18.8  11.1  ‐10.4  ‐4.3  ‐4.4  0.0 
Trade, Hotels, Restaurants  2.9  1.9  70.9  77.0  17.1  10.8  ‐6.8  ‐3.2  ‐1.3  0.0 
Transportation, Telecommunication  2.6  1.7  56.5  63.5  32.8  25.2  ‐7.7  ‐1.8  ‐2.0  0.1 
Business Services, R&D, Technical Services  4.5  2.3  51.3  54.4  27.7  11.7  ‐5.5  ‐0.7  0.5  2.7 
Health  1.5  0.6  43.3  35.6  64.3  71.0  ‐8.2  ‐3.5  ‐0.2  0.0 
Other  2.2  1.5  38.0  34.5  37.3  28.5  ‐6.7  ‐1.3  ‐0.7  0.0 
Overall  3.8  1.9  59.3  65.2  26.6  16.7  ‐7.3  ‐2.6  ‐1.3  0.0 
  Mining, Manufacturing  5.7  3.9  47.9  48.0  22.6  17.7  ‐7.6  ‐2.8  ‐2.1  0.0 
  Energy, Water Supply  4.5  3.6  43.1  42.0  59.1  70.2  ‐12.6  ‐4.8  ‐6.3  0.0 
Large  Construction  2.0  0.9  67.4  73.6  26.9  13.7  ‐5.4  ‐3.1  ‐1.8  0.0 
  Trade, Hotels, Restaurants  4.4  2.6  60.0  69.4  12.9  6.5  ‐6.9  ‐1.9  ‐1.7  0.0 
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Firm Size  Economic Activity  Profitability  Debt Ratio  Capital Intensity 
Change in Taxes Due 
under CCTB 
Change in Taxes Due 
under CCTB + CIT adj 
Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
 
 
Large 
Transportation, Telecommunication  2.3  1.3  42.0  38.5  24.5  9.4  ‐5.0  0.0  ‐0.3  0.0 
Business Services, R&D, Technical Services  3.0  1.2  47.2  52.2  42.6  29.9  ‐7.6  ‐0.3  ‐3.3  0.5 
Health  0.6  0.5  32.5  28.6  66.6  71.2  ‐11.8  ‐6.6  ‐4.2  0.0 
Other  1.5  0.2  29.9  24.0  55.2  70.7  ‐5.4  0.0  ‐0.1  0.0 
Overall  3.4  1.3  47.4  48.1  37.3  26.0  ‐8.0  ‐1.4  ‐2.9  0.0 
Overall    4.2  2.6  48.5  52.7  23.2  13.7  ‐4.2  ‐0.35  2.6  4.0 
Source: Data is from the extrapolated DAFNE sample underlying the ZEW TaxCoMM simulation analysis. Data is for 2005 – 2007. 
 
 
 
 
Table D.2: Sample Coverage and Firm Characteristics for Domestic Firms and Multinationals 
  Sample Coverage  Firm Characteristics 
      Share of  Capital (T EUR)  EBIT (T EUR)  Debt Ratio (%) 
Firm Type  Total  %  Loss‐making  Holding  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median 
Domestic  841,072  97.84  34%  3.2%  1,527  16  255  9  48.4  52.7 
MNE 1  10,544  1.23  34%  1.4%  10,376  332  4,750  203  53.4  55.7 
MNE 2  7,501  0.87  41%  20%  7,876  12  6,896  3  31.3  19.2 
MNE 3  512  0.06  25%  0.2%  21,724  718  24,869  854  40.0  43.9 
All MNE  18,557  2.16  36%  9.5%  9,648  140  6,236  137  43.7  43.7 
Source: Data is from the extrapolated DAFNE sample underlying the ZEW TaxCoMM simulation analysis. Data is for 2005 – 2007. 
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Table D.3: Further Economic Parameters Set in ZEW TaxCoMM 
Nominal interest rate  4.3% 
Real interest rate  2.5% 
Inflation Rate  1.8% 
Economic Depreciation Rates   
Buildings  3.1% 
Tangible fixed assets (short‐lived)  17.5% 
Tangible fixed assets (long‐lived)  6.3%  
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